By Marc Lynch
Given
the turbulent path of Egypt's post-revolutionary transition, it somehow seems
only right that last week's first round of the Presidential election managed to
produce the worst of all the possible run-off combinations: the Muslim
Brotherhood's Mohammed al-Morsi vs. the SCAF's Ahmed Shafik. It's fair to say that the sky appears to many
people, once again, to be falling. That
tantalizing glimpse of a successful transition to a civilian President who
could represent the revolution and challenge the SCAF seems to once again be
dancing from view. So, basically, the
Presidential election has gone just about as well as every other part of
Egypt's disastrous transition. What now?
It's
important to keep the results in perspective.
The results look less surprising once it's recognized that the two most
powerful forces in Egypt won the first round.
Neither did especially well. The
Muslim Brotherhood won 25%, which is just about exactly where most experts have
pegged their popular support for years and is significantly lower than in the
Parliamentary elections. Another quarter
of the vote to the SCAF's candidate, Shafik, likely reflecting the widespread
reality of popular exhaustion with the revolution. Neither of those should be a surprise. The real tragedy is that the center, just as
many had warned, destroyed itself by failing to unite around a single candidate
and dividing the remaining 50% of the vote among three candidates.
The
results are mainly surprising given popular ideas about the elections in
advance. Polling was indeed almost
completely useless, radically exaggerating Amr Moussa's share of the vote and
missing the appeal of the actual front-runners. Shafik was likely underestimated because
people (on all sides) assumed that Moussa was the real candidate of the SCAF
and that the fix was in on his behalf.
Morsi was dismissed because many observers confused the individual with
the movement; in fact, helped by the
relatively low turnout, the Brotherhood's electoral machine probably performed
just as well for him as it would have for the disqualified Khairet
el-Shater. Democratic elections often
fail to produce desirable results -- it's the nature of the beast.
So
what now? It's hard to judge how the
electorate will shake out -- and given how few people got the first round
remotely right, it's probably best to take all such predictions with much salt.
(Will any pollsters dare release pre-election polls?) But there's going to be a
season of political jockeying, with tough coalition formation and endorsement
challenges for both candidates. The
Muslim Brotherhood should be the natural beneficiary of the
"pro-revolution" vote, but its political mistakes over the last
months -- especially its decision to field a Presidential candidate after
vowing to not do so -- have helped generate enormous mistrust and resentment
among the political class. This
political resentment, combined with growing polarization around Islamism and
fear of one party dominated both branches of government, has pushed at least
some forces towards Shafik. But his
uncompromising stance makes him an exceedingly unlikely partner.
Most
activists seem understandably stunned by the outcome. If only they had recognized the strategic
logic of the election earlier and united around a single candidate, this might
have been averted. But neither Mousa,
given his past nor Abou el-Fotouh given his awkward coalition of salafis and
revolutionaries, quite fit the bill. The late surge for Sabbahi likely
reflected frustration with those two candidates. In the next round, voting for
either the Brotherhood or the SCAF is anathema to them, and I wouldn't be
surprised if many stay home. For some
activists, this should be just fine actually -- they were likely to continue
street activism regardless of the outcome, so this will in their view simply
strip away the masks.
It's
hard to see a real upside to either candidate winning -- that ship has
sailed. But the threat posed by either
remaining candidate is probably exaggerated.
The odds of persistent instability (thought not likely another January
25 style mass uprising) would go up with Shafik, especially if the election is
seen to have been rigged even more than in the first round and he seeks to
govern with the iron fist he's promised.
But more likely he would end up as a weak President, with little popular
legitimacy and commanding little respect from a SCAF which would remain empowered.
His policies would likely resemble the transitional status quo, which has
produced poor economic performance and pervasive instability.
Morsi
has a greater chance of being willing and able to use the Presidency to contest
SCAF authority, but still frightens many outside of the Brotherhood's orbit
(including many salafis who retain a deeply ingrained hostility to their
Islamist rivals). I doubt that Morsi
would actually move to impose sharia law, should he win, however. Despite erratic political behavior over the
last few months, the Brotherhood remains a pragmatic organization, and all of
the leaders with whom I've spoken over the last year have emphasized the urgent
need to prioritize economic reform.
Forming meaningful coalitions in the next few weeks ahead of the
election, and making firm guarantees on the constitution, would help.... though
such promises are difficult to make credible.
Don't
believe the idea that Washington is pleased with the choice. The odd idea of a convergence or alliance
between the U.S. and the Muslim Brotherhood is radically exaggerated in some
circles, while Shafik promises instability and an emboldened military which
could resist meaningful reform. My personal hunch is that the U.S. was quietly
rooting for Moussa, which shows how effectively it controls events in
Cairo. It's actually a very good sign
that the U.S. was so irrelevant to the
election campaign -- a successful campaign based primarily on
anti-American rhetoric, or overt American intervention in the election being
two dogs which didn't bark in an important way.
The
first round of the elections really did produce the worst possible outcome,
even if it in retrospect seems rather inevitable in light of earlier decisions,
such as the MB's fielding a candidate and the political center failing to unite
around a single candidate. The second
round really can't produce a President who will command wide legitimacy or a
popular mandate. Sadly, I suppose that's about what we should have expected
from this disastrous transition. But
despair isn't an option. The focus must
remain on seeing through the transition to civilian authority and the drafting
of an acceptable constitution.
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 28/05/2012
-Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University
-Marc Lynch is associate professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University
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