This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 18/12/2010
Recent discussions concerning the political succession in Saudi Arabia surfaced when King Abdullah flew to New York City for surgery, and his brother Crown Prince Sultan, himself ill, returned to take charge over everyday Saudi affairs. Aware of the dangers in the aging leadership, King Abdullah created a framework that will allow the ruling house to take sensible account of age and fitness when it decides on the next step in succession.
While this process is fascinating to Saudi watchers, another key question emerges: What are the general strategic ramifications of the Saudi succession issue? An answer is significant because much of the regime’s legitimacy comes from its role as the guardian of Sunni orthodoxy, the majority branch of Islam and the branch followed by most Saudis. Future kings are expected to follow this mantra in their world view and foreign policy decision-making processes. In addition, it is important to remember that the policies a new king adopts are not necessarily apparent while he is still a prince.
In the immediate neighborhood, Yemen, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran and Iraq will be watching very closely for shifts in policy toward them, while any future Saudi king will see the same threat perceptions.
Yemen, with its numerous domestic issues and as the home of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, will surely have much stronger influence over the affairs of the kingdom, as well as representing a major threat. Yemeni stakeholders will take advantage of the Saudi succession. The GCC states will align and support a smooth transition and will watch keenly for signals of any shift in Saudi foreign policy. It is assumed by GCC states that any successor will continue to expand Saudi influence over them.
Iran will also take advantage of the succession. As a regional challenger, Tehran threatens Saudi interests in Lebanon, where it has operated with Syria and its Shiite proxy Hizbullah to undermine the Saudi-supported government under Prime Minister Saad Hariri. In the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Iran supports the Hamas movement against the Palestinian Authority; in Yemen, Tehran has been assisting the Houthi rebels who are fighting the Saudi-supported regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. And closer to home in the Persian Gulf, Iran has sought to curtail Saudi interests in Iraq and project its power into neighboring countries, particularly via their Shiite populations.
If Iran gains the upper hand, the Saudi royal family during and after the succession may face serious threats from Saudi Sunni radicals determined to stop the spread of Shiite Islam; as well as from Saudi Shiites encouraged by the rise of Iran and its Shiite regional allies. Both sides would seek to exploit the situation, leading to instability in Saudi Arabia and possibly in the region. Iraq itself would watch carefully and perhaps move closer to Tehran.
Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestinians form another tier. In contrast to the GCC and Yemen, the Levant has witnessed more explicit Saudi-Iranian rivalry and a Saudi effort to roll back Iran’s influence. Yet even within the economic and political strategies pursued by each power on such issues as Lebanon and the Israeli-Palestinian question, there have been nuanced “rules of the game” that tended to dampen sectarian strife and that may now be rejected.
Lebanon may fall into violence with the loss of the “Abdullah factor” and Syria will be more able to pursue its independent regional agenda. Turkey, under the neo-Ottomanist themes that are emerging in Ankara, will likely try to solidify its reach into Saudi Arabia’s domain. Egypt, which is facing a potential succession crisis itself, will watch for signs that the Saudi succession is smooth and observe how the Saudi example may be used in Egypt.
The United States, the United Kingdom and other European states as well as Russia, China, Pakistan and India – the outer core from Riyadh’s point of view – will be watching for any changes in the kingdom that could affect their strategic relations. These touch on counterterrorism policy, energy, arms purchases and training programs, and religious Daawa activities that will likely need to be reviewed.
Overall, several factors will come into play that all of the above countries will be watching closely. Primarily, what type of relationships will emerging Saudi princes have with the aforementioned players and issues? A secondary issue is the WikiLeaks episode and the fall-out from the release of American diplomatic cables. Third are the regional crises and conflicts, notably those involving the Sunni-Shiite divide as well as the eventuality of either attacking Iran over its nuclear weapons program or, alternatively, living with a nuclear Iran.
Continuity in strategic ramifications seems to have been the norm in the past. But Saudi leaders who may be in the line of succession will react and be emboldened by evolving threats, developments and machinations in an increasingly complex Middle Eastern neighborhood and challenging world. In the past few years, the old pan-Arab discourse of “rejection” and “confrontation” has shifted toward the vocabulary of “engagement”: with Israel, with old Arab rivals and, on occasion, with Iran as a form of containment. This may all be rejected during and after Saudi succession.
Theodore Karasik is director of research and development at the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis in Dubai. This commentary first appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter that publishes commentaries on Middle Eastern and Islamic issues.
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