By Elie Issa
The GCC Secretary General Abdul Latif Al Zayani (L) sits next to Saudi Arabia's foreign minister Prince Saud Al Faisal (R) during a ministerial meeting of the six Gulf nations in Riyadh (AFP/Getty Images)
With
growing talk of a political confederation of the Arab states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia’s Defense Minister, Prince Salman Bin
Abdul Aziz, has raised the possibility of transforming the existing Peninsula
Shield Force [PSF] into a “unified Gulf army” able to respond to external and
domestic security threats. The Saudi prince made it clear that inspiration for
this suggestion was the perceived threat from Iran: "Iran is our neighbor, but we draw a line
when it comes to intervention in our internal affairs as 'Gulf Cooperation
Council' countries. Whenever we feel that anybody is interfering in our
internal affairs through internal mercenaries or people from outside, we will
resist it appropriately" (Al-Seyassah [Kuwait], March 3; Arab Times, March
3). The PSF, with a permanent base in Saudi Arabia, was successfully deployed
in March, 2011 to end violent street protests by Bahrain’s Shiite minority (see
Terrorism Monitor Brief, March 24, 2011).
The
long-strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia resemble an updated
replica of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, including the involvement of both nations
in geopolitical and economic conflicts, proxy military conflicts and covert
intelligence operations. Saudi Arabia and Iran currently leads two
ideologically, politically and religiously opposed regional blocs that could at
any moment slip into lethal Sunni-Shiite confrontation, one whose impact would
be magnified by the membership of both nations in larger competing world camps.
Sunni
Saudi Arabia has close and long-standing political and economic ties with the
United States and most other Western nations. Shiite Iran has ties with Russia
and China despite certain ideological differences. Perhaps the most recent
illustration of the on-going regional geopolitical row is Saudi king Abdullah's
statement that "unnamed hands" targeting Islam and the Arabs are
behind the political turmoil in Sunni-dominated states in the region (Saudi
Press Agency [SPA], February 25). Saudi officials have long accused Iran of
meddling in the internal affairs of the GCC and other Arab states without
actually naming the Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia has already lost one of its
long-standing and staunchest allies in the Middle East, meaning former Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak. The Saudi rulers are now facing two key challenges
that might impact the kingdom's near-to-medium term outlook: the so-called
“Arab Spring” and Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions.
But
Iran is also following with concern the Syrian turmoil and the potential
weakness of its key regional ally, President Bashar Al-Assad. The Saudi
government, however, fears that if the Syrian turmoil escalates further it
might develop into a civil war pitting the majority Sunni population against
the ruling Alawite minority. In this scenario both the Syrian regime and Iran
may try to destabilize the Saudi regime by empowering the two million strong
Saudi Shiite minority. The latter is concentrated mainly in the Eastern
Province (al-Sharqiyah), which holds the world's largest oil fields. Claiming
institutionalized discrimination by the kingdom’s Sunni rulers, the Shiite
minority continues to wage sporadic street protests that are gradually turning
into deadly clashes with the Saudi security forces. Last month, Saudi Arabia’s
Interior Ministry vowed to use "an iron fist" to end what it called
Shiite violence in the Eastern Province (SPA, February 21; Reuters, February
21). The ministry reiterated claims that "foreign-backed troublemakers [read
Iran]" were attacking its security forces and instigating violence. "Some of those few [who attacked
security forces] are manipulated by foreign hands because of the kingdom’s
honourable foreign policy positions towards Arab and Islamic countries"
(Kuwait Times, February 21).
The
sensitive Eastern Province is of great importance to the Saudi government due
to the strategic oil reserves and related infrastructure. On March 1, a report
by Iran's state-run Press TV of an explosion on a pipeline in the Eastern
Province sent crude oil prices to a four-year high of $126 a barrel. The next
day, however, the Saudi Interior Ministry denied the report, saying "there
were no acts of sabotage in the kingdom" (Reuters, March 2). The Saudi
government suspects that Iran is using the Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain as part of a regional proxy war to improve its negotiation position
once the time for a deal involving Iran's nuclear program and the region's
geopolitical power balance arrives.
The
official U.S. position advocating a peaceful and negotiated solution to the
Iranian nuclear issue may limit the force of Saudi rhetoric targeting its
Iranian rival, but this does not mean that Saudi Arabia won't develop its own
"peaceful" nuclear program (see Terrorism Monitor, February 23).
Saudi Arabia plans to build 16 nuclear power plants by 2030 worth $100 billion
in a bid to generate at least 20% of its electricity needs from nuclear energy.
By 2021, Saudi Arabia is scheduled to have two nuclear reactors up and running.
Two plants will then come on stream annually through 2030, each costing $7
billion. In December, 2011 Prince Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi intelligence
chief and ambassador to the United States, said that his country might seek to
acquire nuclear weapons to help counterbalance regional rivals Israel and Iran
(AFP, December 5, 2011). Saudi Arabia has failed to convince Israel to abandon
its nuclear weapons and now that Iran may be seeking to possess a nuclear bomb,
the kingdom has to protect its people through all possible options, noted
Faisal.
Developing
its own nuclear power program is not Saudi Arabia's sole move to counter Iran's
growing power in the region. In December, 2011 Saudi King Abdullah called on
leaders of the GCC states to consolidate their alliance into a united
"single entity" in order to confront what he called threats to
national security. "No doubt, you all know we are targeted in our security
and stability," said Abdullah at the opening session of a GCC meeting in
Riyadh (SPA, December 20; Arab News, December 20). More recently, the GCC called on Iran to
cease its “hostile” policies and interference in the affairs of the Gulf States
(Bahrain News Agency, March 4; Gulf Daily News, March 5). Jordan and Morocco
have also asked to join Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the
United Arab Emirates in the six-nation GCC. Such a potentially large alliance
of Sunni Monarchies falls within Saudi Arabia's medium-term aim of creating a
unified regional front against Iran.
Iranian
rhetoric promising “not a single drop of oil will pass through the Hormuz
Strait” is part of the regional geopolitical row and related bickering about
Iran's nuclear power program (Iran State News Agency, December 27, 2011). The question is whether Iran can close the
strategic maritime route through which nearly 17 million barrels of oil per day
transited in 2011. The answer is not that simple; Iran has likely drafted
various case scenarios to deal with a potential Israeli attack on its nuclear
sites. From using conventional war methods to small but highly effective
suicide speed-boats, Iran could certainly succeed in blocking all kinds of
navigation through the Hormuz Strait for at least several days. In the
meantime, Iranian missiles would likely hit strategic oil infrastructure in the
UAE and Saudi Arabia. Such an apocalyptic scenario would most likely prompt the
U.S. Fifth Fleet to intervene to re-open the Hormuz Strait. The mere thought of
this scenario would send crude oil prices soaring, based on the spike in prices
that resulted from fear of even a temporary closure during Iranian war games in
January. Mounting threats to the regional political and religious status quo
from “Arab Spring” resistance movements and Iran’s aggressive nuclear program
will continue to fuel moves towards greater political and military unity in the
GCC states.
-This article was published in Terrorism Monitor Volume: 10 Issue:
5, on 08/03/2012
-Elie Issa is a Lebanese analyst focusing on the Middle East and North Africa regions for the past eight years. His interests include geopolitical, security and macroeconomic topics
-Elie Issa is a Lebanese analyst focusing on the Middle East and North Africa regions for the past eight years. His interests include geopolitical, security and macroeconomic topics
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