Ahmad Al Attar and William J Moloney
Supporters of the Free Syrian Army block a street during a protest in Reef Damascus, north of Damascus, early Saturday morning,
As the Syrian city of Homs tipped towards open war yesterday, international resolve was still mired in confusion. The ability of a UN Security Council resolution to stem the bloodshed is in doubt, while with few exceptions foreign observers are waffling on military intervention.
The
strongest statements have come from Qatar's Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani,
who recently told the US television channel CBS that "troops should go to
stop the killing". The proposal, however, was short on details, and it
remains to be seen who would be involved.
Turkey
is still trying to hold on to the last vestiges of its "no problems with
neighbours" foreign policy. The Arab League is caught between states that
are dealing with their own revolutions, states that are wary of what comes
after the Assad regime and states that are apathetic.
There
is a general lack of political resolve, but if the violence continues as we
have seen in Homs, intervention is the only option left on the table. But even
if there was the will to intervene, could it be accomplished?
First
and foremost, the goals of intervention must be highlighted. The mandate behind
such a mission would be explicitly to bring an end to the Assad regime. As was
witnessed in Libya last year and in Iraq in 2003, the only way to bring an end
to a despotic and highly centralised regime is to decapitate it by seizing the
capital. Diehard units may continue to hold out after the political centre has
been captured, but for all intents and purposes, the dictatorship would have
lost the ability to use the state apparatus to wield control.
The
forceful removal of the Assads by military means faces several key challenges.
The Free Syrian Army does not have the manpower, materiel, or necessary organisation
and support capabilities to defeat the much larger Syrian Army and Republican
Guard (not to mention Damascus's extensive naval and air assets). Unlike Libya,
intervention in Syria would require the deployment of foreign ground forces.
The
staging of a ground intervention would be critical. While Syria borders five
countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and Iraq) not all of them would be
suitable candidates to support an invasion. A militia that is invested in the
survival of the Syrian regime controls Lebanon; Israel is unlikely to support
the removal of the "devil they know"; and Iraq is too unstable to
support another deployment of foreign troops on its territory. Only Turkey and
Jordan would be capable, and potentially willing, to host a ground offensive.
To
defuse Damascus's claims of "imperialism", the ground component would
best be conducted by a Turkish-Jordanian-GCC force, fighting the regime on both
northern and southern fronts, with US and Nato air and intelligence ground support.
The
Syrian ground forces seem formidable on paper, with 1,600 T-72 tanks, 2,200 BMP
armoured vehicles, plentiful anti-tank weapons (including advanced AT-14 Kornet
missiles) and substantial artillery and air-defence systems. While the Syrian
air force has about 60 relatively modern planes, the remaining 524 combat
aircraft are ageing models from the 1960s and 1970s. The navy is the smallest
and most poorly equipped of the branches, and would be almost irrelevant anyway
in an intervention staged from Turkey or Jordan.
The
first phase would be the aerial campaign preparing the way for close air
support of a ground advance. Surface-to-air missile sites (SAMs) and air force
planes and installations would have to be completely destroyed, which would take
significantly longer than the initial salvo against air defences in Libya.
There
is a precedent in the 1999 Nato intervention in Kosovo, which stretched out
over three and a half months, involving over 1,000 combat aircraft and 38,000
combat sorties. It involved almost all Nato members, and heavily relied on the
US air force's diverse capabilities.
The
2011 intervention in Libya relied even more heavily on US air force support.
While US and Nato forces should not have boots on the ground, their expertise in
winning air superiority would drastically limit casualties.
The
best-case scenario would be a two-front war. On the northern front, the Turkish
army would push south to take Aleppo and severe Damascus's links to the Syrian
Mediterranean region (which contains a large Alawite population). This would
reduce the likelihood of a repeat of the battle of Sirte, where Qaddafi
loyalists held out for several weeks after the fall of Tripoli.
On
the southern front, a combined Jordanian-GCC force would take Al Harisa and
Shahba, before pushing on to Damascus. The rationale is based on low population
density. The Syrian military may have units that are better trained in
defensive asymmetric warfare, which would fortify themselves in urban
environments, having learnt from the experience of Hizbollah in Lebanon. The
southern approaches to Damascus are relatively flat, supported by a road
network and have a lower population density, allowing a mobile offensive that
avoided urban areas and minimised civilian casualties.
Middle
East militaries' ever-present problems with practical combined forces and
manoeuvre warfare would slow the southern advance, but a conventional ground
offensive backed by close air support could avoid a long, drawn-out war, as was
seen in Libya. Estimates of Libyan civilian casualties are uncertain, but
certainly aggravated by urban warfare and the poor training of Libyan militias.
If
the political or humanitarian situation in Syria changes to a degree where
intervention is the only option, it could be successful. But it must be focused
and decisive to shorten the conflict and minimise casualties. As the Homs
massacre continues, this could be the only solution to the crisis.
-This commentary was published in The National on 05/02/2012
-Ahmed Al Attar is an Emirati security affairs commentator & William J Moloney is a defence analyst
-Ahmed Al Attar is an Emirati security affairs commentator & William J Moloney is a defence analyst
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