It won’t be easy -- but it sure beats the alternative.
BY MATTHEW BUNN & ABBAS MALEKI
Observers
would be forgiven for dismissing negotiations over Iran's nuclear program as
Kabuki theater. Despite years of on-again, off-again efforts, after all, fears
of war continue to simmer.
Such
frustrations are understandable -- but they may not be entirely justified.
Despite real obstacles, there is a serious chance for progress if both sides
come to the table willing to compromise and focused on a step-by-step approach
that gives each side real gains, builds confidence, and allows more time for
talks on the harder issues. The next round of negotiations between Iran and
world powers, slated for May 23 in Baghdad, is crucial -- though only the start
of a long road.
No
one could claim these negotiations will be easy. Iran and the United States
have been locked in mutual hostility since Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, and
this enmity has produced deep mistrust and tough political constraints on both
sides. In a U.S. presidential election year, compromise will be difficult, as
no candidate can be seen as "soft" on Iran -- and in Iran, which has
a presidential election next year, no faction can be seen as advocating retreat
in the face of Western pressure. For a deal to work, both sides have to see it
as genuinely serving their national interests.
Nevertheless,
as an American and an Iranian, both of us patriots, we believe that a
negotiated deal is possible. Although genuine clashes of interests are at
stake, we believe our countries would be better served by such a pact, however
imperfect, than by continued stalemate or military conflict. For Iran, the
status quo means ongoing sanctions, limited access to foreign investment and
technology, and the looming danger of military strikes. For the United States,
stalemate means no negotiated limits on the Iranian nuclear program, continued
high oil prices (reflecting the risks of conflict), and no resolution of
U.S.-Iranian disputes over terrorism, Israel, and more.
If
the confrontation deteriorated into a military conflict, it would be a disaster
for both countries' security. Strikes by the United States or Israel would risk
an unpredictable regional conflagration and could convince Iran to redouble its
nuclear efforts and build covert sites that would be hard to find and strike.
To
open the path to an accord, the parties must combine the realism of small
initial steps with a vision of a long-term rapprochement. Early steps should be
designed to build confidence on both sides that it is worth continuing the
process, and to buy time for further talks.
There
are a number of ways both sides could bolster confidence in the negotiating
process. Iran should offer to halt its enrichment of uranium to 20 percent
U-235, its buildup of larger stocks of 5 percent enriched uranium, and its
acquisition of ever-more centrifuges as long as the talks are making progress.
As in past proposals, the United States and Europe should offer to provide
low-enriched fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor in exchange for Iran's
agreement to ship a substantial portion of its enriched uranium out of the
country. And Iran should agree to implement the International Atomic Energy
Agency's Additional Protocol, which allows for broader international
inspections of nuclear facilities, as long as cooperation is moving forward.
At
the same time, the United States and Europe should offer to lift the new oil
and banking sanctions now going into effect -- again, as long as the talks are
making progress. Such initiatives would allow each side to say to skeptics in
its own camp: Things are no longer getting worse; give us more time.
As
an early gesture, the United States and Europe could also allow the shipment of
desperately needed spare parts for Iran's civilian aircraft, which have been
blocked under sanctions for decades, and allow Iranian airliners to refuel and
receive normal services in Europe. Iran could commit to prevent any arms or
other assistance from flowing to armed groups in Iraq or Afghanistan. The sides
could also negotiate a pact to prevent inadvertent clashes in the Persian Gulf
and work together to stop the flow of heroin from Afghanistan into Iran.
None
of these interim steps, of course, will be able to produce a breakthrough
unless both Iran and the United States share a long-term vision of forging a
more productive relationship. The nuclear deal that would be a part of this
vision would inevitably involve some level of continued enrichment in Iran
under agreed-upon constraints. Iran would agree to far-reaching inspections and
transparency, including resolving concerns about past work that the West
suspects may have been weapons-related. The United States and its negotiating
partners would agree that Iran's admissions about past activities will not be
punished.
As
part of a nuclear agreement, the United States and Europe should help Iran
replace the aging Tehran Research Reactor with a modern facility outside
densely populated Tehran -- and Iran should agree to suspend construction of
the Arak heavy-water reactor, which the West fears is well suited for plutonium
production, as it would no longer be needed.
It's
not only the nuclear issue that divides Iran and the United States. The two
countries will have to talk directly to address the many other issues that divide
them, including terrorism, sanctions, regional security, and more. All
participants, including the United States, should assure Iran that they will
not attack or threaten to overthrow Iran's government as long as Iran complies
with the nuclear deal and does not commit or sponsor aggression. Iran, for its
part, proposed a nonaggression pact with its Persian Gulf neighbors after the
Iran-Iraq War.
Both
sides are likely to fear that the other will cheat on its commitments in such a
deal. Both will have to take some risks for peace, while seeking commitments
that are clear and verifiable. But there may be a chance to build a virtuous
cycle: Once the benefits begin to flow, it will likely be harder for those who
would call for ripping up the deal and returning to confrontation to win the
argument.
As
difficult as it is, both sides must come to Baghdad this month ready to offer
clear, verifiable first steps on the path toward compromise -- and away from
the abyss of armed confrontation.
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 21/05/2012
-Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, is a former nonproliferation advisor in the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy
-Abbas Maleki, an associate professor of energy policy at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran and Robert Wilhelm fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a former deputy foreign minister of Iran
-Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at the Harvard Kennedy School, is a former nonproliferation advisor in the White House's Office of Science and Technology Policy
-Abbas Maleki, an associate professor of energy policy at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran and Robert Wilhelm fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a former deputy foreign minister of Iran
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