By Scott Charney
Iranian Kilo class submarine
In
the middle of all the discussion of the possibility of attacks on Iran and a
war in the Persian Gulf region, one factor in particular has been largely
overlooked. The Iranians have evidently fallen in love with submarines.
Brief
news stories about the launch of new submarines have appeared repeatedly in the
past few years, and yet this phenomenon receives only a passing mention in most
articles and reports. No other country in the area (unless one counts Pakistan)
operates any submarines. By contrast, the Iranians now could potentially have
more than 20.
Obviously
the Iranian naval establishment thinks it’s on to something, and that their
near-term future lies beneath the waves. What do they have in mind?
What They Have
Accurate
information about Iran’s submarine force is difficult to acquire. The
announcements of new submarines often emanate from semi-governmental Iranian
sources, which are known to boast about the capabilities of their indigenous
weapons systems.For their part, international journalists often vary widely in
their estimates of the size of Iran’s submarine force, with no consistent
pattern emerging..
In
the 1990s and shortly thereafter, the Iranians purchased three Kilo class
submarines from Russia. These submarines
are diesel-electric attack subs, well-known for being quiet. The Iranians
subsequently began constructing their own midget submarines, with one craft of
the Nahang class and many more of the Ghadirclass. The Iranians may also have
acquired a few midget submarines from North Korea, though details are hazy, and
these craft may no longer be operational. All of these midget subs can carry
two torpedoes or anti-ship missiles, lay mines, and transport commando teams.
More
recently, the Iranians seem to be seeking to bridge the gap between the midget
subs and the Kilos by constructing what they call “semi-heavy” submarines of
the Qaaem and/or Fateh class, with more possibly to come. Such submarines, if
successful, could complement the Kilos at first and eventually supplant them
when the larger submarines reach the end of their service lives. The upshot of
all of this is that, even by the most conservative estimates, the Iranians have
a sizable submarine force, are seeking to make it larger, and have a
substantial head start over any of the other states bordering the Persian Gulf.
Why They Want Them
The
reason for this submarine construction binge is very similar to the reason for
Iran’s missile program: it circumvents their
aerial deficiencies and, in so doing, creates a deterrent to attack. The
Persian Gulf is mostly shallow and is littered with shipwrecks from centuries
of traffic. Antisubmarine warfare is complicated in such an environment, and
smaller submarines have particular advantages. All of the Arab states bordering
the Persian Gulf have small navies, and suffering losses to Iranian submarines
would leave these kings, sheiks, and emirs able to protect neither their
exports of oil nor their imports of vast quantities of consumer goods. The
Saudis have the most powerful navy in the region by far, but they are cursed by
geography. Some of their most powerful ships are based at a port on the Red
Sea, and transferring these elements to the Persian Gulf would necessitate
sailing through the Straits of Hormuz. This would likely be a suicide mission
in the face of Iran’s mines, submarines, shore-launched missiles, warships, air
strikes, and so on.
The
Arab air forces would surely attempt to eliminate Iran’s naval bases. But the
Iranians have likely constructed missiles with that in mind. The multi-billion
dollar air forces and navies of the Gulf states are concentrated at very few
bases such that even an inaccurate missile is likely to land on something
valuable.
In
the case of a conflict with the United States, the Iranians could not win per
se, but this is where deterrence comes into play. Before being overwhelmed and
destroyed, Iranian submarines could conceivably sink one or more American ships
and/or submarines, resulting in unacceptable casualties for the United States.
This strategy is behind most of Iran’s recent military moves, and is common
around the world. For this reason, among others, many current and retired
American senior military officers oppose any attack on Iran. The military
situation for the Israelis is similar. They would love to add the firepower of
their own submarines’ cruise missiles to any strike on Iran, but risking the
subs would be very foolish at a time of terrible relations with Turkey, upheaval
in Syria, and an uncertain future with Egypt.
The
Iranians would not have acquired so many submarines if they did not think they
would come in handy. Thanks in part to these undersea craft, the regime in
Tehran may have developed the ability to dominate its neighbors and ward off
attack from faraway powers even as most of the foreign policy community has
been chasing the specter of nuclear weapons.
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy In Focus on
09/04/2012
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