A rising power starts to knock against the limits of its hallowed
“non-interference”
ALONE
of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, China has yet to
recognise the new government in Tripoli, a clue as to how the recent upheaval
in the Arab world has put unusual stress on the country’s much-vaunted
hands-off policy when it comes to others’ affairs. With growing economic
interests and ever more citizens to worry about in far-flung regions, Chinese
policymakers are tweaking their strategy. A more normal—that is to say, less
reactive—big-power approach could be slowly in the making.
Rhetorically,
the principle of “non-interference” remains sacred. On September 6th China
issued a white paper on its “peaceful development” (ie, rise), its first on the
topic since 2005, well before financial crisis crushed Western economic
confidence and propelled China even more to the fore in international terms.
The document said China still upheld the principle and that it respected the
right of others to “independently choose their own social system and path of
development”. Usually this has meant supporting whoever is in power no matter
how thuggish or unpopular. In Libya, though, China wavered.
It
could have done as it did in earlier Arab uprisings: wait on the sidelines and
recognise the legitimacy of opposition movements only after dictators had
fallen. But Libya presented an unusual combination of challenges for China.
These included demand at home for prompt action to ensure the safety of more
than 35,000 Chinese working in the country; widespread support among
(China-friendly) Arab countries for tough action against Muammar Qaddafi; and
economic interests in Libya that might be threatened by supporting the wrong
side.
China’s
response at the start of the year to the upheaval in Egypt was typical of the
old style. The state-owned media were quick to portray Cairo’s anti-government
demonstrators as lawless troublemakers and played down their impact. The
Communist Party did not want citizens at home to get any ideas. After President
Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in February, and with calls for a Chinese “jasmine
revolution” circulating on the internet, many police were deployed in the
centres of big cities to prevent any copycat unrest. China appeared defensive
and insecure.
But
its approach to the Libyan unrest proved somewhat different. First came its
decision to vote in favour of UN sanctions against Colonel Qaddafi. Then it
mounted a big operation to fly out its citizens on chartered flights and four
military aircraft (China also sent a frigate from its duties off the Horn of
Africa to provide protection for vessels transporting refugees across the
Mediterranean). The official media called this the largest such operation China
had mounted abroad since the Communist takeover in 1949. In a recent paper, the
European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, said these moves seemed to
reflect China’s realisation that a posture of non-interference was
“increasingly at odds with its global economic presence”.
In
March China retreated somewhat by abstaining in the vote on the UN Security
Council resolution that authorised “all necessary measures” to protect
civilians in Libya. But it knew what the outcome would be: a NATO-led operation
(the very words fill Chinese nationalists with anti-imperialist loathing) aimed
at hastening Colonel Qaddafi’s downfall. To protect itself from the
nationalists’ venom, the Chinese government condemned the NATO air strikes and
avoided any hint of support for the rebels’ cause.
But
then in June the government dipped its toes into the conflict, first by meeting
the rebels in Qatar and then by sending a diplomat to meet them in Benghazi
itself (ostensibly to discuss the humanitarian situation and the security of
Chinese businesses). In late June a senior official of the rebels’ National
Transitional Council (NTC) held talks in Beijing with China’s foreign minister,
Yang Jiechi. This was followed in July by another visit to Benghazi by a senior
Chinese diplomat. Although China has not officially recognised the NTC’s
late-August assumption of power in Tripoli, on September 1st it sent a deputy
foreign minister to the Paris summit on Libya, where he met the NTC’s chairman,
Mahmoud Jibril.
Yet
China did not abandon Colonel Qaddafi. In June it received his foreign minister
in Beijing. This week it confirmed that his representatives had also visited
Beijing in July on a weapons-buying mission (reports of this having appeared in
a Canadian newspaper based on documents found in Tripoli). China’s foreign
ministry denied, however, that any arms were shipped and said the visit took
place without the government’s knowledge. NTC officials say they believe some
countries including China supplied weapons to Colonel Qaddafi’s government
after the Security Council’s approval in February of a ban on such assistance.
Now
China worries that Libya’s new authorities will make it pay for its support for
the old regime by discriminating against it in business deals, including
potentially lucrative ones related to the oil industry. During Colonel
Qaddafi’s rule, China had big interests in Libya’s economy. Chinese media say
it was involved in projects worth more than $18 billion when the conflict broke
out, mostly in construction. Libyan oil last year accounted for just 3% of
China’s crude imports, but Chinese oil companies are keen to get bigger stakes.
A
need for oil and other resources greatly shapes Chinese foreign policy in
Africa. Having long supported the government of Sudan (a big supplier of oil)
in its fight against secessionist rebels, China eventually swung into line with
Western governments. It was quick to recognise oil-rich South Sudan when it
seceded in July, having sent observers to monitor its referendum on
independence.
China
will remain extremely cautious, however. It does not want to send signals at
home that rebellion can ever be justified. Despite the police crackdown earlier
this year, which involved a sweeping round-up of dissidents, occasional
articles still appear online and even in the official media urging the
government to learn lessons from the Arab world’s upheavals. Before the
authorities rushed to delete it, a Shanghai newspaper managed to publish a
commentary on its website giving warning that unless it “gradually but
resolutely” gave its people more political choice, every developing country
faced the same “nightmare” of violent upheaval.
This article was published in The Economist on
10/09/2011
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