This commentary was published in Arab News on 15/12/2010
With a vision for a new relationship for the United States with the Arab and Muslim world President Barack Obama traveled to Cairo early in his presidency to create better mutual understanding.
He followed up his speech with a serious gesture toward the Arab world with the American demand that Israel freeze building in the West Bank. This gambit, with all of the best intentions to show the United States could be more even-handed, did not play out as the White House hoped it would. The US administration has now abandoned the settlement freeze and with it direct negotiations. On Friday Secretary of State Clinton unveiled Plan B at the Brookings Institute. How did we get to this point after such high hopes when the Obama administration began two years ago?
To start with, once the US set the bar at that level of a settlement freeze, the Palestinians who had never made settlement freeze a condition for negotiations, could not lower the bar, leaving them with very little wiggle room. In addition there were indications from the offset that one or both sides would find some reason not to enter into direct talks - the settlement freeze became that excuse.
The amount of pressure that had to be placed on Israeli Prime Minister Banjamin Netanyahu to establish the freeze became for the Palestinians an indication in their eyes that Netanyahu would not be able, or willing, to deliver the minimum of what would be acceptable to them should negotiations commence. For Abbas the fear was and is if he enters into direct negotiations with the Israelis and they are unable to reach an agreement it will not only be the end of his leadership but probably moderate Palestinian leadership as well. Unless he receives serious signals where the negotiations will go there is very little chance that the Palestinians would enter into direct negotiations.
Netanyahu's reluctance is both ideological and pragmatic. With the former security is primary, along with a distrust of the Arab and Muslim world, as well as a concrete Zionist connection to the land. Even if these can be addressed in a satisfactory way, there is still Hamas to the south in Gaza and Hezbollah to the north in southern Lebanon. So the Israelis ask themselves what do they really gain with an agreement only on the West Bank.
Putting public pressure on Israel only plays into its insecurities. As strong as Israel is militarily, and economically, the scars of the Shoah, wars, and terrorism still create a sense of isolation that the world is against it. That Obama went to Cairo and more recently returned from Indonesia (the largest Muslim country in the world) and has not visited the Jewish state feeds that feeling. Related, both parties see themselves as vulnerable when compared to the other and so are very hesitant to move forward. Israelis see not only the Palestinians when they look at their neighbor, but the armies of the rest of the Arab world, as well as the Islamic Republic of Iran. While the Palestinians do not only see Israel but the support of the West and the power and might of the United States.
While the recent Time Magazine article was considered controversial - its thesis that there is a disconnect in Israeli society about the reality of the occupation on the lives of Palestinians (not to mention what it turns young Israelis into) was spot on. As long as there is quiet Israel feels fine. This is a false security. Combine this quiet with an improving Palestinian economy and most Israelis say why rock the boat. It should not be forgotten that between 1968 and 1986 per capita GDP in the Palestinian territories doubled and the Palestinian economy's growth rate was higher than even the rapidly growing Israel economy. The next year the First Intifada broke out. Economic improvement will not buy quiet forever.
The shadow of Iran hanging over the region is one of the reasons why the Arab world, the Palestinians, and the Israelis keep adding more time to work things out. Despite misgivings about what the other side can offer the other, Israel and many of its Arab neighbors would like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over, and by extension the end of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict, which would lessen complications when it comes to facing Iran.
Once the Obama administration faced up to reality that too much capital had been invested and lost, on the format of the past year, they needed to come up with a new strategy. So where did that leave the administration? One alternative is a new Israeli government. Netanyahu bites the bullet and forms a new coalition or there are new elections - not that the outcome may be much different than what they are now. There are two real options available. The first is for the Americans to facilitate back channel direct negotiations. The second option, which is what the Secretary of State Clinton talked about on Friday is a return to the model of quiet behind-the-scenes shuttle diplomacy. In her talk she announced that special envoy Mitchell will return to the region this week. All sides need to face up to the fact that there is not much left to negotiate within the rubric of the Taba Summit, the Clinton Parameters, the Arab Peace Initiative, the Road Map and the Geneva Accords. It is now time for decisions.
Rabbi Michael M. Cohen is director of development for the Friends of the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, a member organization of the Alliance for Middle East Peace, and is the author of "Einstein's Rabbi: A Tale of Science and the Soul." Contact him at: rabbimichael@friendsofarava.org
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