The Gulf Cooperation Council states have exited their reservations in the exposed and open conflict with the Iranian Islamic Republic, as the challenge had to be raised in public following the changes witnessed in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the rise of the Iranian influence in Baghdad - and before that in Lebanon and Palestine - and the infiltration in Syria and Sudan. The discrepancies affecting the foreign policies of some GCC states had to be overcome, after the latter states recently found themselves facing fateful events amid the rift that is affecting the Arab world. Indeed, defensive positions and calm diplomacy are no longer enough while awaiting the outcome of the storm.
In light of the changes witnessed in Egypt - after Tunisia - and what was and is still being witnessed in Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman, the Gulf states were forced to reconsider their policies and strategies. This is done every day by the United States, Europe and all the countries directly linked to the region, vis-à-vis what is happening in it in terms of changes touching the regimes, the national structures and the regional system. This is due to the fact that these changes will have deep repercussions on the entire international system, either by leading to stability or anarchy. For their part, the GCC states firstly turned toward their domestic affairs, as their oil revenues and many other considerations allowed them to resort to a series of measures - some of which were political but most of which were economic and social. This spared them from some of the effects of the storm, at least temporarily, and let them move to the closer, and then to the more distant arenas.
In a second stage, the six states turned toward the protection of their regional bloc which was able to survive four major wars that destroyed the region, from the Iraqi-Iranian war to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Liberation War and finally the war on Iraq. Hence, they are now trying to draw up a strategic separation line in the region between them and Iran. In this context, they did not hesitate to act militarily in Bahrain by using the Peninsula Shield Force, adopted an ambitious plan to provide massive financial aid to Manama and Masqat to help them deal with their economic and developmental problems, and immediately rushed to get the Arab League to provide an Arab cover to Resolution 1973 for Libya. They thus seemed to be compensating for Cairo’s “absence,” and the preoccupation of Damascus, Algiers, Sana’a and others. Moreover, they launched an initiative to find a settlement in Yemen, based on what they referred to as being the “intertwining collective security of the GCC states,” and its protection from the “Iranian conspiracy” that is trying to “spread division and sectarian strife.”
It is clear that through their action, these states are demarcating the border of their national interests and security, just as any state or bloc would do in times of crises or during a cold war. This was done by the United States and Europe following World War II and the eruption of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. It is also being done by China and Russia in the competition with the United States, and what is being done by Turkey and Brazil. The GCC is not proclaiming war on the Islamic Republic and has repeatedly expressed its rejection of the resolution of the Iranian nuclear file by force. Moreover, it definitely does not want to act as the West’s spearhead in any confrontation which will be destructive to all the countries overlooking the Gulf. What it wants is to exit the position of negative neutrality and silence toward the Iranian policies, as though this issue did not concern it or as though it was fearful or weak.
During this foggy stage, the GCC is concerned by the following: On one hand, it wishes to engage in the management of the political and media conflict with Iran, while expressing its willingness to militarily protect its collective security and interests if need be. The dispatch of a force from the Peninsula Shield to Manama stands as proof for this willingness, instead of disregarding or surrendering to additional “depletions” affecting its role in more than one location in the region. On the other hand, it wishes to deter the winds of the interferers, from America to Europe, as the latter want to protect their oil and economic interests, support the states which they perceive as being part of their strategic security and maintain international stability. It also wishes to deter those offering “advice,” arrangements, deals and settlements in order to secure the aforementioned goals.
The GCC countries certainly do not want a nuclear Iran on their eastern border, just as they do not want to let it advance toward positions which they perceive as being their vital space on the political, security and economic levels. For a long time now, they have been watching Tehran presenting itself not only as a major regional state or the biggest state in the region – as it was stated by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he called on the GCC leaders during the Doha summit around two years ago to turn their faces toward the East and head to Tehran – but also as a superpower similar to the United States and Russia among others. This sense of self features a lot of exaggeration. The hope of reaching this position through the building of a massive military arsenal featuring missiles among other weapons, will remain a dream unless it is based on a major economic power – as it is the case in China, India and Brazil – as well as on a scientific power, domestic stability and national unity.
The GCC states recently realized they were not spared from the repercussions of the ongoing cold war between the West and the Islamic Republic, at a time when the “alternative confrontations” on alternative arenas undermined the positions and roles of these states in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. The Gulf states perceive what happened in these three countries as being a “loss,” so as not to say a “defeat” in the face of Tehran which is viewing the situation as being a “victory” in the context of its confrontation of the American and Israeli project solely. A few years ago, this almost reached Yemen, then Bahrain and recently Kuwait as it is stated by the Gulf capitals. Even the crisis affecting the governmental situation in Lebanon is somewhat related to the direction that will be taken by the events in Syria and the extent of their impact on Damascus’ relations with Iran and the GCC states, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Will the “Syrian action” not have repercussions in Beirut as it will in Damascus, based on the concomitance of the two tracks and fates, and consequently on the balance of powers between Iran and the Gulf states?
All these Gulf positions do not discount history and geography. Indeed, Iran is a “Gulf” state in the sense that it is a partner in this sea and what it represents to the world economies, as well as an inherent part of the strategic vital interests, both economically and militarily. Therefore, it cannot be disregarded in the context of the building of a stable and sound “Gulf” security system, while it represents a major human, economic and military strength that cannot be ignored. However, the GCC states believe that these obvious facts do not grant it the right to participate in this system from a position of hegemony, either under the slogan of “exporting the revolution” or under that of protecting the Shiite Muslims in this or that country, or by threatening to use its missile and nuclear military power!
Iran must realize that it cannot dominate its neighbors on the other side of the Gulf, and cannot drag them into its positions, projects and confrontations. Moreover, it cannot simply fill the vacuum left by the preoccupation of most of the Arab countries with their domestic problems or revolutions, and cannot reconstruct the Middle East based on its policies and ambitions as it was and is still being stated by President Ahmadinejad and other officials, without any consideration for the Arab countries or the intertwinement of the regional and international interests in the Gulf and elsewhere. And while the unity of the Gulf position today is not enough to draw up a defense line, Tehran must take Turkey into account, considering that the latter has become part of the balance of powers in the regional system and will not remain idle. Prior to the Arab revolutions, it did not hesitate to interfere in the affairs of Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza. So, how will it stop today? Moreover, there is the “American guardian” of the American interests with its forces, bases and missile shields, knowing that Washington is reiterating every day that “the security of the Gulf in the face of Iran’s threats is a priority.”
Even Egypt was not preoccupied by Tahrir Square to the point of forgetting about the Gulf arena, because it is well aware of the fact that the collective security of the GCC is an inherent part of the overall Arab security that is violated on more than one front and is troubled in more than one arena, from the entire African North, to the Levant and Iraq. In this context, its Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi announced that the “Gulf region represents a key strategic depth for Egyptian national security. It is one of the most important principles of the Egyptian policy which perceives the safety, stability and Arab identity of the Gulf states as being a red line whose violation will not be tolerated by Egypt.”
Iran must remember that the GCC was established following the Islamic Revolution, the emergence of the “exportation of the revolution” slogan and the eruption of the Iraqi-Iranian war. In other words, the six states became aware – early on - of the importance of building a political, military, security and economic bloc that would allow them to uphold their interests and security, expressing this need during crises and developments, the most prominent of which probably being the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. And while the six states rejected Baghdad’s hegemony over the region, they will definitely not allow the Islamic republic to revive the role of the Gulf policeman which Iran enjoyed under the rule of the Shah. Tehran must relinquish the method of hegemony and try to ensure partnership with its neighbors to protect the security of the region, in what would alleviate the burden of the Americans’ and Europeans’ military and non-military interference in its affairs. It is in its own interest to adopt a policy that would reassure its neighbors, from Bahrain to Kuwait, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. Until this day, the GCC states have not yet assimilated the reality of the change in Baghdad, so how can they stand by and watch what is happening in other locations in which their positions are retreating?
The entire Arab security system is eroding, due to anarchy, the winds of division, the civil wars and the threat posed by Al-Qaeda organization and its sisters, which provided justifications to a new Western attack on the region under a thousand and one justifications, and allowed “neighboring states” to fill the vacuum from the source of the Nile and its shores, to those of the Tigris and Euphrates! So, will the Gulf states be able to maintain whatever is left from this system in preparation for its revival?
In light of the changes witnessed in Egypt - after Tunisia - and what was and is still being witnessed in Bahrain, Yemen, Kuwait and the Sultanate of Oman, the Gulf states were forced to reconsider their policies and strategies. This is done every day by the United States, Europe and all the countries directly linked to the region, vis-à-vis what is happening in it in terms of changes touching the regimes, the national structures and the regional system. This is due to the fact that these changes will have deep repercussions on the entire international system, either by leading to stability or anarchy. For their part, the GCC states firstly turned toward their domestic affairs, as their oil revenues and many other considerations allowed them to resort to a series of measures - some of which were political but most of which were economic and social. This spared them from some of the effects of the storm, at least temporarily, and let them move to the closer, and then to the more distant arenas.
In a second stage, the six states turned toward the protection of their regional bloc which was able to survive four major wars that destroyed the region, from the Iraqi-Iranian war to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Liberation War and finally the war on Iraq. Hence, they are now trying to draw up a strategic separation line in the region between them and Iran. In this context, they did not hesitate to act militarily in Bahrain by using the Peninsula Shield Force, adopted an ambitious plan to provide massive financial aid to Manama and Masqat to help them deal with their economic and developmental problems, and immediately rushed to get the Arab League to provide an Arab cover to Resolution 1973 for Libya. They thus seemed to be compensating for Cairo’s “absence,” and the preoccupation of Damascus, Algiers, Sana’a and others. Moreover, they launched an initiative to find a settlement in Yemen, based on what they referred to as being the “intertwining collective security of the GCC states,” and its protection from the “Iranian conspiracy” that is trying to “spread division and sectarian strife.”
It is clear that through their action, these states are demarcating the border of their national interests and security, just as any state or bloc would do in times of crises or during a cold war. This was done by the United States and Europe following World War II and the eruption of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. It is also being done by China and Russia in the competition with the United States, and what is being done by Turkey and Brazil. The GCC is not proclaiming war on the Islamic Republic and has repeatedly expressed its rejection of the resolution of the Iranian nuclear file by force. Moreover, it definitely does not want to act as the West’s spearhead in any confrontation which will be destructive to all the countries overlooking the Gulf. What it wants is to exit the position of negative neutrality and silence toward the Iranian policies, as though this issue did not concern it or as though it was fearful or weak.
During this foggy stage, the GCC is concerned by the following: On one hand, it wishes to engage in the management of the political and media conflict with Iran, while expressing its willingness to militarily protect its collective security and interests if need be. The dispatch of a force from the Peninsula Shield to Manama stands as proof for this willingness, instead of disregarding or surrendering to additional “depletions” affecting its role in more than one location in the region. On the other hand, it wishes to deter the winds of the interferers, from America to Europe, as the latter want to protect their oil and economic interests, support the states which they perceive as being part of their strategic security and maintain international stability. It also wishes to deter those offering “advice,” arrangements, deals and settlements in order to secure the aforementioned goals.
The GCC countries certainly do not want a nuclear Iran on their eastern border, just as they do not want to let it advance toward positions which they perceive as being their vital space on the political, security and economic levels. For a long time now, they have been watching Tehran presenting itself not only as a major regional state or the biggest state in the region – as it was stated by President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad when he called on the GCC leaders during the Doha summit around two years ago to turn their faces toward the East and head to Tehran – but also as a superpower similar to the United States and Russia among others. This sense of self features a lot of exaggeration. The hope of reaching this position through the building of a massive military arsenal featuring missiles among other weapons, will remain a dream unless it is based on a major economic power – as it is the case in China, India and Brazil – as well as on a scientific power, domestic stability and national unity.
The GCC states recently realized they were not spared from the repercussions of the ongoing cold war between the West and the Islamic Republic, at a time when the “alternative confrontations” on alternative arenas undermined the positions and roles of these states in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. The Gulf states perceive what happened in these three countries as being a “loss,” so as not to say a “defeat” in the face of Tehran which is viewing the situation as being a “victory” in the context of its confrontation of the American and Israeli project solely. A few years ago, this almost reached Yemen, then Bahrain and recently Kuwait as it is stated by the Gulf capitals. Even the crisis affecting the governmental situation in Lebanon is somewhat related to the direction that will be taken by the events in Syria and the extent of their impact on Damascus’ relations with Iran and the GCC states, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Will the “Syrian action” not have repercussions in Beirut as it will in Damascus, based on the concomitance of the two tracks and fates, and consequently on the balance of powers between Iran and the Gulf states?
All these Gulf positions do not discount history and geography. Indeed, Iran is a “Gulf” state in the sense that it is a partner in this sea and what it represents to the world economies, as well as an inherent part of the strategic vital interests, both economically and militarily. Therefore, it cannot be disregarded in the context of the building of a stable and sound “Gulf” security system, while it represents a major human, economic and military strength that cannot be ignored. However, the GCC states believe that these obvious facts do not grant it the right to participate in this system from a position of hegemony, either under the slogan of “exporting the revolution” or under that of protecting the Shiite Muslims in this or that country, or by threatening to use its missile and nuclear military power!
Iran must realize that it cannot dominate its neighbors on the other side of the Gulf, and cannot drag them into its positions, projects and confrontations. Moreover, it cannot simply fill the vacuum left by the preoccupation of most of the Arab countries with their domestic problems or revolutions, and cannot reconstruct the Middle East based on its policies and ambitions as it was and is still being stated by President Ahmadinejad and other officials, without any consideration for the Arab countries or the intertwinement of the regional and international interests in the Gulf and elsewhere. And while the unity of the Gulf position today is not enough to draw up a defense line, Tehran must take Turkey into account, considering that the latter has become part of the balance of powers in the regional system and will not remain idle. Prior to the Arab revolutions, it did not hesitate to interfere in the affairs of Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon and Gaza. So, how will it stop today? Moreover, there is the “American guardian” of the American interests with its forces, bases and missile shields, knowing that Washington is reiterating every day that “the security of the Gulf in the face of Iran’s threats is a priority.”
Even Egypt was not preoccupied by Tahrir Square to the point of forgetting about the Gulf arena, because it is well aware of the fact that the collective security of the GCC is an inherent part of the overall Arab security that is violated on more than one front and is troubled in more than one arena, from the entire African North, to the Levant and Iraq. In this context, its Foreign Minister Nabil al-Arabi announced that the “Gulf region represents a key strategic depth for Egyptian national security. It is one of the most important principles of the Egyptian policy which perceives the safety, stability and Arab identity of the Gulf states as being a red line whose violation will not be tolerated by Egypt.”
Iran must remember that the GCC was established following the Islamic Revolution, the emergence of the “exportation of the revolution” slogan and the eruption of the Iraqi-Iranian war. In other words, the six states became aware – early on - of the importance of building a political, military, security and economic bloc that would allow them to uphold their interests and security, expressing this need during crises and developments, the most prominent of which probably being the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. And while the six states rejected Baghdad’s hegemony over the region, they will definitely not allow the Islamic republic to revive the role of the Gulf policeman which Iran enjoyed under the rule of the Shah. Tehran must relinquish the method of hegemony and try to ensure partnership with its neighbors to protect the security of the region, in what would alleviate the burden of the Americans’ and Europeans’ military and non-military interference in its affairs. It is in its own interest to adopt a policy that would reassure its neighbors, from Bahrain to Kuwait, Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq. Until this day, the GCC states have not yet assimilated the reality of the change in Baghdad, so how can they stand by and watch what is happening in other locations in which their positions are retreating?
The entire Arab security system is eroding, due to anarchy, the winds of division, the civil wars and the threat posed by Al-Qaeda organization and its sisters, which provided justifications to a new Western attack on the region under a thousand and one justifications, and allowed “neighboring states” to fill the vacuum from the source of the Nile and its shores, to those of the Tigris and Euphrates! So, will the Gulf states be able to maintain whatever is left from this system in preparation for its revival?
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