By Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryan
Observers
of Yemen are often asked why the revolution there has taken so long and why it
has been so inconclusive. The more basic question -- never asked, though
inextricably tied to this -- is why an uprising started in the first place.
When
the Arab Spring started in Tunisia and began to spread in the region, I did not
think the conditions in Yemen were ripe for it. Indeed corruption, inequality,
and the callous disregard for law were much worse in Yemen than any other
country in the region. However, the conditions usually viewed as prerequisites
for revolution -- a large and mobile middle class, a strong civil society, high
literacy rate, and internet penetration -- are all non-existent. Yet the state
does benefit from an historical accident, the adoption of a multi-party system
in 1990 as part of the unity agreement between South and North Yemen. Twenty
years of multi-party experience and the attendant mobilization skills of
politicking made it possible for Yemeni activists to launch the revolution.
Unfortunately, the absence of a broad middle class and a dynamic civil society
has stunted the movement's momentum. The revolution has gradually transformed
into what is largely an elitist struggle for power.
In
February, the revolution was in its purest form, an escalating popular protest
not controlled by political parties or political factions. Activists demonstrated
a degree of national unity rarely witnessed in Yemen. But the Joint Meeting of
Parties (JMP), the main coalition of opposition groups, was reluctant to
participate in the protests. As a result, youth in squares across Yemen cried
out, "No partisanship and no parties. It is a youth revolution."
Junior
partners in the JMP, especially the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), were more
forthcoming in support of the revolutionary platform from the start. Meanwhile,
the Islamic party Islah, the main opposition faction, which until recently had
an alliance with President Ali Abdullah Saleh, was hesitant to commit until the
revolution gathered pace. They had the most to lose by openly challenging the
regime. Islah eventually joined the youth in full force and successfully
maneuvered to control the organizing committee of Al-Taghyeer (Change) Square
in Sana'a and was instrumental in setting up many provincial protest squares.
It's worth noting that the exception to Islah dominance played out in
al-Hurreyah (freedom) Square in Taiz, Yemen's third city, which came to be
referred to as the heart of the revolution.
From
then on, the slogans and the rhetoric of the protestors came to represent the
voice of the JMP rather than the youth. A notable example of this shift in
rhetoric is the attacks on the General People's Congress (GPC), the nominal
ruling party which lacks hard power and which the masses do not perceive as a
primary adversary of the revolution. Islah's disparagement of the GPC is seen
as a self-serving tactic, a ploy which they hope would lead to disbanding the
GPC and thus giving Islah a real chance of gaining a majority in
post-revolution elections.
The
situation transformed in March after the massacre at al-Karamah where snipers
shot dead 54 unarmed youth and injured many more. That horrific event led to
mass defections within the regime, the military, the bureaucracy, and the
ruling party.
General
Ali Mohsin, Shaykh Sadeq al-Ahmar, and Sheikh Abdul-Majid Al Zindani were the
most notable converts to the revolution. Mohsin, the second-most powerful
person in Yemen, was Saleh's closest ally. As Saleh succeeded in concentrating
power around him and his closest relatives, Mohsin was sidelined and, in turn,
became Saleh's greatest competitor. Al-Ahmar inherited the powerful position of
the Paramount Sheikh of Hashid Tribal Confederacy from his father, the
legendary Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein al-Ahmar, whose approval of Saleh was
sought by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before it agreed to install Saleh as
president in 1978. Moreover, Zindani is the most popular and best-known Yemeni
hard-line cleric with links to Osama Bin Laden. A leader of Islah, he was
Saleh's ally against Islah moderate leadership in the past few years.
All
three regime insiders -- Mohsin, al-Ahmar, and Zindani -- are publically
perceived as equal partners with Saleh in the regime's past misdeeds. They lost
some of their privilege in the past few years as Saleh and his family sought to
monopolize power, but continued to enjoy access and privilege that even the
vice president and prime minister couldn't dream of. Mohsin's forces, the First
Armored Division, began to provide military protection to the Sana'a protest
square while at the same time exercising excessive police control of the
square. Islah activists and radical
students of Zindani's Al Iman University also lent hand to this crackdown. Many
independent protesters, seeing their revolution being hijacked by the original
tripod of regime power -- the military, the tribe, and politicized Islam -- went home in resignation.
The
introduction of these figures into the revolutionary camp polarized the public
and gave the Saleh regime an opportunity to regain some popular support. Saleh
moved from a defensive to an offensive posture. Hence, Saleh's supporters
chanted, "No Mohsin; No Hamid (al-Ahmar)." At that point, the
revolution appeared so adrift that many concluded that it was no longer a
revolution; it became just another episode in the regime's perpetual factional
competition and power struggle.
After
the initial thuggish response, and the murder of more than 200 innocent
protesters, the regime developed two comprehensive strategies. The first was to
maneuver and stall in the hope of outlasting the revolutionary fervor so that
Saleh can stay in power until the end of the presidential term, 2013 -- even if
he has to give up much of his presidential authority to his vice president. The
second strategy -- developed at the negotiation table by regime moderate
negotiators, their JMP counterparts, and international mediators -- was a
peaceful and orderly transfer of power, a political transformation that would
lead to a fully decentralized parliamentary system.
Most
of the GPC and the general public support such a transition, originally
expressed in the famous Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, later
elaborated upon by U.N. mediator Jamal Bin Omar. The GCC Initiative, signed by
the JMP and GPC, stipulated the transfer of Saleh's executive power to the vice
president, who would then oversee the formation of a government of national
unity; the opposition would hold the prime-ministerial post and half the
cabinet portfolios. In return for giving up power, Saleh and all his associates
would be granted immunity from prosecution. But at the very last moment Saleh
refused to sign it.
Both
of these strategies have partially succeeded. While outlasting the revolution
is an unreasonable expectation, the regime is now in a stronger position than
it was just a few months ago. In contrast, the revolutionary movement has
weakened due to the opposition's miscalculations, elites' hijacking of the
revolution, and the regime's disingenuous plan to subject the people to such
hardship that "stability" is valued at any cost. The second strategy
is now at the final crossroads.
After
months of false promises, Saleh has signed a limited delegation of power to his
vice president. But will the process of implementing the initiative move
forward? We are awaiting JMP's response. If they agree, they will find the vice
president and most of the GPC to be as anxious to complete the transfer of
power as they are. While this arrangement falls short of the opposition's
expectations, the two sides can capitalize on the constitutional authority of
the vice president to overcome Saleh's recalcitrance and proceed with the
business of forming a government of national unity. In such an outcome, the
power dynamic would change and produce a more powerful coalition in favor of a
peaceful transfer of power. If that does not happen, though, there is nothing
on the horizon that would stand in the way of a military confrontation that
could -- if not checked by the international community -- deteriorate into
civil war.
As
the politicians haggle over the transfer of power, the youth seem to be set up
for a bitter disappointment. While they advocate a new Yemen of freedom,
democracy, equality, and equal opportunity, they find themselves in alliance
with some of the shadiest characters of the old regime. Some of the youth
leaders now recognize that they need to re-examine their alliances and identify
those on the other side who share those democratic ideals. As the opposition is
leaning toward accepting Saleh's latest initiative, many of the youth now
realize that they have more in common with the GPC rank-and-file than they do
with some of their current allies. Once Saleh leaves office, the youth can
expand the democratic camp into the GPC popular base and improve the chances of
having a more democratic future.
-This commentary was published in in The Foreign Policy on
16/09/2011
-Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani is a Yemeni political analyst and co-founder of the Democratic Awakening Movement
-Abdul-Ghani Al-Iryani is a Yemeni political analyst and co-founder of the Democratic Awakening Movement
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