In the two Arab crises – i.e. the Libyan and Yemeni ones that are open to all forms of civil violence – it is difficult to imagine an end similar to the one seen in the Ivory Coast. On the short run at least, there is no military power enjoying credibility and capable of doing in Libya and Yemen what the French Licorne force (which operates under the cover of an international resolution) did in Abidjan to facilitate the arrest of the president whose term has expired, and give back the authority to the worthy.
So far, the political initiatives to resolve the crises in both countries have been obstructed by a balance of powers preventing a settlement either way, despite the military intervention of NATO in Libya and the Gulf political pressures in Yemen.
What can be noticed in Libya is that the regime can settle the situation in its favor militarily due to the weakness of the rebels in this area. However, the air strikes carried out by NATO are standing in the way of this settlement, thus creating a reality based on an unstable power balance that may prevent the elimination of whichever side involved in the conflict.
In Yemen, and in light of the relative neutrality of the armed forces, some sort of a reality also surfaced based on a power balance in which the two sides are on equal grounds. This prevents the emergence of circumstances allowing the elimination of any of them.
Amid this domestic balance, each side is eager to improve its position – at least on the political level – before being able to carry out a military settlement. Therefore, the Yemeni authority welcomed the Gulf initiative and the Libyan authority the African one, hoping to remove the card of support and sympathy toward the oppositionists and make them look as though they are rejecting the settlements and the regional wishes to contain the violence and head toward a solution.
In light of the different circumstances surrounding the Gulf initiative in Yemen and the African initiative in Libya, one can notice that the Africans failed to adopt a similar approach at the beginning of the crisis in the Ivory Coast. It was when the president whose term had expired refused to surrender power to President-elect Alassane Ouattara, although they threatened with military intervention and started preparing the necessary forces. This failure is mainly due to a balance between the domestic powers, and the non-existence of real pressure tools to force Gbagbo to step down. However, the French adopted this approach later on and ended the crisis of duality in the authority.
It is unlikely to see an extension of the African initiative in Libya, not just because the revolutionaries rejected it, but also because the powers supporting it do not enjoy any influence. This is especially true in the presence of an international resolution being implemented by NATO and providing elements of strength to countries which will in no way deal with Colonel’s Gaddafi’s rule ever again. It is in this context that the revolutionaries rejected the initiative.
Such a conclusion would also be applicable in the case of the Gulf initiative in Yemen, considering that the wager on the determination of those who presented the initiative to exert pressures, is the only way to shift the current domestic balance of powers in a direction that would allow a settlement. This is due to the fact that the reliance on intentions alone does not encourage the exchange of concessions and the conclusion of such a settlement.
And just like in Libya where it has become quasi-impossible to coexist with any possible settlement in light of Gaddafi’s continuation in power, it is clear that any settlement in Yemen will have to feature the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This is what the Gulf initiative tried to allude to through the transfer of the prerogatives to the vice president, but without resorting to elements of pressure and influence that would turn this process into one that is clear and without any ambiguity, especially since the constitutional cover might be used again to extend the crisis – rather than respond to the Gulf initiative – with what this carries in terms of possible slides toward wide-ranging civil violence.
So far, the political initiatives to resolve the crises in both countries have been obstructed by a balance of powers preventing a settlement either way, despite the military intervention of NATO in Libya and the Gulf political pressures in Yemen.
What can be noticed in Libya is that the regime can settle the situation in its favor militarily due to the weakness of the rebels in this area. However, the air strikes carried out by NATO are standing in the way of this settlement, thus creating a reality based on an unstable power balance that may prevent the elimination of whichever side involved in the conflict.
In Yemen, and in light of the relative neutrality of the armed forces, some sort of a reality also surfaced based on a power balance in which the two sides are on equal grounds. This prevents the emergence of circumstances allowing the elimination of any of them.
Amid this domestic balance, each side is eager to improve its position – at least on the political level – before being able to carry out a military settlement. Therefore, the Yemeni authority welcomed the Gulf initiative and the Libyan authority the African one, hoping to remove the card of support and sympathy toward the oppositionists and make them look as though they are rejecting the settlements and the regional wishes to contain the violence and head toward a solution.
In light of the different circumstances surrounding the Gulf initiative in Yemen and the African initiative in Libya, one can notice that the Africans failed to adopt a similar approach at the beginning of the crisis in the Ivory Coast. It was when the president whose term had expired refused to surrender power to President-elect Alassane Ouattara, although they threatened with military intervention and started preparing the necessary forces. This failure is mainly due to a balance between the domestic powers, and the non-existence of real pressure tools to force Gbagbo to step down. However, the French adopted this approach later on and ended the crisis of duality in the authority.
It is unlikely to see an extension of the African initiative in Libya, not just because the revolutionaries rejected it, but also because the powers supporting it do not enjoy any influence. This is especially true in the presence of an international resolution being implemented by NATO and providing elements of strength to countries which will in no way deal with Colonel’s Gaddafi’s rule ever again. It is in this context that the revolutionaries rejected the initiative.
Such a conclusion would also be applicable in the case of the Gulf initiative in Yemen, considering that the wager on the determination of those who presented the initiative to exert pressures, is the only way to shift the current domestic balance of powers in a direction that would allow a settlement. This is due to the fact that the reliance on intentions alone does not encourage the exchange of concessions and the conclusion of such a settlement.
And just like in Libya where it has become quasi-impossible to coexist with any possible settlement in light of Gaddafi’s continuation in power, it is clear that any settlement in Yemen will have to feature the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. This is what the Gulf initiative tried to allude to through the transfer of the prerogatives to the vice president, but without resorting to elements of pressure and influence that would turn this process into one that is clear and without any ambiguity, especially since the constitutional cover might be used again to extend the crisis – rather than respond to the Gulf initiative – with what this carries in terms of possible slides toward wide-ranging civil violence.
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