When Morocco took the step of severing diplomatic relations with Iran, over two years ago, it seemed as if it was singing its own tune outside the chorus. It was content to keep its stance a bilateral matter, not trying to gather support for its decision, which was based on field observation, not on bias towards those who oppose the Iranian regime, who are many and on the rise.
At the time, Rabat based its action on the fact that its diplomats in Tehran were under suspicion, with regard to the stance on refusing Iranian interference in Bahrain, although many international actors had taken the same stance. And whether bringing up this incident was merely a pretext or the real origin of the crisis, Morocco has since then stopped discussing the existence of a plan to draw its citizens to embrace the Shiite faith. One might also say that the same applies to other Maghreb and African countries that have adopted Sunni Islam as their faith, without failing to acknowledge other sects.
The features of a Moroccan-Iranian conflict did not start appearing now. Indeed, during the Islamic Summit of 1982 in Casablanca, the late King Hassan II made an appearance on television, holding in his hand a publication he said followers of the regime of the mullahs in Iran had distributed in Morocco in order to disrupt the Islamic Summit. This was followed by a wave of arrests aimed at extremist Islamist activists.
It was no use for Morocco to request from the Shah of Iran, who resided in Marrakesh, that he leave the country, in order to enable it to host an Islamic Summit that Iran would attend. Indeed, the confrontation between the two countries grew more acute, at both the religious and political levels, and only the idea of establishing dialogue between Muslim sects within the perspective of the Islamic Awakening University could quell the excesses. Yet Hassan II was not angry for anything more than being upset at some of the Arab criticism that he had received on the background of his ratification of a military treaty with the United States that allows US forces to use Moroccan bases in the case of a threat to the Gulf region.
This took place in the early 1980s, and Morocco, which had established a strategic alliance with the Gulf states, remained apprehensive and would constantly be warning against Iran’s ambitions. Moreover, the good offices it exerted in order to launch dialogue between Iran and the UAE over withdrawal from the three Emirati islands failed to achieve any progress.
Much water has flowed under the bridge since, but caution and the lack of trust have affected the course of relations between Rabat and Tehran. And to this day, neither of the two sides has taken any initiative to contain the crisis. Indeed, it seemed as if Morocco had painlessly pulled out a tooth, while Iran became preoccupied with its immediate neighborhood, looking for loopholes that would serve to fulfill its dreams. Yet the region of North Africa which Iran had placed, from Cairo to Nouakchott, at the forefront of parallel concerns, was itself no longer prone to sectarian spread, being much more preoccupied with sorting out internal matters.
Certainly the changes the region has witnessed will make it likely to terminate practices that have led to the appearance of foreign ambitions with sectarian tendencies. Indeed, and in spite of the geographical distance, it did not fall outside of the agenda of exporting the Iranian revolution. This was helped by the fact that Islamist movements in the region were some of the most fervent, as in Algeria’s experience, and by the appearance of combatant factions in Libya, Mauritania and Morocco under different names. But the situation is in the process of becoming quite different, if not at the level of normalization with movements that can find in themselves the ability to become integrated, then by consecrating the choice of democracy as a framework for competition and for the struggle of ideas and programs.
The problem is that Iran, which criticizes what it considers to be repression of the protests of the Arab street, especially when it comes to protesters affiliated with the Shiite faith, itself opposes the right to protest in order to make heard the voices of domestic opposition in Iran, should rather ensure a normal form of coexistence for the followers of all religious faiths.
Historically, the North African region has been known to always to react to the events taking place in the Levant, especially when it comes to upholding the doctrine and defending the sovereignty and integrity of nations. And the effective severing of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran only asserts the reality of this timeless connection. Indeed, had the matter been the result of political disagreements, it could have been contained with a lesser extent of restraint. But having delved deep into the religious dimension, it has become imbued with more dangerous perspectives.
At the time, Rabat based its action on the fact that its diplomats in Tehran were under suspicion, with regard to the stance on refusing Iranian interference in Bahrain, although many international actors had taken the same stance. And whether bringing up this incident was merely a pretext or the real origin of the crisis, Morocco has since then stopped discussing the existence of a plan to draw its citizens to embrace the Shiite faith. One might also say that the same applies to other Maghreb and African countries that have adopted Sunni Islam as their faith, without failing to acknowledge other sects.
The features of a Moroccan-Iranian conflict did not start appearing now. Indeed, during the Islamic Summit of 1982 in Casablanca, the late King Hassan II made an appearance on television, holding in his hand a publication he said followers of the regime of the mullahs in Iran had distributed in Morocco in order to disrupt the Islamic Summit. This was followed by a wave of arrests aimed at extremist Islamist activists.
It was no use for Morocco to request from the Shah of Iran, who resided in Marrakesh, that he leave the country, in order to enable it to host an Islamic Summit that Iran would attend. Indeed, the confrontation between the two countries grew more acute, at both the religious and political levels, and only the idea of establishing dialogue between Muslim sects within the perspective of the Islamic Awakening University could quell the excesses. Yet Hassan II was not angry for anything more than being upset at some of the Arab criticism that he had received on the background of his ratification of a military treaty with the United States that allows US forces to use Moroccan bases in the case of a threat to the Gulf region.
This took place in the early 1980s, and Morocco, which had established a strategic alliance with the Gulf states, remained apprehensive and would constantly be warning against Iran’s ambitions. Moreover, the good offices it exerted in order to launch dialogue between Iran and the UAE over withdrawal from the three Emirati islands failed to achieve any progress.
Much water has flowed under the bridge since, but caution and the lack of trust have affected the course of relations between Rabat and Tehran. And to this day, neither of the two sides has taken any initiative to contain the crisis. Indeed, it seemed as if Morocco had painlessly pulled out a tooth, while Iran became preoccupied with its immediate neighborhood, looking for loopholes that would serve to fulfill its dreams. Yet the region of North Africa which Iran had placed, from Cairo to Nouakchott, at the forefront of parallel concerns, was itself no longer prone to sectarian spread, being much more preoccupied with sorting out internal matters.
Certainly the changes the region has witnessed will make it likely to terminate practices that have led to the appearance of foreign ambitions with sectarian tendencies. Indeed, and in spite of the geographical distance, it did not fall outside of the agenda of exporting the Iranian revolution. This was helped by the fact that Islamist movements in the region were some of the most fervent, as in Algeria’s experience, and by the appearance of combatant factions in Libya, Mauritania and Morocco under different names. But the situation is in the process of becoming quite different, if not at the level of normalization with movements that can find in themselves the ability to become integrated, then by consecrating the choice of democracy as a framework for competition and for the struggle of ideas and programs.
The problem is that Iran, which criticizes what it considers to be repression of the protests of the Arab street, especially when it comes to protesters affiliated with the Shiite faith, itself opposes the right to protest in order to make heard the voices of domestic opposition in Iran, should rather ensure a normal form of coexistence for the followers of all religious faiths.
Historically, the North African region has been known to always to react to the events taking place in the Levant, especially when it comes to upholding the doctrine and defending the sovereignty and integrity of nations. And the effective severing of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran only asserts the reality of this timeless connection. Indeed, had the matter been the result of political disagreements, it could have been contained with a lesser extent of restraint. But having delved deep into the religious dimension, it has become imbued with more dangerous perspectives.
No comments:
Post a Comment