By David Cortrigh
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad tours a nuclear facility
During
his State of the Union address President Obama trumpeted the supposed success
of tougher sanctions on Iran. U.S. policymakers seem to believe that stronger
measures will deny the regime’s nuclear capability and force it to cry uncle.
Although sanctions are indeed causing serious harm to the Iranian economy, they
have not forced the government to comply with U.S. demands.
Greater
pressure seems only to have hardened the regime’s determination to press ahead
with the nuclear program, while weakening the position of the country’s
beleaguered civil society opposition.
Research
in other cases has shown that the success of sanctions depends not on their
severity but on how skillfully they are mixed with incentives as part of a
diplomatic strategy. This was the case with Libya in 2003 when Gaddafi gave up
weapons of mass destruction. The success of sanctions also depends on whether
significant political factions within the target country support external
sanctions, as was the case during the international campaign against apartheid
in South Africa. Neither of these conditions exists in Iran.
Punishment, Not Diplomacy
Sanctions
against Iran have been used primarily to punish not to provide bargaining
leverage. This method of sanctions policy has proven ineffective in numerous
cases. U.S. sanctions were imposed more than 30 years ago in response to the
Islamic revolution and the subsequent hostage crisis. They have remained in
place ever since. In the 1990s they were reinforced by President Clinton and
the U.S. Congress via the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The declared purposes of
U.S. sanctions include ending Iran’s support for militant groups such as Hamas
and Hezbollah and preventing the development of nuclear weapons production
capacity. The Iranian leadership has refused to discuss these topics until
sanctions are lifted and the United States returns billions of dollars of
financial assets frozen in 1979. Since 2006, the United States and its allies,
along with the United Nations, have imposed additional multilateral sanctions
focused on ending Iran’s nuclear program and halting uranium enrichment. These
measures have imposed costs on Iran’s nuclear program and may have slowed its
development, but they have not stopped Tehran from steadily enhancing its nuclear
capability and developing the technologies and materials that could be used to
build a bomb.
Nearly
every objective analysis of U.S. sanctions against Iran has judged them a
failure. In 2001 the Atlantic Council issued a report concluding that the sanctions
were not achieving the desired policy results and were an obstacle to the
realization of U.S. interests. The Council strongly recommended lifting
sanctions on Iran and pursuing normalized diplomatic relations. Any hopes for such a change in policy were
dashed when President Bush included Iran in the “axis of evil.” The Obama
administration has further intensified pressure against Iran as part of its
attempt to curry favor with pro-Israeli interests in the United States.
Sanctions
are hurting not helping our potential allies within Iran. Democratic opposition
leaders and supporters of the Green Movement do not favor international
sanctions on their country. Former
presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi has labeled President Ahmadinejad's
foreign policies "wrong and adventurist," but he has consistently
opposed sanctions. "Sanctions would not affect the government,” he said in
2009, “but would impose many hardships upon the people, who suffer enough as a
result of the calamity of their insane rulers." The regime is able to use
its defiance of Western demands to rally domestic political support. Iranian
human rights advocates warn that increased external pressure often means
greater repression against domestic opponents. "The government will say
that critics of their policies are doing the foreigners' bidding and will use
sanctions as a pretext” to silence them, said Ali Shakouri-Rad, a leading
opposition voice. Restrictions on public assembly and internet access have
tightened in recent years as external pressure has intensified.
Persuasion, Not Force
The
history of nonproliferation teaches that nations must be persuaded to give up
nuclear weapons capability. They cannot be forced. Over the decades more than
two dozen countries have decided not to acquire or maintain nuclear weapons
capability. Security assurances and positive inducements played an important
role in many of these nonproliferation decisions. Coercive disarmament worked
only once, in the exceptional case of Iraq, which was subjected to draconian
multilateral sanctions and subsequently defeated in war. In all other cases
nations decided to give up the bomb on their own. They did so for a variety of
reasons--a domestic shift toward democracy, the lure of greater openness to the
global economy, improved security relations with neighboring states, and
security assurances from major states. In many cases economic and security
inducements helped to make denuclearization the preferred option.
This
does not mean that sanctions have no role to play, especially when combined
with incentives. In the case of Libya lifting sanctions formed a central part
of the agreement to abandon weapons of mass destruction. The offer to lift
sanctions can be a potent inducement for cooperation. The art of diplomacy lies
in creatively blending pressures and inducements to exert persuasive influence
and reward a state for adopting a desired change in policy. As nonproliferation
expert Leon Sigal observes.
Convincing
countries not to build the Bomb requires cooperating with them, however
unsavory that may be. Countries that seek nuclear arms are insecure. Trying to
isolate them or force them to forgo nuclear arming could well backfire.
Such
states need assurances to ease their insecurity. The best approach, according to
Sigal, is a “strategy of diplomatic give-and-take that combines reassurance
with conditional reciprocity, promising inducements on the condition that
potential proliferators accept nuclear restraints.”
Peace, Not War
Diplomatic
options are available for defusing tensions with Iran. A settlement of the
nuclear standoff could be based on international acceptance of Iran’s right to
enrichment, in exchange for enhanced monitoring of its nuclear program. Iran
has recently renewed its willingness to negotiate with the United States and
its European allies and has indicated continued interest in arranging a fuel
swap with foreign countries. Under the terms of the proposed deal, Iran would
transfer some of its low-level enriched uranium to another country (France or
Russia have been mentioned), where the fuel would be enriched to higher levels
and returned to Iran for medical uses. The removal of a portion of Iran’s
nuclear fuel would lower its growing stockpile of low-enriched uranium.
The
proposed arrangement could set a precedent for greater transparency and
international participation in Iran’s nuclear program. U.S. and European
officials complain that the proposed deal has many loopholes and would not shut
down continuing enrichment. Negotiating a fuel swap is not meant as a final
solution but rather as a confidence-building process to begin diplomatic
dialogue. When Iran, Turkey, and Brazil formally proposed the fuel swap two
years ago, they specifically referred to the proposal as a “starting point to
begin cooperation and a positive constructive move forward among nations.”
The
United States has shown no interest in negotiating with Iran, and that will
probably not change in this political season as the Obama administration seeks
to outflank the right in pressuring Iran. Some in the administration no doubt
believe that tougher sanctions will stay the hand of those urging military
strikes. This is a dangerous game, for it maintains and deepens the isolation
of Iran and increases the risk of miscalculation. The United States needs a
completely different policy, based on a willingness to talk (which Obama
promised and took some heat for in his 2008 campaign). After 30 years of failed
sanctions, it’s time to try a different approach, using persuasion rather than
punishment. Let’s offer to begin lifting sanctions in exchange for steps toward
greater transparency and assurances that Iran’s nuclear program is genuinely
peaceful.
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy In Focus on
02/02/2012
-Foreign Policy In Focus contributor David Cortright is director of policy studies at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and author or editor of 17 books, including the Adelphi volume Towards Nuclear Zero (International Institute for Strategic Studies/Routledge, 2010)
-Foreign Policy In Focus contributor David Cortright is director of policy studies at Notre Dame’s Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and author or editor of 17 books, including the Adelphi volume Towards Nuclear Zero (International Institute for Strategic Studies/Routledge, 2010)
No comments:
Post a Comment