Al Assad's Only Option Is Reform

Marwan Al Kabalan writes: For the sake of Syria and Syrians, promises made must be translated into action without delay
This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 08/04/2011

In a famous interview with the New York Times in December 2003, Syrian President Bashar Al Assad summarised the key challenges to his reform project. In response to criticisms about the slow pace of reform, he rejected the argument of old guard versus new.

Instead, he put the blame on what he called ‘Syrian mentality' and the lack of trained cadre to carry out the necessary reform. "There are some obstacles related to the mentality… You have people who are old and people who are young who have this mentality", Al Assad argued. As for the lack of a skilled bureaucracy, he said: "The major problem that I am facing as somebody who is responsible in this country is the cadre; the efficient, trained people to do the reform particularly the administrative reform."

More than seven years after that famous interview, Syria seems to still be looking for the right cadre to fill in key ministerial posts in the new government, which has been entrusted with solving the problems that have led to unprecedented social unrest in recent weeks. A closer look however shows that Syria's problem may have nothing to do with ‘mentality' or the lack of efficient bureaucracy to steer the desired reform. It is, rather, the legacy of a distorted one party system, which is dominated by shadowy institutions and extrajudicial procedures.

Like many other Third World countries, Syria has two power structures: the official powerless one and the real one. In the official one there are all the institutions of a modern state, such as the cabinet, parliament, the ruling party and the bureaucracy. In the real one there is a small number of top brass making all key decisions behind closed doors. The influence of these people, who are often accountable to no one, is a huge problem for reform in Syria.

Three options

When Al Assad succeeded his father president Hafez Al Assad in July 2000, he found the economy and the political system mired in problems and decadence. He faced a classic dilemma: on the one hand, he needed to liberalise the economy and reform the political system in order to survive. On the other hand, he wanted to keep the pillars of his regime intact. Hence, he had three options with risks and gains in mind. The first was to initiate a profound transformation, addressing the economic and political problems of the country in a true and innovative manner. The benefits of this option were gaining a badly needed legitimacy and rally the Syrian people around him.

The risks were to antagonise the barons of the old regime who would certainly strike back against anyone daring to strip them of their privileges. The second option was to make minor changes and maintain the status quo. The risks here were losing the support of the people while keeping the barons happy. The third option was a variation between the two, that is, to introduce some reforms on the economic front while keeping the political system closed. At the time, the third option seemed appealing; but proved to be very costly later. People started to question the president's commitment to reform and his ability to deliver the promises he made in his inaugural speech.

Today, the president finds himself faced with almost the same dilemma but under more pressing conditions. Change in Syria is round the corner and most Syrians believe that it is coming sooner or later.

The majority wants it incremental, peaceful and under no circumstance, would prefer foreign interference in the internal affairs of their country. Should the president opt for genuine reform he needs to know that his power rests with the people who would certainly come to his support in case of a conflict with the barons. Yet, the support of the people should not be taken for granted; some steps are needed in order to regain their trust.

These steps include establishing the rule of law, end the state of emergency, in effect since 1963, release all political prisoners, grant political freedom, including the freedom of expression and the press and allow exiled Syrians to come back home. Since the recent unrest broke out couple of weeks ago, several government officials have assured that reform is on the way. For the best interest of Syria and Syrians, these promises must be translated into action without any further delay.

Dr Marwan Al Kabalan is Lecturer in Media and International Relations at Damascus University.