By Faisal Al Yafai
How
much can a country change in a single year? On the anniversary of Hosni
Mubarak's fall from power, Egypt is still convulsed daily by protests. Sit-ins
in Tahrir Square continue. Relations between "the Square", which is
shorthand for the Egyptian public that supports the protests, and the generals
of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Scaf) are tense and characterised
by mutual mistrust. The stability and calm sought by the outside world is a
work in progress.
Yet
beneath the surface, decisive changes have taken place in the past 12 months.
There is a tension at the heart of the Egyptian revolution between making
cosmetic changes - arguably elections, and even a new president - and genuine,
deep-rooted change.
Egyptians,
even those who do not support the Square, are in favour of fundamental change.
The Scaf generals are now torn between the Square and the newly elected
parliamentarians, who are also uncertain. No decisions can be taken without
regard to Tahrir. That, certainly, is new.
This
three-way struggle continues daily. What is happening is a systematic
renegotiation of the social contracts that have held Egypt firm (for which,
read: stagnant) for decades. In this mix is the tentative renegotiation of the
close relationship with the United States and, by proxy, the peace treaty with
Israel. A more democratic Egypt will bring closer alignment between the wishes
of the people and state policy.
In
this climate, everything is political. The violence that followed a football
match earlier this month escalated into days of clashes and riots - all aimed
at the military, which protesters accused of orchestrating the violence. The
Supreme Council is in a bind: the generals seem to be looking for ways to
transfer to civilian rule while keeping intact as much of the old guard as
possible. But the Square has set as its target that very system.
The
presidential election, previously scheduled to begin in June, has been brought
forward, with nominations to be accepted in March. In itself, a change of two
or three months isn't meaningful, but what it represents is significant: the
people have spoken.
In
other ways, too, the rules of the game have been altered from a year ago. In
the past two weeks, Egyptian activists launched a campaign on social networks
to boycott companies owned by the army. Activists argue that military-run
companies deprive the economy of investment and competition. By naming
companies owned by the generals, they hope to further pressure Scaf, while
raising awareness of the real role of what is often described as the "deep
state".
This
is a brave step, inconceivable a year ago, because information about these
companies is considered a military secret. It is a further demonstration of how
much Egyptian society has changed, and how the previous social contracts are
being rewritten.
This
renegotiation is not a mere metaphor for social change. Last month, the UAE's
Damac Properties settled a dispute with the Egyptian government over the value
of land purchased by the company during the Mubarak era. Several other
companies have also been involved in the review of contracts after protesters
objected to deals struck during Mubarak's rule.
The
Supreme Council is not stationary in this situation, even if its acts are
sometimes opaque. A mass raid on 17 NGOs at the end of last year has led to the
detention and possible prosecution of 43 foreigners, including 19 American
citizens. The arrest of these citizens prompted US government officials to
suggest the estimated $1.5 billion (Dh5.5 billion) annual aid package to Egypt
might be in jeopardy. In response, Cairo cancelled a high-ranking army
delegation, in a diplomatic row that would have been extremely unlikely in the
Mubarak era.
This
may be an elaborate bluff on Scaf's part, an attempt to exert some leverage
over the United States, which at least in public has been supportive of the
protest movement. Or it may be an attempt to pander to public opinion; Egyptian
society is generally suspicious of the intentions of the United States, which was
the primary patron of the Mubarak regime.
Yet
this may be a bluff on both sides. No institution in Egypt is closer to the
United States than the army. For Washington, there is no real question of
withdrawing aid, which is the cornerstone of US policy in the region. Aid has
always been the price the US government had to pay for the Israeli-Egyptian
peace treaty, to placate Cairo as Israel continued its occupation of
Palestinian land.
But
what is happening is that the generals - slowly, tenuously, pushing back when
they can - are being forced to listen to what the Egyptian people are saying.
This is not a perfect system: the people of Tahrir have no formal mandate and
parliamentary elections have, in the minds of many, supplanted their political
role. Better, ideally, for Egypt to speak through the ballot box.
But
with the army still in charge and electoral politics still being defined to
offer as many Egyptians as possible a voice in public affairs, Tahrir Square
remains the megaphone through which the people - a large proportion of the
people, at least in spirit - can speak and demand that the generals listen.
That is a sea-change from a year ago. Egypt may not be stable, but these days
is far from stagnant.
-This commentary was published in The National
on 14/02/2012
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