By Dalia Dassa Kaye
In
the days since the Justice Department unveiled its charges of an Iranian plot
to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington, conservative pundits have dusted
off their attack Iraq language from 2003 and begun to apply it to Iran. It
didn't take long for many to advocate a military response to Iran, in some
cases not just against the revolutionary guard members believed responsible for
the plan but also against Iran's nuclear program. The martial rhetoric from
inveterate hawks was predictable. But even President Obama suggested that the
United States would not take any "options off the table," a phrase
that is understood to leave open military options.
They
should not be. Even assuming the worst -- Iranian Government involvement at the
most senior levels -- a military response is just what it was before the plot
became known: a dangerous and unpredictable option that should be avoided.
Much
remains unclear about the alleged terrorist plot itself. According to the
Justice Department, an Iranian-American used-car dealer and his cousin, an
operative of the Quds force of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corp, are at the
center of a bizarre, sloppy and, audacious terrorist plot to assassinate the
Saudi ambassador to the United States. A large number of experts on Iran have
expressed skepticism about the plausibility of these allegations. Still, the
U.S. Government clearly believes Iran is responsible. The Obama administration
has made public accusatory statements that can hardly be walked back at this
point, and it is difficult to believe that it would have staked its reputation
on a flimsy case.
If
the Justice Department has the story right, and if the clerical regime actually
had knowledge of the plot, Iran has crossed a dangerous redline. As bad as
United States-Iranian relations are now, they are bound to get worse. Only
evidence that leads the administration to back down on its claims -- an
unlikely scenario -- could avert at this point a serious escalation in United
States-Iranian tensions.
The
public exposure of this plan, coming alongside continued Iranian progress on
its nuclear program and United Nations reports of egregious human rights
abuses, may have been meant to show toughness against Tehran and to build
international support for sanctions. But it has also created new opportunities
for advocates of the military strike option to more forcefully press their
case. In a presidential campaign season in which potential Republican
candidates are searching for ways to attack Obama and to differentiate
themselves from each other, all the incentives push toward ever more hawkish
public rhetoric. It is not clear that the administration anticipated the
political pressure that is now being mustered to demand a forceful response
that matches the severity of these allegations.
The
escalation has already started with U.S. efforts to increase international
economic and diplomatic isolation of Iran. However, such efforts are likely to
face resistance from critical countries like Russia and China, particularly as
U.S. officials lack or are unwilling to expose indisputable intelligence to
implicate Iranian officials in the plot. The difficulty of garnering sufficient
international support for effective sanctions will now be associated with a
failure to adequately respond to what lawmakers across the political spectrum
have called an act of war against the United States.
Military
alternatives will again very likely become part of the Washington conversation,
even if senior U.S. officials had previously all but ruled them out (and
encouraged Israel to do the same). At this stage, there is little chance of
retaliatory U.S. military action. Pentagon officials have already issued
statements suggesting this incident requires a diplomatic and legal response.
But if such responses appear lackluster and ineffective, political pressure
will mount to make military options more credible. At the very least, Israeli
and Saudi officials who favor military strike options against Iran's nuclear
program may now receive a more receptive audience in Washington.
The
sad reality is that there is no silver bullet solution to the Iranian
challenge, and a creative combination of engagement, containment, and
deterrence will likely be necessary to address it. Despite this new plot twist,
a military strike remains among the worst options possible, whether it comes
from the United States or Israel, as the United States will be implicated
either way.
First,
the operational challenges of a military attack remain daunting. Iran's nuclear
facilities are widely dispersed and deeply buried and so difficult, if not
impossible, to eliminate. An Israeli attack would be even more challenging,
though not impossible, due to long distances to Iranian targets and over flight
challenges. Second, and more significantly, the aftermath of an attack could be
devastating militarily and politically. It could unleash a wave of Iranian
retaliation against U.S. forces, allies, and interests. Iran maintains a wide
array of levers across the region, including militia groups it has trained and
funded, that it could employ to retaliate against U.S. forces or diplomatic
personnel, particularly in countries like Iraq. Iranian missiles have ranges
that can reach Israel and all its Gulf Arab neighbors, including those hosting
U.S. military forces. Such an attack could also backfire by fomenting
nationalist sentiment within Iran (particularly if large numbers of civilians
are killed) and boost support for more hard-line elements within the regime
that current policies are attempting to marginalize. It could also increase
Iranian incentives to obtain nuclear weapons to avoid such attacks in the
future, while undermining painstaking U.S. efforts to bolster international and
regional support for economic and diplomatic pressure against Iran. In short,
there are serious risks associated with this option with little potential to
actually solve the problem, and possibly making it harder to solve in the
future.
A
military strike would be particularly damaging in a post Arab spring
environment, in which public opinion is already hostile toward U.S. policies.
Even if Arab governments may quietly welcome forceful U.S. actions, Arab
publics are far more sympathetic to Iran's anti-Western positions. Despite
Iran's waning regional influence as Arab revolts and Turkish activism have
decreased its relevance in the resistance narrative, Arab publics would likely
rally behind Iran in the face of an attack. Additionally, they could constrain
their governments' ability to support US-backed efforts to isolate Iran.
Some
may view the assassination plot as an opportunity to bring the military option
back to the table, believing that only a forceful response to Iran's actions
will prevent the country from striking again. However this type of response
would be a strategic mistake. A military attack would isolate the United States
rather than Iran, further weakening U.S. influence regionally and globally
while giving an increasingly isolated and vulnerable Iran a second chance.
Dalia Dassa Kaye is a Visiting Professor and Fellow at UCLA's
International Institute and Burkle Center for International Relations.
