By Mohammad el-Ashab
This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 24/04/2011
At least at the level of the Maghreb, Rabat could have played a role in hastening the resolution of the Libyan crisis. This is not because it enjoys a widest scope of influence, but because its connections with the sides involved in the crisis – and specifically the Libyan regime and the transitional council opposed to it – could have rendered it an acceptable interlocutor capable of combining the scattered propositions to reach a solution. Indeed, Morocco remains almost the only state that enjoys this proximity with the two conflicting parties.
Few know that Moroccan Monarch King Mohammed VI presented his first university study on “The Arab-African Union” back when he was heir to the throne, but opted in his PhD for the Euro-Mediterranean choice, which he perceived as being the perfect embodiment of the idea to turn the Mediterranean Sea into a lagoon of security, peace and coexistence between the different civilizations, religions and aspirations.
Although he granted more attention to fixing the internal home as a strategic priority, this did not prevent him from turning toward the Maghreb and Arab spaces and to maintain balance between the local and regional wagers. Therefore, Morocco’s presence at the heart of this equation qualifies it – one way or the other – to play a certain role, the least of which being the fact that it listened to the complaints of the two parties. In the meantime, its position alongside the international alliance did not lead to boycott with the collapsing regime, as there is no harm in listening if it can push toward overcoming the crises.
Rabat might be on the brink of distancing itself from a policy based on confrontation with Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, with regards to the position to be taken toward the developments at the level of the Sahara issue, and it probably acted wisely when it did not connect the reports about some Polisario elements fighting alongside Gaddafi to its commitment to the support of the international alliance, as long as this alliance is respecting the decisions of international legitimacy. At this level, its experience stems from the instatement of the Arab Maghreb Union during a stage which witnessed the revival of hopes over the ruins of the diverging opinions over the latter issue. But the most eloquent message was seen in the announcement of its insistence on the unity of Libyan soil, i.e. its rejection of the Balkanization and partition scenarios being promoted by some and constituting mere half solutions.
Colonel Gaddafi might have imagined his regime could still be humored, considering that Rabat – which concluded a unity deal with it in the eighties of last century – did so despite the pressures and threats to which it was subjected by its Western allies and especially Washington and Paris. It thus seems that the man did not draw the lessons from the tempestuous transformations, among which is the fact that what could be tolerated in the past was no longer so today.
The issue – at the core – is not related to the Libyan regime’s relations with the West that kept awaiting an opportunity to eliminate it. The issue is deemed important when it comes to the regime’s relations with the Libyan people, and nothing can change the course of this conflict. Therefore, no mediation project can shift away from this track. It might shorten the ways leading to its consecration, but it will not replace, in any way, the greater action that is guiding the events. Consequently, Morocco can play a role by helping detect the way to exit the predicament.
A lot has changed. The West, which now seems more inclined to use its influence to tighten the noose around the regimes that are fighting change, is the same which used to interfere by use of force to impose the control of these regimes whenever they faced uprisings or violent internal shakes. Did it not interfere at least twice to back up the ruling regime in the African Zaire in the sixties and seventies of last century? Did Belgium and France not interfere, for instance, to protect certain regimes in the Dark Continent?
The standards are now different, but not to the policy of defending the interests. However, Morocco – which was present in the majority of the African events – might have seized the opportunity to reveal another type of mediation, to shed light on what the Maghreb Union could have accomplished had it not faltered. Still, such a Union without Gaddafi will be more functional on all levels.
At least at the level of the Maghreb, Rabat could have played a role in hastening the resolution of the Libyan crisis. This is not because it enjoys a widest scope of influence, but because its connections with the sides involved in the crisis – and specifically the Libyan regime and the transitional council opposed to it – could have rendered it an acceptable interlocutor capable of combining the scattered propositions to reach a solution. Indeed, Morocco remains almost the only state that enjoys this proximity with the two conflicting parties.
Few know that Moroccan Monarch King Mohammed VI presented his first university study on “The Arab-African Union” back when he was heir to the throne, but opted in his PhD for the Euro-Mediterranean choice, which he perceived as being the perfect embodiment of the idea to turn the Mediterranean Sea into a lagoon of security, peace and coexistence between the different civilizations, religions and aspirations.
Although he granted more attention to fixing the internal home as a strategic priority, this did not prevent him from turning toward the Maghreb and Arab spaces and to maintain balance between the local and regional wagers. Therefore, Morocco’s presence at the heart of this equation qualifies it – one way or the other – to play a certain role, the least of which being the fact that it listened to the complaints of the two parties. In the meantime, its position alongside the international alliance did not lead to boycott with the collapsing regime, as there is no harm in listening if it can push toward overcoming the crises.
Rabat might be on the brink of distancing itself from a policy based on confrontation with Colonel Gaddafi’s regime, with regards to the position to be taken toward the developments at the level of the Sahara issue, and it probably acted wisely when it did not connect the reports about some Polisario elements fighting alongside Gaddafi to its commitment to the support of the international alliance, as long as this alliance is respecting the decisions of international legitimacy. At this level, its experience stems from the instatement of the Arab Maghreb Union during a stage which witnessed the revival of hopes over the ruins of the diverging opinions over the latter issue. But the most eloquent message was seen in the announcement of its insistence on the unity of Libyan soil, i.e. its rejection of the Balkanization and partition scenarios being promoted by some and constituting mere half solutions.
Colonel Gaddafi might have imagined his regime could still be humored, considering that Rabat – which concluded a unity deal with it in the eighties of last century – did so despite the pressures and threats to which it was subjected by its Western allies and especially Washington and Paris. It thus seems that the man did not draw the lessons from the tempestuous transformations, among which is the fact that what could be tolerated in the past was no longer so today.
The issue – at the core – is not related to the Libyan regime’s relations with the West that kept awaiting an opportunity to eliminate it. The issue is deemed important when it comes to the regime’s relations with the Libyan people, and nothing can change the course of this conflict. Therefore, no mediation project can shift away from this track. It might shorten the ways leading to its consecration, but it will not replace, in any way, the greater action that is guiding the events. Consequently, Morocco can play a role by helping detect the way to exit the predicament.
A lot has changed. The West, which now seems more inclined to use its influence to tighten the noose around the regimes that are fighting change, is the same which used to interfere by use of force to impose the control of these regimes whenever they faced uprisings or violent internal shakes. Did it not interfere at least twice to back up the ruling regime in the African Zaire in the sixties and seventies of last century? Did Belgium and France not interfere, for instance, to protect certain regimes in the Dark Continent?
The standards are now different, but not to the policy of defending the interests. However, Morocco – which was present in the majority of the African events – might have seized the opportunity to reveal another type of mediation, to shed light on what the Maghreb Union could have accomplished had it not faltered. Still, such a Union without Gaddafi will be more functional on all levels.
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