By Garrett Jones
On
the 19th of February 2012, the New York Times had an interesting article
pointing out the logistical and tactical problems the Israeli Air Force would
encounter if it were to try to interdict the development of Iran’s nuclear
weapons program.[1] The conclusion reached by the author was the problems
involved precluded Israel from making an attempt at derailing the Iranian
nuclear program through conventional military means. While I largely concur
with the logic in the article, I do not believe the Israelis ever have
seriously considered a conventional military strike as an effective way of
stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. The more pertinent question is
Will nuclear weapons be used by Israel against Iran?
Since
the beginning of Israel’s own nuclear weapons program, the Israeli doctrine on
nuclear weapons has been to reserve the employment of nuclear weapons for
attacks or potential dangers that threaten the existence of the Israeli state.
This is best demonstrated by Israel’s reaction to Pakistan’s announcement that
it had acquired nuclear weapons in 1998. While there was no celebration of the
development of an “Islamic Bomb” in Israeli circles, nor was there any public
talk of retaliation or military strikes. While Pakistan was not an ally or
supporter of Israel, it also did not develop nuclear weapons with much regard
to Israel at all.
The
development of nuclear weapons was focused on the threat from India, not
Israel. While key players in the Pakistani nuclear program may have taken steps
to promote the spread of the “Islamic bomb” to other Middle East players, it
has been the unwavering stand of the Government of Pakistan, and, more
importantly, the Pakistani Army that nuclear weapons were for
self-defense—“from India” being the unsaid but clearly understood source of any
threat requiring the use of Pakistani nuclear weapons. This was the weapon
system to prevent the neighboring Indian Army from simply overwhelming Pakistan
with its superior size.
While
both distance and the support of the U.S. for both Israel and Pakistan by the
U.S. also mitigated the threat of Pakistani possession of nuclear in regard to
Israel, it is clear that the Pakistani’s nuclear program simply did not rise to
the level of an existential threat to the Israeli state. I do believe, however,
that as an unintended consequence, the Pakistani nuclear program is the current
greatest existential threat to Pakistan.
The
possibility of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into terrorist hands is of
major interest to the United States, but such a development is a survival
threat to India. While the Pakistani Army may publicly express concern about
the U.S. staging a special operation mission to deprive them of their nuclear
weapons should the command and control of Pakistani weapons be threatened, it
is far more likely the Indian Army will be there long before the U.S. feels
compelled to move. In view of the history of conflict between India and
Pakistan, the addition of nuclear weapons to the mix means that the next conflict
which is more than a border skirmish, is almost by definition an extinction
event for Pakistan. It would hardly be rational for the Indians to leave a
defeated enemy on its very border in possession of nuclear weapons in the wake
of a serious bilateral military engagement. Pakistan cannot hope to be a victor
in any prolonged military engagement against India. Pakistani’s nuclear weapons
were meant to create a military stalemate with India. Stalemates are great as
long as they work. Loose nukes in Pakistan are an Indian survival threat long
before any U.S. targets are held at risk in such an eventuality. I fully expect
to see India move to destroy the Pakistani nuclear program should any serious
question of uncertainty over the control of Pakistani weapons arise.
Much
the same view should be taken in regard to the Iranian quest for nuclear
weapons. The question is not whether Iran should be permitted by the West to
develop nuclear weapons. The true question is whether Israel determines the
Iranian possession of nuclear weapons poses an existential threat to the
Israeli state. If it does, Israel will employ its nuclear arsenal to end the
threat. If it does not, there will be no overt military action. The logistical
and tactical problems outlined in the New York Times article dictate the use of
nuclear weapons. What would have required hundreds of aircraft to neutralize
with conventional weapons can be done by a handful of aircraft employing
nuclear weapons. A nuclear mission against Iran is well within the capability of
the Israeli Air Force.
Unfortunately,
such a mission seems to be outside the limits of imagination of the West’s
current national leaders. There has been little discussion of such an
occurrence in public circles and I believe that reflects a lack of thoughtful
consideration of the possibility. I believe most observers expect a violent and
prolonged reaction against Israeli interests, and by extension the interests of
Israel’s allies such as the U.S., should Israel carry out a conventional
military strike against Iran. I believe it would be fair to say that such a
reaction to a conventional strike will pale in comparison to the uproar caused
by a nuclear strike. I also believe such a development would completely reset
the relationship and positions of all the players in the Middle East peace
process in an unpredictable manner. The current stalemate and fossilization of
positions would be swept aside, for better or worse.
The
Israeli government will receive condemnation and hostility from the other
players in the Middle East no matter what sort of military action it takes
against Iran. By the same token, Israel’s supporters in the U.S. are likely to
back any action Israel takes, if it is cast in the form of the preservation of
the Jewish state. “Never again,” reflecting the unique history of the founding
of the state of Israel in the wake of the Jewish holocaust after World War II,
is probably the most powerful phrase in Israeli politics. It is a slogan which
will unite all parts of the political spectrum in Israel and the supporters of
the Jewish state internationally.
No
private citizen is truly in a position to judge the rationality and the
intentions of a government such as is now in control of Iran. The opacity of
lines of responsibility and decision making processes in Iran make such a
judgment properly within the purview of national intelligence organizations of
the various sovereign governments. With that said, the public statements of the
Iranian leadership lead me to believe that they will not be diverted from their
goal of achieving nuclear weapons. The same public statements also do not
engender much confidence in the rationality or judgment of Iran’s leadership.
The
history of the Israeli state and its location in a sea of enemies has in an
almost unique way trained the leaders of Israel to think the unthinkable. If
Israel determines the Iranian nuclear program is in fact a threat to its very
existence, then it will strike, and strike in such a manner as to be
successful. This will require nuclear weapons. If Israel determines it can live
with Iran as a nuclear state, then expect there to be no overt military action
but a continuing series of low-level sabotage and covert intelligence actions.
I
believe the West and the current U.S. administration are again engaged in a
failure of imagination. I do not think the current crop of Western leaders
fully understand that Israel may well believe itself to be facing an extinction
threat. This may simply be because since the end of the Cold War those currently
exercising power in the West have not been faced with such a dilemma. In a very
real way, they may not have sufficient practice in both “thinking the
unthinkable” and preparing for the consequences of the “unthinkable.”
-This commentary was published by Foreign Policy Research
Institute in 1st of March 2012
-Garrett Jones is a retired operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent extensive time in the Middle East and Africa and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College
-Garrett Jones is a retired operations officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. He spent extensive time in the Middle East and Africa and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College
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