By Saban Kardas
Tariq al-Hashimi and Recep Tayip Erdogan (Source: AA)
The
developments in Iraqi domestic politics, coupled with their regional
implications, continue to drag Turkey deeper into Middle Eastern affairs, while
its involvement in the Syrian conflict already occupies a large part of
Ankara’s foreign policy agenda. The ongoing power struggle between Iraqi Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his opponents on the one hand, and the complicated
relationship between the central government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan
Regional Government (KRG) in Northern Iraq on the other have taken an
interesting turn, creating reverberations for Turkey’s regional policies.
In
the wake of the withdrawal of US forces, Maliki has moved to consolidate his
power, threatening to undermine the delicate balance between various sectarian
and ethnic groups. Maliki, who assumed his current post following a 2010 power
sharing agreement, has failed to work toward national reconciliation. On the
contrary, in this already fractured country, he has even undermined the
governing coalition and also put Iraq on a collision course. His campaign
against Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, who took refuge in Northern Iraq
fearing for his life, crystallized the power struggle. The dispute grew into an
impasse, with the increasingly harsher tone of the parties, engulfing Turkey
(EDM, January 18). After spending some time in Kurdistan, Hashemi visited Saudi
Arabia and Doha and later came to Turkey, effectively beginning his days in
“exile.” Calling openly for Ankara’s support, Hashimi also furthered its
involvement in his country’s affairs (Anadolu Ajansi, April 10).
A
parallel process concerned Iraqi Kurds. The KRG’s relationship to Baghdad is
complicated over the status of the disputed city of Kirkuk and the conflict
over revenues from the exploration of natural resources in the North. In the
ongoing standoff, the leader of KRG, Masoud Barzani, supports Hashimi and has
used the leverage he gained to further bolster his position in Iraqi domestic
politics. Last month, Barzani suggested he could hold a referendum to redefine
ties to Baghdad. In a move that further accentuated this trend, during his trip
to the US earlier this month, Barzani urged Washington to reconsider its
backing of Maliki. Then, Barzani visited Turkey to meet with Hashimi and
Turkish leaders (Anadolu Ajansi, April 20).
Barzani’s
visit also underscored the degree to which Turkey has readjusted its regional
policies. After years of confrontation with the KRG, Turkey already moved to
normalize its relations with the Northern Iraqi Kurdish leadership to solicit
their backing for Ankara’s fight against the PKK. In the wake of the latest
developments, Ankara has further moved toward Iraqi Kurds to cope with the
challenges in Iraqi domestic politics.
In
the region, too, Turkey faces a similar fluid environment. With the unfolding
of the Syrian uprising, Ankara’s partnerships in the region have gone through a
new reshuffling. Faced with Tehran’s support for the Syrian regime and its
backing of Iraq’s Maliki, Turkey’s coordination of its policies with the Syrian
opposition, Iraqi opposition and the Gulf countries raise interesting questions
about the patterns of Ankara’s alignment.
These
realignments lead some to suggest that Turkey has been drawn into sectarian
groupings but the Turkish government rejects those claims. Ankara justified its
support for the Syrian opposition on the principles of human rights and
democracy, rather than any sectarian affiliation. In Iraq, Turkey again
refrained from framing its support for the Sunni leader Hashimi in sectarian
terms and instead underlined the divisive nature of Maliki’s policies.
However,
such statements from Turkish officials have far from convinced the Iraqi
leadership. Maliki, already critical of Turkey’s policy on Syria, reacted
harshly to recent developments and, in a press release, accused Turkey of
interfering in Iraqi internal affairs and acting in a hostile manner (Milliyet,
April 21). Reflecting the new regional realignment, Maliki then paid a two-day
visit to Tehran on April 22-23, where he met with key Iranian leaders. In his
first visit after his reelection, Maliki expressed solidarity with the Iranian
leadership and vowed to work in tandem on regional issues (www.presstv.ir,
April 23).
Both
Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan and Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
gave a very strong reaction to Maliki’s remarks. On his way back from Doha,
where he discussed Middle East issues with his regional counterparts, Erdogan
called Maliki insincere and maintained that his oppressive policies threatened
to divide Iraq. Suggesting that Maliki himself might have a sectarian agenda,
Erdogan insisted that Ankara was in communication with all Iraqi groups
including Shiite leaders (Sabah, April 22). The MFA’s statement also referred
to Maliki’s attempts to monopolize power and exclude others as the basis of the
current crisis in Iraq (www.mfa.gov.tr, April 21). Both countries summoned each
other’s diplomats posted to the respective capitals over the developments.
To
Turkey’s credit, concerns over Maliki’s course are indeed shared by a larger
number of Iraqi actors, including Shiite groups. Increasingly, the inability of
Maliki to build up coalitions with other groups and the weakening of the ties
between Baghdad and the provinces, most notably Northern Iraq, are criticized
by major Iraqi actors. Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr also visited Northern Iraq
for the first time, in an effort to establish bridges between the parties
(Anadolu Ajansi, April 26).
For
years, Turkey has worked to ensure a smooth political transition in Iraq.
Ankara’s policy was based on the understanding that if national reconciliation
cannot be achieved, it could deepen the fragmentation and pave the way for an
independent Kurdish state, not to mention other damaging repercussions for
regional peace. It was for this reason that Ankara supported the Maliki-led
government, although its initial preferences after the Iraqi elections had been
different. With the ongoing political crisis and tensions in the region, Turkey
has increasingly found itself on the same page as the KRG.
For
his part, Barzani apparently hopes to deepen his cooperation with Turkey to
further consolidate his position in Iraq. This development inevitably raises
speculations as to whether the Iraqi Kurds might press for independence or a
greater degree of autonomy from Baghdad, which, ironically, will put Turkey in
a difficult position. Given Ankara’s own concerns about an independent Kurdish
state and the Kurds’ claims over Kirkuk, Turkey’s support for Barzani will be
conditional and it will hardly be the midwife to an independent Kurdistan.
-This commentary was published in Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 9 Issue: 84, on 03/05/2012
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