By Ignacio Alvarez-Ossorio
For a brief moment in 2000 and 2001, it looked as if there might be a "Damascus Spring" with the investiture of Bashar al-Assad and his British-born first lady. But all signs of openness were soon quashed by the repressive measures first perfected by Bashar's father and Syria's long-time ruler, Hafez
Authoritarian
regimes have traditionally been disinclined to accept any political or social
opposition and have been hostile to the development of an independent civil
society that could form a counterweight to state power.
Article
8 of the Syrian constitution established the Baath party, which has prevented
any independent parties from emerging since the 1963 military coup that brought
it to power as "the leading party in the state and society."[1] Yet
despite this systematic repression, there has been a sustained effort by a
small group of intellectuals and critics over the past decade to transform the
country's political system and make it more open and accountable.
While
these activists did not ignite the uprising that has shaken Syria since March
2011, their courageous defiance of Bashar al-Assad's regime has given them high
standing among many Syrians. They may yet play a significant role in shaping
Syria's future.
Commitment to Freedom
Bashar
al-Assad's assumption of the presidency in July 2000 gave rise to a brief
period of unprecedented easing of state repression known as the "Damascus
Spring" whereby dozens of discussion forums and associations were created,
all calling for political liberalization and democratic openness.
This
sector of Syrian civil society came to light with the "Declaration of the
99," signed by numerous intellectuals including Burhan Ghalyoun, Sadeq
al-Azm, Michel Kilo, Abdul Rahman Munif, Adonis and Haidar Haidar, who
demanded: 1) an end to the state of emergency and martial law applied in Syria
since 1963; 2) a public pardon to all political detainees and those who are
pursued for their political ideas and permission for all deportees and exiled
citizens to return; 3) a rule of law that will recognize freedom of assembly,
of the press, and of expression; 4) freedom in public life from the laws,
constraints, and various forms of surveillance, allowing citizens to express
their various interests within a framework of social harmony and peaceful
[economic] competition and enable all to participate in the development and
prosperity of the country.[2]
On
January 1, 2001, a group of Syrian lawyers demanded a complete reform of the
constitution, the lifting of emergency laws, and the concession of full civil
liberties. Shortly thereafter, a group of activists published the founding
charter of their civil society committee—better known as the "Declaration
of the 1,000."[3] The following day, the Jamal Atassi Forum for Democratic
Dialogue was established with the participation of communists, Nasserites,
socialists and Baathist critics of the regime, and on March 7, authorization
was given to create independent organizations for the defense of human rights
as well as cultural and social associations made up of moderate Muslims. This
group included the Islamic Studies Center, headed by Muhammad Habash, a
progressive scholar opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, who served as a
parliament member. By July 3, 2001, the Human Rights Association of Syria had
been established with lawyer Haitham al-Malih as president.
In
just a few months, two hundred discussion clubs and forums were created.
Reacting to the proliferation of spaces where the future of Syria was being
freely debated, the regime pushed back, fearful it might lose its monopoly on
power. Invoking a need to maintain national unity in the face of external
threats, beginning in September 2001, the regime arrested deputies Riad Saif
and Mamoun al-Homsi, economist Arif Dalila, lawyer Anwar al-Bunni, and Atassi
Forum spokesman Habib Issa, followed in short order by Kamal al-Labwani and
Haitham al-Malih.[4] All were sentenced to between three and twelve years in
jail on charges of "weakening national sentiment" and "inciting
sectarian strife." Other important figures were forbidden to leave the country
including Radwan Ziyyade, director of the Damascus Center for Human Rights
Studies, and Suhair Atassi, director of the Jamal Atassi Forum.
In
an open challenge to the regime, prominent figures persisted in the demand for
reform. The Damascus declaration stated that the "establishment of a
democratic national regime is the basic approach to the plan for change and
political reform. It must be peaceful, gradual, founded on accord, and based on
dialogue and recognition of the other." This declaration also called on
the government to "abolish all forms of exclusion in public life by
suspending the emergency law; and abolish martial law and extraordinary courts,
and all relevant laws, including Law 49 for the year 1980 [which made
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offense]; release all political
prisoners; [allow] the safe and honorable return of all those wanted and those
who have been voluntarily or involuntarily exiled with legal guarantees; and
end all forms of political persecution by settling grievances and turning a new
leaf in the history of the country."[5]
The
declaration was the result of efforts made by journalist Michel Kilo to unify
the main political forces, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood. Kilo had
met with the group's leader, Ali Sadreddine Bayanouni, in Morocco where they
agreed on a program based on nonviolence, democracy, opposition unity, and
political change. A further public attack on the regime, the Beirut-Damascus
declaration, which called on the Syrian regime to recognize Lebanon's
independence, establish full diplomatic relations and demarcate the joint
border, led to a second wave of arrests during which Kilo and Bunni were
imprisoned.[6] With this example, the regime tried to put a stop to its
opponents' efforts and to ensure that their demands did not awaken Syrian
society from its political lethargy.
The People's Revolt
One
of the dissidents' foremost weaknesses was their inability to get their message
out due to draconian restrictions on the freedom of gathering and expression.
In a 2005 interview, noted activist Kamal al-Labwani provided an accurate,
indeed prophetic, prognosis of the current situation when he cautioned that there
is no politically mobilized street. When that happens, everything will change.
Today, the opposition is purely symbolic, and this sort of opposition is
incapable of uniting because it is based on personalities, on the capability of
single individuals to confront the authorities… Society is watching, and when
the masses begin to move, they will move behind those who represent them… So
right now, we are reserving space in that arena so that when the day comes that
people move to the street—either because of foreign or their internal
pressures—we will be ready.[7]
The
fall of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, Husni Mubarak in Egypt, along with
the upheavals in Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain, had a contagious effect across the
Arab world. Most Syrian dissidents saw the uprisings as the long-awaited
opportunity to introduce major changes inside the country. In an article in the
Lebanese newspaper as-Safir, the prominent Syrian dissident Michel Kilo argued,
"We are entering a new historical stage based on the primacy of
citizenship, freedom, justice, equality, secularism, and the rights of men and
citizens."[8] After spending five years in prison, Anwar al-Bunni stated
that "an event like this only happens once every 200 years, and it is
clearly going to bring about a radical change."[9]
On
March 10, former parliamentarian Mamoun al-Homsi appealed to the Syrian people:
"After fifty years of tyranny and oppression, we are beginning to see the
sunlight of freedom approach."[10] He openly accused the regime of
resorting to repression, corruption, and sectarian division to remain in power.
On March 15, after a first unsuccessful attempt, an anonymous Facebook group,
The Syrian Revolution 2011, called for a second day of rage, which led to a
mass demonstration against the regime to demand democratic openness.[11]
Despite
these appeals, few in Syria expected Assad to follow the path taken by Ben Ali
and Mubarak and abdicate power. Rather, it was hoped that the new regional
developments would force the regime to abandon its stubborn resistance to change
and, in the face of pressure from the street, introduce reforms. As the more
politicized elements in Syrian society had been decimated by successive waves
of repression, there was little attempt at the outset to mobilize the masses,
reasoning that they had little power to affect such change. Thus, the outbreak
of popular rage surprised everyone. Suhair al-Atassi, who was in hiding at the
time, recently said: We have been subjected to suppression and murder for
merely calling for freedom, democracy, general freedoms, the release of all
prisoners of conscience, an end to the state of emergency, and the return of
all political exiles. At the time, we said that any suppression would cause the
volcano to erupt… we knew that we were working slowly but surely toward
freedom, but we didn't dream of a revolution like this breaking out. It was the
Syrian youth who made this dream a reality.[12]
The
revolt began in the southern city of Dar'a and then gradually and progressively
spread across almost the entire country. The demonstrations, which at first
mobilized a few thousand people at best, began to enjoy great prestige. In
Bunni's words:
In
the past, only a few of us dared to call for freedom and human rights. We used
to feel isolated, as the majority of people avoided us for fear of retribution
from the authorities. After my release, I have realized that my demands became
the demands of the entire Syrian people.[13]
Initially,
important sectors of the population demanded limited reforms, but Assad's
brutal repression raised the bar. Appearing before parliament on March 30,
2011, the president made it clear that any reforms would not come about as a
result of popular pressure and that the process of political liberalization
would not be hurried. Some members of the intelligentsia believed that the
regime would not be able to introduce reforms without collapsing:
We
all know that the authorities lie and they won't permit anyone to speak out
because the regime is corrupt and dictatorial, and corruption and dictatorship
fundamentally contradict transparency and freedom of opinion because the first
opinion that anyone would express would be opposition to the regime's
corruption and tyranny and the crimes it has committed. And then they'll face
arrest, interrogation, and a trial. They say, we'll enact a party law; we'll
implement reform, but these are all lies because these authorities are
incapable of it.[14]
Michel
Kilo added, Syria today is experiencing an existential crisis related to the
distribution of wealth, social justice, freedom, and political participation,
and this is not going to be resolved with repression. The police should be
arresting killers, thieves, and smugglers, but not hungry people with nothing
to put in their mouths.[15]
As
the uprising spread, the Syrian regime blamed the violence on armed radical
elements seeking to destabilize the country. Assad told parliament that Syria
was facing a conspiracy intended to provoke a sectarian war between Sunnis and
Alawites.[16] The regime tried to use this tactic to play for time in the midst
of a rebellion that had taken it by surprise as well as to justify the high
number of civilians killed by the security services and pro-government armed
groups. Repression has intensified in the ensuing months and spread to most of
the cities, but the security forces have failed to suppress the popular
uprising. Faced with the success of the demonstrations, the Syrian regime was
forced to back down in July and adopt a series of cosmetic reforms to try to
quell the unrest, including the initiation of a national dialogue.[17] The
rebels roundly declared these measures insufficient and designed merely to buy
the Assad regime more time.
As
the unrest has continued, most activists have come to believe that the protest
wave has transformed into a revolution that will bring about the fall of the
regime. From her hiding place in July 2011, Suhair al-Atassi gave an apt
description of the spirit of the demonstrations:
It's
a revolution… triggered by the Syrian people seeking to stand up and say that
they are citizens and not subjects, and that Syria belongs to all its citizens
and not just the Assad family. This is a revolution of the youth who are
demanding freedom and are being confronted with violence and murder… Today Syria
is witnessing a battle for freedom by unarmed civilians urging the ouster of a
regime that has utilized methods of brutal and inhumane suppression. They have
brutally attacked and killed the protesters whilst the demonstrators have
nothing but their words to defend them.[18]
An Opposition Divided
As
a result of fifty years of repressive measures, it is not surprising that the
recent uprising has been an ensemble movement with contributions from different
players. The economist and commentator Omar Dahi has identified five clearly
differentiated groups taking part in the unrest: traditional opposition parties
(socialists, Nasserites, and communists); dissident intellectuals; the youth
movement, including the leaders of the Local Coordination Committees (LCC),
which has driven the revolution and was joined by other sectors of society; a
disorganized cohort of conservative Muslims; and armed Salafist groups who
represent a minority.[19]
Most
of these groups (with the exception of the Salafi elements) agreed about the
need to avoid violence, reject sectarianism, and prevent foreign intervention.
On August 29, 2011, the LCC stated: While we understand the motivation to take
up arms or call for military intervention, we specifically reject this position
as we find it unacceptable politically, nationally, and ethically. Militarizing
the revolution would minimize popular support and participation in the
revolution. Moreover, militarization would undermine the gravity of the
humanitarian catastrophe involved in a confrontation with the regime.
Militarization would put the revolution in an arena where the regime has a
distinct advantage and would erode the moral superiority that has characterized
the revolution since its beginning.[20]
Initially,
opposition figures urged the creation of a new social pact between the rulers
and the ruled, rejecting the use of violence to force Assad from power. Bunni,
for example, advocated "a peaceful solution to all the problems"
while Kilo urged "a new national contract for a peaceful and negotiated
end to the crisis" arguing that "a bloody conflict must be prevented
given that exacerbating the sectarian tensions could lead to chaos."[21]
At the beginning of August, Kilo warned, "There are some who have chosen
to take up arms against the regime, but they only represent a minority of the
demonstrators. But if the authorities persist in using violence, then they will
become a majority."[22]
At
first, national dialogue was also defended, but as the uprising has advanced
and the repression intensified, most of the intelligentsia has come to reject
this option. In March, the intellectual Burhan Ghalyoun, later named president
of the National Transition Council, warned that to get out of the crisis, the
whole crisis, the use of weapons must be rejected and political logic must be
accepted… The logic of negotiation and political dialogue requires credibility
and the recognition of the other.[23]
He
cautioned, however, that such an attitude seemed lacking in Assad, who
continued "to dream about formal reforms within the existing regime, a
regime with only one ruler, one party, and one authority."[24]
Confronted
with external and internal pressure, the regime indicated its readiness for a
national dialogue, authorizing a historic meeting with opposition members in
Damascus on June 27. Some members of the protest movement, notably Kilo, Louai
Hussein, and Hassan Abbas, chose to participate, yet most signatories to the 2005
Damascus declaration boycotted the meeting and contested the participants'
right to speak on behalf of the demonstrators. While Hussein contended that the
main goal of the meeting was "to organize a safe, peaceful transition from
tyranny to freedom,"[25] Bunni argued that it would be exploited by the
regime and used "to cover up the arrests, murders, and tortures that
continue to take place on a daily basis."[26]
Then
on July 9 and 10, the regime sponsored yet another national dialogue meeting,
which was boycotted by almost all opposition leaders. "While the regime is
meeting—and that is what today was—there are funerals in other cities, and
people continue to be killed and arrested," commented Razan Zeitouneh, a
lawyer and prominent LCC member.[27] Syrian Human Rights Association president
Malih, likewise, declined the invitation, saying: Whoever attends such a
dialogue with a regime that commits these crimes is a traitor to the people.
After 200 martyrs, 1,500 missing persons, and 15,000 refugees, what is there to
talk about? How can you have a dialogue with a person who is holding you at
gunpoint?[28]
The
meeting was attended by two hundred delegates, most of them intellectuals and
politicians with close ties to the regime, and was presented as a steppingstone
to a transition to democracy. Vice President Farouk al-Shara opened the meeting
with the expressed hope that "it will lead to... the transformation of
Syria into a pluralistic, democratic state where its citizens are
equal."[29] In a surprising development, the final statement exceeded
expectations by raising the issue of releasing all political prisoners,
including those arrested since the uprising began (with the exception of those
involved in crimes). It also argued that "dialogue is the only way to end
the crisis in Syria" and strongly rejected any foreign interference under
the pretext of defending human rights.[30] Furthermore, it called for deeper
reforms and stronger efforts to combat corruption and requested the amendment
of the constitution to make it commensurate with the rule of law, a multiparty
system, and democracy.
Most
Syrian activists agreed that the offer to engage in dialogue came too late and
that the regime had lost all credibility. In the words of Suhair Atassi,
It
has been contaminated by the blood of our people! How could we accept this
[national dialogue]? It came too late! This is not to mention the lack of trust
between the people and the regime. The best example of this was the arrests of
the artists and intellectuals who decided to take to the streets in solidarity
with the legitimate demands for greater freedoms in Syria. The Syrian regime
was merely trying to buy time with this national dialogue… The Syrian
opposition is united, which can be seen in its joint decision to boycott the
so-called dialogue with the authorities that have been killing and suppressing
the people.[31]
In
their statement, the LCC dismissed the meeting's results on the grounds that
Syrians
who have already been killed and tortured by the thousands will not accept any
proposals or arrangements that leave Bashar Assad, the intelligence service,
and the death squads in control of their lives.[32]
As
the uprising intensified and the dissidents' demands grew, the need to form a
transition government, given the possible collapse of the regime, was
considered. As early as April 2011, Kilo had requested the formation of "a
government of national unity," and by mid-July, Malih had gone still
further, calling for a shadow government made up of "independent experts"
that would unify the opposition movements and prepare for the post-Assad
era.[33]
Foreign Intervention?
The
Turkish government has followed the unfolding Syrian crisis with deep concern.
In the earliest phases of the uprising, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and
Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu advised the regime to end the repression and
democratize the country. Assad ignored this "friendly advice,"
generating a profound unease in Ankara, which was heightened by the arrival of
thousands of refugees fleeing the besieged Syrian town of Jisr Shughour.[34]
The
possibility of a full-fledged civil war troubles Ankara, which believes that
the intensification of violence would significantly increase the influx of
refugees into its territory. In an interview with the Qatar newspaper
ash-Sharq, Erdoğan stressed the importance of the ties between the two countries:
For
Turkey, Syria is not just another country, it's a neighbor with which we share
a 910-kilometer-long border… and with which we have shared interests that
cannot be ignored… We know very well that stability there is part of our
national security, and we are afraid that the situation will lead to the
outbreak of a civil war between Alawites and Sunnis.[35]
The
widening gap between Ankara and Damascus also means the end of Davutoğlu's
"zero problems with neighbors" policy.[36] The premise of this policy
was that by way of increasing its international clout, Turkey had to maintain
the best possible relationships with neighboring countries and diversify its
alliances. This required that Ankara turn its attention back to the Middle
East, a region that had formed an integral part of the Ottoman Empire for
centuries, thus filling a long-standing vacuum that no Arab regime had been
able to fill.
The
Turkish government thus warned Damascus that trade relations between the two
countries, which amount to around $2.5 billion annually, could be
endangered.[37] It also hosted various opposition group meetings inside Turkey
with the goal of creating a road map for a post-Assad era. In mid-July,
Istanbul hosted the National Salvation Conference, which elected Malih as its
president. During the meeting, Malih rejected any dialogue with the regime:
"The Syrian regime has declared war on its people, who will not go back
home until the regime has fallen."[38] The final statement from the
meeting called for the formation of a shadow government, but not before the
fall of the regime, and expressed its will to reach "a unified
approach" between the opposition and the young demonstrators.
In
a subsequent meeting, held in Istanbul on August 23, 2011, the Syrian
opposition agreed to create a National Transition Council (NTC) comprised of
opposition members both inside and outside the country and presided over by
Burhan Ghalyoun, a Syrian academic residing in France.[39] Despite their
differences, the intensity of the repression had brought opposition members
together. Basma Qadmani, their spokesperson, told the media that "the NTC
represents the major forces: political parties and independent figures who
symbolize the Syrian opposition." The names of Syria-based NTC members
were kept secret to prevent reprisals.
In
September, this group was renamed the Syrian National Council (SNC). It
included members of the Damascus declaration, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,
the Local Coordination Committees, the Syrian Revolution General Commission,
Kurdish factions, tribal leaders, and independent figures. One of the first
decisions of SNC was to approve a national consensus charter that defined the
principles of the Syrian revolution:
1)
Affirming that the Syrian revolution is a revolution for freedom and dignity;
2)
Maintaining the peaceful nature of the revolution;
3)
Affirming national unity and rejecting any call for sectarianism or
monopolizing of the revolution;
4)
Recognizing Syria is for all Syrians on an equal footing;
5)
Rejecting foreign military intervention.[40]
While
the opposition members initially rejected any foreign intervention, voices
favoring this eventuality began to emerge, albeit still in the minority. During
the Istanbul conference, Malih urged the U.N. to put an end to the bloodshed
through political and diplomatic pressure but soundly rejected any military
intervention.[41] Earlier, Kilo had also declared his desire "to see an
exclusively Syrian solution... reached based on a broad, complete national
understanding."[42]
Yet
given the worsening situation, the opposition has begun to consider different
scenarios to bring the dictatorship to an end. Some favor following the Libyan
example where the uprising combined with foreign military intervention to bring
about the collapse of the regime: Ashraf al-Miqdad, signer to the Damascus
declaration living in Australia, told Asharq al-Awsat that the Syrian regime
will never stop the repression and murders, meaning that there are only two
options: foreign intervention or arming the revolutionaries… International
military intervention has become the only possible solution. The other
alternative would be to divide the army, which would avoid having to arm the
people.[43]
Although
these voices still represent a minority, they reflect the growing desperation
of the Syrian opposition, which believes that the uprising may lose its muscle
if none of the objectives are reached soon. On July 29, 2011, a group of
defectors formed the Syrian Free Army (SFA).[44] By mid October, there were an estimated
10,000 to 15,000 defectors especially active in the north and central regions.
In the last months of the year, SFA began launching some operations against the
Syrian army.[45]
The
LCC has tried to nip this debate in the bud, stating in a communiqué,
"While we understand the motivation to take up arms or call for military
intervention, we specifically reject this position as we find it unacceptable
politically, nationally, and ethically."[46] At least for now, then, it
seems that a Libya-style intervention is being rejected. The communiqué
stressed
The
method by which the regime is overthrown is an indication of what Syria will be
like in the post-regime era. If we maintain our peaceful demonstrations, which
include our cities, towns, and villages, and our men, women, and children, the
possibility of democracy in our country is much greater. If an armed
confrontation or international military intervention becomes a reality, it will
be virtually impossible to establish a legitimate foundation for a proud future
Syria.[47]
Malih
concurred, "Any foreign intervention would destroy Syria, just like what
has happened in Libya… the revolution in Syria will prevail, and the regime
will be brought down by peaceful means." He added that "the
revolutionaries will not fall into the trap" of militarizing the
uprising.[48]
An
eventual militarization could have devastating effects and would likely be
exploited by the regime to present itself as the guarantor of internal
stability and to regain some of the territory lost to the rebels. The
possibility of an outbreak of civil war could have unforeseeable effects on
Syria's neighbors since it shares borders with Israel, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq,
and Jordan. As Arab League secretary general Nabil al-Arabi recently said, "Syria
is not Libya… Syria plays a central role in the region, and what happens there
has a direct impact on Lebanon and Iraq."[49]
Conclusion
Although
the influence of opposition intellectuals in Syria remains limited, there is
little doubt that the Assad regime considers their demands for the release of
political prisoners, suspension of the state of emergency, and an end to the
single-party system a declaration of war. This further underscores the regime's
tenuous grip on power as none of the members of this small opposition group can
count on a broad social base or hail from Syrian families boasting great wealth
or long lines of politicians with the notable exception of Suhair Atassi, scion
to a prominent political family that has produced three heads of state.
Given
the absence of freedom of expression and the regime's absolute control of the
media, the intelligentsia has not been able to inculcate its message to the
Syrian "street" or to mobilize it, a task that now falls entirely to
the Local Coordination Committees. Some are further hampered by their past: A
good portion of their members are Nasserites, communists, or socialists,
affiliations that are in decline and lack any significant popular backing.
Support for secularism also weakens their influence among the more traditional
or devout segments of Syrian society.
Internal
divisions and lack of coordination have also taken their toll. Some of the
leading figures differ over core issues such as whether it is possible to have
a dialogue with the regime; what the proper relationship with foreign powers
should be; what form a transitional government should take, and how it should
rule. These differences have been apparent over the last few months.
These
structural deficiencies notwithstanding, the opinions of these intellectuals
are followed by an important segment of the demonstrators, who hold the
struggle by these thinkers against the regime in great esteem. Indeed, this
group of intellectuals and critics is solidly represented in both the Committee
for National Salvation and the Syrian National Council spearheading the
uprising. Perhaps this uncertain situation is best summed up in Malih's words:
The
opposition and the Syrian intellectuals did not create the revolution. The
revolution is the work of the youth. Now they need political support, and we
want to be by their sides in this revolution.[50]
NOTES & REFERENCES
-This article was published in Middle East Quarterly, in its Spring
2012 Issue, pp. 23-32
-Ignacio Alvarez Ossorio is a lecturer of Arabic and Islamic studies in the
University of Alicante, Spain. His recent books include Report on Arabs Revolts
(Ediciones del Oriente y el Mediterráneo, 2011) and Contemporary Syria
(Sintesis, 2009).
[1] Syrian constitution,
Mar. 13, 1973; al-Jazeera TV (Doha), July 25, 2011.
[2] "Statement by 99 Syrian Intellectuals," al-Hayat, Sept. 27, 2000.
[3] Gary C. Gambill, "Dark Days Ahead for Syria's Liberal Reformers,"
Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, Feb. 2001.
[4] Human Rights Watch World Report 2002 - Syria, Human Rights Watch, New York,
Jan. 17, 2002.
[5] Damascus declaration, Oct. 16, 2005.
[6] The Syria Monitor (Center for Liberty in the Middle East, Washington,
D.C.), May 13, 2007.
[7] Joe Pace, interview with Kamal al-Labwani, posted on Syria Comment blog by
Joshua Landis, Sept. 2, 2005.
[8] As-Safir (Beirut), Apr. 16, 2011.
[9] "Veteran Activist's Demands Reflect New Syria," Amnesty
International, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2011.
[10] YouTube, Mar. 10, 2011.
[11] "The Syrian Revolution 2011," Facebook, accessed Dec. 27, 2011.
[12] Asharq al-Awsat (London), July 16, 2011.
[13] "Veteran Activist's Demands Reflect New Syria," July 26, 2011.
[14] Pace, interview with Labwani, Sept. 2, 2005.
[15] Al-Akhbar (Cairo), Aug. 9, 2011.
[16] Voice of America, Mar. 30, 2011.
[17] The Guardian (London), June 27, 2011.
[18] Asharq al-Awsat, July 16, 2011.
[19] Omar Dahi, "A Syrian Drama: A Taxonomy of a Revolution," posted
on Syria Comment blog by Joshua Landis, Aug. 13, 2011.
[20] "Statement to the Syrian People," Local Coordination Committees
in Syria (LLC), Aug. 29, 2011.
[21] As-Safir, Apr. 16, 2011.
[22] Al-Akhbar, Aug. 9, 2011.
[23] Al-Jazeera TV, Mar. 28, 2011.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., June 27, 2011.
[26] Ibid.
[27] The Guardian, July 10, 2011.
[28] Asharq al-Awsat, July 13, 2011.
[29] Al-Watan (Kuwait), July 8, 2011.
[30] Syrian Arab News Agency (Damascus), July 12, 2011.
[31] Asharq al-Awsat, July 16, 2011.
[32] Declaration, Local Coordination Committees in Syria (LCC), Sept. 7, 2011.
[33] As-Safir, Apr. 26, 2011; al-Bayan (Dubai), July 11, 2011.
[34] BBC News, June 8, 2011.
[35] Ash-Sharq (Doha), Sept. 13, 2011.
[36] See Svante E. Cornell, "What Drives Turkish-Foreign-Policy?"
Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2012, pp. 13-24.
[37] The National (Abu Dhabi), Aug. 11, 2011.
[38] France 24 TV (Paris), July 19, 2011.
[39] Associated Press, Oct. 3, 2011.
[40] National Consensus Charter, Syrian National Council, Sept. 15, 2011;
Steven Heydemann, "Syria's Opposition," United States Institute of
Peace, Washington, D.C., Sept. 20, 2011.
[41] France 24 TV, July 19, 2011.
[42] Al-Arab al-Yawm (Amman), June 18, 2011.
[43] Asharq al-Awsat, Sept. 6, 2011.
[44] YouTube, July 29, 2011.
[45] The New York Times, Nov. 17, 2011.
[46] "Statement to the Syrian People," Local Coordination Committees
in Syria, Aug. 29, 2011.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Asharq al-Awsat, Sept. 11, 2011.
[49] Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Sept. 7, 2011.
[50] Asharq al-Awsat, July 13, 2011.
U.S. President Barack Obama
