By Michael Wahid Hanna
Kofi Annan
Despite
the tentative and fragile ceasefire that appears to have now taken hold in
Syria, skepticism and outright vitriol regarding the mission of United Nations
and Arab League envoy Kofi Annan remains. This frustration is understandable as
the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has until now shown no signs of
credible compromise and the human costs of conflict have continued to escalate.
The odds against success remain high. Even as the Syrian regime has observed a
cessation in hostilities, it has ignored agreements to redeploy troops and
heavy weapons from population centers. However, even if the current iteration
of the Annan mission fails, a sequential diplomatic approach remains the only
avenue by which an international consensus might be reached; without such
consensus there is simply no hope for a near-term resolution of the conflict
through managed transition.
The
ceasefire that is at the crux of current attention is not an end in and of
itself. The six-point plan endorsed by the Arab League and the United Nations
also seeks to establish a Syrian-led political process that addresses the
legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people. While the terms of a transition
are left unspecified, it should be clear to Russia and others that any credible
managed transition will require the removal of Assad from power. There can be
no stability in Syria if the regime remains fully intact. In light of the
indispensability of Russia and China and their reservations about the
consequences of a political transition, focus should now shift to fashioning a
serious transition process that retains specific figures and institutions from the
Assad regime while allowing for genuine political change to take root. If
international consensus cannot be marshaled around such basic realities then
Syria is destined to suffer from escalating and protracted conflict that is the
sole alternative to a diplomatic resolution.
The
limitations of the Annan mission and its mandate are a reflection of the
polarized international debate on Syria and the decidedly poor options
available for ending the bloodshed. Chief among the complaints against the
Annan initiative has been the argument that it is buying time for the Syrian
regime's brutal crackdown on peaceful and armed opposition. However, the Assad
regime has made abundantly clear that its only means for dealing with the
opposition is by force. As such, it is in no need of cover.
It
is also not the case that the Annan initiative is blocking more consequential
action. There is currently no appetite for direct foreign military intervention
in Syria, despite continued hopes by some that Turkey would lead such an
effort. Sharpened Turkish rhetoric, particularly that of Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, has fueled these hopes among the Syrian opposition and its
supporters. While Turkish officials have privately confirmed the existence of
contingency planning regarding various types of intervention, there is no real
sense of imminent Turkish action, especially without regional and international
backing. Short of massive refugee flows, clear evidence of outright Syrian
support for Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) guerillas, or escalating
cross-border spill-over violence, Turkey will not opt for unilateral military
options.
Furthermore,
the logistical and operational difficulties of arming the Free Syrian Army,
coupled with the manifest dangers of this approach, have hindered any serious
efforts to do so. While the Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal,
offered resolute words regarding the arming of the Free Syrian Army (FSA)
during the inaugural meeting of the Friends of Syria group in February, actual
support has not materialized. This gap between rhetoric and actions on the part
of Saudi Arabia, as well as Qatar, is partly a reflection of the lack of
consensus within the anti-Assad camp regarding the wisdom of arming the Syrian
opposition. But as importantly, it is also a reflection of the lack of depth of
Saudi and Qatari diplomacy and their inability to effectively carry out such
policies. While the Gulf is in a dominant position in terms of its ability to
set the diplomatic agenda of the Arab League, without direct assistance from
Turkish or Jordanian intelligence, it is unclear whether the policy apparatus
of either country could manage such a complex process beyond simply funding
various favored Syrian groups. The lack of serious policy coordination between
the Gulf and Turkey should also be a warning as to the seriousness of their
intent.
Against
this backdrop, the Annan mission will serve to clarify the intentions of the
interested international parties, including Russia, which has positioned
itself, buttressed by China, as the chief obstacle to international efforts to
initiate a managed transition. For Russia, the question presented by current
diplomatic efforts is whether their interests can be satisfied through a
managed transition process despite their longstanding objections to policies
that Russia deems to compromise state sovereignty. It will also clarify the
sincerity, or lack thereof, of Russia's current stance and whether it is only
driven by its desire to be treated as a great power and to be consulted on
critical issues of international security. This is particularly the case since
Russia demonstrably supported the Annan plan. Its own credibility as an
international player is put into doubt by its inability to persuade the Assad
regime to fulfil its own obligations.
Any
assumption that the Assad regime could crush the armed opposition and
reestablish order on its terms should now be moot. While Assad has proven
willing to slaughter his own people, his regime has proven unable to decisively
crush the opposition to his continued rule. Despite recent tactical successes
for the Assad regime, the armed opposition cannot simply be wiped out by
military means. Following the massive destruction of the Baba Amr district of
Homs and the high toll on civilians, it is likely that the FSA will shift from
seeking to openly hold territory to more traditional insurgent tactics. While
this will lead to greater resilience, it will also likely result in increased
civilian casualties and human suffering.
If
all avenues for diplomacy are shut down, the conflict in Syria will escalate
and the end goal will be a toppling of the regime. Particularly for Russia,
such an outcome represents an all or nothing scenario that would risk Russian
strategic interests and further poison Russia's relations with much of the Arab
world. It should be clear that there can be no return to the status quo ante.
The sequential progression of diplomacy now offers both Russia and China an
opportunity to engage in a process that does not create a threatening new
precedent while also limiting the destabilizing spillover effects that would
accompany heightened sectarian conflict and the likely increase in
transnational jihadi involvement.
Syrian
opposition figures who have met with Chinese officials have also noted emerging
but tentative signs of a potential shift by China, which would leave Russia
much more exposed if it casts a lone veto against any further U.N. Security
Council action.
In
recent conversations with several senior members of the Syrian opposition, it
is clear that there remains space for non-military options and diplomatic
solutions in the minds of certain sectors of the opposition. This attachment to
diplomacy on the part of some political leaders comes despite facing severe
bottom-up pressure insisting upon outright regime change through military
options. These individuals described the parameters of a managed transition
that should satisfy Russian and Chinese concerns while preserving space for a
democratic transition. The broad outlines of such a process would include a
dignified exit for the president and his most trusted aides while limiting the
vetting of the security services to the core leaders of the crackdown. These
limited steps would focus attention in immediate terms solely on the 50 or so
individuals most culpable for the regime's brutal crackdown. While such steps
would undoubtedly be controversial and entail wrenching compromises, in
limiting the focus in this fashion, a managed transition would preserve Alawite
control of the security sector and would serve as a curb against reprisals and
escalated sectarian conflict. In exchange, the transition process would mandate
an expedited multi-party electoral process, guarantees of a free and fair
process, and an opportunity to craft a new constitution, in addition to
fulfilling the existing obligations of the regime as laid out in the Arab
League's six-point plan.
Clear
signals of the inevitability of a managed transition will also send positive
signals to fence-sitters, as such regime figures and potential defectors are
calculating their personal interests based on an assessment of the internal
balance of power. Shifting their assumptions about the intent of diplomatic
efforts could encourage defections and regime fragmentation.
The
practicability of this type of managed transition is dependent on the ability
of the Syrian National Council (SNC) to unify its ranks inside and outside
Syria in support of diplomacy and compromise solutions. It will also require
much greater internal consensus than the fragmented Syrian opposition has
displayed to date. While rejection of political solutions has increased as
regime brutality has escalated, creating de-escalatory momentum and
establishing new facts on the ground are the best possible route for limiting
the appeal of extremists among the ranks of the opposition.
Such
proposals might also be the only path to international consensus regarding
Syria's political transition and the only hope for steering the country away
from the possibility of increased and protracted violence. If even such
far-reaching proposals for compromise are shunned by the supporters of the
Assad regime then Syria, its people, and the region will undoubtedly suffer the
consequences of proxy conflict and growing sectarian animus.
The
current diplomatic process has appeared impotent in the face of the Syrian
regime's brutality but with such grim alternatives, the Annan plan and a
process of sequential diplomacy remain the last and only hope available for avoiding
the worst-case scenarios that might await Syria.
-This commentary was published on 12/03/2012
-Michael Wahid Hanna is a fellow and program officer at the Century Foundation
-Michael Wahid Hanna is a fellow and program officer at the Century Foundation
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