This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 21/04/2011
The statements made and the stances taken by the Syrian Ambassador in Lebanon are reminiscent of the time of the French “High Commissioner”, who back then represented one of the two great powers that had no competitor in the region, and who used to deal with Lebanon’s sovereignty at whim, as per his country’s interests and what its policies required. But Syria, which played a role of tutelage over Lebanon for three decades, is not “great” by any standard. It today is no longer recognized as playing such a role, and does not have the ability to exercise it except in a negative manner. Indeed, its influence has become restricted to its closest allies, in only one direction, and it no longer has the ability to produce settlements and the patchwork deals its intelligence officers were so skilled at formulating, based on their sponsoring contradictions and feeding conflicts among the Lebanese.
Syria’s inability to “control” the two sides of the Lebanese issue is becoming clearer, as the Ambassador of the country which all of the Lebanese used to fear presented Lebanese authorities with a “notice” about an MP from the Future Movement whom the Syrian media has accused of arming and inciting the opposition, despite the fact that the movements opposed to the regime within Syria have continued after Jamal Jarrah’s “implication” was “exposed”, and after monitoring measures were tightened along Syria’s border with Lebanon, and are still taking place.
But why is Damascus intent on targeting Hariri’s movement after it and its allies have excluded him from the post of Prime Minister, despite the fact that he overwhelmingly represents the Sunnis? And what does that have to do with Syria’s internal situation?
In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq and its army came closer to the border with Syria, and when Washington sent warnings, some direct and others veiled, to Damascus that it must change its alliances and its behavior by withdrawing from Lebanon and distancing itself from Tehran, some considered Syria’s response to have come in the form of punishing Lebanese Sunnis for the US’s stances by waging a fierce campaign against Rafic Hariri and excluding him from the post of Prime Minister, before he was later assassinated– regardless of whether Damascus is directly implicated in the murder or in the negligence at the security level that allowed for it to take place, a matter which is left to the UN tribunal. This time, the regime in Syria is trying to repeat the experience of 2003 by waging a media campaign against Saad Hariri’s movement, one which its allies in Lebanon were quick to seize and build on, in order to suggest that the United States is the one responsible for the growing wave of protests on Syrian soil and the increasing calls for more freedoms, and to warn that Damascus is prepared to retaliate again by punishing “Washington’s friends” in Lebanon.
But there is much in Syria’s “constant conspiracy” theory which is inconsistent with truth and facts, and which reveals an inextinguishable desire to regain a role that was lost, despite all of the official denial about interfering in Lebanon’s affairs, first because the Syrian opposition has proven that its movements had strictly internal motivations and was unconnected to any foreign goals, and also because the US stance on this movement is dominated by reservation and hesitation; and second because there is no longer anything in Lebanon that could be negotiated over between Damascus and Washington, as UN Resolution 1701 and the deployment of UN troops has led to keeping Hezbollah’s activity at the Southern border in check, after Syria had long used such activity as a bargaining chip with the Americans and others.
The statements made and the stances taken by the Syrian Ambassador in Lebanon are reminiscent of the time of the French “High Commissioner”, who back then represented one of the two great powers that had no competitor in the region, and who used to deal with Lebanon’s sovereignty at whim, as per his country’s interests and what its policies required. But Syria, which played a role of tutelage over Lebanon for three decades, is not “great” by any standard. It today is no longer recognized as playing such a role, and does not have the ability to exercise it except in a negative manner. Indeed, its influence has become restricted to its closest allies, in only one direction, and it no longer has the ability to produce settlements and the patchwork deals its intelligence officers were so skilled at formulating, based on their sponsoring contradictions and feeding conflicts among the Lebanese.
Syria’s inability to “control” the two sides of the Lebanese issue is becoming clearer, as the Ambassador of the country which all of the Lebanese used to fear presented Lebanese authorities with a “notice” about an MP from the Future Movement whom the Syrian media has accused of arming and inciting the opposition, despite the fact that the movements opposed to the regime within Syria have continued after Jamal Jarrah’s “implication” was “exposed”, and after monitoring measures were tightened along Syria’s border with Lebanon, and are still taking place.
But why is Damascus intent on targeting Hariri’s movement after it and its allies have excluded him from the post of Prime Minister, despite the fact that he overwhelmingly represents the Sunnis? And what does that have to do with Syria’s internal situation?
In 2003, when the United States invaded Iraq and its army came closer to the border with Syria, and when Washington sent warnings, some direct and others veiled, to Damascus that it must change its alliances and its behavior by withdrawing from Lebanon and distancing itself from Tehran, some considered Syria’s response to have come in the form of punishing Lebanese Sunnis for the US’s stances by waging a fierce campaign against Rafic Hariri and excluding him from the post of Prime Minister, before he was later assassinated– regardless of whether Damascus is directly implicated in the murder or in the negligence at the security level that allowed for it to take place, a matter which is left to the UN tribunal. This time, the regime in Syria is trying to repeat the experience of 2003 by waging a media campaign against Saad Hariri’s movement, one which its allies in Lebanon were quick to seize and build on, in order to suggest that the United States is the one responsible for the growing wave of protests on Syrian soil and the increasing calls for more freedoms, and to warn that Damascus is prepared to retaliate again by punishing “Washington’s friends” in Lebanon.
But there is much in Syria’s “constant conspiracy” theory which is inconsistent with truth and facts, and which reveals an inextinguishable desire to regain a role that was lost, despite all of the official denial about interfering in Lebanon’s affairs, first because the Syrian opposition has proven that its movements had strictly internal motivations and was unconnected to any foreign goals, and also because the US stance on this movement is dominated by reservation and hesitation; and second because there is no longer anything in Lebanon that could be negotiated over between Damascus and Washington, as UN Resolution 1701 and the deployment of UN troops has led to keeping Hezbollah’s activity at the Southern border in check, after Syria had long used such activity as a bargaining chip with the Americans and others.
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