By Michael Singh
U.S. President Barack Obama
U.S. President Barack Obama
In
one of the most memorable lines of his March 4, 2012, speech on the Middle
East, President Obama declared, "Iran's leaders should understand that I
do not have a policy of containment; I have a policy to prevent Iran from
obtaining a nuclear weapon." However, containment is rarely a policy one
prefers, with its implication of preventing a bad situation from getting worse.
Instead, it tends to be the policy one is left with once other realistic
options have been exhausted.
Avoiding
containment, therefore, has less to do with declarations about the future, and
far more to do with sound strategy today: We must prevent ourselves from being
maneuvered into a corner where we have little choice other than to accept
containment as our de facto Iran policy. Instead of emphasizing what we may do
if Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, or is on the cusp of doing so, the U.S.
should focus on denying Tehran the necessary building blocks to reach that
point -- in other words, a nuclear weapons capability.
North
Korea provides a case in point. It would surprise most Americans to learn that
the United States provided North Korea with over $1.3 billion in assistance
from 1995 to 2008. This aid, along with other benefits, such as North Korea's
removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and the unfreezing of key
assets, was provided even as the U.S. and its allies spent countless dollars
more defending themselves from the dangers emanating from Pyongyang, and as
North Korea made steady progress toward a nuclear weapon, culminating in a pair
of nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.
The
North Korean regime was given relief, not in exchange for irreversible denuclearization, but for
"confidence-building measures" (CBMs), which stopped short of
addressing Washington's core concerns. The net effect, however, is that
diplomatic confidence has instead been undermined due to the North's reversals,
and Pyongyang has reportedly assembled a nuclear arsenal despite withering
international pressure. While Iran and North Korea are different in many
regards, these outcomes should nevertheless be bracing for those involved in
the nuclear negotiations with Tehran, into which similar language regarding
interim agreements and CBMs has crept.
In
order for the talks resuming this week in Baghdad to provide a path to Iran's
denuclearization -- rather than a slippery slope towards containment -- the
Obama administration should avoid three key mistakes.
First,
the U.S. should not provide relief from sanctions in exchange for anything less
than the full suspension of uranium enrichment by Tehran, and other
hard-to-reverse steps such as the removal of Iran's enriched uranium stocks and
dismantlement of its key fuel fabrication facilities.
This
is necessary for three reasons: First, it prevents Iran from using the talks
simply to derail the pressure campaign against it, only to renege on its
commitments later, as it has done in the past. Second, it prevents Iran from
legitimizing its uranium enrichment program and thereby gaining technical
mastery of the enrichment process, which would be a boon should the regime
later kick out inspectors. Finally, it would simplify the task of detecting
Iranian cheating. If Iran is permitted a legitimate enrichment program, then
the IAEA and Western intelligence agencies must seek to detect diversion of
uranium or other material and personnel to a possible parallel, clandestine
program, whereas if Iran is not permitted such activities at all, any
enrichment-related work would be a red flag and a cause for punitive action.
Second,
the U.S. must take care not to reward Iran for provocations. Decision-makers in
Tehran cannot help but be pleased that the international community is now
focused on Iran's 19.75 percent enrichment work and treats its 3.5 percent
enrichment as a fait accompli, or that their once-secret facilities at Natanz
and Arak seem likely to remain in operation in the nuclear proposals put
forward by the P5+1.
Washington
has tended to focus its energies on each marginal advance by Tehran, such that
what the U.S. now appears willing to do in return for a limit on Iran's
enrichment activities is equivalent to what had previously been offered for a
full suspension of enrichment. This constant re-drawing of U.S. redlines may
seem sensible in the diplomatic heat of battle, but the perverse effect is not
to cap Iran's activities, but to encourage further nuclear progress.
Finally,
the U.S. must not neglect the bigger picture. It is a common fault of
policymakers -- or any decision-maker, for that matter -- that near-term costs
and benefits are given a disproportionate weight relative to longer-term ones.
For example, there is a great deal of analysis of the impact of military action
against Iran on the price of oil, but little on the long-term effect of Iran
obtaining a nuclear weapon or of a policy of containment on oil prices.
Any
nuclear deal which stops short of fulfilling the U.N. Security Council's
repeated demand for the full suspension of uranium enrichment by Iran, among
other things, holds the possibility of eroding U.S. influence in the Middle
East, undermining U.S. deterrence broadly, strengthening the Iranian regime,
and damaging the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. Washington
tends to exaggerate the benefits of a deal with Iran, given the short lifespan
of past agreements, and underestimate these long-term costs.
Too
often, a compromise on Iran's nuclear program has been presented by its
advocates as a Hobson's choice -- accept a bad deal, or invite military
conflict. The real choice is between ineffective diplomacy which provides
Tehran with much-sought relief, yet leaves Washington's concerns unresolved and
U.S. policy on a slippery slope towards containment -- or a firmer approach
which provides Tehran with no benefits until it yields its nuclear weapons
capabilities irreversibly. Negotiations and agreements are useful insofar as
they advance our national security interests, but should never be seen as ends
in themselves. The leverage the U.S. has built up has been hard-won, but can be
easily lost, and should not be yielded too readily.
-This commentary was published first in Foreign
Policy on 22/05/2012
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