By Eric Davi
President Obama with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
The
end of 2011 will mark a watershed in U.S.-Iraqi relations. The Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) that the United States and Iraq signed in December 2008 calls
for all American forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. While it is still
unclear whether U.S. troops will remain in Iraq beyond this year, there is
little doubt that U.S.-Iraqi relations will undergo significant change. What
will that change look like? Will it mean a substantial decline in U.S. influence
in Iraq? In light of Iraq’s strategic importance both in the Middle East, and
to U.S. regional interests, as well as the importance of its continued efforts
at democratization, what form should U.S. policy take after the drawdown of
U.S. troops?
U.S.
policy in post-SOFA Iraq will need to focus on five main areas of mutual
interest to both countries, all of which are interrelated. Their focal points
include: security, governance and institution building, democracy promotion,
economic growth and development, and regional, bi-lateral relations. As a
proviso, the United States will need to be sensitive to the legacy of tensions
that developed with Iraq following the 2003 invasion that overthrew Saddam
Hussein’s Bacthist regime. An effective U.S. foreign policy will require
treading softly as it pursues its national interests in Iraq.
SECURITY
Both
Iraq and the United States share a strong interest in improving the country’s
security situation. The inability of U.S. and Iraqi forces to control the country’s
national territory after the U.S. invasion in 2003 was a major cause for the
sectarian violence that engulfed the country between late 2003 and early 2008.
While Iraqi security forces have made great progress in containing terrorist
groups, terrorist related violence has recently increased as U.S. and British
forces have withdrawn from many areas of the country. The wide scale attacks
that occurred throughout Iraq during the month of Ramadan in August 2011 offer
a stark reminder that Iraqi security forces are still not in control of
country’s territory.
As
U.S. forces have been leaving Iraq, Iran has been rearming Shiite militias in
southern Iraq. This activity continues a strategy that Iran has pursued since
the U.S. invasion. Its goal has been to pressure the United States as much as
possible by increasing casualties among U.S. forces. Iran seeks to send a
message that Iraq will only enjoy stability if Iranian interests in Iraq and
the region are accommodated.
Foreign
meddling in Iraq’s domestic affairs underscores the fact that Iraq’s stability
is as much a function of corrosive “neighborhood effects” as it is a function
of the capabilities of its security forces. At least three of its
neighbors—Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia—are deeply disturbed by the image of a
resurgent Iraq with the potential to reestablish itself as a major regional
power, given its extensive untapped reserves of oil and natural gas. Iraq’s
emerging democracy offers a model for its own citizens that all of Iraq’s
neighbors find threatening. For Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states, a
nation-state where the Shica dominate the political landscape provides a model
for their own restive Shica communities, who seek greater political, social, and
economic freedoms. Due to the threat they perceive, none of these countries is
willing to try to help Iraq achieve stability.
Security
concerns represent an area where U.S. and Iraqi interests will converge for the
foreseeable future. Iraq needs to develop its armed forces to prevent armed
Shiite militias in the south from reasserting their power. In addition, Iraq
must contain a weakened al Qaeda and its surrogates, such as the Islamic State
of Iraq. It must also prevent these organizations from re-establishing
themselves in the Sunni Arab heartland of north central Iraq. U.S. forces
provide Iraq with invaluable logistical support and Iraqi commanders want
access to U.S. counterterrorism expertise. That many American law enforcement
agents are working in Iraq with five-year contracts demonstrates Iraq’s desire
to have the United States play a central role in helping it institutionalize
its security needs.
Iraq
needs to develop an air force if it is to have any military credibility, as
well as the capacity to monitor and control its lengthy borders with Syria and
Iran. The impunity with which Iranian forces have been able to attack
opposition PJAK (Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan) guerillas in Iraqi
Kurdistan is just one example of Iraq’s need for air power. Here the United
States will be crucial in providing Iraq with state-of-the-art aircraft,
command and control technology and, of course, pilot and maintenance training.
While Iraq has a short coast along the Persian Gulf, its waters south of the
Shatt al-cArab, at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are
critical to its ability to export oil, as well as to receive goods at its main
ports of Basra and Umm Qasr. Iraq will also need the United States to help it
develop a modern navy. As a number of Iraqi leaders have admitted, their
country possesses neither the capacity to control its airspace nor its waters
in the Persian Gulf.
Because
the Iraqi government realizes that the United States offers the best military
equipment and training available, and given the ties that have already
developed between Iraqi and American officers, undoubtedly the Iraqi government
and higher echelons of the armed forces want to maintain a close military
relationship with the United States.
Although
Prime Minister al Maliki, a majority of the political elite, as well as the
military command, want a U.S. military presence to be maintained beyond
December 2011, matters are not that simple. The future of the U.S.-Iraqi
security relationship is closely tied to Iraq’s domestic politics. The
leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), which comprises the three
majority Kurdish population provinces in the north east, is alarmed at the
developing military ties between the United States and the central government in
Baghdad. For the Kurds, a resurgent and powerful Iraqi army recalls the efforts
of a number of Iraq’s Arab leaders to subordinate the Kurds. This was
especially true of Saddam Hussein whose notorious “Anfal Campaign,” between
1986 and 1989, killed hundreds of thousands of Kurds and destroyed over 175
Kurdish villages, devastating the Kurds’ agrarian sector in the process.
For
its part, the Iraqi government is concerned that the Kurds are keen to keep a
U.S. military presence in the KRG—even a military base. Iraq’s Arab leadership
views the KRG’s efforts to maintain close ties with the United States as a
strategy designed to strengthen its regional autonomy and control local oil
reserves at the expense of the central government. While the Kurds view U.S. troops
as providing insurance against another attack by the Iraqi army on the KRG, the
central government considers close U.S.-KRG ties to be threatening Iraq’s
sovereignty and national integration. The Iraqi government sees these ties
enhancing the KRG’s ability to declare independence from Iraq should it decide
to do so. Of course, the underlying issue is the lack of trust between the Arab
and Kurdish wings of Iraq’s political elite.
Not
all security issues divide the al Maliki government and the KRG, however. One
security-related issue that has created a set of mutual interests among the
central government, the KRG, and the United States is preventing the unresolved
issue of the “disputed areas” from turning into a military conflict. These
areas include the oil rich and ethnically divided city of Kirkuk, which the
Kurds insist should be part of the KRG, and the border—the so-called Green
Line—that divides Arabs and Kurds in the Ninawa plains. U.S. forces have played
a critical role in mediating tensions in both Kirkuk and other disputed areas
in the north. The joint U.S.-Arab-Kurdish patrols that the U.S. created have
had a salutary impact on reducing possible flare-ups between troops of the
Iraqi army and the Kurdish Pesh Merga militia. With U.S. forces completely
removed from the volatile north, violence could easily break out between the
two forces, which neither the central government nor the KRG desires. Thus, it
is in the interest of both the Iraqi government and the KRG to have some U.S.
troop presence in the north.
However,
all these issues are moot because, at present, the Iraqi government has still
not indicated whether any U.S. troops will be allowed to stay in Iraq. As Iraqi
President Jalal Talabani noted, any revision of the SOFA would require a vote
of the parliament and would need to be supported by 2/3 of the delegates. [1]
In
his view, such an outcome is unlikely before the December 31, 2011 deadline for
the U.S. forces to withdraw. In reality, the parliament is not the real
impediment to preventing an agreement allowing U.S. forces to remain beyond
2011. If al Maliki and his State of Law Coalition, the Kurds, and the al
Iraqiya Coalition decide that U.S. forces should remain beyond December 2011, a
positive decision would be forthcoming in parliament.
Nevertheless,
al Maliki must protect himself from ongoing attacks by populist forces that
insist that all U.S. forces leave Iraq by the end of this year. The most
vociferous opposition to U.S. forces remaining in Iraq comes from Muqtada al
Sadr, the leader of the once powerful Mahdi Army (Jaysh al Mahdi). [2] The
Sadrist bloc in parliament (known as the al Ahrar) has played an anti-American
nationalist card, to the extent of introducing a resolution in parliament that
would ban the current U.S. Ambassador, James Jeffrey, from entering and
addressing the body. [3]
Although
the Sadrist opposition has aroused nationalist sentiments—especially among the
downtrodden sectors of Iraq’s Shica—the Sadrists, with only 39 seats in
parliament, do not have the power to constrain government behavior. Clearly,
Iran is the main player in influencing Nuri al Maliki’s government and is using
the Sadrists as one of its proxies to undermine the U.S. presence in Iraq.
Because Iran not only has influence among the Sadrists, but within the al
Maliki government as well, it has become difficult for al Maliki to convince
all cabinet members and the political elite to support keeping on U.S. troops,
even if only in a training capacity. As long as some political forces continue
to play the anti-American card, al Maliki remains vulnerable to the criticism
that he is not protecting Iraq’s national sovereignty.
However,
tensions have emerged between the Sadrists and the Iranian government,
particularly over Muqtada al Sadr’s call for the Iranians to turn over the
former Mahdi Army commander, Ismacil al Lami, the notorious “Abu Diraca (“the
invincible one,” also known as the Shiite Zarqawi). [4] A highly feared
commander, who was responsible for the deaths of many Sunni Arabs in Baghdad at
the height of the sectarian violence in 2006, al Lami had been living in Qom.
He now leads an offshoot of the Mahdi Army, the League of the Righteous (Asa’ib
al Haqq), which is located in Sadr (Revolution) City, in northeastern Baghdad.
According to Arabic press reports, al Lami returned to Iraq in 2010 and became
a threat to Muqtada al Sadr’s leadership. Al Sadr is angry with the Iranian
government for giving support to al Lami, including military training by
Revolutionary Guard units. [5] If these tensions persist, the Sadrists may be
less willing to do Iran’s bidding in Iraq.
If
al Maliki is to take Iraq’s security needs seriously, he will need to
restructure his political coalition. If he agrees to allow U.S. troops to
remain in Iraq after 2011, he will certainly lose the support of the Sadrists
and face opposition from pro-Iranian elements within his own government.
However, if he were willing to compromise with Ayad Allawi and his al Iraqiya
Coalition which would require his agreeing to cede powers to the new National
Council for Strategic Affairs and filling the portfolios of minister of defense
and interior with appointees agreeable to al Iraqiya, his coalition would rest
on a much firmer basis. If he likewise made a greater effort to reach out to
the Kurds, he would be able to withstand attacks by pro-Iranian political
forces. A coalition of members of his State of Law Coalition, al Iraqiya
Coalition, and the National Kurdish Alliance would provide the parliamentary
basis for moving ahead to insure Iraq’s security needs.
GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS
Modern
Iraq has never enjoyed the benefits of well-developed political institutions.
The Hashemite monarchy that the British imposed in 1921 was viewed as
illegitimate by many Iraqis. While a parliament was established and regular
elections began to be held in the 1920s, they were manipulated by the
monarchical elite. Consequently, the Iraqi parliament never gained legitimacy
either. The army was the only institution that developed after the 1930s, staging
the Arab world’s first military coup d’état in 1936 and ruling the country
between 1937 and 1941. After the army overthrew the monarchy in July 1958,
personalistic and dictatorial rule became the norm. [6]
General
Abd al Karim Qasim, who ruled Iraq from 1958 until being overthrown by a
Bacthist putsch in 1963, banned political parties and refused to allow
elections. The new Bacthist leader, Ali Sacdi al Salih, who ruled briefly from
February until November, 1963, was a brutal ruler who was responsible for
massive repression and the destruction of much of Iraq’s civil society. While
less repressive, Colonel cAbd al Salam cArif, who ruled from 1963-1965, and his
brother, cAbd al Rahman cArif, who ruled from 1965 to 1967, continued the
tradition of dictatorial rule.
When
the second Bacthist regime came to power in 1968 under Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and
Saddam Hussein, all remaining institutions of civil society were systematically
destroyed. Consequently, Iraq became a one-party state. Repression was the norm
and an estimated three million Iraqis perished during 35 years of Bacthist
rule. While Saddam created a parliament in 1980 after seizing the presidency
from al Bakr in 1979, this parliament possessed no independent authority. [7]
Given this legacy of dictatorial rule, it is remarkable that Iraq has, since
2003, been able to hold free and fair elections, develop new institutions of
civil society, and establish a functioning parliament.
Nevertheless,
as the political impasse following the March 2010 parliamentary elections
demonstrates, one of Iraq’s crucial needs is to develop functioning political
institutions, especially at the executive level of prime minister and cabinet
officers. Although technically a parliamentary system, Iraq’s polity is still
controlled by a small elite, centered around Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki. In
reality, the parliament exercises limited control over the prime minister and
his cabinet. In many ways, his government continues the personalistic style
that characterized monarchical rule under the Hashemite and the strong men who
ruled after its overthrow in 1958.
While
the Iraqi parliament (Council of Deputies) deserves more credit for its
accomplishments to date—such as its efforts to control corruption within
government ministries—the office of the prime minister and his cabinet officers
can claim few civic accomplishments. Ministries are distributed according to a
political calculus that is determined by the power of individual political
parties, not the candidates’ qualifications. Ministers are not accountable to
voters nor the Iraqi prime minister, but rather to the small cliques who
control their respective political parties.
In
addition, Iraq’s judiciary represents a core component of the nation’s
political institutional framework. The judiciary has a long historical
pedigree, dating back to the early twentieth century. The Baghdad College of
Law was founded in 1908. In the 1940s and early 1950s, a sophisticated legal
code was established under the tutelage of the renowned Egyptian jurist, cAbd
al Razzaq al Sanhuri. Even under the Bacthist rule, some civil and criminal
cases were known to have been adjudicated beyond political influence.
However,
since 2003, Iraq’s judicial system has faced numerous obstacles in establishing
itself as an independent institution—deciding cases on their merits rather than
according to political considerations. In March 2010, after the al Iraqiya
Coalition won 91 seats to al Maliki’s State of Law Coalition’s 89, the prime
minister was angered that the judiciary did not support his claim that the
results were invalid. Instead, Iraq’s high court ruled that the elections had
been fair and the results valid. [8]
Since
the March 2010 elections, al Maliki has worked to circumscribe the power of the
judiciary and the Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), which
also validated the election results. Judges face pressure to vote according to
the prime minister’s wishes. Al Maliki has also sought to place Iraq’s Central
Bank under his control and has established security services that report
directly to him. He has also resisted efforts by the parliament to extend
jurisdiction over the cabinet officials at the highest levels—minister and
general director—who are currently immune from prosecution for corruption. Al
Maliki has told judges how he wants them to vote. In short, the independence of
much of the federal judiciary has been seriously undermined under his
administration, belying the title of his political party, the State of Law
Coalition.
Prime
Minister al Maliki claims that Iraq is a democracy and that his government
functions according to the rule of law. Neither the United States nor any other
country should dictate what form Iraq’s political institutions should take.
However, the United States and many other foreign countries provide significant
assistance to Iraq. This assistance requires a constitutional and democratic
framework if it is to be used in an effective manner to assist the population
for which it is intended. Further, a global consensus has developed—especially
since the collapse of communism—that all nation-states should adhere to
internationally accepted norms of democratic governance and the rule of law.
U.S. efforts to promote the capacity of Iraqi political institutions should not
be seen as an intrusion into Iraq’s domestic affairs. Rather they must be
viewed as efforts designed to assist the Iraqi government in meeting the
demands of its citizenry and implementing the very standards of governance
which it says it seeks to achieve.
Without
improvements in the quality of political institutions, the extensive government
corruption that currently exists in Iraq will persist and the provision of
services will continue to decline. Pervasive corruption and lack of government
services have evoked serious hostility and cynicism from large segments of the
Iraqi populace, thereby threatening to undermine Iraq’s effort at a democratic
transition.
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
Ever
since the Iraq invasion, U.S. efforts at Middle East democracy promotion have
assumed a negative connotation. [9] Rather than making a rapid transition to
democracy after 2003, Iraq developed a major insurgency and widespread
sectarian violence. The Bush administration initially was unsuccessful in its
efforts to promote democracy in Iraq, in large part due to cultural
insensitivity to local notions of democracy. Nevertheless, Iraq has made
significant progress towards democratization since Saddam Hussein’s regime was overthrown.
The seminal question that needs to be asked is how can the U.S. support the
continuation of this process? How can U.S. involvement avoid creating the
impression that it seeks to dictate how Iraq should promote democratization?
Rather
than assuming that it possesses all the answers to Iraq’s attempt to implement
a democratic transition, the United States should devote more effort to
eliciting views from Iraq’s democracy activists, both within and outside the
government, as to what the country needs to support democratization. Based on
public opinion polling to date, such questioning would indicate that two-thirds
of Iraqis support democracy, and seek greater transparency in government
decision making, eliminating corruption, and improving the quality of services
provided by the state. [10]
One
important consideration in helping Iraq implement a transition to democracy is
improving the system of checks and balances. This requires building more
effective political institutions. Training for judges and parliamentarians, as
well as civic training for security forces, constitute ways in which the
international community can assist Iraq in strengthening political
institutions. The model developed by the United States Institute of Peace’s
Rule of Law program that has provided many Iraqi judges with up-to-date
knowledge of developments in the legal field—access to which was unavailable
under Saddam Hussein’s regime and especially during the UN sanctions—provides
an excellent model of providing assistance to Iraqis in their efforts to
reconstitute civil society. [11]
Another
way to enhance the system of checks and balances is to provide support for the
print and visual media—newspapers, journals and television programs—that can
provide information needed to prevent government officials from taking
advantage of their positions. A large number of Iraqi journalists, television
commentators, and producers have been killed by sectarian and pro-authoritarian
political forces, [12] precisely for their persistent efforts to root out
corruption and nepotism in government circles and to force ministries to
provide better services to the Iraqi population.
Support
for civil society is another area where the United States and other countries
and international agencies can help promote democratization in Iraq. The dual
legacies of Saddam Hussein’s regime’s destruction of civil society, and the UN
sanctions imposed on Iraq between 1991 and 2003, have created serious
impediments to Iraq’s ability to re-establish a functioning civil society.
While the concept of civil society was well established prior to the onset of
Bacthist rule in 1963 and then again in 1968, many Iraqis, especially young
people, are unfamiliar with the idea that citizens have the right to organize
themselves to promote their collective interests—independent of the state. [13]
Developing
civil society is key to Iraq’s process of national reconciliation. Saddam
Hussein spent years following a “divide and conquer” policy of setting one
ethnic group against another, especially during the UN sanctions period between
1991 and 2003. Now, civil society organizations’ work, devoted to conflict
resolution and national reconciliation (such as the Iraqi Peace Network) is
essential to moving Iraq forward in an area which the al Maliki government and
the current political elite have largely neglected.
As
my research with Iraqi youth has made clear, young people reject sectarianism
which they see as destructive to their futures and to Iraqi society generally.
[14] With 70 percent of the population under the age of 30, it is critical that
organizations exist that can give hope that a new political culture—one more
open, tolerant and pluralistic—can emerge in the future. Because so many of
Iraq’s civil society organizations are populated by Iraqi youth, the
institutional development of Iraq’s civil society provides an important channel
through which they can express their aspirations for the future. It also
provides an important training ground for young people who may seek to enter
politics. [15]
Women’s
rights groups, professional associations—especially those of journalists,
jurists, and students—youth groups, and conflict resolution groups are just
some of the civil society organizations that require ongoing foreign financial
support. Training organizers and members of civil society organizations,
whether in Iraq or outside the country, constitutes another crucial need.
The
United States can have a salutary impact on Iraq by expanding educational
opportunities for Iraqis in the United States. When I first conducted research
in Iraq in May and June of 1980, I was surprised by the number of Iraqis who
demonstrated positive attitudes towards the United States. The reason soon
became apparent: these were Iraqis who had studied at American universities.
Even a number of Bacthist officials with whom I spoke, after the perfunctory
critique of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, would smile recalling their
study in the United States.
America
should consider offering far more scholarships to Iraqis for studying in the
United States, as well as encouraging private universities to do so. With the
world’s best university system, the United States can offer better professional
and technical training than most countries in the world. Equally importantly,
the country’s open society invariably fosters respect among foreign students
for American traditions of fairness, political freedom, and expressing
contrarian views. These scholarships would represent a small cost in the larger
scheme of U.S. expenditures in Iraq. Educating Iraqi students at American universities
would benefit the professional classes in Iraq and, ultimately, have a positive
impact on civil society, as well.
If
the United States were to suggest the convening of several international
conferences that included Iraq, the European Union, Turkey, and other countries
and NGOs committed to democracy in the Middle East, the Iraqi government and
civil society organizations could use such a platform to develop a
“democratization agenda.” With a well-defined plan for implementing a
democratic transition securely in place, both the Iraqi government and those
outside Iraq, who are concerned with this process, could better define and
identify what types of support are needed.
Creating
a “democratization agenda” could serve to temper the behavior of political
leaders who seek to deviate from the democratic transition process. If a
subsequent government tried to abrogate the process, it would have to answer to
the Iraqi parliament, the judiciary, and the citizenry at large. Criticism
would also come from foreign countries and NGOs, who are committed to providing
resources to assist Iraq in its democratic transition. Clearly, encouraging
Iraq to better define the democratic transition process would benefit the Iraqi
people, as well as contributing to greater stability in the Middle East.
ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
It
cannot be stated strongly enough that Iraq’s efforts to implement and
consolidate a democratic transition will come to naught if the country does not
experience economic growth and development. Unemployment and underemployment
are widespread, especially among Iraqi youth. The lack of jobs has created
great resentment because many Iraqis question why a country as rich in oil and
natural gas is not able to provide for the material well-being of its citizens.
That many Iraqis are unable to secure durable employment only adds to the
public anger at high government salaries and widespread corruption.
The
power and influence of criminal organizations and sectarian militias is
directly correlated with the lack of jobs. In the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, for
example, many physicians have closed their clinics and left the city for the
more secure Kurdish provinces to the north because they have increasingly been
subject to kidnapping. [16] Clearly, Iraq’s security is inextricably linked to
economic conditions. If the government fails to more actively create employment
opportunities, we can expect the continued expansion of criminal activity in
response.
With
the focus on Iraq’s hydrocarbon wealth, the agrarian sector is often neglected
when considering economic growth. Successive Iraqi governments have paid little
attention to agriculture. Combined with a protracted drought that has plagued
the country for over two years, many peasants have left their farms and
migrated to urban areas. This is especially true of younger peasants. With few
jobs available in Iraq’s cities, especially since migrants possess little
education and few skills, they are ripe for recruitment to criminal
organizations and sectarian militias.
This
continued decline of the agrarian sector and the central government’s inability
to improve rural conditions constitute a major threat to Iraq’s security. It is
one of the main reasons why sectarian militias have been able to generate
support in southern Iraq. Here is an area where the United States can provide
important technical expertise. While water shortages will remain a serious
problem for the foreseeable future, better water management could have a
positive impact on Iraqi agriculture. Right now, there is almost no national
conservation program in place. [17]
The
United States could also have an important impact on Iraq’s budding private
sector. Studies have indicated that Iraqis are among the most entrepreneurial
people in the Middle East. [18] While the government bureaucracy is not
particularly favorable to the creation of new industries, many businessmen have
nevertheless built successful enterprises, ranging from cellular telephone
service to construction. One of the most successful business organizations has
been the Iraqi American Chamber of Commerce and Industry which, through a large
membership and sponsorship of economic development projects, has had a valuable
impact on Iraq’s economy. [19]
The
continued development of the Iraqi hydrocarbon sector will provide economic
opportunities for foreign firms specializing in exploration, technical
services, and human resource training. A robust expansion of the oil and
natural gas industries will continue to attract ever larger foreign investment
in Iraq. Here American corporations can make an important difference in
providing Iraq with state-of-the-art technology.
Despite
the wealth generated by the sale of oil and natural gas in the world market,
many hydrocarbon rich countries are said to suffer from the so-called “oil
curse.” [20] This condition occurs when countries become excessively dependent
on resources, such as oil, for the majority of their revenues. This is the case
in Iraq which derives 95 percent of its current revenues from exporting oil. It
will need to diversify its economy. The fact that the state controls oil
production means that reliance on oil has potentially negative political
consequences, as well. Centralizing wealth in the central government can lead
to authoritarian rule because it largely removes the state’s need to depend on
the populace at large for revenues. [21]
One
of the remedies for the “oil curse” is economic diversification. The United
States, European Union, and international assistance agencies would do well to
provide Iraq with the resources to promote private sector enterprise. [22] In
light of the entrepreneurial nature of the Iraqi people, the development needs
of the agrarian sector, including improving the delivery of water resources,
and the inability of the central government and KRG to deliver necessary social
services, the private sector can fill a large vacuum by helping to improve the
lives of Iraq’s citizenry.
BI-LATERAL RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ‘NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECTS’
Iraq’s
most important bi-lateral relationship—beyond the United States—is with Iran.
As Iran has continued to pursue its nuclear weapons program, its economy has
suffered from the impact of international sanctions imposed on it. Iraq has
become important to Iran in several ways. First, it provides Iran with an
outlet from the relative isolation that it increasingly experiences in the
international community. Having the ability to sell a wide variety of
commodities to Iraq, and to benefit from oil smuggled into the country, helps
Iran offset some of the negative economic consequences of international
sanctions.
Iran’s
increasing economic presence in Iraq carries with it more political influence.
The United States can do little to offset this influence. Nevertheless, it can
seek to channel Iranian economic influence in Iraq into developing Iraq’s
private sector. As Iran significantly increases its economic influence in Iraq,
this may reduce its meddling in Iraqi politics. Economics ties could become the
priority if only because of Iran’s concerns about its own shaky economy.
Turkey
has played an increasingly positive role in Iraq—especially in the KRG where it
has large investments. [23] Turkish investments in the KRG (estimated to be
well in excess of $6 billion) have tempered the Turkish government’s response
to attacks by the outlawed PKK (Kurdish Workers Party), which often uses Iraqi
territory as a base of operations against Turkish forces in south eastern
Turkey. Realizing that it can serve its national security interests more
effectively through encouraging economic integration with Iraq, Turkey has
pursued a very constructive foreign policy that stands in sharp relief to that
of Iran.
Particularly
important will be the ties that develop between Turkey and Iraq as a result of
the development of Iraqi natural gas resources, especially in the Ukaz field in
al Anbar Province along the Syrian-Jordanian borders. Iraqi gas is expected to
feed in to the proposed Nabucco pipeline connecting Central Asia and Iraq with
Europe. [24] This will increase Iraq’s strategic importance because it will
provide a counterweight to Russian efforts to manipulate natural gas supplies
to Europe for its national interests.
The
United States should continue to undertake all it can to enlist Turkey’s help
in developing closer ties with Iraq. As mentioned above, economic growth that
generates additional employment is among the most important ingredients in
bringing political stability to Iraq, thereby enhancing the possibility of an
effective transition to democracy.
Syria’s
relationship to Iraq has been very ambiguous. On the one hand, it has given
shelter to members of the deposed Bacth Party. It has also allowed insurgents
to cross its border with Iraq to carry out terrorist attacks. In other
contexts, Syria has cooperated with the Iraqi government to police the border.
It has accepted many Iraqi refugees, who have fled to its cities to escape
sectarian violence. This refugee influx has been especially true of Iraq’s
Christian community, which is more concentrated in the northwest of Iraq near
Syria. [25]
With
the current unrest spreading throughout the country, and the Bacthist regime of
Bashar al Asad diverting all its attention to controlling the uprising, it
appears that Syria will be unable to interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs.
Indeed, it has sought to obtain Iraqi oil given the disruption of its own economy
and declining oil production. Its economic vulnerability provides an incentive
not to attempt to destabilize Iraq. Still, Syria maintains close ties with
Iran, which may try to use such ties to further destabilize Iraq. However,
Syria’s ties with Iran may become more tenuous as Bashar al Asad’s regime faces
ever more widespread protest.
The
United States must be wary of Syria’s alliance with Iran. However, it is
unlikely that Syria will loom as large as it did during the sectarian violence
of 2003-2008 given the challenges that the Bacthist regime will continue to
face. If, on the other hand, the current Syrian regime is forced to make
concessions and meet the demands for greater freedoms by the ongoing uprising,
then it is possible that a new and more positive relationship may develop
between Iraq and Syria. Equally plausible is the possibility that Syria may
continue to devolve into chaos. In that case, remnants of al Qaeda and the
Islamic State of Iraq may be able use it as a base of operations and cross the
Iraqi-Syrian border with impunity.
The
final set of bi-lateral relations impacting Iraq’s security involves its
relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states. The main concern of
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states is Iran’s expanding influence in Iraq. They
view with alarm the close ties that have developed between the al Maliki
government and the Islamic Republic. An Iraq that is militarily resurgent and
allied with Iran represents a frightening scenario from a Saudi and Arab Gulf
perspective.
Given
its own restive Shiite population, which resides in the oil-rich northeastern
al Hasa (al-Ahsa’) and Qatif areas, Saudi Arabia, in particular, is very
concerned that Iraq has developed a political system that has resulted in
significant political power for the country’s majority Shiite population. Saudi
Arabia and the Arab Gulf states find Iraq’s open electoral process to be
threatening. This is true not only because it suggests the need for political
reforms that would offer greater political participation to Saudi Arabia’s
Sunni citizenry, but because it encourages its Shi’a, which constitute a large
segment of the Arab Gulf’s population as well, to also seek greater political
and social freedoms.
The
United States can play a constructive role here. America should continue to
encourage Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states to exert greater efforts to
prevent radical elements in their societies from providing funds to Sunni Arab
sectarian organizations in Iraq. They must also prevent their nationals from
traveling to Iraq to join insurgent organizations. [26] Saudi Arabia and the
Arab Gulf states have often looked the other way as merchants and supposed
philanthropic organizations have channelled funds to Sunni radical groups in
Iraq (much as Iran has followed a similar policy with Shiite militias in
southern Iraq). The United States can also play a positive role in helping Iraq
settle its outstanding financial obligations to Kuwait that stem from its
seizure of the country in August of 1990, which subsequently led to the 1991
Gulf War.
CONCLUSION
U.S.-Iraqi
relations are highly complex and fraught with danger. As these relations
evolve, the United States will need to show great patience. It will need to
emphasize repeatedly that its goals in Iraq are neither to control its
extensive hydrocarbon wealth, nor to dominate the country politically. Rather
the main U.S. goal—as should constantly be highlighted—remains assisting Iraq
in achieving the goals of stability, democratization, and economic prosperity
that it has set for itself. In this process, both countries remain tied to the
same outcome, a free and democratic Iraq that assumes its role as a force for
positive change in the Middle East.
Notes and References
-This essay was published by The Foreign Policy Institution in September 2011
-Eric Davis is professor of political science at Rutgers University and former
director of Rutgers’ Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He is the author of
Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq
(University of California Press, 2005) and the forthcoming Taking Democracy
Seriously in Iraq (Cambridge University Press, 2012
1-[Text] Al-Hayat, July 21, 2011
2-[Text] For an analysis of the Mahdi Army, see my, “Sectarianism, Historical
Memory and the Discourse of Othering: The Mahdi Army, Mafia, Camorra and
‘Ndrangheta,” in Chris Toensing and Mimi Kirk, eds., Uncovering Iraq:
Trajectories of Disintegration and Transformation (Washington, DC: Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 2011), pp. 67-113.
3-[Text] Al-Hayat, July 5, 2011.
4-[Text] Abu Dira‘a literally means, “owner or possessor of the shield,” which
implies that no one can penetrate his armor and thus he is invincible. Abu
Dira’a, who brutalized many victims along Haifa Street in Baghdad, is also
referred to as the “Shiite Butcher” for torturing his victims with electric
drills before killing them.
5-[Text] “Iraq's Sadr Says Iran Will Not Hand Over Militant,” Agence France
Presse, August 10, 2011. For the possible outbreak of violence between the
Sadrists and the League of the Righteous, see, “Mahdi Army vs. League of
Righteous: Fears That Fresh Violence Between Shiites Could Spread, Niqash, July
14, 2011, http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2864&lang=0
6-[Text] For a discussion of Iraq’s early political development, see my
Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq
(Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 55-81.
7-[Text] Having visited polling stations during the June 1980 parliament
elections while conducting research in Iraq, it was clear to me that only
candidates hand-picked by the Bacth Party were allowed to stand for office.
8-[Text] For al Maliki’s efforts to use kingship ties to influence the
decisions of the IHEC, see: “A Family Tie Too Tight: Nepotism Runs Deep in Iraq
Politics,” Niqash, July 21, 2011, http://www.niqash.org/content.php?contentTypeID=75&id=2868&lang=0
9-[Text] Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign
Affairs, Mar. – Apr., 2006, pp. 55–68.
10-[Text] See the National Democratic Institute (NDI) poll, Iraq’s Democracy at
the Tipping Point, November 23, 2010; and the ABC/BBC/NHK poll, Iraq - Where
Things Stand, March 16, 2009. The poll’s results were summed up as: “Dramatic
advances sweep Iraq, boosting support for democracy.”
11-[Text] For the details of this program, see,
12-[Text] As of September 9, 2011, 340 journalists have been killed, see, http://www.brussellstribunal.org/Journalists.htm
13-[Text] For a discussion of the development of civil society in Iraq, see my,
The Historical Genesis of the Public Sphere in Iraq, 1900-1963: Implications
for Building Democracy in the Post-Ba‘thist Era, in Seteney Shami, Publics,
Politics and Participation: Locating the Public Sphere in the Middle East and
North Africa (NY: Social Science Research Council Books, 2010), pp. 385-427.
14-[Text] This research, in which I conducted focus groups with 600 Iraqi
youth, will be published in preliminary form in a forthcoming Special Report,
Iraqi Youth between Optimism and Cynicism, to be published by the U.S.
Institute of Peace.
15-[Text] Admittedly, I am referring largely to educated and middle class
youth. Poor Iraqi youth continue to bear the brunt of unemployment, lack of
education and exposure to violence and displacement. In the larger study that
builds upon the focus groups, I focus more on the “other Iraq,” namely the
underprivileged and disadvantaged sectors of Iraqi youth.
16-[Text] Wladimir Van Wilgenburg, “Abductions Target Kirkuk Doctors,” Rudlow,
May 7, 2011, http://www.rudaw.net/english/news/iraq/3797.html
17-[Text] For a discussion of this issue, see my, “Iraq’s Water Crisis
Threatens its Economic and Political Development,” December 14, 2011; http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2010/12/iraqs-water-crisis-threatens-its.html
18-[Text] See the Gallup Poll, Arab Youth Express Strong Entrepreneurial
Spirit, June 9, 2009, in which Iraqi youth expressed very high levels of
commitment to entrepreneurship:
http://www.sbdc-iraq.com/files/128100279569_doc101488_RFA_FD801-2010-002_webfnl-1.pdf;
For the problems faced by Iraqi entrepreneurs, see: Sameeksha Desai,
“Entrepreneurship in Iraq: Understanding the Constraints,” http://www.ony.unu.edu/middayforum/UNU.%20Background%20Readings%20on%20IRAQ.pdf
19-[Text] The Iraqi-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry can be accessed
at: www.i-acci.org/
20-[Text] This term should no doubt be revised to reflect that fact that many
oil-producing countries are also rich in natural gas resource, such as Iraq.
21-[Text] For an analysis of “rentierism” (excessive dependence on oil wealth
for state revenues), see Bassam Yousif and Eric Davis, “Iraq: Understanding
Autocracy - Oil and Conflict in Historical and Socio-Political Context,” in
Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi, eds., Democracy in the Arab World:
Explaining the Deficit (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), pp. 227-253.
22-[Text] For efforts of the U.S. Agency for International Development to promote
small business in Iraq, see the discussion of the Tijara Project at:
http://iraq.usaid.gov/node/34.
23-[Text] “Turkish Investors Favour Iraq as Unrest Sweeps Region,” Reuters,
March 30, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/30/iraq-turkey-investment-idUSLDE72T28120110330
24-[Text] “Iraq Looks Beyond Nabucco Gas Pipeline,” UPI, April 7, 2011,
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2011/04/07/Iraq-looks-beyond-Nabucco-gas-pipeline/UPI-89351302178500/
25-[Text] “Many Christians Fell Iraq, With Syria the Haven of Choice,” New York
Times, August 5, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/05/international/middleeast/05syria.
26-[Text] “U.S. Officials Voice Frustrations With Saudis Over Iraq,” The New
York Times, July 27, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/27/world/africa/27iht-27saudi-web.6857553.html?scp=1&sq=us%20voices%20frustration%20with%20saudis&st=cse;
This article notes that of the 60-80 fighters entering Iraq each month to join
Sunni Arab insurgent organizations, over half were Saudi.
