By Richard Gowan
Is
it time for Kofi Annan to declare that his bid to resolve the Syrian crisis has
failed? A growing number of Western diplomats argue privately that he should.
U.S. officials have stated publicly that Annan's peace plan "is
failing," and the Saudi foreign minister has said confidence in his
efforts is "rapidly falling." Syrian security forces continue to
target dissidents, rebel forces remain active, and there have been attacks on
convoys carrying U.N. monitors -- reinforcing the case that Annan should admit
defeat.
The
former U.N. Secretary-General has made it clear that he knows his mission is
close to failure. But it's very difficult for him to call the whole thing off.
While violence has continued in Syria at what Annan calls
"unacceptable" levels, the death-rate has generally been lower than
prior to the "ceasefire" he engineered in April. But whoever is
attacking the U.N. observers probably wants to foment a full-scale war, and
fighting appears not only to be on the rise again but also to be spreading into
Lebanon.
If
Annan were to quit now -- precipitating the withdrawal of U.N. military
personnel from Syria -- he could risk a further escalation. This presents an
ethical dilemma: Is it better for the United Nations to oversee, and arguably
provide cover for, the current violence or retreat and open the way for
something potentially worse?
Annan,
previously pilloried for the U.N.'s failings in cases such as Srebrenica and
Rwanda (some of which have been rehearsed by Western hawks who dislike his role
in Syria) is deeply sensitive to attacks on his own performance and that of the
U.N. In dealing with other conflicts, such as that in Darfur and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, he has argued for patience and persistence in the face of
continuing violence. He can hardly turn away from that philosophy now, and is
unlikely to admit defeat quickly.
Even
if Annan wants to quit, the political implications of doing so might be
destructive. Russia, which approved his mission to win breathing space for its
allies in Damascus, would accuse him of having given up too early. The Western
members of the Security Council could push for a new U.N. resolution imposing
new sanctions on Syria. Russia and China (which has made sincere-sounding
statements about backing Annan) would almost certainly then use their vetoes
against the West for a third time on Syria.
This
would mean the end of U.N. diplomacy over Syria, over a year after European
members of the Security Council first proposed a resolution censuring Damascus.
In theory, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon could find a replacement for
Annan. But Ban has taken a much harder moral line on the conflict than Annan,
and Syria has accused him of "outrageous" bias. It is hard to see how
he could credibly re-launch talks. It is equally difficult to think of any
international mediator with enough prestige and drive to take on Assad where
Annan failed.
So
Annan is trapped: he cannot keep up his peace process indefinitely, but nor can
he resign peremptorily. If the Syrian situation deteriorates, he has one chance
to escape this quandary. In late July, the Security Council will decide whether
to renew the mandate for the U.N. monitoring mission. U.S. ambassador to the
U.N., Susan Rice, has stated that she will veto the continuation of the mission
if there is no improvement on the ground. Technically, Annan could continue his
diplomatic efforts after the monitors went home. But the U.S. veto would be a
vote of no confidence that he could not survive.
But
Annan presumably does not want to be humiliated. So, with his original peace
plan fraying, he needs some sort of Plan B, both to alleviate Syrian suffering
and safeguard his reputation. He hasn't been coy about this, telling the
Security Council at the start of May that he would "jump" at new ideas.
One
Plan B -- calculated to please Western commentators -- would be for Annan to
throw caution to the wind, declare that the Syrian government is irredeemable,
and call for a major international intervention. There has been a lot of talk
about a no-fly zone and creating safe areas or humanitarian corridors. But
Annan and his team know that these are politically or operationally
impractical. Even if Russia and China weren't primed to veto proposals for any
U.N.-mandated military presence in Syria, there is very little evidence that
NATO powers want to send in forces. While Western officials may think that it's
time for Annan to announce that he's failed, they don't really want him to tell
them what to do as a result.
A
lower-risk alternative would be for Annan to state that, on the basis of
reporting from the U.N. observers, he believes that it is time for a strategic
pause in his diplomatic efforts. He could request the Security Council to keep
the peacekeeping mission in place to track violence, and then lay out a series
of conditions he needs to see met before renewing his mediating role. Some of
these would be based on his initial peace plan, such as a lasting diminution of
violence and the release of political prisoners.
But
Annan could also test the goodwill of some wavering international backers by
asking for concrete signs of progress in bilateral efforts by the U.S., Russia,
and others to prepare the ground for peace talks. If Annan is struggling,
nobody else seems capable of pulling off a diplomatic coup either, as the Arab
League's recent inability to convene Syrian opposition groups for a unity
conference demonstrated. Annan could state that he remains willing to act as a
mediator in the future -- but only if he is sure that the Security Council's
members and regional powers can cajole or compel their clients in Syria to
bargain.
A
strategic pause might allow some facts on the ground to change to Annan's
advantage. There have, for instance, been some signs of rebel forces regaining
momentum in recent weeks. Peaceful protests also continue, having spread to
previously quiet Aleppo this week. If these trends continue, the Syrian regime
may begin to rethink its position on talks (the U.S. and its allies can
continue to keep Damascus off-balance with gestures such as this week's
war-games in Jordan.) Even the much-maligned U.N. observers, who have deployed
faster than peacekeeping experts thought likely a month ago, may make a
difference if they can switch from reporting on violent incidents to giving
public warnings of upcoming Syrian offensives.
The
odds against Annan succeeding remain daunting. But on balance, the risks of him
quitting outright are too great for him to do so yet. By declaring a strategic
pause, he could show that he is not willing to be treated like a fool by the
Syrian regime -- and stay on standby for a better opening to mediate later.
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 18/05/2012
-Richard Gowan is associate director for Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations at New York University's Center on International Cooperation and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
-Richard Gowan is associate director for Crisis Diplomacy and Peace Operations at New York University's Center on International Cooperation and a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations
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