Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a strong advocate of
secularism, is feted in Egypt, and now he is promoting the Palestinian cause
By Patrick Cockburn
A protester in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, wears the colours of Syria, Libya, Yemen and the Palestinians
The
political world has turned upside down in the Middle East since the Arab
Awakening erupted. The region has been convulsed by the most radical changes
since the end of imperial occupation and the foundation of the state of Israel
in 1948.
One
significant development is becoming evident: many Arab countries may be more
democratic in future, but they will be weaker in terms of state power and
ability to secure their independence. This enfeeblement of the state is most
obvious in Iraq, is under way in Libya and is now likely to happen in Syria.
This
weakness – unlikely to be reversed for many years – ensures the growing
influence of foreign powers. This was evident last week as the prime minister
of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, received a rapturous reception in Cairo and
David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy were lauded as heroes in Tripoli and
Benghazi. No visiting Arab leader would be so applauded.
In
several Arab states, political, sectarian and ethnic divisions, previously
suppressed, are re-emerging. These differences once prevented a united
opposition. Central to the success of the Arab Awakening movements in Tunisia,
Libya, Egypt and Syria is creation of anti-regime coalitions, bringing together
liberals and conservatives, secular and religious, rich and poor, educated and
uneducated. These alliances are fragile. Without the prospect of overthrowing
hated dictators, they have little in common.
In
many Arab countries, sectarian and ethnic divisions have a long history, but in
the last decade they have deepened. In Iraq, Shia, Sunni and Kurd fear and
suspect one another more than they do foreign patrons, be they Iranian,
Turkish, American or Saudi. In Syria, hatred between Sunni and Alawite is
becoming more poisonous by the day, and President Bashar al-Assad relies on the
Alawites, the Shia sect that is the backbone of his regime.
In
any case, the whole ethos of the Arab Awakening is against the continuation of
powerful state machines which, for half a century, justified dictatorships as
the price for domestic peace and national independence. This might have seemed
a reasonable bargain to pay in Egypt at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, in
Syria after defeat in the 1967 war, or even in Iraq in the 1970s.
But
the dictators never delivered on their promises. By about 1975 they had
rendered themselves coup-proof by building multi-layered intelligence services
that brutally repressed any opposition. Independent sources of power, such as
the media, political parties, trade unions and, so far as it was possible, the
mosque, were controlled or crushed. Military regimes turned into police states
run by a quasi-monarchical ruling families which monopolised wealth.
As
power was concentrated by the Mubarak, Assad or Gaddafi dynasties, they ignored
or betrayed former supporters. In Syria, Egypt and Libya, regimes lost their
populist base. In Syria, there was a sort of social contract whereby the state
provided jobs, a minimum wage and controlled prices. But unfettered capitalism
and the free market alienated this support. Uprisings gained support among
those sections of the working class who once backed the regime. Workers in the
cotton mills of Egypt were among the first to protest, as were the poorer and
older districts of Tripoli. In Iran, by contrast, the government has made great
efforts to ensure that the democratic protest movement of the Greens remained
largely middle class; it has never won over the masses of south Tehran.
The
Arab nationalist dictators, many of whom seized power in the years after
Israel's military victory in 1967, have fallen or are discredited. Their
particular variant of nationalism has gone down with them. Military coups and
popular protests in the 1950s and 1960s all had nationalist slogans, but the
Arab Awakening has produced very few. In Tahrir Square there were almost no
placards attacking Israel (though the few there were have been repeatedly shown
on Israeli television). Liberty from domestic tyrants, not foreign influence,
is at the heart of this year's revolutions. Gaddafi beat the nationalist drum
in vain, claiming that the rebels were the pawns of foreign powers wanting to
steal Libya's oil wealth. This propaganda sounded hypocritical and self-serving
since Gaddafi and his sons had stolen so much of this wealth themselves.
Foreign
powers will inevitably have increasing influence in an enfeebled Arab world.
This has already happened in Iraq. It is likely to happen in Syria, where
sectarianism and tribalism are increasing. The Assad regime may try to survive
by a general massacre of protesters. The opposition is hoping to stop this by
the threat of international intervention along the lines of Libya. Bashar
al-Assad might briefly stabilise his regime by a general slaughter, though this
will probably usher in a civil war. As with Gaddafi, Assad is suffering from
the growing belief among his former allies that he will lose.
An
obvious winner is Turkey. For the moment it is seen as the coming power in the
Middle East. Its assets are a strong, democratic, mildly Islamic government
ruling 80 million increasingly prosperous people. Its escalating hostility to
Israel and support for the Palestinians are highly attractive when the US is
more than ever in lockstep with Israel.
Mr
Erdogan spared no effort last week in broadening Turkey's appeal in the Middle
East. To the surprise of many in Turkey, and to the distress of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, he strongly endorsed secularism. "In a secular
regime, people are free to be religious or not," he said. "I
recommend a secular constitution for Egypt. Do not fear secularism, because it
does not mean being an enemy of religion."
Israeli
leaders sound perplexed about how seriously to take Turkey's bid for leadership
in the Arab world. For the first time, since the foundation of Israel, the
three most powerful states in the region – Turkey, Egypt and Iran – are
opposing it. Having specialised for so long in exaggerating the threat posed by
minnows like Hamas, Hezbollah and the PLO, Israeli leaders have difficulty
responding to a situation of real gravity when its two most powerful regional
friends and allies switch sides.
Turkey's
policy of making friends everywhere without making enemies cannot last for
ever. If Mr Erdogan's tough words on Israel are followed by tough action, then
Israel and the US will respond. Mr Erdogan should enjoy his political honeymoon
while it lasts. He will soon find that in the Middle East it is not possible to
be friends with all.
This commentary was published in The Independent On Sunday on
18/09/2011
No comments:
Post a Comment