Libya Is At Stalemate – Now A New Strategy Is Needed

The perception of Britain's military involvement has not been helped by confused announcements

By Douglas Alexander
This commentary was published in The Guardian on 23/04/2011

When military action was first proposed in Libya, I said that those of us advocating the use of force have to accept that it can have unforeseen and often unpredictable consequences.

Weeks later, murderous slaughter by Muammar Gaddafi's forces still threatens the people of Misrata, and, as things stand, neither Benghazi nor Tripoli appears likely to fall imminently to either side. This situation has led the US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, to observe on Friday that Libya is "moving towards stalemate".

The standoff we see in Libya today was always one of a range of possible immediate outcomes resulting from the commencement of the air strikes that followed the passage of UN Resolution 1973.

Labour remains steadfast in its support for the enforcement of the United Nations Security Council resolution. That decision – implemented with professionalism and bravery by both our own and our allies' armed services – saved the 700,000 residents of Benghazi from a grim fate. But we are not, and should not be, deaf to the anxiety in the country about Britain's present and future role in the Libyan mission.

Over recent days, the government's announcements on Libya suggest that strategic, tactical and operational matters seem to have become worryingly confused. The specific operational steps announced by the government — providing telecommunications, body armour and ten military advisers — each had a rationale reflecting the new realities on the ground. But the ad hoc and uncoordinated manner in which they were announced, rooted in no clearly articulated plan, has only served to increase public anxieties.

None of the measures announced, in and of themselves, represents a breach of the mandate provided by the United Nations and approved by the House of Commons. But, in truth, none of them is likely to significantly affect the strategic situation in Libya.

As the opposition, we thought hard about the original decision to vote for the mission; we knew the dangers but we judged the alternatives were worse. But, in truth, we also knew that the first decision was the easiest and the situation thereafter would be far more complicated.

In my view, what is now needed from the British government is a clearer and better articulated strategy. Of course, in military conflict, certainty is elusive, but strategy is essential. And hope is not a strategy. The Government needs to acknowledge that while the realities on the ground have changed, Britain's strategic constraints endure — the finite nature of our military capacity, the need to maintain support in the UK and other participating countries, and the importance of keeping Libya's Arab neighbours on our side.

The urgency of the government framing such a strategy was only underlined by the article published last week by the American and French presidents and our own prime minister. While the piece made clear that they would adhere to the UN mandate, it also stated that "so long as Gaddafi is in power, Nato and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds".

We all understand Gaddafi's repeated disregard of previous ceasefires, his continuing use of brutal repression, and the very real difficulties that would be involved in trying to translate any "freezing" of the present situation on the ground into a durable self-enforcing stability. But the message of the article would surely have been all the more powerful if the prime minister was clearer about the military and non-military means by which he sees their stated aims being achieved.

For in the UK and beyond, there is no plan, no mandate, and no appetite for Nato troops attempting to fight their way into Tripoli to remove Gaddafi. It was also ill-judged and irresponsible for the defence secretary, Liam Fox, to compare the action in Libya to the continuing campaign in Afghanistan where, a decade on, Britain currently has about 11,000 combat troops deployed.

Such a comparison not only ignores the different order of threat to Britain's national security posed by al-Qaida and its supporters.

It also needlessly threatens support at home and abroad for the Libyan mission.

Speaking in support of the mission last week to the 26 ambassadors of our European Union partners, I said we needed an approach from the government that was practical as well as principled. When the House of Commons returns on Tuesday that will be my message at the dispatch box to, the foreign secretary, William Hague. We will be seeking clearer answers from the government on the distinction between political ambitions and military objectives, and the strategy needed to enforce UNSCR 1973.

There should be greater clarity about what support to anti-Gaddafi forces, in the government's view, would be both legal and advisable. Is an increasingly unwieldy 40-wide "contact group" proving an effective and agile enough forum to direct the mission? And is the government really doing enough diplomatic work to sustain and strengthen international support for both the military and non military aspects of the mission?

With thousands currently trapped in the fighting in Misrata, Gaddafi's forces now using cluster munitions against civilians, and British forces committed, these are issues that demand an urgent, coherent and strategic response.

It matters not simply to ensure that the government addresses the real concerns at home and abroad. Crucially, it matters to convince Gaddafi's henchmen that there is a credible strategy in place to ensure his brutal attacks on civilians will not prevail.