If Assad Falls, We Will See All The Region's Alliances Unravel

Syria's president is not the only one nervously monitoring the protests. Regime change there will reshape the Middle East

By Patrick Seale
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 11/04/2011

The Syrian regime, long a key player in the Middle East power play, has decided to fight back with full force. It seems determined to defeat the tidal wave of popular protest that smashed the regimes of Tunisia and Egypt, that is threatening rulers in Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, and is now challenging state power in a dozen Syrian cities.

If the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad fails to reassert its authority, and is instead brought down or merely enfeebled by a prolonged period of popular agitation, the geopolitical implications could be considerable. Syria's allies – the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Shia resistance movement Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Hamas government in Gaza – would all come under pressure. For all three, loss of Syrian support would be painful.

Israel would no doubt view such a development with great satisfaction. It has long sought to disrupt the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah-Hamas axis, which has challenged its regional supremacy – even acquiring a certain deterrent capability, intolerable in Israel's eyes. But Israel's feelings might be tempered by fear that Assad could be replaced by an Islamist regime, even more threatening to its interests and security.

For the moment, all that can be said is that the concessions and promises made so far by Assad have been too little, too late, and have failed to satisfy the protesters. The last few days have seen a renewed surge of demonstrations that, with their swelling numbers, fury and anti-regime slogans, are beginning to seem like an insurrection. The regime has replied with live fire, curfews, massive arrests and cordons thrown around towns and villages. Some 200 protesters must have been killed.

The gloves are now off. In a chilling warning, the Syrian ministry of interior declared at the weekend: "There is no more room for leniency or tolerance in enforcing the law, preserving the security of the country and citizens, and protecting public order."

By all accounts, hardliners inside the regime have now won the debate with reformers, if indeed debate there was. The protesters have in turn hardened their stance as a result of the regime's harsh response. Pointing a finger at key relatives of the president – his brother Maher al-Assad, commander of the Republican Guard, and his cousin Rami Makhlouf, an exorbitantly rich businessman – some are demanding not mere improvements to the way Syria is governed but a change of regime.

It seems clear that in his speech on 30 March – his only public intervention so far – the president missed a historic opportunity to assert his leadership and pull things back from the brink. Had he announced long overdue measures – such as lifting the state of emergency, freeing political prisoners and human rights activists, bringing to trial the regime's corruption bigwigs, curbing the security services' powers, allowing new political parties to challenge the Ba'th party's monopoly of the past half century – he might have been able to lead his country towards a democracy on the Turkish model, as his friend and ally Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey's prime minister, has advised.

He might yet save the day with a dramatic announcement of immediate reforms. But the powerful interests that depend on the regime may make such a radical change impossible. Instead, Syria may be condemned to a bruising contest between regime and opposition, fought out on the street with increasing violence. The regime's armed strength could make sure that it gained the upper hand, but at great cost to its already badly shaken legitimacy.

More broadly, the region is witnessing the unravelling of alliances formed in a critical period three decades ago that saw the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979; the Iranian revolution of the same year; and Israel's devastating invasion of Lebanon in 1982, followed by its 18-year occupation of the south, which led to the emergence of Hezbollah. Having been Syria's ally in the 1973 war, Egypt changed sides and became Israel's partner in peace. Iran, Israel's ally under the shah, changed sides under the Islamic republic, becoming Syria's ally instead. Syria and Israel swapped partners.

These arrangements are now under threat. Post-Mubarak Egypt is likely to distance itself from Israel and rejoin the Arab camp, while Syria's alliance with Iran – unpopular with the Sunni- majority population, – could be endangered by any change of regime in Damascus. Other significant changes to the regional geopolitical map include the emergence of Turkey as a beneficent player, promoting trade and conflict resolution, and Iraq's slow recovery as a major Arab power from the devastation inflicted on it by Tony Blair, George Bush and America's pro-Israel neocons.

Are we then about to witness some reshuffling of alliances formed 30 years ago? Iraq and Iran, who fought a bitter war in the 1980s, could well draw closer now both are under Shia leadership. Together they will form a formidable power block. America's colossal investment in men and treasure in the Iraq war will seem vainer than ever.

Some things, however, could remain the same. Once the crisis abates, Turkey will continue to cultivate its friendship with Syria whatever the nature of its regime, because Syria will remain a key pivot of Turkey's ambitious Arab policy. Turkey may indeed come to replace Iran as Syria's main regional ally.

Nor is the crisis likely to reduce Syria's influence in Lebanon. No Syrian regime of any colour can tolerate a hostile government in Beirut. Its security – especially vis-a-vis Israel – is intimately tied to that of its Lebanese neighbour. The wave of protest engulfing the Arab world has pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict into second place. But that can only be temporary. Until it is resolved, the region will know no stability and little peace.