I war-gamed an Israeli strike on Iran -- and it got ugly.
By Karim Sadjadpour
The
International Atomic Energy Agency's new report on Iran's nuclear program
asserts that Tehran "has carried out ... activities that are relevant to
the development of a nuclear explosive device" and that the agency sees
"strong indicators of possible weapon development." In other words,
the IAEA has finally reached the same conclusions that Israel first reached in
1995. So should we really be worried about an Israeli strike now?
Historically,
there has been an inverse correlation between Israeli saber rattling and
military action, but senior Obama administration officials consistently confirm
in private meetings that they take "very seriously" the prospect of
an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear sites.
Think
of it like this: In one way -- and one way only -- the potential of an Israeli
military strike on Iran is akin to a Herman Cain presidency. Its likelihood is
slim, but the potential consequences are too dramatic to ignore.
Although
the precise strategy Israel would employ to carry out such an operation is
debatable, its objective -- to avert a nuclear-armed Tehran -- is crystal
clear. What's less clear is how Tehran would react and with what aim. Would the
Iranian regime be strengthened or weakened internally? Would it respond with
fury or restraint?
To
probe these questions, the Brookings Institution in late 2009 assembled two
dozen former senior U.S. government officials and Middle East specialists for a
daylong simulation of the political and military consequences that would result
from an Israeli military strike against Iran's nuclear program.
The
simulation was conducted as a three-move game, with Israeli, U.S., and Iranian
teams, each representing their government's top national security officials.
The members of the U.S. team had all served in senior positions in the U.S.
government; the Israeli team was composed of a half-dozen experts on Israel,
including former senior U.S. officials with close ties to senior Israeli
decision-makers; the Iranian team was composed of a half-dozen specialists,
including people who had either lived in Tehran or served as U.S. officials
with responsibility for Iran.
I
had the unenviable task of trying to channel Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei.
The
simulation was premised on a surprise Israeli military strike -- absent U.S.
knowledge or consent -- on Iran's nuclear facilities, motivated by the
breakdown of nuclear negotiations, the ineffectiveness of sanctions, and
newfound intelligence of secret Iranian weapons activity. In other words,
pretty close to what we have before us now.
Arguably,
the strongest argument against an attack on Iran is a question of simple
mathematics. According to Israeli estimates, a strike would, at best, set back
Tehran's nuclear clock by just two to three years -- but it would likely
resuscitate the fortunes of a deeply unpopular, ideologically bankrupt Iranian
regime, prolonging its shelf life by another decade or generation. As one
Iranian democracy activist once told me, Israel and the United States should
"focus less on the gun and more on the bandit trying to obtain the
gun." Bombing Iran, he said, would strengthen the bandit, not weaken it --
and only increase his desire to get the gun.
Iran's
nuclear sites are purposely built close to population centers, but in the
simulation, the Israeli strike managed to cause only a small number of civilian
casualties. Nonetheless, one of my immediate reactions was to order Iranian
state television to show graphic images of the "hundreds of innocent
martyrs" -- focusing on the women and children -- in order to incite
outrage against Israel and attempt to convert Iranian nationalism into
solidarity with the regime.
To
further that goal, we then invited the symbolic leadership of the opposition --
Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi (both of whom are now under house
arrest), as well as former President Mohammad Khatami -- onto state television
to furiously condemn Israel and pledge allegiance to the government. Instead of
widening Iran's deep internal fractures -- both between political elites and
between the people and the regime -- the Israeli military strike helped repair
them.
I
asked a longtime aide to Karroubi about the plausibility of the above scenario.
He said that an Israeli strike on Iran would be "10 times worse" --
in terms of eliciting popular anger -- than a U.S. strike and agreed that it
would likely bring recognized opposition figures in concert with the government,
strengthening the state's capacity to respond.
And
respond we did. I went into the exercise believing that the Iranian regime's
response to an Israeli military strike -- despite many predictions otherwise --
would be relatively subdued, given the regime's fears of inviting massive
reprisals. The opposite turned out to be true. Once our nuclear sites were
effectively destroyed, we calculated that we had no choice but to escalate and
retaliate in order to save face and project power to our own population and neighbors,
deter future attacks, and inflict a heavy political cost on Israel.
Perhaps
implicitly, the experience of Israel's September 2007 bombing of a Syrian
nuclear reactor was instructive. Aside from a feeble official complaint to the
United Nations about Israel's "breach of Syrian airspace," there was
virtually no reaction from Damascus. As a result, the Israeli attack was met
with little international or even Arab condemnation.
We
needed to respond in a way that would further enflame the regional security
environment, negatively impact the global economy, and make reverberations felt
throughout the world. So we played dirty.
One
of our first salvos was to launch missiles at oil installations in Saudi
Arabia's Eastern Province, as well as stir unrest among Saudi Shiites against
their government. Our pretext was that Israel had used Saudi airspace to attack
us, though we later found out it did so without Saudi permission. Given Iran's
less-than-accurate missile technology, most missiles missed their mark, but
some struck home and we succeeded in spiking oil prices enough so that
Americans and Europeans filling their cars with gasoline might be irritated by
Israel's actions.
We
also fired missiles at Israeli military and nuclear targets and unleashed
Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad to fire rockets at Israeli population
centers. Although few of these missiles reached their targets, the goal was
create an atmosphere of terror among Israeli society so its government would
think twice about future attacks.
We
didn't limit our reaction to just the Middle East. Via proxy, we hit European
civilian and military outposts in Afghanistan and Iraq, confident that if past
is precedent, Europe would take the high road and not retaliate. We also
activated terrorist cells in Europe -- bombing public transportation and
killing several civilians -- in the belief that European citizens and
governments would likely come down hard on Israel for destabilizing the region.
But,
appreciating the logic of power, we stopped just short of provoking the United
States. Before the simulation, I'd often heard it said that it wouldn't make
much difference whether Israel actually got a green light from the United
States to strike Iran, for Tehran would never believe otherwise.
This
assessment wasn't borne out in the simulation. The U.S. secretary of state sent
us a private note telling us that the Americans did not approve the Israeli
strike, and vowed to restrain Israel from attacking further -- if we also
exercised restraint. They tried on multiple occasions to meet with us or speak
by phone, but we refused. While Washington believed that its overtures would
have a calming effect on us, we interpreted them to mean that we could strike
back hard against Israel -- not to mention European targets -- without risking
U.S. retaliation, at least not immediately.
Given
that the simulation was intended to gauge the immediate consequences of an
Israeli strike on Iran -- not its long-term impact -- the final results were
inconclusive. The intent wasn't to prove either side correct, but to try to
understand the decision-making calculus of each side.
Not
unlike wars themselves, different actors drew different lessons. Those, like
myself, who thought that the costs of an Israeli attack significantly
outweighed the benefits, felt the results of the simulation validated their
position. In the span of just a few days, our simulation had the Middle East
aflame. But those who, prior to the exercise, believed that attacking Iran's
nuclear facilities was a necessary risk weren't convinced otherwise.
Yet
the reality is that no one -- not even the Iranians -- can say with confidence
how they will choose to react once the fog of war sets in. And as for long-term
consequences, it's way too murky to say anything but this: It will be ugly.
One
of the great American strategic thinkers of the 20th century, former U.S.
Ambassador to the USSR George Kennan, spent more than half a century
alternatively thinking about how to avert a nuclear war with the Soviet Union
and what a nuclear war with the Soviet Union might look like.
Shortly
before he passed away in 2005 at age 101, he reflected on his half-century of
experience. "Anyone who has ever studied the history of American
diplomacy, especially military diplomacy, knows that you might start in a war
with certain things on your mind as a purpose of what you are doing, but in the
end you found yourself fighting for entirely different things that you had
never thought of before," he said. "War has a momentum of its own,
and it carries you away from all thoughtful intentions when you get into
it."
"But
also, there is a very, very basic consideration involved here, and that is that
whenever you have a possibility of going in two ways, either for peace or for war,
for peaceful methods of for military methods, in the present age there is a
strong prejudice for the peaceful ones. War seldom ever leads to good
results."
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 10/11/2011
-Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Reading Khamenei: The Worldview of Iran's Most Powerful Leader.
-Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Reading Khamenei: The Worldview of Iran's Most Powerful Leader.