In recent years, the Gaza Strip has been – and remains – the most complex issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the peace process. In the summer of 2005, Ariel Sharon decided to unilaterally withdraw from Gaza. The Israelis held that getting rid of the strip would make it easier for them to focus on the problems of the West Bank, and would absolve them of the commitments of the Road Map for Peace, or in other words, would help them emasculate the negotiations. However, facts on the grounds went on to prove the opposite of this. Hardly two years had gone by when Hamas seized control of Gaza, which was followed by the strict blockade on the Strip. And then another two years later, war was waged against the city. Then this year, there was the crime committed by the Israeli navy against the Freedom Flotilla and the Turkish vessel Mavi Marmara.
In truth, the atmosphere surrounding the Gaza Strip these days amid political deadlock in the region, especially the hindrance that U.S. effort to revive the peace process are being subjected to, are reminiscent of the circumstances that led to the Israeli war on Gaza two years ago. Despite the fact that both the Israelis and the Palestinians have shown their keenness before the United Nations on maintaining calm, nothing prevents the possibility that the region is on the verge of a new war in the Gaza Strip. Neither did rocket fire stop, nor have the occupation forces halted their aggression; instead, the air is rife with their bellicose threats.
Throughout the past two years, the front has not been as tense as it is now. Israel is gearing up. It has filed a complaint before the Security Council, in an attempt to put a stance on the record in anticipation of what might happen in the future. Hamas responded by saying that it will lodge a complaint with the UN regarding the Israeli retaliation and threats of further aggression. Egypt, too, has gotten involved, warning of the dangers of the situation, bearing in mind some of the campaigns it has suffered during the previous war on Gaza. The Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor warned Hamas that Israel might be forced to carry out a military operation similar to operation Cast Lead, which Israel launched two years ago against the Gaza Strip, if rockets continue to be launched from the Strip, and threatened to retaliate against any operation. Meridor also held Hamas responsible for any rockets launched, and said that the recent war has achieved the desired deterrence, but that it did not end Hamas’s control of Gaza or secure the release of the captured soldier Gilad Shalit.
But this was not the only failure. The blockade, too, has failed to weaken Hamas’s stranglehold, as did the war on Gaza two years earlier. While it is true that the war has deterred Hamas and forced it to abide by an undeclared truce, it is also true that rocket fire has yet to stop. Some Israeli military leaders have even expressed their fears in the aftermath of the incidents where Cornet type missiles have been fired at an Israeli tank, considering that this type of missiles threatens the balance of power. This is exactly the case with the front in southern Lebanon as well. Whenever the political situation at the level of the negotiations or otherwise falters, some ruckus becomes necessary, and the arming of Hezbollah by Syria and Iran is thus invoked. This is the policy of trying to maintain the required level of deterrence, or to remind everyone of it from time to time.
True, Hamas has renewed its ‘commitment’ along with the Palestinian factions to calm, as expressed by Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar, when he said, “based on the realities of power and the size of the sacrifices we have made, we declare at this stage our commitment to the truce with the occupation”. However, it is also true that the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau has reiterated the necessity of resistance, saying that “the only real option for the Palestinian people is resistance and not negotiations”.
Meshaal’s message is plain and clear. It is first addressed to Abu Mazen, and its bottom line is that the only real alternative to the failed negotiations is a return to resistance. It indeed is the basis and the sine qua non of any reconciliation. No doubt, Hamas is embarrassed by the current phase of ‘no resistance and no peace’, as is the case with Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Hamas is benefitting from the current period of calm to rebuild its arsenal and upgrade it with more advanced rockets and missiles, and also to reorganize its ranks after the blow it suffered two years ago. According to sources within the Israel military, its forces are no longer as weak as they used to be in late 2008. These sources elaborate in detail on Hamas’s efforts to reinforce its arsenal with weapons, which this time are capable of hurting strategic locations in the Jewish state, and which Hamas did not have in its possession two years earlier.
Nonetheless, war in Gaza remains a valid option that may provide a respite for more than one party involved in the conflict. For instance, a war on Gaza would give Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu more time to ward off Washington’s persistent demands regarding the resumption of the peace talks. This is while he is fully aware that the campaign to incite the world for decisive military action against Iran has failed to push Washington into embracing this risky and costly option, which would entail many an adverse impact on the regional level. Everyone is convinced that a diplomatic solution, backed by comprehensive and ever expanding sanctions, is the least costly solution.
In the absence of the war option in the Iranian issue, the option of war in Gaza, under the pretext of the Iranian missiles, and in light of the seizure of arms shipments bound for Hamas from Iran through African states, may deflect some of the criticism against the leader of Likud because of the support afforded to laws and measures that entrench ‘crude racism’ against Arabs and illegal immigrants from Africa. Moreover, if the war achieves its objectives, this may weaken Tehran’s ability to continue its military and financial support for Hamas. But before this and that, a new confrontation might place further hurdles to the Palestinian Authority’s bid to adopt the option of declaring a state: Would it be possible to declare it in the West Bank alone without Gaza?
Meanwhile, such a war would relieve the Palestinian Authority from the burdens of massive U.S. and non-U.S. pressure being put on it to resume negotiations that are not only as futile as they appear now, but which have also damaged Palestinian interests and rights and drained the Palestinian Authority itself. They have also deepened the rift among the Palestinians, as publicly stated by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who confirmed that the Palestinians have nothing left to concede when he said, “We recognized Israel’s right to exist in the Oslo agreement, and this recognition must be weighed in the gold scale. We have accepted a state on 22 percent of the land, and this is a painful and historical concession. There is nothing else left to concede”.
Intra-Palestinian dispute or conflict requires no evidence of its existence. It is enough to recall that the issues obstructing Palestinian reconciliation are only increasing, both on the political and security levels. While Hamas is holding on to the resistance option, Fayyad’s government asserts that all required institutions are now ready to usher in the promised Palestinian state, including forfeiting foreign financing of the budget in 2013. Fayyad’s government also reaffirms its commitment to fulfill its security obligations stipulated by the Road Map. This is what both Palestinian and Israeli officials boast. The Palestinian Authority does not conceal any complacency regarding arms, whether they belong to Hamas or other factions. This might explain Hamas’s wrath after a number of its members were arrested, and its demands for the Fayyad government to release them and end security cooperation with Tel Aviv.
However, war remains an adventure that is open to all possibilities and endless repercussions, and may not end with the desired results, even if the Israeli army needs to reassert its ability for deterrence and to restore its image that existed prior to the wars in south Lebanon and Gaza. Even the Iron Dome, which Tel Aviv relies upon, is unreliable for the army leaders except in protecting certain strategic positions! The two wars have shown that Israeli military power can no longer provide absolute control over the theater of operations. Despite all the damage it inflicted on the infrastructure, the war on Lebanon in July 2006 did not achieve its goals on the ground, such as the primary target of crushing Hezbollah, and in spite of the political gain Israel achieved through the war, namely, UNSC Resolution 1701. And indeed, it is now known that the resistance in Lebanon has restored its arsenal of rockets and upgraded it with more advanced weaponry, and so is the case in the Gaza Strip. True, the war that took place in late 2008 has caused indiscriminate destruction and death, but it failed to overthrow Hamas and end its control of Gaza, and also to prevent it from rearming.
Beyond this, who can guarantee that the war will remain limited to Gaza? What prevents its spread towards the south of Lebanon, and possibly beyond? If the ‘Defiance Camp’ felt that there is an attempt to strike Hamas out of the regional balance of power, while the Special Tribunal for Lebanon looms over Hezbollah’s shoulders with the aim of striking it out later, then what would prevent a flare-up in the southern Lebanese front? Perhaps this would provide a way out of local Lebanese complications, or would be an attempt to compensate for the damage that an indictment by the tribunal would cause to the party’s image, both at home and abroad. This is not to mention what opening a new front would entail in terms of domestic confusion in Israel.
Israel is no longer capable of achieving decisive victory in any war. It has fought one of its longest wars four years earlier, and another similar war in Gaza, without achieving its desired objectives. Instead, Israel seems powerless as it faces this new type of wars. It is now the balance of terror that governs the equation between Israel and Lebanon, and perhaps even Gaza, in spite of the calm on both fronts, and despite all that has been said about lessons that Israel has learnt from the last two wars. The rocket arsenal that the resistance possesses in Lebanon and Gaza is a source of great concern for the Jewish state, albeit their threat is not great enough to threaten the fate and future of the state as a whole, even when Iran hints that any new war will push Israel to the sea…So will Netanyahu venture and meet the same fate as Ehud Barak?
In truth, the atmosphere surrounding the Gaza Strip these days amid political deadlock in the region, especially the hindrance that U.S. effort to revive the peace process are being subjected to, are reminiscent of the circumstances that led to the Israeli war on Gaza two years ago. Despite the fact that both the Israelis and the Palestinians have shown their keenness before the United Nations on maintaining calm, nothing prevents the possibility that the region is on the verge of a new war in the Gaza Strip. Neither did rocket fire stop, nor have the occupation forces halted their aggression; instead, the air is rife with their bellicose threats.
Throughout the past two years, the front has not been as tense as it is now. Israel is gearing up. It has filed a complaint before the Security Council, in an attempt to put a stance on the record in anticipation of what might happen in the future. Hamas responded by saying that it will lodge a complaint with the UN regarding the Israeli retaliation and threats of further aggression. Egypt, too, has gotten involved, warning of the dangers of the situation, bearing in mind some of the campaigns it has suffered during the previous war on Gaza. The Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor warned Hamas that Israel might be forced to carry out a military operation similar to operation Cast Lead, which Israel launched two years ago against the Gaza Strip, if rockets continue to be launched from the Strip, and threatened to retaliate against any operation. Meridor also held Hamas responsible for any rockets launched, and said that the recent war has achieved the desired deterrence, but that it did not end Hamas’s control of Gaza or secure the release of the captured soldier Gilad Shalit.
But this was not the only failure. The blockade, too, has failed to weaken Hamas’s stranglehold, as did the war on Gaza two years earlier. While it is true that the war has deterred Hamas and forced it to abide by an undeclared truce, it is also true that rocket fire has yet to stop. Some Israeli military leaders have even expressed their fears in the aftermath of the incidents where Cornet type missiles have been fired at an Israeli tank, considering that this type of missiles threatens the balance of power. This is exactly the case with the front in southern Lebanon as well. Whenever the political situation at the level of the negotiations or otherwise falters, some ruckus becomes necessary, and the arming of Hezbollah by Syria and Iran is thus invoked. This is the policy of trying to maintain the required level of deterrence, or to remind everyone of it from time to time.
True, Hamas has renewed its ‘commitment’ along with the Palestinian factions to calm, as expressed by Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Zahar, when he said, “based on the realities of power and the size of the sacrifices we have made, we declare at this stage our commitment to the truce with the occupation”. However, it is also true that the head of Hamas’s Political Bureau has reiterated the necessity of resistance, saying that “the only real option for the Palestinian people is resistance and not negotiations”.
Meshaal’s message is plain and clear. It is first addressed to Abu Mazen, and its bottom line is that the only real alternative to the failed negotiations is a return to resistance. It indeed is the basis and the sine qua non of any reconciliation. No doubt, Hamas is embarrassed by the current phase of ‘no resistance and no peace’, as is the case with Hezbollah. Nevertheless, Hamas is benefitting from the current period of calm to rebuild its arsenal and upgrade it with more advanced rockets and missiles, and also to reorganize its ranks after the blow it suffered two years ago. According to sources within the Israel military, its forces are no longer as weak as they used to be in late 2008. These sources elaborate in detail on Hamas’s efforts to reinforce its arsenal with weapons, which this time are capable of hurting strategic locations in the Jewish state, and which Hamas did not have in its possession two years earlier.
Nonetheless, war in Gaza remains a valid option that may provide a respite for more than one party involved in the conflict. For instance, a war on Gaza would give Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu more time to ward off Washington’s persistent demands regarding the resumption of the peace talks. This is while he is fully aware that the campaign to incite the world for decisive military action against Iran has failed to push Washington into embracing this risky and costly option, which would entail many an adverse impact on the regional level. Everyone is convinced that a diplomatic solution, backed by comprehensive and ever expanding sanctions, is the least costly solution.
In the absence of the war option in the Iranian issue, the option of war in Gaza, under the pretext of the Iranian missiles, and in light of the seizure of arms shipments bound for Hamas from Iran through African states, may deflect some of the criticism against the leader of Likud because of the support afforded to laws and measures that entrench ‘crude racism’ against Arabs and illegal immigrants from Africa. Moreover, if the war achieves its objectives, this may weaken Tehran’s ability to continue its military and financial support for Hamas. But before this and that, a new confrontation might place further hurdles to the Palestinian Authority’s bid to adopt the option of declaring a state: Would it be possible to declare it in the West Bank alone without Gaza?
Meanwhile, such a war would relieve the Palestinian Authority from the burdens of massive U.S. and non-U.S. pressure being put on it to resume negotiations that are not only as futile as they appear now, but which have also damaged Palestinian interests and rights and drained the Palestinian Authority itself. They have also deepened the rift among the Palestinians, as publicly stated by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who confirmed that the Palestinians have nothing left to concede when he said, “We recognized Israel’s right to exist in the Oslo agreement, and this recognition must be weighed in the gold scale. We have accepted a state on 22 percent of the land, and this is a painful and historical concession. There is nothing else left to concede”.
Intra-Palestinian dispute or conflict requires no evidence of its existence. It is enough to recall that the issues obstructing Palestinian reconciliation are only increasing, both on the political and security levels. While Hamas is holding on to the resistance option, Fayyad’s government asserts that all required institutions are now ready to usher in the promised Palestinian state, including forfeiting foreign financing of the budget in 2013. Fayyad’s government also reaffirms its commitment to fulfill its security obligations stipulated by the Road Map. This is what both Palestinian and Israeli officials boast. The Palestinian Authority does not conceal any complacency regarding arms, whether they belong to Hamas or other factions. This might explain Hamas’s wrath after a number of its members were arrested, and its demands for the Fayyad government to release them and end security cooperation with Tel Aviv.
However, war remains an adventure that is open to all possibilities and endless repercussions, and may not end with the desired results, even if the Israeli army needs to reassert its ability for deterrence and to restore its image that existed prior to the wars in south Lebanon and Gaza. Even the Iron Dome, which Tel Aviv relies upon, is unreliable for the army leaders except in protecting certain strategic positions! The two wars have shown that Israeli military power can no longer provide absolute control over the theater of operations. Despite all the damage it inflicted on the infrastructure, the war on Lebanon in July 2006 did not achieve its goals on the ground, such as the primary target of crushing Hezbollah, and in spite of the political gain Israel achieved through the war, namely, UNSC Resolution 1701. And indeed, it is now known that the resistance in Lebanon has restored its arsenal of rockets and upgraded it with more advanced weaponry, and so is the case in the Gaza Strip. True, the war that took place in late 2008 has caused indiscriminate destruction and death, but it failed to overthrow Hamas and end its control of Gaza, and also to prevent it from rearming.
Beyond this, who can guarantee that the war will remain limited to Gaza? What prevents its spread towards the south of Lebanon, and possibly beyond? If the ‘Defiance Camp’ felt that there is an attempt to strike Hamas out of the regional balance of power, while the Special Tribunal for Lebanon looms over Hezbollah’s shoulders with the aim of striking it out later, then what would prevent a flare-up in the southern Lebanese front? Perhaps this would provide a way out of local Lebanese complications, or would be an attempt to compensate for the damage that an indictment by the tribunal would cause to the party’s image, both at home and abroad. This is not to mention what opening a new front would entail in terms of domestic confusion in Israel.
Israel is no longer capable of achieving decisive victory in any war. It has fought one of its longest wars four years earlier, and another similar war in Gaza, without achieving its desired objectives. Instead, Israel seems powerless as it faces this new type of wars. It is now the balance of terror that governs the equation between Israel and Lebanon, and perhaps even Gaza, in spite of the calm on both fronts, and despite all that has been said about lessons that Israel has learnt from the last two wars. The rocket arsenal that the resistance possesses in Lebanon and Gaza is a source of great concern for the Jewish state, albeit their threat is not great enough to threaten the fate and future of the state as a whole, even when Iran hints that any new war will push Israel to the sea…So will Netanyahu venture and meet the same fate as Ehud Barak?
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