'Refreshing And Worrying'

By Rami G. Khouri

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 24/12/2010

 

It is refreshing and worrying to discuss Middle East issues with friends, colleagues and knowledgeable people in the United States these days. It is refreshing because most people are convinced that Washington is serious about working hard for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is worrying because Washington is serious about working hard for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The problem, as seems obvious from discussions with people with inside knowledge of what is going on in both the United States and Israel, is that Washington’s energy and emphasis on the negotiating process lack the needed vision of what a permanent settlement would look like and what it sees as a fair resolution for all concerned.

The Israeli government has a clear vision of what it wants as a final arrangement, but most of the world rejects its demands as too ambitious and unfair to the Palestinians, while the more moderate Israeli public is content to let the rightwing government carry the day for now.

The Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world have both a clear vision of a comprehensive peace agreement and the negotiating means to get there, but they lack the leverage to generate any movement in that direction.

Washington’s special envoy to the Middle East peace-making process, George Mitchell, is in the region this week and has spoken of working to move the parties towards forging a framework agreement. This follows the bitter American experience of the past two years when pressure, cajoling, enticements and one outrageous bribe attempt failed to move the Palestinians and Israelis - both of whom rebuffed American demands in their own ways.

The United States’ good intentions, lofty rhetoric and energetic action are clearly insufficient to move the parties towards an agreement. So it seems that one option now being considered is to put on the table American compromise ideas for a settlement. If the United States moves in this direction, all signs are that it will not generate much progress if all other things remain as they are, i.e., the Arabs and Israelis feel no new incentives or disincentives to change their positions and move faster towards an agreement.

This is being matched, in the meantime, by two possible initiatives from the Palestinians: to obtain European and global recognition of a Palestinian state within its 1967 borders, and to go to the United Nations and seek a resolution on Palestinian statehood. Both are worthy goals, but neither will generate sufficient energy to move the parties towards making the hard decisions needed to break through the stalemate of the past 17 years, ever since the Oslo accords.

The occupied, exiled and besieged Palestinians are the ones who suffer most today, and have the most incentive to move things forward diplomatically, but the least leverage to do so. The Israelis have both the power and the incentive, but seem to lack the will to do so, perhaps believing that they can endure the current situation for decades or even generations to come.

The United States therefore remains the party everyone looks to for movement to break this stalemate. One American with much experience in the Middle East suggested in private that the reason the United States seems stuck in the Middle East is that its efforts are hampered by three Is: inability to act, incompetence when it does act, and illegitimacy that sometimes negates any attempt to act.

Two other Is were also suggested: insensitivity and ignorance. This is a hard but probably broadly accurate description of the American experience in the Middle East. This now must be supplemented with a final I: impotence - based on the experience of the past two years in failing to move the Israelis and Palestinians forward, despite serious efforts to do so.

It seems quite foolish to look to the Americans to resolve a conflict that has been severely aggravated by American policies that have given Israel the power and diplomatic protection in recent decades to remain intransigent, aggressive and colonial in its attitude to Palestinians and other Arabs.

Americans, for their part, are becoming understandably fed up with being asked to solve a conflict when the parties to the conflict themselves seem less eager to make the moves needed to succeed in finding a resolution. So they increasingly wonder if they should just drop their efforts and go home.

An important debate is finally starting to take place in the United States about what can and should be done to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace, but it has yet to fully include a discussion of the consequences of Washington’s own policies and the influence of pro-Israeli forces in the State Department and throughout the US political system. Whether the American political system will allow this to occur remains to be seen.

Economy, Not Politics, Is Worry For Iranians

By Parisa Hafezi from Tehran
This article was published in Gulf Times on 26/12/2010

With Iranians feeling choked by foreign sanctions, broken promises and money worries, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad faces as much pressure on the economic front as from politics.

Ahmadinejad has cut fuel and food subsidies to save $100bn on the state budget and to make Iran less vulnerable to any sanctions on fuel imports. Critics say he risks stoking inflation and consumer unrest.

For many ordinary Iranians, the economy is their main headache. They are not concerned whether the Islamic Republic is covertly building nuclear bombs, as the US and its allies fear.

International sanctions and the government’s elimination of subsidies have led to a general fear that life will get worse. The US imposed new sanctions on Iran on Tuesday to increase pressure on Tehran over its nuclear programme, which the Islamic state says is only for peaceful purposes.

“People are worried about the economic situation. You can not care about politics when you are worried about not being able to pay your rent,” said Farokh Amiri, a political science teacher.

Analysts say that despite public disgust with the economy, the revival of anti-government unrest was unlikely as the opposition leaders no longer had the power to inspire people.

The 2009 disputed re-election of Ahmadinejad plunged the world’s fifth biggest oil exporter into its biggest internal crisis since the 1979 Islamic revolution and exposed a deepening rift among the ruling elite.

“In the absence of coherent opposition leadership, mobilising unrest is almost impossible,” political science teacher Samad Hojjati said.

Students, merchants and clerics, who played a major role in mobilising unrest to topple the US-backed shah in 1979, have been either paralysed or sidelined since the vote, which the opposition says was rigged.

The establishment has neutralised its opponents and stamped out any expression of dissent, a senior western diplomat in Tehran said.

“Those who took into streets will think twice. The government has made any opposition very costly,” he said.

Thousands of people protesting against the conduct of the election were arrested after the vote. Most have since been released, though more than 80 people have received jail sentences of up to 16 years. Two people who were put on trial after the election have been executed.

“He played a very dangerous gamble to regain his legitimacy and popularity among Iranian grassroots...that is why he acts like a Robin Hood” said analyst Hojjati, referring to the monthly cash compensation of $40 per person which the government pays to the needy.

“Ahmadinejad needs lower-income Iranians’ vote to secure a 2012 parliamentary election victory.”

But frustration is simmering in the nation. Prices of most consumer goods have risen and many middle and lower-class Iranians already struggle to make ends meet.

“The monthly amount of $40 does not even take care of the electricity bill after the subsidy cut. How can I manage with a meagre salary of $500, when prices are rising,” said school teacher Hamid Maleki, 46, a father of three.

Thousands of Iranian truck drivers began strikes after an increase in the price of diesel fuel, opposition websites reported.

Courting confrontation both at home and abroad, Ahmadinejad also played a risky game by sacking his foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki. He was a close ally of parliament speaker Ali Larijani, a critic of Ahmadinejad’s policies.

Appointing Ali Akbar Salehi, an aide who heads the Iranian Atomic Energy Organisation, as acting Foreign Minister despite his lack of diplomatic expertise had a clear but indirect message, a former official said.

“Ahmadinejad dislikes criticism. Only like-minded people can have positions at his cabinet,” he told Reuters on condition of anonymity.

Ahmadinejad’s close aides have outraged many conservatives, including MPs, because of their “unorthodox” comments.

“Many lawmakers respect Salehi, who stands a good chance of overcoming the barrier of parliament’s required confidence vote for the post,” the former official said.

Iraqi Christians Exercise Caution For Christmas

Shiho Fukada for The New York Times

Iraqi Christians attended services in Baghdad on Friday at the Sacred Church of Jesus, a Chaldean Catholic church. Others stayed home, fearing violence.

By John Leland

This article was published in The New York Times on 24/12/2010

BAGHDAD — As they gathered to celebrate the birth of Jesus, the congregation here first contemplated death, represented by a spare Christmas tree decked with paper stars, each bearing a photograph of a member of a nearby church killed in a siege by Islamic militants in October.

The congregants on Friday night were fewer than 100, in a sanctuary built for four or five times as many. But they were determined. This year, even more than in the past, Iraqi’s dwindling Christian minority had reasons to stay home for Christmas.

“Yes, we are threatened, but we will not stop praying,” the Rev. Meyassr al-Qaspotros told the Christmas Eve crowd at the Sacred Church of Jesus, a Chaldean Catholic church. “We do not want to leave the country because we will leave an empty space.”

He added: “Be careful not to hate the ones killing us because they know not what they are doing. God forgive them.”

Throughout Iraq, churches canceled or toned down Christmas observances this year, both in response to threats of violence and in honor of the nearly 60 Christians killed in October, when militants stormed a Syrian Catholic church and blew themselves up. Since the massacre, more than 1,000 Christian families have fled Baghdad for the Kurdistan region in northern Iraq, with others going to Jordan or Syria or Turkey. Though the exact size of Iraq’s Christian population is unclear, by some estimates it has fallen to about 500,000 from a high of 1.4 million before the American-led invasion of 2003. Iraq’s total population is about 30 million.

This week, a new threat appeared on a Web site that said it represented the Islamic State of Iraq, a militant group that claimed responsibility for the October church siege. The Web site referred to a church in Egypt that it said was holding two women because they had converted to Islam, and vowed more carnage. “We swear to God, if there are only two of us left,” the text read, “one of the two will keep fighting you.”

Churches in Kirkuk, Mosul and Basra canceled or curtailed services for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, and warned congregations not to hold parties or mount displays. In Baghdad, decorations were seen in stores, but many churches scaled back or held only prayer sessions.

While Our Lady of Salvation, the church attacked in October, was among those that canceled services for Christmas Eve, it planned to hold services on Saturday. The Epiphany Dominican Convent canceled midnight Mass and then early Mass on Christmas morning so worshipers could avoid risky travel at vulnerable times. During the week, the church moved one Mass to a convent, so the nuns would not have to travel in religious dress.

“People are lost,” said the Rev. Rami Simon, one of five brothers at the convent. “They don’t know where they live now. Is this Iraq?”

For those who dare to attend services, he said: “I say, you must accept to live like the first Christians. They celebrated in a cave, and no one knew about it. So we are not the first to live it.”

But he added: “If I wasn’t a priest, I would not stay one minute in Iraq. As a priest, I find myself a missionary in my country. And some stay because we are here.”

At the Sacred Church of Jesus, attendance has dropped by half since October, Father Qaspotros said. He said he offered this reply to people who tell him they are afraid to come to church: “You are not supposed to be afraid. You are supposed to connect with God, and death is not the last step. If we die, we survive for God.”

For Faez Shakur, 25, who attended Father Qaspotros’s service on Christmas Eve, this was the message he took away. “Whenever there is disaster,” he said, “it means a new day, a new life.” When he saw the tree decorated with the faces of the dead, he cried, he said. But he was where he belonged, he said. “We don’t have anything else,” he said, “just to pray and continue.”

Obama's Foreign Policy Spine

By David Ignatius
This commentary was published in The Washington Times on 26/12/2010

For a world that feared (and in some cases, cheered) the prospect of American decline, this holiday season has been bracing. It showed that despite U.S. political and economic difficulties, President Obama is still able to rally support at home and abroad for a strong foreign policy.

Obama's Christmas-week legislative successes capped a two-month period in which his foreign policy team strengthened key alliances, from East Asia to NATO. After Obama's humbling in the November elections, world leaders were talking in stage whispers about the erosion of American power, and of Obama as a weak and inattentive president. Those worries haven't disappeared, but they are allayed by his recent successes.

The foreign policy challenges of the past two months were also the first test of the new national security adviser, Tom Donilon. True to his reputation as a political "Mr. Fix-It," he was low-key, to the point of near-invisibility - and he'll need to present a stronger public face to succeed in that job. But he ran a smooth and seamless policy process, without the competing voices that have sometimes been heard over the past two years.

Donilon's advantage, it appears, is that he is master of the house at the National Security Council. His predecessor, Gen. Jim Jones, also tried to run an orderly process, but he had to look over his shoulder at Rahm Emanuel, the former White House chief of staff who operated in a sort of prime ministerial role. Emanuel often used Donilon (who was Jones's deputy) as his personal foreign policy operative, which confused lines of responsibility.

"What we have now is a tightly aligned, single process for foreign policy," a senior White House official said when asked what difference the departures of Emanuel and Jones had made.

What has been notable about the recent foreign policy moves is that they have allowed Obama to show some backbone, a quality that Europeans, in particular, feared was missing. This firmness has been especially evident in contingency plans for North Korea.

The White House cites eight specific foreign policy gains over the past two months. The list begins with the president's trip to India in November, when he was still reeling from the Democrats' midterm defeat. That cast an aura of failure over the trip, but in retrospect it looks a bit more positive: In New Delhi, Obama managed to strengthen ties with India without upsetting Pakistan, a neat trick.

Next came South Korea. Although Obama was drubbed for not getting a free-trade deal before his arrival, his refusal to make last-minute concessions to Seoul made the final deal reached in December much better, and won it bipartisan support. It's arguably the most important free-trade pact since NAFTA.

A third success was the Lisbon summit in late November. This was the crowning diplomatic achievement of the late Richard Holbrooke, who managed to coax NATO to support a 2014 timetable for transition in Afghanistan. This bolstered the allies and helped fuzz Obama's July 2011 date for beginning withdrawal, which was perhaps his biggest foreign policy blunder - undercutting his troop surge even as he announced it a year ago.

The December Af-Pak review, the fourth item on the list, followed on the Lisbon frame. Obama's achievement here was to avoid a potential political land mine. A White House aide had explained that the president's goal was "fine-tuning, not changing the channel." He bought some time with a bland status-quo document that spoke of progress but called it "fragile and reversible."

Then came the three big theatrical events in December: the formation of an Iraqi government; the repeal of "don't ask, don't tell"; and ratification of the New START treaty with Russia. In all three, Obama succeeded by working closely with his diplomatic and military advisers, especially Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Finally, and least noticed, was the test with North Korea. While saying little in public, the administration mobilized for the possibility of war if North Korea continued its provocations. Obama cautioned Chinese President Hu Jintao in a phone call three weeks ago that because North Korea is a nuclear nation, its recklessness threatens the United States. The White House thinks the Chinese got the message - and warned Pyongyang.

Sadly, the president's biggest disaster was with his signature issue, Israeli-Palestinian peace. Obama was undone partly by his growing political weakness. I suspect that a stronger but still quixotic Obama will remount that horse next year.

Saudi Liberalism: Is The Problem In The Name?

By Mshari Al-Zaydi
This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 25/12/2010
 
Dr Abdullah al-Ghathami came out to criticize liberalism in Saudi Arabia, during an open lecture he gave at the King Saud University in Riyadh.
 
I watched this lecture in full, which was available online on the King Saud University's Faculty of Arts website. This recording lasted for around two hours.
 
For people seeking further information [about this lecture], please refer to the link on this website. As an ordinary observer, I was expecting a calmer approach from the famous Saudi critic, especially as Dr Abdullah al-Ghathami is one of few figures of the Saudi elite who has enriched the scene with his ideas, books, and even his "stories" such as his book detailing the "story of modernity." I was therefore surprised by Dr al-Ghathami’s approach, especially taking into account his distinguished presence and cultural role in Saudi Arabian academia and the marketplace of ideas.
 
In my opinion, I did not benefit [from this lecture], even though I was genuinely enthusiastic [to listen to it]. What I heard was no different to what I have heard and read before from the opponents of liberalism in Saudi Arabia over the past few years. It was true that Dr al-Ghathami, because he adopts an academic approach, was careful to ensure that he used academic terms, but the latest findings were no different to the "distorted" intellectual depiction of Saudi Arabian liberalism. In his lecture, he referred to a general and distorted perception of liberalism in Saudi Arabia, portraying it as having reached a dead-end. Al-Ghathami’s latest speech about liberalism merely served to underline the negative image of liberalism in the general perception of Saudi society. This is why al-Ghathami’s latest speech targeting and attacking liberalism was welcomed and echoed by the opponents of liberalism throughout Saudi Arabia, the majority of whom are members of the Islamic Awakening movement, or [religious] conservatives.
 
At this point, it is necessary to stress that the author of this article is in favor of all the cultural, social, and political phenomena in Saudi Arabia being studied, for we are in desperate need of these kinds of studies. Critiquing and indeed dissecting liberalism is not only permissible, but it is one of the most important duties for any scholar or researcher, including Dr al-Ghathami. As Saudi Arabian writer Abdullah al-Qafari put forward in his recent article in the "Riyadh" newspaper, even defining the term "Liberalism" is problematic in Saudi Arabia, as it is many other countries. This term seems to have developed into an object of popular satire, and a controversial social topic, and has therefore even been criticized and lampooned on satirical television programs such as "Tash ma Tash". However we expert more than this from scholars and researchers, as they are expected to investigate beyond the standard and oft-repeated definition, and in a professional and analytical manner, seek to reach an understanding, not support or oppose. This is a question of being devoted to an academic approach, but unfortunately this is something that did not happen in this instance, at least in my opinion.
 
Liberalism is an issue worthy of study, examination and analysis. It deserves to be placed in its historical, social and political context, and to be understood within the developments that have taken place in the Middle East. Specifically, these range from the dawn of the Al-Nahda [Arab Cultural Renaissance] to the end of the Cold War and the birth of the new world order under President George Bush Senior. We must also consider the rise of religious terrorism, which is something that existed before 9/11, contrary to what the opponents of liberalism tend to espouse in order to associate national reform with US foreign policy [following 9/11].

 
We can recall the acts of religious terrorism that struck Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as Algeria, not to mention the Al-Ulayya Bombings in Riyadh in 1995. We do not have to go far back in history to recall the Grand Mosque Seizure in 1979 by Juhayman al-Otaibi and his group, or the assassination of [late Egyptian President Anwar] al-Sadat in 1981 at the hands of Egyptian radical extremists.
 
All these events generated huge questions about the development of religious discourse and its reform in the Arab world. Many Arab intellectuals produced studies, some of them profound and wonderful, on the debates between the state and religion, tradition and modernity, and religious reform in general. This debate developed into a growing trend towards the necessity for political and religious reform. A famous theory soon emerged to the effect that religious intolerance and social rigidity were effects, rather than causes, the results of political despotism and autocracy. Egyptian sociologist and political dissident Saad Eddin Ibrahim was one of the most prominent advocates and defenders of this theory, and he believed that the only solution to this problem was for the immediately implementation of a democratic system, even if this would result in the fundamentalists coming to power. As a side note, we must say that Saad Eddin Ibrahim later distanced himself from this proposal. For his part, we see Dr al-Ghathami categorically putting forward the idea of elections in Saudi Arabia, however these would be elections in social clubs and social clubs alone, even if these elections bring extremists to power [in these social clubs].
 
The debate surrounding reform and development is an old one in the Muslim world; it almost seems to coincide with the birth of the concept of the Arab nation itself. The questions of freedom, secular and religious reform, and women's social reform, as well as other issues, were the fundamental fabric of the discourse during the Al-Nahda, particularly that by [Syrian Arab nationalist intellectual] Sati al-Husri, his colleagues, and their students.
 
Likewise in Saudi Arabia, the question of reform is considered an old one, particularly social, religious, and even political reform. Here we can recall the writings of [Saudi intellectual] Mohamed Hassan Awad and Abd al-Karim al-Juhayman.
 
A confrontation with the conservative and anti-modernist current soon began, particularly on the issue of women and the fight for female education, during the era of King Saud and King Faisal. The debate around social reform has also been well documented in the Saudi press.
 
Dr al-Ghathami is well aware of all these issues; he has even addressed some of them in his books. Therefore, is there nothing new to be said about the issue of reform in Saudi Arabia, or is the problem merely in the term "liberalism"?
 
This underplays the issue somewhat, because the problem does not lie in terms and definitions. Perhaps, Dr. al-Ghathami remembers a story that he himself previously mentioned about the problem that Saudi society has in dealing with the term "modernism" due to the criticisms made by key conservative literary figures.
 
In his book that deals with the story of modernity, Al-Ghathami recalls an occasion when traditionalists, modernists and media representatives participated in the Al-Janadriyah Heritage and Cultural Festival in 1988. At this time, the conservative critic Mohammad al-Malibari had announced his opposition to the term and indeed concept of modernism, saying that if a more appropriate concept was found, then he would not have a problem with the modernists. This prompted journalist Muhammad Sadiq Diyab to propose to rename this concept, and after much discussion he proposed to rename this "imaginary realism." Thus, we saw a new term coined, and an old term rejected, in the hope of ending the problem and stopping the criticism and attacks by the anti-modernists. However, of course, this did not happen, because the issue was not a problem of names and terms. These names were just a terminological construct veiling the real dispute regarding modernization and reform, amongst its supporters and opponents.
 
Let us discard the term liberalism for example. Let us throw it into the fire and re-define it under a new name: enlightenment, moderation, modernization, national reform, rationalism, or any other term you might choose. After a period of time, you would find that the opponents who distorted the first term will have gone on to distort the next!
 
Let's save our efforts and confine our discussions to the intellectual and dialectical content of the term, rather than exhausting ourselves in a fruitless struggle over the term itself.
 
The story is not a tale of names and terms; these issues have been discussed and analyzed in an academic manner. You can examine the validity of the terms with academic discipline, or even discuss them in general, but this must not become a preoccupation.
 
The story relates to the meaning [of the term], and the differences of opinion, regarding questions of reform and development. This is the core issue.

Lebanon: One Step In Return For Another?

By Walid Choucair

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 24/12/2010  

It is natural for the “great settlement” over the Lebanese crisis, resulting from the dispute over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, to be subject to tension between the parties concerned, whether domestic or foreign. Each side is striving to see that this settlement serves its interest, while everyone is agreed that it will involve compromises by both groups. The outlines of these compromises are gradually beginning to appear, amid strict secrecy about the details of this settlement.

This secrecy is allowing the sides, especially local players, to give free rein to their imaginations, as some envision the aspects of this settlement. This is despite the fact that some figures and parties are issuing information about the settlement and discussing its contents; they lack the minimum level of credibility, which would require them to acknowledge that they are unaware of what the settlement contains. Going too far in predicting what it entails will result in disappointment, when this settlement is eventually announced.

However, the discussion of its broad outlines, and denying the rumors of what the settlement contains, is believable, amid the heavy confusion that surrounds the circulation of information about the settlement. The circulation of this information is due more to desires than facts, and attempts to hint at things without speaking candidly.

However, the reliable information about the settlement permits one to say that it has been completed. If the time remaining before the announcement of the settlement is being used to make contacts to fortify the settlement internationally, to allow Syria to obtain guarantees about its relations with western countries, especially the United States, in exchange for its “engagement” in achieving the urgent western demand to preserve stability in Lebanon through the settlement, whose provisions are being prepared with Saudi Arabia, then calling the Saudi-Syrian understanding the “Great Settlement” is something that conforms to the reality.

Leaving behind the narrow Lebanese maneuvering, the news about efforts to secure American guarantees that satisfy Syria impart even more seriousness to this settlement, irrespective of what these efforts lead to in the end. The important thing is to see that Washington’s failure to satisfy Syria with these guarantees does not cause a setback for these efforts, and to see the White House deal realistically with Syria’s desire for these guarantees, in line with the former’s affirmation of intent to preserve stability in Lebanon. This is especially because this settlement will likely be based on separating the track of the STL from that of Lebanese domestic relations, in order to guarantee civil peace, without giving in to the demand by the tribunal’s opponents to abolish it or obstruct its work. This is what concerns the American administration and Western countries.

In the promised settlement, there is enough to create the foundation of a discussion between Syria and the United States. This discussion would tackle the so-called guarantees for Syria, as Damascus fears continued US pressure, or at the least a decision by US President Barack Obama to ignore the policy of engagement with Syria. Meanwhile, Syria would wait for what Washington will offer, due to the Syrian belief that the failure of US policy in the region means Washington should embrace openness with Damascus, with nothing in return.

The Saudi-Syrian settlement offers a window by which Damascus would obtain these guarantees, if the matter is approached with a bit of modesty. If Washington has adopted a rule of exchanging one step for another in its engagement with Syria, which Washington believes to have been a disappointment, some items in the settlement will require seeing what Damascus has done as a step that should generate a step in return by the Americans.

The Saudi-Syrian settlement might refer to setting down a mechanism to treat the decision to remove Palestinian arms outside the camps (even though no one knows how solid the item is in the settlement). If this happens, a policy such as this, in exchange for Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s absorbing the repercussions of the likely indictment by the STL, deserves attention. The seriousness in treating this issue signals an implementation of one of the items in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, which Washington continues to insist on; it appears in the provision related to disarming non-Lebanese militias. Even if Damascus adheres to this item in the settlement without returning to the text of the resolution, and seeks with its Lebanese allies to implement it, then it is an implementation – in such a case, the only pending item will be the disarming of Lebanese militias. This is something that the Lebanese have decided to refer to the National Dialogue sessions among their leaders, and the White House earlier understood this move.

In the end, it is in Washington’s power to come up with a step that it can take, in return for a step by Damascus to implement an international resolution, as part of the latter’s quest for guarantees…

Turkey And Israel Are Still Searching For A Magic Formula

By Soli Ozel
This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 24/12/2010 

The forest fire recently on Israel’s Mount Carmel presented a timely opportunity for the Turkish and Israeli governments to climb down from crisis mode and look for an opening to start the normalization of relations. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan swiftly decided to send two firefighting aircraft as his “humanitarian and Islamic duty.” Rising to the occasion, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called his Turkish counterpart to show his appreciation, and at the site of the blaze personally thanked Turkish firefighters.
 

With the theatrics taken care of, the two sides sent their representatives to Geneva to look for ways to break the impasse they have found themselves in since May. Relations hit a breaking point when the Israeli military attacked an aid flotilla in international waters and killed nine Turks (one an American citizen) after it encountered resistance by activists on the flagship Mavi Marmara.

The Israelis argued that this was an act of self-defense and that the primary instigator of the flotilla was an Islamist organization whose members had dubious affiliations. Turkey, on the other hand, insists that the attack was illegal, since it took place in international waters, accuses Israel of violating international conventions and laws in the way it treated the detainees, and demands both an official apology and indemnity for the victims of the raid.

So far, a judicious report by the United Nations Human Rights Council has provided strong support for the Turkish case. A commission brought together by the UN secretary general is also working on a report that is overdue, mainly because of Israeli foot dragging.

Although the gestures came rapidly and the Geneva talks immediately convened (they were later suspended), a problem remains. How do you come up with a magic formula for a conflict-resolving statement that gives two diametrically opposed messages so that both parties can save face? Turkey will not be satisfied unless it receives an apology for the death of its citizens. Israel is officially hesitant even to express regret.

If a formula can be found, then the parties may turn to their publics, boast of their victory and go back to reasonably civil relations, even if the intimacy during the heyday of their relations is likely never to be recovered. Indeed, the degree of commonality of interests that existed in the context of the mid-1990s between the two countries is no more.

On the most critical issues of the Middle Eastern regional order, the two capitals do not see eye to eye. Turkey’s preference is almost exclusively for non-belligerence in solving the problems of the region. It is committed to a two-state solution and strongly opposes Israeli settlement activities, not to mention Israel’s policy toward Gaza. On Iran, it steadfastly opposes a military option. Therefore Turkey is at odds with Israel, though it may not like a nuclear Iran or an Iran that makes its strategic peace with the United States any better than Israel.

What developments since the Carmel fire demonstrate, however, is the existence of a political will from both prime ministers to forge ahead, break the impasse, and move on. Turkey is interested in not having Israel as a thorn in its side, especially when this concerns its relations with the US. Israel values the Turkish connection, is interested in normalizing relations, and wishes to have an agreement so that Turkey can help indemnify Israel’s military against lawsuits that might result from the findings of the report of the secretary general’s commission.

 

Many observers wanted to invest the forest fire with the kind of psychological breakthrough that the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in 1999 proved to be. Although there is no denying the importance of the psychological dimension, that was not the only reason for Turkish-Greek relations to turn for the better. There were already political developments and a fairly well advanced political and societal rapprochement that provided the basis for that breakthrough.

In the Israeli-Turkish case as well, I would argue that political expediency plays an important role in Erdogan’s apparent readiness to jump on the opportunity provided by the fire. While Erdogan was taking this critical step, his party members were accusing Israel of being the mastermind behind the WikiLeaks scandal that they saw as a plot to embarrass and weaken the AKP government.

For Turkey, the falling out with Israel and the populist rhetoric used in the wake of the flotilla incident have been costly in terms of its relations with Washington. Combined with the shock and fury engendered by the Turkish vote against the new Iran sanctions package at the UN Security Council, Turkish-American relations have soured significantly.

Erdogan’s meeting with President Barack Obama in Toronto during the G-20 summit was reportedly testy. In the US Congress, anti-Turkish sentiment rose to new heights. The pro-Israel lobby that was Turkey’s reliable ally in Congress and in public opinion turned decisively anti-Turkish and engaged in a defamation campaign against the AKP government. All this resurrected the tired talk about Turkey’s changing axis because of the Islamization of its foreign policy. It became clear to the Turkish authorities that so long as the row with Israel continued, relations with the US could not be put on the right track.

Israel and Turkey look at the Middle Eastern order from very different perspectives. The Turkish military no longer calls the shots. Public opinion, which will remain anti-Israel as long as the Palestinian issue is not resolved, influences policymakers. At the same time, there are now strong Turkish constituencies that prefer a more cautious and moderate course in the conduct of policy toward Israel.

So if the magic formula is found, one can expect correct if not cordial relations between Israel and Turkey. This will get Israel off the hook on the flotilla affair and relieve Turkey of the pressures of an antagonistic, influential lobby in Washington. Based on the overwhelmingly positive reaction of the Israeli public to Turkish assistance during the fire, this may mean a return to the pre-flotilla days in societal relations.

Soli Ozel is a lecturer at Kadir Has University and a columnist for Haberturk newspaper. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons- international.org, an online newsletter.

Palestinian Statehood

By John V. Whitbeck

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times

 

On December 17, Bolivia extended diplomatic recognition to the state of Palestine within its pre-1967 borders (all of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem). Coming soon after the similar recognitions by Brazil and Argentina, Bolivia’s recognition brought to 106 the number of UN member states recognising the state of Palestine, whose independence was proclaimed on November 15, 1988.

While still under foreign belligerent occupation, the state of Palestine possesses all the customary international law criteria for sovereign statehood. No portion of its territory is recognised by any other country (other than Israel) as any other country’s sovereign territory and, indeed, Israel has only asserted sovereignty over a small portion of its territory, expanded East Jerusalem, leaving sovereignty over the rest both literally and legally uncontested.

In this context, it may be enlightening to consider the quality as well as the quantity of the states extending diplomatic recognition.

Of the world’s nine most populous states, eight (the US does not) recognise the state of Palestine. Of the world’s 20 most populous states, 15 (the US, Japan, Mexico, Germany and Thailand do not) recognise the state of Palestine.

By contrast, the 72 UN member states which currently recognise the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state include only one of the nine most populous states (the United States) and only four of the 20 most populous states (the United States, Japan, Germany and Turkey).

When, in July, the International Court of Justice held that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence did not violate international law because international law is silent on the subject of the legality of declarations of independence (meaning that no declaration of independence violates international law and is “legal”, albeit subject to the political decisions of sovereign states to recognise or not the independence declared), the US responded by calling on all countries that had not already recognised Kosovo to do so promptly. Five months later, only three more have seen fit to do so: Honduras, Kiribati and Tuvalu.

If the Arab League were now to call on the minority of UN member states that have not already recognised Palestine to do so promptly, it is certain that the response would be superior (both in quantity and in quality) to the response to the recent American appeal on behalf of Kosovo. It should do so.

Notwithstanding the fact that (by my rough calculations) states encompassing between 80 per cent and 90 per cent of the world’s population recognise the state of Palestine while states encompassing only between 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the world’s population recognise the Republic of Kosovo, the Western media (and, indeed, much of the non-Western media as well) act as though Kosovo’s independence were an accomplished fact while Palestine’s independence is only an aspiration which can never be realised without Israeli-American consent, and much of international public opinion (including, apparently, the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah) has, at least until recently, permitted itself to be brainwashed into thinking and acting accordingly.

As in most aspects of international relations, it is not the nature of the act (or crime) that matters but, rather, who is doing it to whom. Palestine was conquered and is still occupied, 43 years later, by the military forces of Israel. Most of the world (including the UN and even five EU member states) still regards as Serbian the province of Kosovo, which was conquered and is still occupied, 11 years later, by the military forces of NATO. The American flag is flown there at least as widely as the Kosovo flag, and the capital, Pristina, boasts a Bill Clinton Boulevard and a larger-than-life-size statue of the former American president.

Might makes right, at least in the hearts and minds of the mighty, including most Western decision makers and opinion formers.

Meanwhile, as a perpetual “peace process” appears suddenly threatened by a peaceful recourse to international law and international organisations, the US House of Representatives has adopted by a unanimous voice vote a resolution drafted by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) calling on President Barack Obama not to recognise the state of Palestine and to veto any effort by Palestine to obtain UN membership.

Western politicians and the Western media customarily apply the term “international community” to the US and whatever countries are willing to publicly support it on a given issue, and apply the term “rogue state” to any country which actively resists Israeli-American global domination.

By its slavish subservience to Israel, as reflected yet again both in the absence of a single brave voice raised against this new House resolution and in the Obama administration’s recently rejected offer of a huge military and diplomatic bribe to Israel, as reward for a mere 90-day suspension of its illegal colonisation programme, the US has effectively excluded itself from the true international community (redefined to refer to the great majority of mankind) and became a true rogue state, acting in consistent and flagrant contempt of both international law and fundamental human rights.

One might hope that the United States could still pull back from the abyss and recover its own independence, but all signs are pointing in the opposite direction. It is a sad ending for a once admirable country.

The writer, an international lawyer who has advised the Palestinian negotiating team in negotiations with Israel, is author of “The World According to Whitbeck”. He contributed this article to The Jordan Times.

This Week In The Middle East

Charities that fund the settlers; Egypt's vanishing migrants; Christmas extravagance in the Gulf, and an unhappy New Year

 By Brian Whitaker

This commentary was published in The Guardian on 23/12/2010 

Human rights 'hypocrisy': There was a predictable response this week from Binyamin Netanyahu when Human Rights Watch issued a report about Israeli discrimination against Palestinians in the West Bank.

"We must expose the hypocrisy of human rights organisations that turn a blind eye to the most repressive regimes in the world, regimes that stone women and hang gays, and instead target the only liberal democracy in the Middle East," the Israeli prime minister said.

This is a frequent complaint when human rights organisations dare to say something critical about Israel, but in the case of Human Rights Watch it's just not true.

Just four days before the West Bank report appeared, HRW had issued another – very detailed – report on the treatment of gay people in Iran, and a look at the Middle East section of HRW's website shows the wide range of countries and issues that it tackles.

As it turned out, the report on Israel didn't get a lot of media coverage, probably because it only confirmed what most people know already. The US state department, for example, noted: "Many of the issues covered in the HRW report are also covered in great detail in the state department's annual Human Rights Report."

But one important point from HRW's report has been largely ignored. This concerns the way illegal settlement activity is subsidised by American taxpayers through tax-exempt charities. The report urges Congress to investigate and "ensure that tax-exempt status is not granted to organisations that facilitate human rights violations or violations of international humanitarian law".

African hostages: It's now almost two weeks since Khataza Gondwe of Christian Solidarity Worldwide wrote an article here on Comment is free about the suffering of African migrants at the hands of traffickers in Egypt.

The migrants pay $2,000 or more each to be smuggled across the border into Israel but, once they arrive in Sinai, the traffickers suddenly demand more money – as much as $10,000 in some cases – and hold them hostage until their families pay up. It's a horrible racket.

  Some have been threatened with death or having their kidneys removed and sold if the money is not forthcoming. Human Rights Watch says:
"In dozens of cases asylum seekers and migrants said that, to coerce relatives to make payments, traffickers would make them call their relatives by mobile phone and then shoot in the air or physically abuse them so the relatives would hear their screams."

The UN high commissioner for refugees has made representations on the migrants' behalf. So has the pope, along with various NGOs.

Initially, the Egyptian government said it was working "around the clock" to find the hostages and release them. By last week, though, the foreign ministry was beginning to cast doubt on the hostage stories and yesterday, the ministry again said the reports were "baseless".

The Egyptian authorities say none of the organisations complaining about the racket has provided them with information. This is untrue, according to EveryOneGroup, an Italian-based human rights organisation, which says it has given them the approximate location of the hostages and even provided mobile phone numbers for some of the traffickers, plus the names of two of the hostages' guards.

The Egyptian state, despite its enormous security apparatus, doesn't seem very keen to track them down. Why? One reason, no doubt, is that the migrants are from poor African countries and mainly Christian – so their fate is of no great consequence.

Neither the migrants nor the traffickers are regarded as a threat to the regime, but there may also be other reasons for leaving them unmolested. Maintaining security along the border with Israel depends partly on co-operation from the local population – including smugglers. Keeping a lid on arms smuggling may mean letting the smugglers make money in other ways.

Bejewelled tree: The world's most expensively decorated Christmas tree has gone on show at the Emirates Palace hotel in Abu Dhabi, bedecked with $11m-worth of diamonds, pearls, emeralds and rubies, plus some more "mundane" items, such as gold and silver balls.

No Saudi celebrations: And a miserable New Year to you all. That's the seasonable message from Saudi Arabia's religious police, the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.

Bang on cue, they have warned that anyone caught celebrating New Year in public will be punished – along with any shops selling "items symbolising the occasion".

Now, I know they don't like Valentine's Day or Halloween (though, judging by a recent WikiLeaks document, they have trouble keeping the damper on that), but what exactly is wrong with New Year? Where in the Qur'an does it say you can't have a party at midnight on 31 December?

The objection, I suppose, is that the western (Gregorian) calendar competes with the Islamic calendar, in which New Year falls at a different time. But the fact that the western calendar was introduced by Pope Gregory XIII on 24 February 1582 (or 20 Muharram 990, if you prefer) doesn't give it any religious significance, and it's widely recognised, even by non-Christians, including many Muslims.

The first of January simply marks the start (not very accurately these days) of the new solar year. The Islamic calendar, meanwhile, is based on the lunar year. Both calendars probably owe something to ancient pagan practices of sun and moon worship – though I'm sure the religious police wouldn't want to admit that.

Roadblocks To Mideast Peace

Only the Israelis and Palestinians hold the key to peace in the Middle East, but neither is invested enough in border and security talks to allow them to succeed. Until they do, there's likely to be more wheel spinning than real progress.

By Aaron David Miller

This commentary was published in The Los Angeles Times on 23/2010

Having spent 20 months chasing an elusive Israeli settlement freeze, the Obama administration has now launched a new effort on borders and security whose chances of success are almost as dubious.

Giving up is not an option, but neither is giving in to the illusion that America holds the key to Mideast peace. It doesn't. Only the Israelis and Palestinians do, and right now neither is invested enough in these talks to allow the effort to succeed. Until they are, there's likely to be more wheel-spinning than real progress.

The good news is that the administration has finally focused on the right issue: how to get Israelis and Palestinians to the end game. But that's also the bad news. The gaps on the core issues are wide, and even on the two least hopeless ones — borders and security — there are fundamental divisions.

On paper, the arguments in favor of fast-tracking how to define the borders of a Palestinian state and accompanying security arrangements seem quite compelling. After all, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has become a trade-off between land and security. And by defining the borders of a future Palestine, the argument goes, you can get at settlements through the back door, identifying how much West Bank land Israel needs to keep for settlement blocks and the extent of territorial swaps to compensate Palestinians.

In the cruel and unforgiving world of Middle Eastern politics, however, these assumptions don't neatly stand up. First, while borders and security may be the easiest of the final status issues, they are hugely complex. Benjamin Netanyahu isn't Ehud Barak or Ehud Olmert, whose offers of up to 96% of the West Bank to Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively, still weren't completely acceptable to the Palestinians. And it's certain that this Israeli government, or even another, won't improve on that offer.

Then there is the security component, which, over the last 10 years of Palestinian terror, violence and high-trajectory weapons, has become more, not less, complex. It's true that security in the West Bank has improved markedly, but no Israeli government will agree to surrender the vast majority of it to a Palestinian president who doesn't control all of the Palestinian guns and rockets. In short, until the Hamas problem is resolved (and nobody has a clue how to do that), it's hard to imagine how a binding agreement on borders could be reached and approved by Israel's parliament, let alone implemented.

Nor will Israelis and Palestinians give up their leverage by negotiating sequentially. Israel will not part with land it controls without first seeing where Palestinians are on issues like Jerusalem and refugees. And Palestinians will not give up their refugee card or make concessions on security arrangements without seeing first what they can get from the Israelis on Jerusalem and borders.

Netanyahu has also demanded that Palestinians recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, something Abbas will not do easily. If he does agree, it would most likely be at the end of the process and not until the Israelis made some concessions on refugees.

To this list of headaches add the capacity of Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah to undermine the process, the reality that Jerusalem is both an identity and territorial issue, and the pesky problem of continuing Israeli construction in West Bank settlements and in Jerusalem. And given the administration's track record of vacillation, it is not entirely clear that President Obama is prepared to defend his own bridging proposals. Even if he is, what does he do when one or both sides says no?

A breakthrough between Israelis and Palestinians requires them to own and invest in their negotiations in a way they currently don't. Real ownership is usually driven by local factors involving prospects of pain or gain, not by Washington's pleadings or desires.

Today, we have neither enough pain nor enough gain. The status quo, while harsh, particularly for Palestinians, is manageable. Paradoxically, Palestinian state-building efforts, security performance and the absence of terrorism inside Israel have created a tolerable situation for most Israelis. Israel's focus on the Iranian threat has further distracted its attention. And Palestinians seem to be gearing up for their own grand diversion: gaining international recognition for a Palestinian state they don't control.

The status quo could change, of course. But to make the tough decisions required now, leaders are needed who are not only masters of their own politics but who are also prepared to be bold and visionary with one eye on the future.

Neither Abbas nor Netanyahu is that risk-ready. And Obama can't create in Washington the leadership, urgency and partnership needed among Israelis and Palestinians.

What should the administration do? Abandon the field, as some have suggested? Withdrawal isn't in our interest, and in any event, our "If it's broke, we can fix it" mentality makes that all but impossible.

Instead, the administration must walk the fine line between doing too much and not enough. The current approach — supporting state-building from the bottom up and engaging Israelis and Palestinians quietly on all the core issues from the top is worth a try as long as the president doesn't get overly ambitious, as he did on the settlements issue.

The Israeli-Palestinian endgame isn't ready for prime time. The U.S. could make the situation a great deal worse by assuming it is. I saw this movie with another risk-ready president in the run-up to Camp David in July 2000. The Israeli and Palestinians weren't ready to make conflict-ending decisions then, and neither were we. And the results were predictable and disastrous.

This time we need to refrain from putting U.S. positions on the table or looking for a moment of truth unless there is a reasonable chance that the gaps can be bridged. And we need to approach this phase without deadlines, big rhetoric or bigger peace plans doomed to fail, and above all, without making promises we can't keep.

It's not pretty or dramatic, but if we're smart and lucky, patient, determined and measured in our approach, we just might help the Israelis and Palestinians get hooked on a process that could work instead of hooking ourselves again on one that won't.

Aaron David Miller, a public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, is the author of "The Much Too Promised Land: America's Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace."

Islamists Bite The Ballot

By Saif Shahin,

This commentary was published in Foreign Policy In Focus on 23/12/2010

Recent elections in Bahrain and Egypt are being criticized for all the usual reasons. Authoritarian regimes -- one a monarchy, the other a quasi-military dictatorship -- cracked down on the media and the small opposition forces that challenged them in the run-up to the polls, eventually holding ballots with little or no monitoring.

But a silver lining can be discerned in the dark cloud. Islamist opposition groups in both countries, instead of interrupting the polls with violence, decided to participate in them. This is in line with a growing tendency among Islamists to embrace democratic politics -- even when they know the process to be skewed against them.

At a time when the decade-old militarist approach to dealing with Islamism has been laid bare as impotent, even counterproductive, governments should view this positive trend as reinforcing a new, more political approach to Islamist militancy.

Elections in the Gulf

Bahrain is a Shiite-majority nation ruled by a Sunni monarchy. The election to the lower house of the national assembly, the third since 2002, was held in two rounds on October 23 and October 30. In the weeks preceding the poll, the government arrested several outspoken Shiite clerics, including Abdul Jalil al Singace, a spokesman for the main opposition Haq Movement. Widespread protests and riots followed. The Haq Movement and some other political groups -- Bahrain bans formal political parties -- boycotted the election. Shiite Islamist groups such as the Islamic Action Society and Bahrain Freedom Movement also joined the boycott.

But the main Shiite opposition Al Wefaq as well as Sunni Islamist groups Al Asalah and Al Menbar participated. All Islamists campaign for socially conservative policies, such as a ban on alcohol and restrictions against women, while calling for political liberalization. Al Wefaq champions better housing and jobs for Shiites and speaks against the large-scale naturalization of Sunnis from other countries, which it views as a move to undermine the Shiite population’s dominance in Bahrain.

Al Wefaq won 18 of the 40 seats, up one seat from the outgoing assembly. The Sunni groups split five seats between them, down from 15 in 2006 when they contested as allies. Analysts said the boycott by other Shiite Islamists helped Al Wefaq. The government did not allow international monitors. Local NGOs that scrutinized the voting said the election was “procedurally acceptable,” although the overall electoral system remains unfair.

Different Script

The script was slightly different for Islamists in Egypt, which elected its new assembly on November 28 and December 5. President Hosni Mubarak’s government began suppressing the main opposition Muslim Brotherhood almost a year in advance, jailing senior leaders as well as grassroots activists. More recently, it gagged the media and banned overseas and local monitors to hold what may have been “the most fraudulent parliamentary elections in its recent history.”

Three out of four voters boycotted the election, as did many leading opposition figures, including Nobel Peace Prize winner Mohamed ElBaradei. The Brotherhood initially appeared to be leaning toward a boycott as well -- for instance, when its members voted out reformists in favor of radicals in internal elections earlier this year. However, the group finally decided to participate, albeit only in the first round.

Its leaders focused on issues such as the need for democratic rights and transparent elections in their campaign. They also spoke against the privatization of public services and the falling standards in the health, education, media, and religious endowment sectors. However, the group lost all its 88 seats in the 518-member assembly.

There were crucial differences in the degree to which the two regimes controlled the polls -- leading to variations in the performance of Islamist and other opposition groups. Bahrain, like Egypt, made the electoral atmosphere difficult for the opposition, but it did not indulge in widespread ballot-stuffing to wipe it out. It doesn’t need to. The appointed upper house of the assembly can block legislations passed by the elected lower house, allowing the monarchy to rule unperturbed.

Egypt had marginally relaxed its political environment five years ago under pressure from the George W. Bush administration’s Middle East democracy drive, allowing the Brotherhood to reap its richest-ever electoral harvest. This time around, there was no U.S. pressure. Also, the stakes were much higher. The new parliament will elect a new president next year, when Mubarak is expected to pass on the reins to son Gamal after 30 years in power. The transition could be tricky, and Mubarak wants his house to be perfectly in order. The parliamentary vote is “a training exercise for the presidential elections in how you mobilize the party, the party machine,” said a senior ruling party official. But in countries where elected assemblies have limited powers anyway, the performance of particular groups in elections is only of partial significance. Participatory trends are more interesting -- and important.

Participation Gathers Pace

Contrary to common wisdom, Islamist participation in elections is not an exception. Islamist groups in 21 countries have participated in 89 parliamentary elections over the past 40 years, according to a research by Charles Kurzman and Ijlal Naqvi. The trend has gathered pace in recent years, although participation generally hinges upon expectations of free and fair elections.

Participating Islamists often leave behind a violent past. The 82-year-old Brotherhood, for instance, is regarded as the precursor of all modern Islamist outfits. It was linked to the Nazis during World War II and blamed for many assassination and coup attempts in Egypt in the following decades. Its most influential ideologue in this period was Sayyid Qutb, whose incendiary writings are treated as gospel by Islamist militants the world over. But the Brotherhood gave up violence in the 1970s and has intermittently dabbled in electoral politics since then.

The leaders of Al Wefaq organized violent unrest that brought Bahrain to the brink of civil war in the 1990s. In this decade, however, they have turned to democratic politics. Islamists in countries such as Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria have made similar transitions from militancy to democracy. Those in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories participate in elections while still maintaining militant wings.

Such a turn indicates both ideological and tactical moderation. Militant Islamists traditionally do not accept the notion of nation-states, emphasizing instead the global Muslim ummah, or community. Many Islamists also consider democracy to be un-Islamic, as it gives precedence to manmade legislations over the divine law, or shari’a. Participating in elections marks a departure from both these hardline stances. Islamists also run the risk of antagonizing their core support, making it a difficult tactical choice. And participating in rigged elections, as Middle Eastern elections generally are, leaves Islamists -- indeed Islam itself -- open to the charge of failure.

In this context, the all-too-familiar news of two more farcical polls in the Middle East takes on a new meaning. Islamists who entered the fray in Bahrain and Egypt did so at considerable risk; the decision of some Bahraini Islamists not to participate and of the Muslim Brotherhood to pull out from the second round of voting in Egypt reinforces the tenuousness of this trend. Indeed, the Brotherhood-affiliated Islamic Action Front, the main opposition in Jordan, did not participate in the parliamentary election on November 9, citing unfair election laws.

Defying the Stereotype

Democratic participation is significant because it belies a number of myths about Islamists. It shows that Islamism is not always a mindless call to arms but a more complex phenomenon, comprising parallel, overlapping, and sometimes paradoxical principles. Islamists might originally have been ideologically opposed to the concepts of nation-states and elections, but they are also capable of intellectual evolution and compromise.

Also, Islamists aren’t necessarily opportunists who turn to elections only when they think they can win. This was the charge brought against the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria when it was denied certain electoral success in 1992, and against Hamas in 2006, when the international community did not recognize its victory in internationally monitored elections in the Palestinian territories. The participation of Muslim Brotherhood and Al Wefaq in elections skewed against them reflects a commitment to bringing about political change through legitimate means.

But perhaps the most significant question is: what kind of changes would Islamists try to bring about if they do come to power? Would they establish theocratic states, as happened in Iran after the 1979 Islamic revolution? Kurzman and Ijlal’s research suggests otherwise. A number of Islamist groups they studied dropped calls for the implementation of shari’a over successive elections, began offering secular justifications for democratic participation, and embraced global norms of political pluralism and human rights. A prime example is Turkey, which has been adding constitutional safeguards for democratic rule since the Justice and Development Party, which has Islamist roots, came to power in 2002.

From Militancy to Moderation

Democratic politics generally has a liberalizing influence on Islamists. This is to be expected: if the Muslim masses are not militant or radical, as is widely acknowledged, then groups that depend on their votes for survival would naturally have to soften their stances and look for moderate political platforms that are acceptable to the majority.

To be sure, the recent trend of Islamist participation in elections does not imply that militant Islamism is on the wane. Groups like al-Qaeda appear no closer to renouncing violence than they were on the morning of September 11, 2001 -- despite some al-Qaeda dissidents recently calling for wider consultations with Muslim groups, scholars, and the intelligentsia on issues such as jihad. Terrorist plots continue to be uncovered, and some succeed. The call to violence continues to entrap gullible young Muslims who are disenfranchised by their governments, disenchanted by the economic and cultural strains of globalization, and disillusioned by the apathy of the global superpower.

But there is no one type of Islamist, nor is there a single Islamist agenda. That is precisely why Islamist groups need to be encouraged -- or at least allowed -- to participate in mainstream electoral politics. Opening up the space of legitimate political dissent can help delegitimize violence, draw existing and potential Islamists away from militancy and terrorism, and moderate their world view. After nearly a decade of trying and failing to beat the pulp out of them, this could be the only serious option left. And as the Bahraini and Egyptian elections show, Islamists may be more than willing to explore it.

Saif Shahin is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus and a doctoral candidate in West Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.