In an effort to oust Qaddafi, independent militias of varying
strength have been formed inside Libya and are threatening regional security
inside the country. Of these the Zintan
militia is one of the foremost examples of a brigade with strong organizational
skills, effective tactics and entrenched authority in their base city of
Zintan. On December 10th, the Zintan brigade was involved in a firefight with
the convoy of the ex-commander-in-chief of the National Army, Major General
Khalifa Haftar. The Zintan Brigade acted without orders from the National Army,
which they accused of not notifying them of the convoy’s approach to the
Tripoli airport. It is becoming a major challenge for the Libyan Transitional
Council to integrate, rather than marginalize, these militiamen in the new
security structure of Libya. The Zintan Brigade and other militias will
continue to be key actors in Libya affecting the domestic security situation
until they become fully integrated into the new Libyan National Army.
By Dario Cristiani
Osama al-Juwali, Zintan militia member and Minister of Defense in the Libyan Transitional Cabinet
One
of the major challenges for the future of Libya concerns the presence on its
soil of a variety of autonomous militias of various sizes, geographical origin,
ideology and organizational aims. The consequent fragmentation of the security
environment is a major obstacle for Libyan efforts to achieve an effective and
functional statehood.
Efforts
to integrate the militias into a new national army and police force have been
stymied in part due to the unpopularity of Major General Khalifah Haftar,
chief-of-staff of the Libyan National Army until he was replaced earlier this
month. General Haftar appeared to have lost the confidence of the government,
with Transitional National Council (TNC) chairman Mustafa Abd-al-Jalil
reportedly describing the American-backed Haftar as “suspicious and arrogant”
at an official meeting between al-Jalil and a number of militia commanders
(al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 12, 2011).
On January 3, Haftar was replaced as chief-of-staff by Colonel Yusuf
Mangush, who was promoted to general. Mangush, a Misrata native and retired officer
from the Libyan military, joined the rebel forces after fighting began last
spring, only to be captured by loyalist forces during the struggle for Brega in
April. Though Mangush has the support of Abd al-Jalil and Prime Minister Abd
al-Rahim al-Kib, the powerful Benghazi rebel faction have denounced his
appointment as “undemocratic” while promoting their own candidate, General
Salah Salem al-Ubaydah (AFP, January 3; Jeune Afrique, January 13). General
al-Mangush is determined to establish a supreme defense council and speed up
the integration of militia fighters into the national army and police, but he
may need a greater level of support than he has now to be successful (Jeune
Afrique, January 13).
Libya’s Difficult Transition
In
political science, especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
term “transition” is mostly used to define those political processes leading to
a – more or less – effective (liberal) democracy. In Libya, at present, it is
impossible to use transition in this meaning, as the first step to start a transition
to democracy is to have a government capable of imposing its rule on the people
and groups in its national territory. The 42 years of the Jamahiriya (State of
the Masses) – a very personal Qaddafi creation lacking institutions typical of
modern states – makes this an enormous challenge, even in the event of a
scenario (at present completely detached from the reality on the ground) in
which everyone in Libya acted to meet the need to create a functioning state
without seeking to advance narrow and factional interests at the same time.
The
success of this transition is strongly connected to how Libyans will be able to
manage the thorny issue of militias and the risk of starting a political shift
to warlordism rather than democracy. The continuous clashes between different
militias – the latest occurring in near Gharyan (50 miles south of Tripoli),
involving a militia from Gharyan pitted against another militia from
neighboring Assabia – are a powerful reminder of the menace they pose to
Libya’s increasingly volatile and fragmented security environment (Reuters,
January 14; AFP, January 16). One of the most important and well organized
groups in present-day Libya is the Zintan militia, which controls the Tripoli
airport and other institutions in the capital. The group has been the
protagonist in several political and security incidents over the past few
weeks.
Moving on from the Jamahiriya State
Libya
as a unitary state has always been characterized by several internal fault
lines, with ethnic, tribal, cultural and political cleavages characterizing its
political and social environment. These fault lines were exploited by Qaddafi
during his rule. For example, in the very early stages of his rule after the
1969 coup, Qaddafi tried to downgrade the importance of the tribes, but, after
a few years he understood that it was impossible to maintain a strong grip on
the country without the support of at least some of the major tribes. The
resulting “divide and rule” policy was a major feature of the Qaddafi jamahiriya
(state of the masses). In the long run, stressing these divisions proved to be
unsustainable and was a key factor in explaining the eruption of the revolts in
February 2011.
It
is no coincidence that the core of the revolt was the eastern city of Benghazi,
the stronghold of the pre-Qaddafi Sanussi monarchy and the area most penalized
under Qaddafi. The Libyan east-west divide is a long standing feature of the
Libyan political and social landscape and is essential to understanding Libya’s
fragmentation. The increasing weight of local, regional and tribal interests –
which emerged clearly in the protests against the appointment of the new
transitional government – is connected to this domestic cleavage. Though very
important, this dynamic is only one of many working against the establishment
of a unitary state in Libya.
The
killing of Qaddafi was not only the symbolic end of an era but visible proof
that his rule cannot return to Libya. The psychological relief this provided
had another side to take into account; the death of the common enemy opened the
underlying structural fissions within the heterogeneous bloc of rebels who
carried out the revolution. In this context, the presence of autonomous armed
militias on the ground represents a major obstacle to the normalization of the
Libyan security environment.
Recent Clashes in Tripoli
At
the end of November, fighters of the Zintan militia stopped Abdulhakim Belhadj
at the Tripoli airport, accusing Belhadj of travelling to Istanbul on a fake
passport. Only after a direct intervention from Libyan interim leader Mustafa
Abdul Jalil was he able to catch his flight (Tripoli Post, November 26, 2011).
Belhadj, head of the Tripoli Military Council, a former leader of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and one of the most important figures in the
anti-Qaddafi revolt, is considered to be one of the main enemies of the Zintan
group. His military council presents a direct challenge to the Zintan Brigade
in the struggle to control the security of Tripoli. Like other militias active
in the Libyan capital, establishing control over the city is considered to be a
strategic necessity for these groups to enable them to advance their interests
and agendas in the new political balance. In this context, control of the airport
is considered fundamental.
The
Zintan Brigade was the protagonist in another incident at the Tripoli airport
on December 10, 2011, when the militia was involved in a firefight with a
convoy carrying Major General Khalifa Haftar. Two members of the militia were
killed and several injured (see Terrorism Monitor Brief, December 16,
2011). Khalid al-Zintani, a spokesman
for the Zintan militia, said that members of his group did not try to kill
Haftar and that clashes occurred simply because no one notified the Zintan
revolutionaries of Haftar’s intention to travel to the airport (AP, December
11). Al-Zintani and Mukhtar al-Akhdar, the commander of Zintani fighters at the
airport, criticized the nascent National Army, of which Haftar is now the
ex-commander-in-chief, saying that the presence and influence of this army on
the ground is almost nonexistent and adding that the Zintan Brigade will step
down only once the new government authorities are able to fully guarantee
security in Tripoli. Only a few days later, the members of the Zintan militia
were involved in another clash with members of the neighboring Mashashiya,
arresting 20 members of the tribe, which was considered loyal to Qaddafi’s
regime (AFP, December 12, 2011).
The Zintan Militia Benefits from Strong Organization
The
Zintan militia is named for Zintan, a city of roughly 50,000 people in the
Nafusa Mountains of western Libya. The relationship of this city with Qaddafi’s
regime was always unsettled. Though located in that half of the country that
benefited by the shift in the political balances following the overthrow of the
monarchy, Zintanis remained rather critical of Qaddafi and his Jamahiriya
state. Some Zintanis participated in the failed 1993 coup against Qaddafi that
was organized by some members of the Warfalla, Libya’s largest and most
powerful Libyan tribe and usually regarded as a power base for the Qaddafi
regime (though this support was far from unanimous). Zintani fighters joined
the 2011 revolution during its very early stages and were responsible for
arresting the fugitive Saif al-Islam Qaddafi in southern Libya (Jeune Afrique,
November 30, 2011). The charismatic founder of the Zintan militia, Muhammad Ali
Madani, was killed by loyalist forces on May 1, 2011 (al-Arabiya, September 7,
2011)
The
Zintan Brigade has an inflexible approach in its recruitment procedures - only
those who can fully demonstrate that they were not attached to the previous
regime can join the group. As shown by the dispute with the Mashashiya, the
Zintan Brigade has a more general, non-negotiable approach of rejecting any
possibility of collaboration with people attached to the previous regime.
Another
characteristic of the Zintan militia is their strong and efficient
organization, which allows them to implement an effective control of the areas
under their informal rule. Unlike other Libyan militias that are composed
mostly of civilian volunteers, the Zintan Brigade has a balanced but strictly
hierarchical mix of civilian volunteers from Zintan and former members of the
Libyan national army who defected in the early stages of the revolution and are
now in command positions within the Brigade.
It
is not surprising that a member of the Zintan militia, Osama al-Juwali, was
appointed Minister of Defense in the new transitional cabinet (al-Jazeera,
November 22, 2011). Unlike other members of the Libyan leadership, al-Juwali
has opted for a milder approach towards the militias, aimed at integrating and
co-opting these groups. Al-Juwali says
that time is needed to settle this situation, without setting any deadlines. In
mid-December al-Juwali suggested that six weeks was the minimum time needed in
which to expect some results concerning the normalization of the militias’
presence (Reuters, December 19, 2011). This stance is part of a wider pragmatic
approach pursued by al-Juwali, who wants to integrate militiamen in the new
military and security services of the country. He stressed the fact that these
men represent those marginalized during Qaddafi’s era and will bring new blood
into the Libyan security forces (al-Jazeera, December 26, 2011). In his
efforts, al-Juwali can count on his growing reputation within the revolutionary
forces as a member of one of the most powerful Libyan militias with the support
of a wide network of personal relations within it.
Conclusion
Apart
from a powerful shared aim to get rid of Qaddafi, the various loose-knit groups
of the rebel camp had little in common, leaving a general feeling of mistrust
and suspicion as the main denominators of their relationship. Every militia has
its own self-narrative and myth concerning its role and weight in destroying
Qaddafi’s Jamahiriya. As shown by the recent clashes in and around Tripoli, the
ability to obtain a consensus among the militias seems slight and the
possibility that these groups will voluntarily give up their arms and get out
of Libyan streets appears to be remote. The Zintan militia is a rather powerful
example of how much militias matter in the current Libyan environment; well
organized, tough, irreducibly anti-Qaddafi and even in a way reliable, they
patrol several areas of Tripoli and, although at odds with some residents and
local groups, have been able to perform a more or less effective job of
controlling their districts. Their role during the revolution bought them some
credibility amongst ordinary Libyans and other revolutionaries. With some other
factions, however, relations remain tense, especially with groups vying for
control of Tripoli such as the Tripoli Military Council, the Misrata militia
and the National Army.
Any
state pretending to be effective and functioning cannot allow the presence of
armed groups on its territory that act independently. The efforts of al-Juwali,
a member of the Zintan group, will be aimed at integrating, rather than
marginalizing, these militiamen in the new security structure of Libya. The
presence of a militia member in the position of Minister of Defense is a vivid
demonstration of how much the militias matter. That the Minister is a member of
the Zintan militia displays the importance of this group and suggests that the
next political moves by the Transitional Government will not be hostile to
Zintani interests.
The
presence of an enormous number of “liberated” weapons on the streets of Tripoli
and the strong possibility that not all the militias will be satisfied by the
new political balance make the outcome of the process started by al-Juwali very
uncertain. Optimism regarding a settlement of the militia issue in Libya in the
short term appears to be unrealistic.
-This article was published in the Terrorism Monitor of Jamestown
Foundation on 19/01/2012
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