Carefully Watshing Egypt

By Musa Keilani

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 27/02/2011

 

The collapse of the regime of Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak was something Israel - and indeed many in the region and beyond - did not expect to happen. They thought that the regime would unleash the strong police and security forces, including the military, against the pro-democracy protesters, and that the protest would be over in a matter of hours, given the record of the Egyptian police and security forces.

Well, it did not happen that way. Mubarak hung on for 18 days before accepting the inevitable and stepped down in an ignoble exit for a man who ruled Egypt with an iron first for 30 years.

In mid-January, Tunisian strongman Zine Al Abidine Ben Ali was forced to flee his country. And now, perhaps by press time, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi may have realised that he could not hope to win when he wages war on his own people, and it is time for him to give up power. Who knows,a fate worse than Ben Ali’s and Mubarak’s might be waiting for Qadhafi.

The well-choreographedupheavals in the three Arab countries would have a profound impact on the region, but the country to be watched most closely is Egypt, the most populous member of the Arab League.

Now that Mubarak, who held fast onto his country’s commitment to peace with Israel, is ousted, Israel is anxiously looking for signs of how post-Mubarak Egypt will behave.

The Israelis were relieved that the military generals took charge of Egypt after Mubarak quit because Israel could always speak the language of the generals and do business with them. Indeed, the generals of Egypt sent the Israelis a positive message that they will continue to respect the 1979 Egypt-Israel peace agreement.

Since then, however, the signals were not to Israel’s like. The first came when the Supreme Council of Armed Forces allowed Yusuf Al Qaradawi, a Sunni preacher and one of Mubarak’s foes, to return from exile and lead a victory assembly in Tahrir Square, on February 1.

He called for an Arab and Muslimmarch on Al Aqsa Mosque in Israeli-occupied Jerusalem. He also urged the Egyptian authorities to open the Egyptian-Gaza Strip border ruled by Hamas.

For Israel, Qaradawi is a bitter enemy since hehas justified suicide bombings against Israelis. Since he seems to have established a good relationship with the ruling generals, Israel is worriedhe will use his newfound freedom in Egypt against Israel.

Another negative signal for Israel came when the Supreme Council of Armed Forces permittedtwo Iranian warships to sail through the Suez Canal into the Mediterranean. It was the first time since the 1979 Iranian revolution that an Iranian warship passed through the Suez. Israel called it an Iranian provocation. In private, some analysts said the Egyptian military was signalling an end to Mubarak’s policy of shunning Iran.

Yet another “bad” signal for Israel came when the generals permitted the Muslim Brotherhood to organise demonstrations in Cairo’s Tahrir Square after refusing a similar privilege toother opposition groups.

Arguably, the Brotherhood is the best-organised movement in Egypt (as indeed in many other countries). It has a moderate agenda that has prompted American officials to announce that it might not be a bad idea to involve the group in the political transition process in the country. That does not suitIsrael’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has raised concern that a Brotherhood presence in the corridors of political power will cast clouds on the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

The interpretation of the generals’ handling of the Brotherhood is that they wanted to dilute the role of other opposition groups in the anti-Mubarak revolt and also send a message to the US that Muslim “fundamentalists” could take power if the transition process is hastily rushed.

Obviously, the generals, who are mandated with supervising the post-Mubarak political transition, are not limiting their role to that process. They have their own politics and they are playing it. That raises concerns as to how fair they would bein restructuring the Egyptian political system and how far they would be committed to their pledge of a peaceful transfer of power in six months.

Much Ado About Gulf Reform

There is little tolerance for a Tahrir Square camp in Saudi Arabia, but that doesn't mean that it must turn into a kingdom of fear

By Mishaal Al Gergawi 

This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 27/02/2011

As the world begins to ponder a post-Gaddafi Libya, the Gulf begins to understand how far-reaching the fervour for change is.

Bahrain has had the most visible demonstrations and, unfortunately, a death toll. The protests, which claimed to be peaceful, although the government strongly denied that, attempted to promote themselves as multi-party reformist protests. However, the crackdown quickly put the Wefaq party at the forefront of what became a Shiite protest that called not just for the reform of the system, but its change. This certainly struck a nerve across the Gulf — notably Saudi Arabia and Iran. Shaikh Salman Bin Hamad Al Khalifa, Bahrain's Crown Prince, took the initiative and called for calm that would be followed by dialogue where "all options would be put on the table."

The presence of Bahrain's King Hamad Bin Eisa Al Khalifa at Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz's return couldn't be more symbolic. In short, Bahrain is the new Lebanon; just like it inherited the role of the Middle East's banking capital from Lebanon in the 70s, it has now fully inherited the role of the regional battlefield.

A small Shiite protest was held outside Qatif calling for the release of political prisoners without trial. Prince Talal Bin Abdul Aziz, founder of the 1958-64 Free Princes Movement, gave a careful BBC interview in which he argued that constitutional reform would not see the light if it wasn't initiated by King Abdullah himself. Two open letters signed by a group of intellectuals, businessmen and academics were sent to the king upon his return; King Abdullah announced an aid package that mainly targeted two major structural challenges: jobs and housing. In a New York Times Op-ed, Prince Al Waleed Bin Talal commended the package, but also described it as the beginning of much wider and deeper reforms. The package has been characterised by many activists as attempting to stop the bleeding without addressing its cause.

‘Parliament cheque-gate'

Oman was the first to face protests almost a month ago, but they were related to wage increases. The government promised to study the requests.

Ever the welfare state, Kuwait was the first to give a cash handout early last month. But many Kuwaitis believe its recent "parliament cheque-gate" has effectively accelerated its transformation into a full-fledged constitutional monarchy.

A half-serious Facebook page, calling for an Emirati day of protest against what it described as degradation and shame, was unanimously considered offensive, foreign and uncalled for by the nationals.

Qatar is famously referred to as the world's only state with virtually no opposition — save a minority that would like the American airbase in Al Udeid shut down. It is in effect a very profitable holding company with around 1.3 million very well paid employees of which 200,000 are on permanent employment. Possibilities of dissent are probably the lowest in the world.

This reinforces the view that the GCC states couldn't be in different places if they tried to.

For Bahrain the next few weeks will be crucial to assess if it will be able to develop a reform package that can appease the opposition enough to build a national dialogue platform. It will be hard to see how that can happen when Bahrain prides itself as being the only Gulf state where more of its citizens are employed by the private sector rather than the public one. It is also important for both the government and the opposition to appear independent of regional interference. The opposition and government are respectively cynical of Saudi and Iranian intentions.

Saudi Arabia is where the battle for reform will be long and drawn out. This is because King Abdullah hasn't really groomed anyone to take over his reformist agenda. Many argue that King Nayef Bin Abdul Aziz won't oppose reform as much as Prince Nayef the Minister of Interior opposes it now. Reality is that's not saying much when considering how opposed he has been to it.

In a recent meeting with a select group of Saudi intellectuals, Prince Nayef had effectively said that an Egyptian-like revolution wasn't likely and that any form of dissent wasn't welcome. Infrastructure failures, such as those that allowed the rain in Jeddah to turn into a flood again, have made those most staunchly loyal to the House of Saud question the efficiency of its executive branch and the need to empower the legislative branch and reform its judiciary branch. Saudi Arabia's place in the world should be much more important that what it is now and the 12 million $100 barrels can go a long way into getting it there. But Saudi Arabia mustn't turn towards a mega-welfare state that is weary of its own people. Very few people want to abolish the monarchy, most just want it to work better. The emergence of young princes who would mediate between the callers for reform and the old royal guard is crucial. Everyone knows there is very little tolerance for a Tahrir Square camp-out in Saudi Arabia, but that doesn't mean that it must turn into a kingdom of fear.

If anything, the recent political upheavals in the region have shown that socio-politically the Gulf states' challenges are anything but in sync.

Mishaal Al Gergawi is an Emirati current affairs commentator.

The Destiny Of This Pageant Lies In The Kingdom Of Oil

By Robert Fisk
This commentary was published in The Independent on 26/02/2011

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia offered his citizens $36bn to keep their mouths shut

The Middle East earthquake of the past five weeks has been the most tumultuous, shattering, mind-numbing experience in the history of the region since the fall of the Ottoman empire. For once, "shock and awe" was the right description.

The docile, supine, unregenerative, cringing Arabs of Orientalism have transformed themselves into fighters for the freedom, liberty and dignity which we Westerners have always assumed it was our unique role to play in the world. One after another, our satraps are falling, and the people we paid them to control are making their own history – our right to meddle in their affairs (which we will, of course, continue to exercise) has been diminished for ever.

The tectonic plates continue to shift, with tragic, brave – even blackly humorous – results. Countless are the Arab potentates who always claimed they wanted democracy in the Middle East. King Bashar of Syria is to improve public servants' pay. King Bouteflika of Algeria has suddenly abandoned the country's state of emergency. King Hamad of Bahrain has opened the doors of his prisons. King Bashir of Sudan will not stand for president again. King Abdullah of Jordan is studying the idea of a constitutional monarchy. And al-Qa'ida are, well, rather silent.

Who would have believed that the old man in the cave would suddenly have to step outside, dazzled, blinded by the sunlight of freedom rather than the Manichean darkness to which his eyes had become accustomed. Martyrs there were aplenty across the Muslim world – but not an Islamist banner to be seen. The young men and women bringing an end to their torment of dictators were mostly Muslims, but the human spirit was greater than the desire for death. They are Believers, yes – but they got there first, toppling Mubarak while Bin Laden's henchmen still called for his overthrow on outdated videotapes.

But now a warning. It's not over. We are experiencing today that warm, slightly clammy feeling before the thunder and lightning break out. Gaddafi's final horror movie has yet to end, albeit with that terrible mix of farce and blood to which we are accustomed in the Middle East. And his impending doom is, needless to say, throwing into ever-sharper perspective the vile fawning of our own potentates. Berlusconi – who in many respects is already a ghastly mockery of Gaddafi himself – and Sarkozy, and Lord Blair of Isfahan are turning out to look even shabbier than we believed. Those faith-based eyes blessed Gaddafi the murderer. I did write at the time that Blair and Straw had forgotten the "whoops" factor, the reality that this weird light bulb was absolutely bonkers and would undoubtedly perform some other terrible act to shame our masters. And sure enough, every journalist is now going to have to add "Mr Blair's office did not return our call" to his laptop keyboard.

Everyone is now telling Egypt to follow the "Turkish model" – this seems to involve a pleasant cocktail of democracy and carefully controlled Islam. But if this is true, Egypt's army will keep an unwanted, undemocratic eye on its people for decades to come. As lawyer Ali Ezzatyar has pointed out, "Egypt's military leaders have spoken of threats to the "Egyptian way of life"... in a not so subtle reference to threats from the Muslim Brotherhood. This can be seen as a page taken from the Turkish playbook." The Turkish army turned up as kingmakers four times in modern Turkish history. And who but the Egyptian army, makers of Nasser, constructors of Sadat, got rid of the ex-army general Mubarak when the game was up?

And democracy – the real, unfettered, flawed but brilliant version which we in the West have so far lovingly (and rightly) cultivated for ourselves – is not going, in the Arab world, to rest happy with Israel's pernicious treatment of Palestinians and its land theft in the West Bank. Now no longer the "only democracy in the Middle East", Israel argued desperately – in company with Saudi Arabia, for heaven's sake – that it was necessary to maintain Mubarak's tyranny. It pressed the Muslim Brotherhood button in Washington and built up the usual Israeli lobby fear quotient to push Obama and La Clinton off the rails yet again. Faced with pro-democracy protesters in the lands of oppression, they duly went on backing the oppressors until it was too late. I love "orderly transition". The "order" bit says it all. Only Israeli journalist Gideon Levy got it right. "We should be saying 'Mabrouk Misr!'," he said. Congratulations, Egypt!

Yet in Bahrain, I had a depressing experience. King Hamad and Crown Prince Salman have been bowing to their 70 per cent (80 per cent?) Shia population, opening prison doors, promising constitutional reforms. So I asked a government official in Manama if this was really possible. Why not have an elected prime minister instead of a member of the Khalifa royal family? He clucked his tongue. "Impossible," he said. "The GCC would never permit this." For GCC – the Gulf Co-operation Council – read Saudi Arabia. And here, I am afraid, our tale grows darker.

We pay too little attention to this autocratic band of robber princes; we think they are archaic, illiterate in modern politics, wealthy (yes, "beyond the dreams of Croesus", etc), and we laughed when King Abdullah offered to make up any fall in bailouts from Washington to the Mubarak regime, and we laugh now when the old king promises $36bn to his citizens to keep their mouths shut. But this is no laughing matter. The Arab revolt which finally threw the Ottomans out of the Arab world started in the deserts of Arabia, its tribesmen trusting Lawrence and McMahon and the rest of our gang. And from Arabia came Wahabism, the deep and inebriating potion – white foam on the top of the black stuff – whose ghastly simplicity appealed to every would-be Islamist and suicide bomber in the Sunni Muslim world. The Saudis fostered Osama bin Laden and al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. Let us not even mention that they provided most of the 9/11 bombers. And the Saudis will now believe they are the only Muslims still in arms against the brightening world. I have an unhappy suspicion that the destiny of this pageant of Middle East history unfolding before us will be decided in the kingdom of oil, holy places and corruption. Watch out.

But a lighter note. I've been hunting for the most memorable quotations from the Arab revolution. We've had "Come back, Mr President, we were only kidding" from an anti-Mubarak demonstrator. And we've had Saif el-Islam el-Gaddafi's Goebbels-style speech: "Forget oil, forget gas – there will be civil war." My very own favourite, selfish and personal quotation came when my old friend Tom Friedman of The New York Times joined me for breakfast in Cairo with his usual disarming smile. "Fisky," he said, "this Egyptian came up to me in Tahrir Square yesterday, and asked me if I was Robert Fisk!" Now that's what I call a revolution.

Long Bread Lines And Open Revolt In Libya’s Capital

Moises Saman for The New York Times

A man carrying loaves of bread walks past improvised barricades set up by protesters in Tripoli.

By David D Kirkpatrick
This aricle was published in The New York Times on 26/02/2011

TRIPOLI, Libya — A bold effort by Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi to prove that he was firmly in control of Libya appeared to backfire Saturday as foreign journalists he invited to the capital discovered blocks of the city in open revolt.

Witnesses described snipers and antiaircraft guns firing at unarmed civilians, and security forces were removing the dead and wounded from streets and hospitals, apparently in an effort to hide the mounting toll.

When government-picked drivers escorted journalists on tours of the city on Saturday morning, the evidence of the extent of the unrest was unmistakable. Workers were still hastily painting over graffiti calling Colonel Qaddafi a “bloodsucker” or demanding his ouster. Just off the tour route were long bread lines where residents said they were afraid to be seen talking to journalists.

And though heavily armed checkpoints dominated some precincts of the city, in other neighborhoods the streets were blocked by makeshift barricades of broken televisions, charred tree trunks and cinder blocks left over from protests and street fights the night before.

“I have seen more than 68 people killed,” said a doctor who gave his name only as Hussein. “But the people who have died, they don’t leave them in the same place. We have seen them taking them in the Qaddafi cars, and nobody knows where they are taking the people who have died.” He added, “Even the ones with just a broken hand or something they are taking away.”

In some ways, the mixed results of Colonel Qaddafi’s publicity stunt — opening the curtains to the world with great fanfare, even though the stage is in near-chaotic disarray — is an apt metaphor for the increasingly untenable situation in the country.

On Friday, before the journalists arrived, his forces put down a demonstration in the capital only after firing on the protesters. There were reports that an armed rebel force was approaching the city on Saturday, but Colonel Qaddafi’s forces are believed to have blocked the way at the city of Surt, a stronghold of his tribe.

He is no longer in full control of the countryside either. Rebels now control about half the populous Mediterranean coast, including the strategic towns of Zawiyah and Misurata, not far from the capital and near important oil facilities.

But Tripoli is home to a third of Libya’s roughly six million people. Colonel Qaddafi and his special militias have unleashed enough firepower here that it may enable them to keep a firm grasp on the city for some time to come, raising vexing questions about just how the standoff might end.

Until Friday night, Colonel Qaddafi’s government had imposed a complete ban on foreign journalists, had shut down most Internet access, had confiscated cellphone chips and camera memory cards from those leaving the border, and had done whatever it could to prevent unauthorized images of the unrest here from leaving the country.

But he reversed himself on Thursday when his son Seif al-Islam el-Qaddafi said Libya would now welcome the foreign news media and officials began figuring out how to issue visas when many of its embassies abroad had already defected to the rebels.

When foreign journalists arrived Friday night, the airport looked like a refugee camp, with thousands jammed into the halls awaiting flights out of the country. Many customs and security officials wore hospital masks in fear of contracting some disease among the hordes.

In a midnight news conference for journalists assembled in the luxurious Rixos Hotel, where bread and other food was plentiful, the younger Mr. Qaddafi, dressed in a dark zip-up sweater, acknowledged for the first time the extent of the rebellion, confirming reports that rebels had control of Zawiyah and Misurata despite concerted attempts over the last two days to dislodge them.

But, contradicting rebel claims that their victory was at hand, the younger Mr. Qaddafi said the government was negotiating with the protesters and making great progress, an assertion not confirmed by the protesters.

He promised journalists they would find the streets peaceful and support for his father strong. Do not confuse the sound of celebratory fireworks for bursts of gunfire around the streets of Tripoli, he told them.

The next morning, a driver took a group of foreign journalists to an area known as the Friday market, which appeared to have been the site of a riot the night before. The streets were strewn with debris, and piles of shattered glass had been collected in cardboard boxes.

A young man approached the journalists to deliver a passionate plea for unity and accolades to Colonel Qaddafi, then left in a white van full of police officers. Two small boys approached surreptitiously with bullet casings they presented as evidence of force used on protesters the night before.

But at another stop, in the neighborhood of Tajoura, journalists stumbled almost accidentally into a block cordoned off by makeshift barriers where dozens of residents were eager to talk about a week of what they said were peaceful protests crushed by Colonel Qaddafi’s security forces with overwhelming, deadly and random force.

A middle-age business owner, who identified himself only as Turkey, said that the demonstrations there had begun last Sunday, when thousands of protesters inspired by the uprising in the east had marched toward the capital’s central Green Square. He said the police had dispersed the crowd with tear gas and then bullets, killing a man named Issa Hatey. He said neighbors had now renamed the area’s central traffic circle Issa Hatey Square in memory of their struggle.

He and several other residents said that over the past week neighbors had been besieged by pickup trucks full of armed men shooting randomly at the crowds, sometimes wounding people who were sitting peacefully in their homes or cars. At other times, several said, the security forces had employed rooftop snipers, antiaircraft guns mounted on trucks and buckshot, and they produced shells and casings that appeared to confirm their reports. Mr. Turkey said that on one day he had seen about 50 to 60 heavily armed men who appeared to be mercenaries from nearby African countries.

The residents also said that they had seen security forces scooping up dead and wounded protesters and removing them from the streets, apparently to hide evidence of the violence. Because they believe security forces are also removing casualties from hospitals, they said, they have tried to hide their friends within the hospital and remove them after initial treatment.

After Friday Prayer, Mr. Turkey and his friends said, a crowd of several thousand had gathered at what they now call Issa Hatey Square to march to Green Square. They raised what he called “the old-new flag,” the former tri-color flag of the Libyan monarchy that rebels have claimed as the flag of a free, post-Qaddafi Libya.

Two carloads of Libyan Army soldiers had joined them, he said, though they never used their weapons. The protesters were determined to remain peaceful, he said, because they knew that if they fought back with weapons Colonel Qaddafi would retaliate with even greater force.

But when they got to a neighborhood called Arada, they met an ambush led by snipers firing down from the roofs. Others had attacked with machine guns and antiaircraft guns. At least 15 people had died, he and others said.

Several said they had been attacked by the personal militia of Colonel Qaddafi’s son Khamis Qaddafi, which is considered the most formidable battalion in the Libyan Army or other Qaddafi forces.

A precise death toll has been impossible to verify. A Libyan envoy said Friday that hundreds had been killed in Tripoli.

Asked why he and his neighbors were rising up now, after living under Colonel Qaddafi for 42 years, Mr. Turkey, 46, shrugged. “No one can tell the time,” he said. After forty years of pressure, “you explode.” Two funerals were taking place nearby for those who died on Friday, and he said they expected another big protest on Sunday.

A pickup truck of Qaddafi critics wheeled by just in time to carry the foreign journalists back to meet their official driver, and the official tour continued.

Kareem Fahim contributed reporting from Benghazi, Libya, and Sharon Otterman from Cairo.

The End Of The Arab Dream

Muammar al-Qaddafi's fall won't just mark the close of an awful dictatorship -- it will end the Arab world's disastrous half-century-long affair with utopian governing fantasies.

By James Traub
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 25/02/2011

If Muammar al-Qaddafi falls, as seems increasingly likely, he will land with the rending crash of an immense, rigid object, like the statue of Saddam Hussein pulled down in Baghdad's Firdos Square. This is not because, despite his own delusions, Qaddafi mattered to the world remotely as much as Saddam did. Rather, it's because the Jamahiriya, or stateless society, he fostered in Libya constitutes the last of the revolutionary fantasies with which Arab leaders have mesmerized their citizens and justified their ruthless acts of repression since the establishment of the modern Arab world in the years after World War II.

Qaddafi and the other junior officers who overthrew Libya's King Idris in a bloodless coup in 1969 were inspired by the revolt of the Free Officers in Egypt, who had similarly deposed an unpopular, pro-Western monarch in 1952. The Free Officers under Gamal Abdel Nasser declared a new socialist regime, confiscating the properties and eliminating the privileges of the old elite. Especially after the Bandung Conference of nonaligned nations in 1955, Nasser's pan-Arab vision, which would dissolve colonial borders in order to establish an Arab superstate, became the default ideology of a generation of young thinkers and activists in the Middle East.

The leaders of the Libyan coup also called themselves the Free Officers. Nasser's own reputation had been destroyed by the disastrous outcome of the 1967 war with Israel, but Qaddafi and his co-conspirators saw themselves as the new generation of Arab revolutionaries. "Tell President Nasser we made this revolution for him," Qaddafi said in the aftermath of the coup. "He can take everything of ours and add it to the rest of the Arab world's resources to be used for the battle [against Israel, and for Arab unity]." Over the next few years, Qaddafi would forge pacts with his neighbors, including Chad, Egypt, and Sudan -- all of them far more populous than Libya -- in a vain and mostly ludicrous pursuit of Nasser's dream of a pan-Arab state.

The Libyan leader's ambitions turned out to be yet more grandiose than Nasser's. Qaddafi's Green Book, first published in 1975, offered a design for a state ruled directly by its own citizens with none of the usual mediating institutions -- parties, parliaments, even central government. The revolution would abolish as well the institutions of private ownership. "Whoever possesses the house in which you dwell, the vehicle in which you ride or the income on which you live," Qaddafi wrote, "possesses your freedom, or part of it." This freedom, however, belonged not to the individual but to the collective, for "the individual is linked to the larger family of humankind like a leaf is to a branch or a branch to a tree. They have no value or life if they are separated." The Green Book was an exercise, if a daft one, in utopian totalitarianism.

Qaddafi did in fact succeed in destroying Libya's political and economic institutions -- though only, of course, to remove obstacles to his own brand of despotism. Arab elites came to view him as a loose cannon and a dangerous crank. And yet his revolutionary language and his open support for violence against Israel and the West made him for a time a popular hero in the Arab world. In A History of Modern Libya, Dirk Vandewalle writes that "to many in Libya and within the region, there was something riveting and audacious about his analyses and his proposed solutions." Qaddafi "spoke the unpalatable truths that others" -- those elites -- "did not dare to articulate." Libya's hero offered deeply satisfying answers to the growing Arab sense of failure.

The revolutionary ideology was the opiate of the Arab world, distracting citizens from the manifest failure of their rulers. In The Dream Palace of the Arabs, Fouad Ajami describes how an older cosmopolitanism, in tension with the West but assimilating its influences, began to give way in the 1950s to both sectarianism and totalitarian designs. Pan-Arabism broke on the shoals of the 1967 fiasco -- even if Qaddafi didn't get the message -- but Palestinian radicalism offered itself as an alternative unifying ideology. The militants argued, as Ajami writes, "that 'guerrilla warfare' or 'wars of national liberation' or 'revolution' would deliver Arab society from its superstitions and weaknesses." That, too, of course, turned out to be a hollow fantasy, though hatred toward Israel remains an instrument of solidarity and mobilization in the Arab world.

The terrain of the Middle East is littered with these Ozymandian shards: pan-Arabism, Palestinian militancy, the "secular socialism" of the Baath Party in Iraq, the Islamic revival of Sudan (now facing the threat of disintegration), and finally the Jamahiriya. The ferocity and swift spread of the uprisings across the Middle East and North Africa have demonstrated the bankruptcy of these ideologies and highlighted the disgust of citizens who know all too well they've been sold a bill of goods. The rage in Libya, a relatively affluent and well-educated state by Arab standards, has been especially shocking; Qaddafi's citizens obviously view him not as a crank but a monster.

The statues are crashing to earth. This is the Arab world's exit into history -- an exit from a sterile, walled-off place into a land of painful and consequential choices. The protesters assure journalists, and one another, that they are prepared for the burdens of citizenship, even if their experience of citizenship is only a few days old. They ought to be fully inoculated by now against glittering schemes that direct their attention away from their own well-being toward some remote good or distant enemy.

But are they? The vacuum created by the collapse, not only of regimes but of belief systems, no matter how decrepit, could all too easily be filled by other all-encompassing systems -- thus the fear that Islamic radicals will hijack the revolution in Egypt, or that Bahraini Shiites will topple that country's Sunni regime and then profess their fealty to Tehran. History provides plenty of analogies: It took barely a decade for Russians to throw off the yoke of Communism, tire of their messy experiment with freedom, and embrace Vladimir Putin's soft authoritarianism.

Libya is the country most likely to replace one totem with another. By eliminating all rival institutions, Qaddafi has ensured that there is nothing, and no one, to take his place. And should the country descend into chaos, the homegrown jihadists known as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, supposedly "rehabilitated" by a foundation run by the dictator's son, Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, might well make a bid for power, or at least seek to reorganize themselves. A post-Qaddafi Libya is likely to need outside help. Perhaps the Arab League should view the country as its first exercise in state-building.

As for the others -- which at this point means Tunisia and Egypt -- it's possible, and maybe even likely, that on balance their new regimes will be less hospitable to the United States and Israel than were their predecessors. But those regimes will almost certainly be better for their citizens themselves -- more accountable to the public, more focused on human development, less ideological and bombastic. And if they're not, the voters can throw them out and try someone else.

In his inaugural address, U.S. President John F. Kennedy said of the new countries of the developing world, "We shall not always expect to find them supporting our view. But we shall always hope to find them strongly supporting their own freedom." This was not just inaugural hot air. Whatever its foreign policy, a government whose legitimacy depends on delivering the goods to its citizens rather than on demonizing outsiders -- including the West -- will ultimately be a better partner for the United States.

Will Syria Become More Democratic?

 By David Ignatius from Damascus
This Commentary was published in The Washington Post on 27/02/2011

The rise and fall of a protest demonstration here recently shows that Syrians share the yearning for dignity that's sweeping the Arab world - and also illustrates why President Bashar al-Assad so far hasn't been threatened by this tide of anger. 

Here's what happened on Feb. 19, according to accounts provided separately by a Western diplomat and a Syrian official: A policeman insulted a driver in downtown Damascus; when the man protested, he was beaten by the cop, who was joined by two others. It was the sort of harsh encounter with authority that Arabs swallowed, bitterly but passively, until the surge of anger in Tunisia and Egypt. 

A crowd of hundreds quickly gathered in the Damascus street and began chanting. According to a diplomat who has reviewed tape recordings of the incident, the chants roughly translated: "We are the people. The people don't want to be humiliated." People in the crowd videotaped the action with their cellphones and posted the drama on the Internet. 

It was a volatile situation. Then something interesting happened, which shows how closely the authorities are monitoring events: The minister of the interior arrived on the scene about 30 minutes after the protest started, apologized to the beaten man and took him away in his car. The police officers were reprimanded. The crowd eventually dispersed, and some (perhaps with official encouragement) began chanting in favor of Assad. 

The government did another sensible thing: Rather than try to suppress information about the event (which would have been futile, in any event), the government allowed the videos to circulate widely on the Internet. People shared their anger about police abuses, but the rage doesn't seem to have focused on the leader, as has been the case in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. 

Syria is a paradox in this Arab season of revolt. It has an authoritarian regime dominated by a corrupt Baath Party - a relic of the age of dictators that is being swept away in so many other countries. But President Assad, relatively young at 45 and wrapped in the popular banner of resistance to Israel and America, hasn't yet been affected. 

Is Syria next? That's impossible to predict at a time when, as an Arab proverb puts it, "the artery of shame has ruptured." The answer depends on whether the Assad regime is able to make reforms - and move as quickly as it did a week ago in responding to that street demonstration. 

The French, who probably know this country better than most outsiders, view Assad as relatively secure. "In the short to medium term, the probability of revolution is extremely low in Syria compared to other countries," is how one official describes the French perspective. 

An intriguing debate is underway among Assad's advisers about whether he should allow more democracy and openness - something he has long claimed he wants - or keep the controls fastened tight. The reformers argue that change will enhance Assad's popularity, while the security establishment counters that concessions now would be a sign of weakness - and empower the Muslim Brotherhood. 

Assad must decide soon whether to allow real parties - other than the Baath and its various fronts - to compete in elections this year. Syria has both municipal and parliamentary elections scheduled for this year, and the question is whether there will be real, open balloting for candidates and parties, or a Soviet-style, rubber-stamp version, as in the past. Another opportunity for a shake-up is a congress of the Baath Party also planned for this year. 

Reformers hope that Assad will amend the constitution so that it doesn't require Baath rule and instead allows inter-party competition. "If we have different political parties, it's healthy for the Baath, which is slowing down and getting distanced from the people," argues one Syrian reformer. 

Corruption is also a volatile issue here. The regime is vulnerable because Assad's cousin, Rami Makhluf, is the dominant shareholder of the lucrative cellphone franchise known as Syriatel. Assad is considering whether Makhluf should reduce his interest to make way for foreign investment, according to two knowledgeable people. But that reform move could trigger a rift within his family. 

The debate among Assad's inner circle mirrors the wider political battles that are rocking the Arab world. For now, the streets of Damascus are mostly full of shoppers, not protesters. But if the experience of other countries over the past two months shows anything, it's that delaying reform too long in a one-party state like Syria is potentially a fatal mistake.

60 % Of Saudi Men Financially Exploit Their Wives

By Fatin al-Shehri
This article was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 25/02/2011

A study by Saudi Arabian social researcher at the University of Umm al-Qura, Dr. Mahmoud Kisnawi, claims that 60 percent of Saudi Arabian husbands financially exploit their wives.
 
The study argues that many working wives allowed their husbands to take advantage of their salaries, under the pretence of ensuring family stability, despite the wives religious and legal right to her complete salary.
 
Dr. Kisnawi confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that 60 percent of husbands utilize their wives salaries to enter the real estate market or complete the construction of a home, without taking into account the needs and desires of the wife. He added that this phenomenon contributed to the increase in divorce rates in Saudi Arabia.
 
Kisnawi added "in some cases, husbands have demanded that their wives provide them with large amounts of money so that they can complete the construction of their home. However these husbands may be deceiving their wives and want to complete construction in order to marry a second wife, with this [second] wife living in the home bought by the first wife's salary. This causes psychological trauma to the [first] wife and causes her to lose her trust in the sanctity of marriage, and as a result she would [therefore] seek separation and divorce."
 
Dr. Kisnawi told Asharq Al-Awsat that the issue of what happens with a wife's salary remains a thorny issue in Saudi Arabian society, and has contributed in the increase in divorce rates. He added "many wives perceive that their husbands are stealing their rights with regards to their monthly salary, and this causes [marital] problems, often forcing the woman to submit to her husband in order to protect the integrity of the family and the welfare of her children."
 
Dr. Kisnawi also told Asharq Al-Awsat that the majority of men today who are looking to marry would prefer for their wife to work. This is because a wife's salary allows the husband either to financially exploit her, or, for the husband and wife to cooperate with one another and financially build a stronger future together. Kisnawi said that 40 percent of husbands have this kind of relationship with their wives, whereby they first obtain the wife's consent before utilizing her salary.
 
For her part, Maha Yousef, who is a working wife, told Asharq Al-Awsat that the issue of husbands financially exploiting their wives salaries is today a major reason for divorce. She revealed that her own marriage had lasted for 25 years, before ending in divorce when her husband decided to marry a second wife. However she clarified "his [second] marriage was not the primary reason that I asked for a divorce, but rather due to the manner in which he [financially] exploited me and convinced me that by paying money to complete the construction of a house we owned, this would guarantee my future and the future of my children."
 
However she added "after he finished financially exploiting me, and the house was built, he decided to marry a second wife, and for this second wife to live in the house that I spent my life working to finance. This caused me emotional and psychological trauma, and I saw that divorce was the only solution that would end this crisis, and return a portion of my dignity which was ripped away by the father of my children."
 
As for the Islamic jurisprudential view of this issue, Sheikh Mohamed al-Nujaimi, a member of the International Fiqh Academy, said that the majority of Muslim scholars believed that a wife has complete freedom to utilize the money and property in her name as she liked, without needing the consent of her husband.
 
He added "the wife's salary is considered part of her wealth which she owns and which she has a right to, so she may utilize this as she sees fit so long as this is religiously permissible. This corresponds with Islam's honoring of women, because women's financial obligation [to their husbands] is not the same as husbands to his wife. This is one of the beautiful things about Islamic Shariaa Law."

The Postponement Of Utopia

By Husam Itani

This comment was published in al-Hayat on 25/02/2011

The Arab revolutions are leading salvation projects towards further unfeasibility, as the slogan of the Civil State raised by the Egyptians clearly indicates that those raising it no longer tolerate any talk about a religious state.

The same applies to all the earthly heavens that were promised by utopian ideologies of different sources and backgrounds. The new Arab revolutions have put an end to the illusions of the Aflaqist and Gaddafist unions founded on utopian Pan-Arab ideologies, or at least have postponed them indefinitely. Likewise, the revolutions have upended whatever remains of the actual or potential leverage enjoyed by Islamist movements, especially in their Jihadist facet.

After millions of people took to the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, the conspiratorial-subversive mind fell in a deep predicament. Who will believe after this that a small clique with limited education and imagination could indeed induce change towards the better for the Arab people? Who will believe in the utopia that this clique will be calling for, after seeing history being made by the shouts and actions of the crowds?

More importantly, history proved once again that it chooses its own surprising path. Here are the regimes that have started to take shape in Tunisia and Egypt, featuring coalitions that cannot be otherwise tolerated by ideological governments carrying absolute salvation projects. And here are these new regimes announcing that the Arabs – or at least the Tunisian and Egyptian people – have relinquished the impossible utopia in favor of the possible national state, and that the two people among other Arab populations will no longer await the realization of this utopia and will instead move toward the accomplishment of a feasible political, social and economic project, capable of realizing the minimum level of requirements of a decent living for the Tunisians and the Egyptians.

These facts bring back to mind a study by American critic Fredric Jameson entitled “Progress Versus Utopia.” Although the study focuses on the role of utopia in various literary and narrative works by clarifying the obstacles hindering humanity’s progress, and the role of science fiction in conveying the contradictions of the present in a futuristic light - while relying on literary critique rather than political philosophy –, one can conclude that realistic progress often contradicts utopian ideologies, whether those embracing humanity as a whole or those related to a specific group.

Moreover, also based on Jameson’s writings, the utopian project is a “promises-making machine.” This means that the high level of political realism will automatically lead to the collapse of utopian ideas, as currently being witnessed in Egypt and Tunisia.

On the opposite end of the expressions traditionally used to describe the political practices of the youths - by saying for example they are romantic and staged in complete disregard of objective facts on the ground -, we are seeing in Tunisia and Egypt something that shows political craftsmanship in terms of the management of realities on the ground and the recognition of and coexistence with differences of opinions and beliefs. Also on the opposite end of vagaries hostile to politics and politicians, which accuse the latter of being “involved in filthy tricks” (as it was said by Wael Ghonim in an angry statement), the majority of the young activists involved in public affairs are aware of basic concepts related, for example, to the balances of internal and external powers, and the importance of avoiding positions dictated by the wishes and desires drawn up by the ideological mind.

The youths have replaced the utopian project with another feasible one, thus showing a maturity exceeding that of many pretending to be young and rushing to reap the fruits of change.

A Saudi Prince's Plea For Reform

By Alwaleed Bin Talal Bin Abdulaziz Al Saud
This commentary was published in The New York Times on 25/02/2011

THE toppling of the heads of state of Egypt and Tunisia on the heels of huge demonstrations there, and the subsequent manifestations of public unrest in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Yemen, have generated a wide range of opinion on the root causes of those events. Some analysts see the protests as a natural outcome of the policies of autocratic regimes that had become oblivious to the need for fundamental political reform, while others view them as the inevitable product of dire economic and social problems that for decades have been afflicting much of the Arab world, most particularly its young.

In either case, unless many Arab governments adopt radically different policies, their countries will very likely experience more political and civil unrest. The facts are undeniable: 

The majority of the Arab population is under 25, and the unemployment rate for young adults is in most countries 20 percent or more. Unemployment is even higher among women, who are economically and socially marginalized. The middle classes are being pushed down by inflation, which makes a stable standard of living seem an unattainable hope. The gap between the haves and the have-nots is widening. The basic needs for housing, health care and education are not being met for millions.

Moreover, Arab countries have been burdened by political systems that have become outmoded and brittle. Their leaderships are tied to patterns of governance that have become irrelevant and ineffective. Decision-making is invariably confined to small circles, with the outcomes largely intended to serve special and self-serving interests. Political participation is often denied, truncated and manipulated to ensure elections that perpetuate one-party rule.

Disheartening as this Arab condition may be, reforming it is neither impossible nor too late. Other societies that were afflicted with similar maladies have managed to restore themselves to health. But we can succeed only if we open our systems to greater political participation, accountability, increased transparency and the empowerment of women as well as youth. The pressing issues of poverty, illiteracy, education and unemployment have to be fully addressed. Initiatives just announced in my country, Saudi Arabia, by King Abdullah are a step in the right direction, but they are only the beginning of a longer journey to broader participation, especially by the younger generation.

The lesson to be learned from the Tunisian, Egyptian and other upheavals — which, it is important to note, were not animated by anti-American fervor or by extremist Islamic zeal — is that Arab governments can no longer afford to take their populations for granted, or to assume that they will remain static and subdued. Nor can the soothing instruments of yesteryear, which were meant to appease, serve any longer as substitutes for meaningful reform. The winds of change are blowing across our region with force, and it would be folly to suppose that they will soon dissipate.

For any reform to be effective, however, it has to be the result of meaningful interaction and dialogue among the different components of a society, most particularly between the rulers and the ruled. It also has to encompass the younger generation, which in this technologically advanced age has become increasingly intertwined with its counterparts in other parts of the world.

Exclusion can no longer work. This admonishment was most forcefully and unabashedly expressed by no less a personage of an earlier generation than my father, Prince Talal bin Abdulaziz, in a recent television interview.

Social and political change is invariably turbulent, painful and unpredictable. But the Arab world has an abundance of resources, natural and otherwise, that transcend oil. Most important, it has a substantial reservoir of talent that can be enlisted in the creation of a vibrant social and economic order that would enable Arab countries to join the ranks of those nations that have within a few decades propelled themselves out of underdevelopment, stagnation and poverty. But that can be achieved only if the will to reform is unwavering, enduring and sincere.

Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud, a grandson of the founding king of modern Saudi Arabia, is the chairman of the Kingdom Holding Company and the Alwaleed bin Talal Foundations.

The West Owes It To Libyans To Protect Them From Another Massacre

Oil interests have trumped moral outrage for too long. The international community has a duty to prevent tribal war

By Omar Ashour
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 25/02/2011 

"I am a glory that will not be abandoned by Libya, the Arabs, the United States, and Latin America … Revolution, revolution, let the attack begin," said the self-described king of African kings, dean of Arab leaders, and imam of all Muslims, Muammar Gaddafi. The statement summarises the Libyan regime's extremely repressive response to the popular uprising against Gaddafi's 42-year dictatorship.

But Gaddafi's tactics have boxed him in. Should he be defeated, finding refuge abroad, as Tunisia's former President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali did, will be difficult. And internal exile, such as that currently afforded Hosni Mubarak, will be impossible.

Although the regime's capacity to commit large-scale massacres has shrunk, Gaddafi's defeat will come at a high cost in terms of human life. In an extreme scenario, the regime could use chemical weapons, as Saddam Hussein did against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988, or it could launch an intensive aerial bombardment campaign, as Syria's Hafez al-Assad's did in Hama in 1982.

At that point, international intervention would be more likely than ever. One and a half million Egyptians and many other foreign nationals, including British citizens, are in Libya and now are in an extremely vulnerable position. In his first speech during the crisis, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the colonel's supposedly "moderate" son, alleged an international conspiracy against the regime, involving Egyptians, Tunisians, and other foreign agents. The response of father and son has been to incite violence against foreigners.

Another possible scenario is a move by the army, or a significant part of it, against Gaddafi and his sons. The problem is that the Libyan army has not been able to act cohesively since the protests began, in contrast to the Egyptian and Tunisian armed forces. Senior and junior army officers have defected, often with their troops, to the regime's opponents. Two air force pilots diverted to Malta, followed by a navy warship – all in defiance of Gaddafi's orders to bomb the eastern city of Benghazi.

But, at least so far, there have been no splits reported among the Revolutionary Committees, Gaddafi's diehard loyalists, who are estimated to total around 20,000 fighters. The same is true of Brigade 32, which is headed by another of Gaddafi's seven sons, Khamis Gaddafi. This brigade is in charge of protecting the Bab al-Aziziya area in Tripoli, where the colonel lives in his ersatz Bedouin tent.

Libyan military intelligence, headed by Abdullah al-Sonosi, the Internal Security Forces, led by al-Tuhami Khaled, and the Jamahiriya Security Apparatus also remain intact, with no reported splits. True, the deep, ingrained rivalry and mistrust between Libya's military-security apparatuses is likely to give rise to splits that will be a key factor in undermining the regime. But, overall, the Libyan army's tribal nature and allegiances prevent it from functioning as a single unit, either in backing Gaddafi, or in joining the revolt against him.

Tribal allegiances will play a pivotal role if Gaddafi is defeated in the coming days. Historical rivalries, vendettas, and weapons are widespread among Libya's tribesmen, which suggest that tribal warfare in the post-Gaddafi era is likely.

Yet signs from Libya's east, now a "Gaddafi-free" zone, indicate otherwise. Of course, inter-tribal rivalries are strong in eastern Libya. But the level of organisation and co-ordination among those leading the rebellion has been quite impressive. Security, medical, and other committees were rapidly established, just as similar rudimentary institutions of order were created in Egypt by rebellious protesters a few weeks ago.

Moreover, when Ahmed Gadaffi al-Dam and Said Rashwan, two leading figures in the regime, visited Egypt and attempted to recruit tribes with Libyan branches to attack the Gaddafi-free east from Egypt's western desert, they came away with nothing. Awlad Ali and the other tribes refused the generous bribes offered to them.

Libyan civil society is not as developed as its Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts, which further suggests that Gaddafi's downfall could result in tribal warfare. But the lessons of Iraq's bloody post-Saddam civil war were learned across the Arab world, and the dedication and maturity of Tunisian and Egyptian youth has become a model for other Arabs seeking freedom and dignity. Libya's people may be more politically mature and sophisticated than many observers believe.

The international community has a fundamental legal duty towards Libya. The names of those who head the forces responsible for the killings that have occurred are well known. If generals and colonels like Abdullah al-Sonosi, Abdullah Mansour, and al-Tuhami Khaled, as well as Gaddafi and his sons, were placed on international watch lists, or if arrest warrants were issued against them, many of their subordinates would think twice before ordering their soldiers to shoot or bombard.

The west has known about crimes against humanity and terrorist plots committed by Gaddafi's regime for decades, most notably the June 1996 Abu Selim massacre, in which more than 1,200 political prisoners were gunned down after protesting against prison conditions. Yet there was no international inquiry, mainly because oil interests trumped moral outrage.

The west owes it to Libyans to protect them from another massacre. So far, the Obama administration and European leaders have said all the right words. But words are not enough; it is time for concrete action.

Be Careful What You Wish For

By Charles A. Kupchan

This commentary was published in The International Herald Tribune on 25/02/2011

As the violence escalates in Libya, Western governments remain tongue-tied and befuddled as they struggle to react to the popular revolts that are sweeping the Middle East. At one moment, they eagerly compare the uprisings to the French revolution or the fall of the Berlin Wall. At the next, they cautiously backpedal, clearly mindful of the threats the revolts pose to the West’s strategic and economic interests.

The confusion is understandable. The unrest marks a buoyant reaffirmation of the universal desire for voice and dignity and may well enable democracy to take root in the Middle East. At the same time, the uprisings are not only producing bloodshed, but also toppling regimes on which the West relies for energy and strategic cooperation.

Putting the upheaval in historical perspective buttresses the case for caution.

To be sure, the moment has enormous potential. After all, the arrival of participatory government in the Western world cleared the way for secular nationalism, social cohesion and peaceful relations among stable democracies. But there was plenty of conflict along the way. Democratization in the Middle East promises to be similarly turbulent — and is poised to have quite different effects.

On two key dimensions — the relationship between religion and politics and the link between nationalism and social cohesion — the Middle East is following a trajectory quite different from the West’s. If democracy does take root in the Middle East — and the jury is still out — the regimes that emerge may well be much tougher customers than the autocracies they replace.
In the West, modernity has meant the separation of church and state. Christianity is a religion of faith, not law; its outsized influence on European politics during the medieval era stemmed from a longstanding alliance between secular rulers and the Catholic Church. After the Protestant Reformation, politics in the West took a secular turn that only deepened with the arrival of democracy.

In contrast, Islam is a religion of faith and law, in which there is no separation between the sacred and the secular. Beginning soon after the birth of Islam in the 7th century, state and mosque became inextricably bound.

Secular regimes of course do exist in the modern Middle East, but most of them maintain their secularity through coercion, not consent. In those countries that have experimented with participatory government, Islam has only strengthened its hold on politics.

The 1979 revolution in Iran gave birth to a theocracy. In 1991 Islamists won elections in Algeria, but were blocked from taking power by the military. In Iraq, elections have installed a Shiite-led coalition with Islamist leanings. Elections in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories have strengthened the hand of Hezbollah and Hamas, respectively. The rise of Turkey’s middle class has brought to power the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist-inspired party that has ended decades of political dominance by secular elites. In Egypt, a recent poll revealed that 95 percent of the population believes that Islam should play a large role in politics.

This track record makes clear that the more democratic the Middle East becomes, the greater the role that Islam — even if a moderate brand — will play in its politics. This outcome is neither good nor bad; it is simply a reality in a part of the world where politics and religion are intertwined.

Nonetheless, Western observers and policy makers had better stop operating under the illusion that the spread of democracy to the Middle East also means the spread of Western values.
The role of nationalism in the Middle East has similarly diverged sharply from the Western experience. In the West, nationalism emerged in step with consensual politics; it was the binding glue that replaced religion and dynasty as the main source of political identity.

In contrast, the nation-state in the Middle East is an imported construct, one that arrived via Europe’s imperial powers. And instead of being organic polities, countries in the region are contrived entities that cut across sectarian, ethnic and tribal loyalties. Egypt is one of the few exceptions; its sense of nationhood dates to ancient times.

But Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and most of the states on the Arabian Peninsula and in North Africa are political constructions left behind by retreating colonial powers. Iraq’s transition to democracy has been so troubled in part because tribal, sectarian and ethnic divides regularly trump a weak national identity. The same goes for Lebanon.

With the exception of Bahrain, whose Sunni monarchy rules over a Shiite majority, the Gulf states tend to enjoy greater stability and cohesion — but only because they are held together by tribal patronage systems. Libya’s politics also run along tribal lines. Should a coercive and top-down brand of rule give way to democracy in these countries, long-suppressed cleavages would likely rise to the surface.

These reflections by no means suggest that the West should resist the political opening that is finally coming to the Middle East. But they should approach the ongoing upheaval with eyes wide open. Rather than making overheated proclamations about the spread of liberty, Western leaders had better start mapping out plans for dealing with a Middle East that, even if more democratic, will be more beholden to political Islam and more vulnerable to domestic and regional upheaval.

Charles A. Kupchan is professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.

A Middle Eastern Dream Deferred?

By Francis Njubi Nesbitt
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy In Focus on 24/02/2011

The Mubarak dictatorship is over! The military dictatorship lives on!   

The events in Tunisia and Egypt make it clear that change is coming to the Arab world. But is this change we can believe in?   

Unfortunately, it is increasingly evident that, although the demonstrators have won some concessions, authoritarianism remains in place.   

What we are witnessing is an explosion of an emotional volcano pent up for over 50 years. Educated and middle class Arabs are sick and tired of impunity and corruption. They want the freedoms that they see spreading around the world. They want the freedoms that spread around Eastern Europe, Latin America, and some parts of Africa during the “second independence” of the 1990s.   

Pundits and the English-speaking media have declared that we are witnessing a “revolution.” A revolution, however, requires a change in ideology, a powerful and charismatic leader, and a political movement. So far, however, there is no ideology, no transformative agenda, and no leader.  

Protesters did successfully depose Zine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak. But they are only a symptom of the problem. They were both representatives of the military. They came to power in military coups and ruled with the support of the military. Furthermore, the militaries were beholden to the United States. Egypt receives more military aid than the other 52 counties in Africa combined. Mubarak’s chosen successor, Omar Suleiman, was the torturer-in-chief for the Bush administration.   

Is this a revolution or the rebranding of military dictatorships? 

Not 1989

Experts have compared the current rebellion in the Arab world to what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989 when the Soviet Union collapsed. One major difference, however, is that the regimes under pressure in the Middle East are allies of the United States. The Soviet-era dictatorships in Eastern Europe were not. 

This revolt in North Africa actually resembles the democratization process that ushered in a “second independence” for some African countries in the 1990s. The first independence movement got rid of colonialism; the second ousted military dictators. In 1991 alone, over 30 African countries were rocked by pro-democracy revolts. Millions turned out for peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations.  Military dictatorships fell like dominos. Between 1985 and 1989 only five countries held competitive elections - Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. From 1990-1994, more than 38 countries held truly competitive elections of which 29 openly challenged dictators. 

People danced in the streets. The international community celebrated this demonstration of nonviolent people power. Euphoria and hyperbole reigned. “We won’t go back!” “Free at last!” 

A Mixed Legacy

Some countries successfully transitioned from brutal dictatorships to multiparty democracies.  South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy epitomizes the democratization process.  In other cases, however, the results were less impressive.  Some movements took a decade to bear fruit.  Others, such as Somalia, for instance, descended into chaos after the United States abandoned its erstwhile friend Siad Barre.   

Like the current rebellion in the Arab world, the African revolt came during a period of marked change in the global balance of power.  The collapse of the Soviet Union delegitimized single-party states and the use of cold war rhetoric as an excuse for supporting despots.   

The current climate is very similar to that of immediate post-cold war period.   The election of Obama signaled a post-“war on terror” era.  It also heralded the emergence of an international consensus in favor of promoting democratic principles that coincided with and affirmed powerful pro-democracy movements.  

In other words, the assumption that this is a homegrown “revolution” without global implications and influences is dead wrong.   

The rebellions are clearly feeding on a new global consensus that it is unacceptable to fire upon peaceful demonstrators The recent defections by Libyan diplomats and officials would have been unimaginable only a month ago. So is the widespread panic among erstwhile “stable” Arab dictatorships.    

A Democratic Dream Deferred? 

To the Arab world, the election of Barack Obama delegitimized the “war on terror” and the despots who exploited the Bush administration’s irrational fears of Islamist expansion. Obama’s choice of Cairo to give his landmark speech of reconciliation with the Arab world raised the stakes immeasurably. For the first time since the Cold War the U.S. president addressed the Arab people instead of its leaders. He told them that he was on their side, the side of freedom, not the side of the dictators. In 2011, the people of Cairo, the site of his landmark speech, decided to test his resolve.    

To his credit, Obama took less than a week to call for democracy in Egypt. In comparison, it took three years for Reagan to drop Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and over three months for Clinton to distance himself from the Suharto regime in Indonesia. It is impossible to imagine such unequivocal support for nonviolent social change in the Arab world during the war-mongering Bush-Cheney era. The demonstrations would have been inevitably anti-Bush and thus interpreted as anti-American with predictable consequences.   

There are three reasons why what we are witnessing in North Africa and the Middle East is not revolutionary. It is a middle-class revolt of doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. There are no transformative demands. And the military is still in charge.   

The use of social media in Egypt, and the rest of the Middle East, is limited to those with means. The majority does not have access to computers and does not use social media. The World Bank estimates, for instance, that fewer than 13 million people in Egypt have access to the Internet in a population of over 80 million. Most Egyptians live in the rural areas, have low levels of education, and are more likely to subscribe to extremist Islamist ideas on the role of women and Islamic law. These are not the people we see demonstrating in the cities. They do not share the ideals of the demonstrators and will not benefit from the superficial reforms. 

The overarching demand is that the dictators of the last 30 years leave office. Revolutions, however, are not about individuals: they are about systems and institutions. As we have seen, the militaries remain the dominant political institutions in the region. Even in the best-case scenario, such as the quasi-democratic regime in Turkey, the military continues to call the shots.   

A Pragmatic Response

Pragmatism dictates a cautious and nuanced approach. The Obama administration has done a good job of balancing the interests of the United States and the genuine demands for democratization in North Africa and the so-called Middle East.   

For decades, U.S. security interests have clashed with its supposed commitment to democracy. Support for despots such as Ben Ali and Mubarak was justified on national security grounds. This dualism has undermined U.S. credibility for decades.   

The Obama administration should take note of the lack of anti-American sentiment in the demonstrations and reciprocate by supporting the pro-democracy forces. The rhetorical support of the last few weeks should be followed by concrete partnerships in building democratic institutions. The leverage provided by U.S. aid to institutions such as the militaries across the Arab world should be used to promote democratization. 

The United States has vast human resources that could also be mobilized to support democratization and development abroad. The problem over the last 30 years has been the demonization of the humanitarian impulse as either self-serving or enabling. The United States must understand that there are legions of Arab immigrants resident in the United States who support the democratization agenda but do not know how to proceed without seeming anti-American. 

The dream of Arab democracy has been deferred for many years. Will it, in this new era, "dry up/Like a raisin in the sun," as poet Langston Hughes wrote in 1951. "Maybe it just sags/Like a heavy load./Or does it explode?"

Francis Njubi Nesbitt is a Foreign Policy In Focus contributor and teaches African politics and conflict resolution at San Diego State University. He is the author of Race for Sanctions (Indiana University Press, 2004) and is completing a book on peacemaking in the Horn of Africa.

Act Now!

The world must do more than watch the Libyan bloodletting.

By Hussein Ibish
This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 24/02/2011

The unfolding catastrophe in Libya has forced the world to once again grapple with the conundrum of international humanitarian intervention. However, recent efforts at intervention -- notably the humiliating episode in Somalia and the terrible failure to act in Rwanda -- have revealed both the risks of action and the costs of inaction.

Muammar al-Qaddafi's bloodcurdling speech on Feb. 22 should force even skeptics of international intervention to think twice. In his defiant remarks, the Libyan dictator vowed to "cleanse Libya house by house" in order to stay in power. Qaddafi also insisted that he has not begun to crack down in earnest -- despite sketchy reports that his effort to quell the protests has already left hundreds, possibly thousands, of unarmed people dead -- and approvingly cited other uses of state security forces to quell unrest, such as the Chinese assault on Tiananmen Square and the U.S. actions in Waco and Fallujah.

Neither the United States nor the international community should be under any illusions about the extraordinary costs of humanitarian intervention. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that these difficulties are outweighed by the risks of standing by and watching events unfold without taking any meaningful action.

Let's start with the arguments against a full-throated intervention: There is little the United States can do on its own, and the scope of any potential engagement will have to be based on a broad-based international consensus. Even basic options, such as economic sanctions and the freezing of regime assets, will require support from countries such as Russia and China to have an effect. But these economic measures take time to make their impact felt, and they will certainly not produce, and probably won't seriously accelerate, regime change. Nor will they come quickly enough to stop Qaddafi's bloodletting of his own population.

Dissident Libyan diplomats, including the former deputy ambassador to the United Nations, have called for the more ambitious proposal of establishing a no-fly zone throughout the country. This would prevent the Qaddafi regime from continuing its use of warplanes and helicopters against the protesters. It might also inhibit the regime's ability to ferry in foreign mercenaries, on whom it appears to be relying in the face of growing military defections. And, of course, it would undermine the regime's ability to control the country at large.

Senior U.S. and NATO officials have so far not expressed any serious interest in becoming embroiled in the crisis in Libya, though the White House has refused to definitively take any option off the table. There are legitimate concerns about the long-term impact and short-term efficacy of aggressive intervention. Establishing a no-fly zone might place Americans and other Westerners still in Libya at risk, and compromise important Western economic interests. It could provide "evidence" for regime accusations that the rebellion is essentially an American plot, undermining the opposition movement in some people's eyes. Moreover, the international community may also feel that it simply lacks sufficient information about the forces at work within Libya to be entirely certain about what kind of outcome even a limited no-fly zone intervention would be promoting.

Even more ominously, if the regime holds on to power in Tripoli and some other regions for an extended period of time, a no-fly zone might set the stage for the long-term fragmentation of the country by consolidating the rule of various factions, including the government, in different parts of the country. If Libya is fractured between local groups, it may be very difficult to reunite the country -- possibly encouraging the development of a Somalia-style failed state in a strategic area of North Africa. The most significant concern, however, must be that a no-fly zone will simply be ineffective in preventing the escalation of the already enormous humanitarian crisis. As Qaddafi's use of mercenaries and loyal military units has shown, air power is not necessary to commit atrocities on the ground, especially against unarmed or lightly armed demonstrators.

And then there's the issue of escalation: Once the United States or the international community commits to protecting the Libyan people from their own government, it could prove very difficult to justify persisting with a no-fly zone policy when only intervention on the ground would stop the carnage. The example of the establishment of a no-fly zone over southern Iraq following the Gulf War -- which did nothing, of course, to stop Saddam Hussein from deploying his troops to crush the incipient revolt -- still looms large as a shameful incident in U.S. policy. Fear of being sucked into the use of ground forces -- with far greater potential blowback, internal and international opposition, and unintended consequences -- is also undoubtedly driving international caution.

But U.S. policymakers must not only consider the risks of intervention -- they, and the rest of the international community, also need to contemplate the grave risks of doing nothing. The United States and its allies are now forced to deal with an emerging new order in the Middle East; it is squarely in their interest to place themselves on the side of popular demands for reform, democratization, and the removal of unaccountable leaders who have held power for decades. It's not too late for the United States to be perceived as a positive force for change rather than a guardian of the old regional order, but standing idle while Libya burns would send the wrong message to the people of the region. Forging a broad international consensus for strong actions on Libya would be the wisest political and strategic course for the United States.

Symbolic actions such as freezing assets and economic sanctions are already overdue. A no-fly zone, in spite of its obvious limitations, should be organized as quickly as possible. Its creation will imply a commitment to protect the Libyan people from serious, sustained mass atrocities, and if it comes to that, the international community should be prepared to live up to its responsibilities -- in spite of the present risks. The dangers of escalation shouldn't be overblown: The regime's unpopularity, its loss of control of much of the country and growing military, bureaucratic, and diplomatic defections suggest that Western boots on the ground could well be unnecessary.

The international community not only has solid practical reasons to intervene in Libya -- it has a legal obligation. The invocation of the principle of the "responsibility to protect," which was developed post-Rwanda and endorsed by the U.N. Security Council in 2006, may become unavoidable if the situation in Libya continues to deteriorate. The doctrine commits the international community to taking timely and decisive action to stop mass atrocities when states are either committing, or unable to stop, them. Can anyone seriously doubt that this is becoming increasingly applicable to Libya?

International action in Libya also provides the United States and its allies with an opportunity to make an important and positive contribution to the upheaval currently under way across the Middle East. The widespread alarm in the Arab world about the Qaddafi regime's brutal tactics against the Libyan people means that aggressive international action would almost certainly be welcomed by the Arab public. Unlike other Western interventions in the region, humanitarian action in Libya would place the United States and the West on the side of the aspirations of millions of ordinary Arabs -- and on the right side of history and the wave of democratization sweeping the region.