Nothing left...only the flag!!!
The current confrontation in Gaza began July 12 after three Israeli
teenagers disappeared in the West Bank the month before. Israel announced
the disappearance June 13, shortly thereafter placing blame on Hamas
for the kidnappings. On June 14, Hamas fired three rockets into the Hof
Ashkelon region. This was followed by Israeli attacks on Palestinians in
the Jerusalem region. On July 8, the Israelis announced Operation
Protective Edge and began calling up reservists. Hamas launched a longer-range
rocket at Tel Aviv. Israel then increased its airstrikes against targets
in Gaza.
At this point, it would appear that Israel has deployed sufficient force
to be ready to conduct an incursion into Gaza. However, Israel has not done so
yet. The conflict has consisted of airstrikes and some
special operations forces raids by Israel and rocket launches by
Hamas against targets in Israel.
From a purely military standpoint, the issue has been Hamas's search for
a deterrent to Israeli operations against Gaza. Operation Cast Lead in late
2008 and early 2009 disrupted Gaza deeply, and Hamas found itself without any
options beyond attempts to impose high casualties on Israeli forces. But the
size of the casualties in Cast Lead did not prove a deterrent.
Hamas augmented its short-range rocket arsenal with much longer-range
rockets. The latest generation of rockets it has acquired can reach the
population center of Israel: the triangle of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa.
However, these are rockets, not missiles. That means they have no guidance
system, and their point of impact once launched is a matter of chance. Given
these limits, Hamas hoped having a large number of rockets of different ranges
would create the risk of substantial Israeli civilian casualties, and that that
risk would deter Israel from action against Gaza.
The threat posed by the rockets was in fact substantial. According to
senior Israeli Air Force officers quoted on the subject, Israel lacked
intelligence on precisely where the rockets were stored and all the sites from
which they might be launched. Gaza is honeycombed with a complex of tunnels,
many quite deep. This limits intelligence. It also limits the ability of
Israeli airborne munitions from penetrating to their storage area and
destroying them.
The Israeli objective is to destroy Hamas' rocket capacity. Israel
ideally would like to do this from the air, but while some can be
destroyed from the air, and from special operations, it appears the Israelis
lack the ability to eliminate the threat. The only solution would be a
large-scale assault on Gaza designed to occupy it such that a full-scale search
for the weapons and their destruction on the ground would be possible.
Hamas has been firing rockets to convince the Israelis that they have
enough to increase casualties in the triangle if they choose to. The
Israelis must in fact assume that an assault on Gaza would in its earliest
stages result in a massive barrage, especially since Hamas would be in a
"use-it-or-lose-it" position. Hamas hopes this will deter an Israeli
attack.
Thus far, Israel has restrained its attack beyond airstrikes. The extent
to which the fear of massed rocketry was the constraining factor is not clear.
Certainly, the Israelis are concerned that Hamas is better prepared for an
attack than it was during Cast Lead, and that its ability to use anti-tank
missiles against Israel's Merkava tanks and improvised explosive devices
against infantry has evolved. Moreover, the occupation of Gaza would be costly
and complex. It would take perhaps weeks to search for rockets and in that
time, Israeli casualties would mount. When the political consequences,
particularly in Europe, of such an attack were added to this calculus, the
ground component of Protective Edge was put off.
As mentioned, a major issue for the Israelis is the intelligence factor.
It is said that Iran provided Hamas with these rockets via smuggling routes
through Sudan. It is hard to imagine the route these weapons would take such
that Israeli (and American) intelligence would not detect them on their
thousand-plus mile transit, and that they would move into Gaza in spite of
Israeli and Egyptian hostile watchfulness. Even if Iran didn't provide the
weapons, and someone else did, the same question would arise.
The failure of the Israelis to detect and interdict the movement of
rockets or rocket parts has an immediate effect on the confidence with which
senior Israeli commanders and political leaders calculate their
course. Therefore, to this point, there has been a stalemate, with what we
assume is a small fraction of Hamas' rockets being fired, and limited
operations against Gaza. The ground operation is being held in check for now.
It is interesting that there have been few public attempts to mediate
between Hamas and Israel, and that the condemnation of violence and calls for
peace have been more perfunctory than usual. Last week, reports emerged of
Turkish and Qatari attempts to negotiate a solution. U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry also reportedly contacted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
on Sunday, offering assistance in mediating a truce. Meanwhile, high-ranking
diplomats from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany
discussed truce efforts on the sidelines of talks on Iran. These efforts may
explain Israeli reluctance to attack, or provide a justification for not
carrying out an attack that Israel might see as too risky.
The problem for Israel in any cease-fire is that it would keep the
current status quo in place. Hamas would retain its rockets, and might be able
to attain more advanced models. Israel was not able to stop the influx of this
load, so Israel can't be confident that it can stop the next. A cease-fire is a
victory for Hamas because they have retained their rocket force and have the
potential to increase it. But for Israel, if it assumes that it cannot absorb
the cost of rooting out all of the rockets (assuming that is possible) then a
cease-fire brings it some political benefits without having to take too many
risks.
At this moment, we know for certain that Israel is bombing Gaza and has
amassed a force sufficient to initiate ground operations but has not done so.
Hamas has not fired a saturation attack, assuming it could, but has forced
Israel to assume that such an attack is possible, and that its Iron Dome
defensive system would be overwhelmed by the numbers. The next move is
Israel's. We can assume there are those in the Israeli command authority
arguing that the Gaza rockets will be fired at some point, and must be
eliminated now, and others arguing that without better intelligence the
likelihood of casualties and of triggering a saturation launch is too
high.
We have no idea who will win the argument, if there is one, but right
now, Israel is holding.
· * This analysis was published first by Stratfor Global Intelligence on
14/07/2014.
* George Friedman is the Chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in
1996 that is now a leader in the field of global intelligence. Friedman guides
Stratfor’s strategic vision and oversees the development and training of the
company’s intelligence unit.
No comments:
Post a Comment