By Carole A. O'Leary & Nicholas A. Heras
Iranian President Ahmadinejad and Syrian President Assad
Iranian President Ahmadinejad and Syrian President Assad
Iran’s
ties to Syria go beyond the geo-politics of the "Axis of Resistance."
This is evident in the remote, volatile, and oil-rich al-Jazirah region of
northeastern Syria, where there has been a noticeable increase in Iranian
investment in religious and cultural centers over the last decade. Information
gathered from interviews with Arab shaykhs, tribal youth, Kurds and Assyrians
from the region suggest that Iranian financed Shi'a proselytizing, including
cash handouts for conversion, is having an impact on conversion rates in the
region. Arab shaykhs representing the
six largest tribes in the region assert that the Assad government covertly
supports a missionary effort that has affected both the Sunni (Arab and Kurd)
and Christian (Assyrian) communities. [1]
The
Jazirah region encompasses the areas including and surrounding the cities of
Hasakah, Raqqah, Qamishli, Deir al-Zawr, Mayadin and Abu Kamal. This region
includes the Euphrates River and its major tributary, the Khabour River. Al-Jazirah
is considered to be the agricultural “breadbasket” of Syria. It is also the
locus of Syria’s oil industry and a major transit point for the entry, whether
legal or illegal, of goods and livestock. [2] Arab tribal society is strongest
in this region of Syria, which is comprised of tribal and mixed ethnic
communities. Approximately 60% of Syria’s Arab tribal population resides in
this complex ethno-linguistic zone, which also includes significant numbers of
“politically sensitive” (non-Arab) communities of Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians
and Turkomans.
Lingering
ethnic conflicts and Kurdish nationalism have resulted in an extremely heavy
security presence in al-Jazirah. The
Syrian government has historically employed a divide-and-conquer approach that
has negatively impacted civil society and social cohesion in the communities of
this region. Scores of individuals from al-Jazirah interviewed by the authors
assert that the Syrian government is trying to create a pervasive atmosphere of
distrust, especially between the Kurds on the one hand, and Arabs and
Christians on the other. In addition to the intelligence and informant networks
deployed by the regime in the northeast, other tactics to inhibit local level
authority and autonomy are also utilized.
These include land nationalization, restrictions on farming and grazing
rights and even forced relocation of whole groups of people (e.g. tribal Arabs
and Kurds). The Syrian government’s attempts to assert total control over this
oil-rich region have included blocking outside aid agencies from bringing
relief to the area during the multi-year drought and subsequent famine that
began in 2003.
The
economic situation in al-Jazirah is dire.
The Hasakah Governorate in particular has been fiercely impacted by the
economic crisis, precipitated by a multi-year drought that crippled the local
agricultural economy and forced 36,000 families to leave the land they once
farmed. Over 1.3 million people have been affected by the drought, and more
than 803,000 Syrians have lost their work because of its impact on successive
harvests (Executive [Beirut], November 2009). Even the more wealthy shaykhs of
northeastern Syria are feeling the economic effects of the drought. Many of
them are in debt to either the Ba’ath Party (through government-controlled
banks) or to private lenders who cooperate with the Ba’ath Party. Shaykhs who
refused to pay the exorbitant fees of the loan sharks were forced to leave
thousands of acres of their land uncultivated for the 2009 planting season. [3]
While
there are no generally accepted figures for conversion rates to Shi’ism in
Syria, information provided to us by local shaykhs is informative. Shaykhs
representing the six largest tribes in the region stated repeatedly that Shi’a
missionaries were having an impact on Sunni to Shi’a conversion in the region,
especially among the economically vulnerable young men forced to seek work
outside of al-Jazirah. A Baggara shaykh reported that a Shi’a religious center
near Aleppo, for example, sustains young tribesmen who leave al-Jazirah in
search of jobs with financial support, information on safe housing and a place
of refuge where they can interact with other youth from their home region. When
questioned about the financing of the mosques, one local shaykh from the
Jabbour tribe became uneasy, and would only state that the mosques were
financed by “outsiders,” although he would not state who these outsiders were.
In
a 2009 discussion with two tribal leaders, the Baggara shaykh (whose community
is based both in al-Jazirah and south of Aleppo) stated that fully 25% of his
tribe had converted to Shi’ism. While the second shaykh from the Shammar tribe
(whose community is based in Hasakah) concurred with this figure regarding
Baggara conversion, he stated that for his own tribe the conversion rate was
less than one percent. He added that the
reason the Shammar are largely immune to religious conversion is their very
strong adherence to what he termed “traditional Bedu values.” He went on to explain that the Baggara were
never historically “noble” camel herders and thus were “weak” in terms of
adhering to traditional Arab tribal or “Bedu” norms. In an interview that took place in June 2011,
a local contact of one of the authors stated that the entire population of
Qahtaania (a Baggara village between Qamishli and Malakiyya) has converted to
Shi’ism, praying in the Ali ibn Abu Talib mosque built there in 2007. [4]
Conversion
to Shi’ism is a contested phenomenon in the region. According to our interview
data, the majority of converted Shi’a in al-Jazirah are secretive about their
practices, preferring to practice their faith with fellow converts in
husseiniya-like study groups in private homes. The main reason for this secrecy
is the disapproval of the converts’ families and/or tribes. A contact of one of
the authors, a young convert to Shi’ism from the Walde tribe that live near
Raqqah, stated in September 2010 that: “There is a problem between the tribes
and the Iranians, but between the leader [Bashar Al-Assad] and the Iranians,
there is no problem.” Influential Sunni Syrians such as Ali Sadr al-Din
al-Bayanouni of the Muslim Brotherhood have warned against “Shia-ization” in
Syria. In a May 2008 interview, al-Bayanouni stated that: “on the cultural
level, the Shi’ite school of Islam is spreading in Syria, funded by Iran and
supported by the Iranian regime… This situation is exploited by people who give
financial incentives, and pay the salaries of some tribal leaders, imams, and
shaykhs, in order to convert these influential people to the Shi’ite school of
Islam” (al-Arabiya, May 2, 2008).
The
spread of Shi’ism in al-Jazirah, a majority Arab Sunni tribal region, adds
another element of complexity to the dynamics of identity politics and
organization of resistance to the regime there. Tribal, ethnic and sectarian
differences exacerbated by decades of oppression and years of economic decay
and out-migration, now coupled with Iranian cultural penetration through Shi’a
missionary work, have destabilized the region and will have an impact on any
attempt to form a post-Assad government in Syria. It is the view of the authors that Iran has
“soft” tools or resources in place that it can draw upon in a post- Assad Syria
that reach beyond military and political power politics into the sociocultural
realm.
Notes & References
- This report was published in the Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 9,
Issue: 35, on 15/09/2011
- Carole A. O'Leary is a Visiting Scholar at the Columbus School of Law's Program in Law & Religion within the Catholic University of America (CUA)
-Nicholas A. Heras is an M.A. Candidate in International Communication at the American University (DC) and a former David L. Boren Fellow
- Carole A. O'Leary is a Visiting Scholar at the Columbus School of Law's Program in Law & Religion within the Catholic University of America (CUA)
-Nicholas A. Heras is an M.A. Candidate in International Communication at the American University (DC) and a former David L. Boren Fellow
1. This article draws extensively from interviews conducted by the
authors in 2008-2011 in Lebanon and Syria. The interview data suggests that
there has been an increase in the number of Shi’a Muslim mosques and attendees
at these mosques in al-Jazirah over the last decade.
2. See “On the Ground from Syria to Iraq,” Harmony Project. (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: July 22, 2008), p. 86.
3. Information drawn from author interviews. See endnote 1 above.
4. The village of Hatla, near Deir ez Zawr in Hasakah Province, is also described as having been completely converted from Sunni Islam to Shi’ism (Washington Post, October 6, 2006)
2. See “On the Ground from Syria to Iraq,” Harmony Project. (Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point: July 22, 2008), p. 86.
3. Information drawn from author interviews. See endnote 1 above.
4. The village of Hatla, near Deir ez Zawr in Hasakah Province, is also described as having been completely converted from Sunni Islam to Shi’ism (Washington Post, October 6, 2006)
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