(And why we can't have one in the Obama administration.)
BY AARON DAVID MILLER
First,
full disclosure: I really admire Hillary Clinton.
I
was never an FOB or an FOH* in the political sense of the term, though I did
work for her husband, whom I also like. In 2000, while at the U.S. State
Department, I had the privilege of accompanying her to the funeral of Leah
Rabin, the wife of former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
Then,
as now, she struck me as a smart, charismatic leader, a quick study with a
strong sense of humor and of the absurd -- both very useful when working on
foreign-policy basket cases where chances of solutions are slim to none. The
Clintonites can shoot me if they want, but Clinton isn't going to end up in the
Secretary of State Hall of Fame.
You
might conclude otherwise, given the tsunami of favorable media coverage she has
received, particularly from the traveling press corps. But that's not unusual.
Alone among the cabinet secretaries, America's top diplomat traditionally
already wears a nonpartisan halo, whether her name is Albright or Rice.
Still,
what the media haven't done is to ask some of the tough questions about what
makes a truly consequential secretary of state. Nor has the press (or the
punditocracy, for that matter) been able to establish any standard against
which her performance might be measured.
My
take on her performance -- midway through what is likely to be her last year in
the job -- has little to do with her own abilities, which are impressive.
What
shapes Clinton's performance more are the two unfriendly universes in which she
operates: the cruel world beyond America's shores and the bureaucratically
skewed one back home. Throw in her own innate caution when it comes to taking
on some of the hopeless issues of the day (see the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, Iran), and what you have is a very hardworking and smart media
superstar who fights for her department at home and shines abroad on several
key 21st-century issues that she has identified as critical, but has yet to put
any major points on the board. The Twitter summary of Clinton's legacy would
read: No spectacular failures, but no spectacular achievements either. A John
Quincy Adams, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, Henry Kissinger, or James Baker
she's not.
Over
the years, I've thought a great deal about what is required to be a truly
effective, consequential, even great secretary of state. The position is a
unique one. It's the second-best job in Washington and carries a status no
other cabinet position holds, period.
Part
of the halo effect is that the job is supposed to be apolitical, like the
country's foreign policy itself. When it comes to foreign policy, politics is
supposed to stop at the water's edge. And Americans like to believe, somewhat
naively, that the country's top diplomat is immune or somehow protected from
the seamier aspects of Washington's partisan swamp. Secretaries of state are
expected to rise above the fray, and they generally try to. This is one reason
their public image and favorability ratings tend to be so high.
Still,
in the history of the Republic, only two secretaries of state have resigned
over reasons of high principle -- William Jennings Bryan and Cyrus Vance. The
job -- like so much of America's high politics -- is filled by survivors, not
martyrs. Tending to the country's foreign policy is a tough assignment, one
that requires a combination of skill and luck to succeed.
The
latter is particularly important. If crisis opens the door to greatness in the
presidency, it does the same for the country's top diplomat. Had there been no
Civil War, Theodore Roosevelt lamented about his own missing great moment, no
one would have known Abraham Lincoln's name. Without the right kind of crisis
abroad, no matter how talented the secretary of state, there's no chance to
demonstrate his or her stuff.
So
what makes a great secretary of state? Fortuna is necessary, but not sufficient
for top-level performance. Three other elements are required too.
1. The president must have your back.
All
presidents support their secretaries of state, but not all get the kind of
support critical to success. Baker used to say that he was George H.W. Bush's
man at the State Department, not the State Department's man at the White House.
Those two were particularly close, and it gave Baker real authority, power, and
street credibility. Kissinger and Richard Nixon, on the other hand, were more
competitive, though each exploited the other's talent and authority to command
and marshal respect and power.
If
there's daylight between the two or if it's clear that the White House isn't
really empowering the secretary to take on the important issues of the day, the
latter's status is diminished. The president not only needs to tell the world
that his secretary of state is a trusted confidante, but he also needs to
demonstrate it. If a president doesn't charge the secretary with responsibility
for tackling the biggest challenges, how does he or she become truly important?
2. Anatomy really is destiny.
Freud
was talking about gender differences here. But the capacity to project a
physical presence and persona is critical to success in politics and foreign
policy. And that persona, F. Scott Fitzgerald held, flowed from an unbroken
series of gestures. Effective presidents and secretaries of state are actors on
a public stage; they require charm, flattery, toughness, and drama to make
allies and adversaries take them seriously, particularly in a negotiation or
crisis.
That
means playing any number of roles, sometimes with high gestures of real or
feigned anger, frustration, or disappointment. During the 1948 Senate hearings
on the plan for European recovery that would bear his name, Marshall, whom
columnist James Reston described that day as displaying legendary "moral
grandeur," silenced an interrupting senator with a single glare. Kissinger
threatened to walk out on Syria's Hafez al-Assad at least once; Baker did the
same with Assad, the Palestinians, and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir.
3. The negotiator's mindset.
Beavers
build dams, and teenagers talk on the phone and text. By definition, effective
secretaries of state work negotiations, defuse crises, and tackle issues that
normal human beings consider very hard. A coherent worldview is important too,
but not as critical as the instinctive capacity to know how to make a deal,
sense the opportunity, and then figure out how to close it.
Kissinger
may have been the grand strategist, but both he and Baker had the negotiator's
mindset, the ability to figure out how to assemble the pieces of the puzzle
strewn on the living room floor and stay even when all the pieces didn't quite
fit. Kissinger's Middle East diplomacy -- three disengagement agreements
following the October 1973 war -- is a remarkable testament to those skills:
The one between Israel and Syria still survives, while the other two, between
Egypt and Israel, evolved into a peace treaty. There's no school at which to
learn these kinds of things. Marshall was a military man; Kissinger an
academic; Baker a lawyer. All possessed a natural ability to gauge how to move
the pieces around on the board.
Almost
four years in, Hillary Clinton is undeniably one for three.
She
clearly has star power -- a Gallup poll last year had Clinton at an approval
rating of 66 percent, more popular than the president and the vice president
and better regarded than she herself has been at any time since 1993. And in
terms of raw ability, she has the smarts and work ethic to do the job.
We
know Clinton is talented. What we don't know is how she'd do in a sustained
negotiation or in coordinating and orchestrating a grander political and
military design. Her capacity in that regard has never really been tested, and
likely won't be: You can't be a John Quincy Adams negotiating a historic treaty
with Spain, a Dean Acheson orchestrating the Truman Doctrine, or a George
Marshall doing NATO unless Fortuna and your boss let you.
What
about her relationship with the president? Political rivals turned compatriots
can make for close bonds -- think Rabin and Shimon Peres. Frenemies? Perhaps
there's a great respect between the two born of political combat and now from
the common challenge of making America's foreign policy work.
But
by either circumstance or design, her relationship with President Barack Obama
doesn't seem to have produced real empowerment. Sure, they may have lunch
together each week and she has a chance to weigh in on key decisions, but he
hasn't allowed her to own the high-profile issues. And ownership is critical to
at least having a chance to do big things.
This
doesn't mean she lacks accomplishments. She has fought hard and succeeded in
acquiring resources for the State Department; used her star power to improve
America's image abroad; sharpened America's response to the Libyan crisis;
focused on development, technology, and the environment in a way few of her
predecessors have; and highlighted the urgency of women's issues from one end
of the planet to the other. That she's had no legacy achievements is less her
doing than the result of two self-reinforcing realities.
First,
in this administration, power on domestic policy and foreign policy is lodged
in the White House. Many key issues (and the strategic policies that shape
them), from Iran to Afghanistan to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, are
reposited there, the president's various envoys and czars notwithstanding.
The
irony really is quite striking. Here's a president who inherited the worst
economic crisis since the 1930s. You might have thought he'd be only too happy
to delegate some of the big issues to his secretary of state. This hasn't
happened; the White House controls everything of real consequence. Indeed,
whoever gets the job when Clinton leaves should take notice: This president
doesn't let go, at least on foreign policy.
Second,
one reason for the absence of ownership is the changing nature of the world
Clinton inherited. The reality is that there haven't been all that many good
chances for successful diplomacy. The conflicts where U.S. diplomacy might
actually bridge gaps between conflicting parties -- always rare -- are tough to
identify. There are plenty of crises, but are any really amenable to effective
diplomacy?
I
know the rap that effective secretaries create their own opportunities. But
negotiating with the mullahcracy in Iran on the nuclear issue? Going for broke
with Mahmoud Abbas and Benjamin Netanyahu on the Israeli-Palestinian issue?
Building nations in Iraq and Afghanistan by sorting out differences between
Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites? Let's get real.
The
fact that Obama inherited the two longest wars in U.S. history also gives the
Pentagon an outsized role in his foreign policy. The State Department is of
course deeply involved in the political dimensions of these issues. But abroad
the military quite appropriately runs these wars, and at home, because of the
stakes in American lives and money, the White House controls and coordinates
high policy.
Finally,
there's the secretary's own caution.
Clinton
was a star even before becoming secretary of state; she had little to prove.
Ditto for Colin Powell. That kind of fame also makes you less hungry and less
eager to take risks.
Maybe
it's also just smart political instincts. I suspect that when Clinton looks
around the world these days, she concludes that all these high-level issues she
doesn't own are really a dog's lunch; they are opportunities all right -- for
failure. Sometimes getting out of the way of history is better than getting run
over by it. And knowing what you can't do is as important as figuring out what
you can.
Perhaps
Clinton is a secretary of state well suited for her times. She has faithfully
carried out the president's policies and reinforced the balance he's trying to
strike: how to lead a world in which America has to be much more discerning and
disciplined about where and how it projects its power. To the extent Obama is
succeeding in this enterprise, she is too. And whatever the future holds for
her, she'll be remembered as a pretty competent secretary of state.
So
what if Hillary Clinton doesn't get admitted into the Foggy Bottom Hall of
Fame. James Buchanan didn't either, and he was the last secretary of state to
become president. But who's thinking about that?
*FOB or FOH (Friend of Bill or Friend of Hillary)
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 28/03/2012
-Aaron David Miller is a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His new book, Can America Have Another Great President?, will be published this year
-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy on 28/03/2012
-Aaron David Miller is a distinguished scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. His new book, Can America Have Another Great President?, will be published this year
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