By Stephen Blank
Pro-Assad Syrians wave Russian and Syrian flags during FM Sergei Lavrov's visit (Source: telegraph.co.uk)
To
hear Moscow tell it, Russia’s aims in Syria are only motivated by principle. It
opposes the use of ambiguous UN resolutions to permit intervention to forcibly
democratize a country, an outcome that it believes invariably leads to
protracted war. Russia is also against forcing out Bashar al-Assad. Moscow
fears he will be replaced by a Sunni Arab regime that may then become a
terrorist Islamist regime. As a result, Russian officials and many leading
Russian experts invariably repeat these points in their public presentations
(Interfax, March 30; Rossiya 24, March 19). But, behind the headlines and
official meetings, the truth is rather more prosaic. It is quite clear that
Moscow opposes any autonomous democratic politics whether it occurs in Libya,
Syria or closer to home. Moscow fears that such examples will reverberate
throughout Russia and the CIS as they did in the previous presidential
election. In addition, Russia certainly opposes any extension of US or NATO
power into the Middle East regardless of the outcome. Moreover, realizing that
NATO shows no sign of intervening, Russia also now sees opportunities to grab
economic and political advantages for itself and is not afraid to show force in
its support for the Assad regime.
This
is not merely a question of continuing to sell weapons as it is continuing to
do. Once again, Moscow has shown its intention to deploy naval warships to the
Syrian coast on a permanent basis (RIA Novosti, April 13). Earlier deployments
in December 2011 were temporary, but now that Moscow realizes NATO will not
intervene it feels it can pretend to show force to deter NATO in the belief
that this will win it Syrian support and show that it stands behind its allies.
Previously, Moscow said that its special forces ship Ekvator was deployed
merely to observe developments, but it now seems like this will be a more permanent
deployment (Nezavisimaya Gazeta Online, March 22).
In
first trying to force Syria’s opposition to disarm and now to support the Annan
plan of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan – while Assad’s forces continue
to shell and attack them – also indicates that Moscow has doubled down on its
support for Assad. Clearly Russia’s support for the Annan plan, even as the
Syrian government openly violates it, demonstrates Moscow’s attempt to impose
that solution rather than leave the door open to the possibility of future
foreign intervention by NATO or other states. Believing that its intransigence
has been rewarded since NATO will probably not intervene and the rebels are
disorganized and outgunned, Foreign Minister Lavrov has taken the diplomatic
offensive. In numerous statements, he has denounced the US Friends of Syria
initiative as being unilateral. The Russian Foreign Minister has repeatedly
insisted that Assad has the support of Syria’s majority and that his latest
actions somehow indicate reforms. Finally, Lavrov has stated that there is no
alternative to the UN – where Russia can block any action, even resolutions
condemning mass murder, thanks to Moscow’s veto-wielding permanent Security
Council seat (Interfax, April 2; mid.ru, April 2; Interfax, March 20, 23, 24).
Russia’s
adamantine stance on Syria is cloaked in the rhetoric of vital interests,
international law, basic foreign policy principles and defense against
terrorism. In actuality, however, it reflects Vladimir Putin’s contempt for the
West and Moscow’s perception of its irresolution. Furthermore, it also reflects
the Russian leadership’s abiding fear that the Arab Spring will eventually come
to the CIS if not Russia. And the government in Moscow may not be able to so
indiscriminately shoot its own people as has Assad. Despite warnings to the
contrary, there has been no mass repression of the opposition to Putin since
his re-election, a sign of his confidence in his present status, but also of
the overall uncertainty of the situation.
But
perhaps the most cynical aspect of Russian policy here – beyond its hypocrisy,
invocation of the old colonialist tactic of gunboat diplomacy, and open
contempt for Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar who strongly oppose
Assad’s rampages – is its shameless quest for material gain out of this crisis.
Thus on March 17, Mohammad al-Kishto, Chairman of the Federation of Syrian
Chambers of Commerce, announced that Gazprom would take over the Croatian
energy company Ina’s oil and gas fields in Syria worth billions of dollars.
This allows Syria to claim that it has not been hurt by the departure of
foreign oil and gas firms because of the availability of Russian competition
(Vecerniji.hr, March 17). More to the point, these oil and gas fields are
undoubtedly the price exacted by Moscow for its services rendered to Damascus.
Indeed this second example of neo-colonialist takeover should hardly surprise
anyone who closely follows Putin’s polices. In his Question and Answer session
with the State Duma on April 11, the outgoing Russian Prime Minister asserted
that Moscow has invested repeatedly in the Middle East not out of any
ideological solidarity with them but in order to make money and advance its
interests (premier.gov.ru, April 11). Clearly, in this case Moscow charged a
price for its support of Damascus and it has now been paid.
The
cynicism of this policy may shock many in the West, but it should not shock
anyone who knows the mentality of the Russian elite. As Charles de Gaulle
observed, states are “cold monsters.” Putin’s Russia is, however, rather colder
than many others, and at the same time more frightened by the prospect of
autonomous public participation in politics. After all, Sergei Lavrov in 2007
told the Financial Times that democracy is a “bardak” (a particularly slovenly
and disorderly brothel) (Financial Times, April 18, 2007). Given that outlook,
are today’s policies truly a surprise to observers of the Russian elite?
-This commentary was published in Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 9,
Issue: 79, on April 20, 2012
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