Egypt and Israel need each other, but the explosive situation in
Sinai makes it a challenge for both sides to remember that.
By Maher Hamoud
Five
Egyptian soldiers are killed in Sinai by Israeli troops; a young Egyptian
climbs 22 floors to replace the Star of David flag with an Egyptian one atop
the Israeli embassy in Cairo; and the former Arab League president Amr Moussa
says the "Camp David treaty is neither the Quran nor the Bible".
These
dramas that escalated in the second half of August seemed to forebode a
diplomatic crisis. Politics, however, works in a different way.
Are
Egyptians and Israelis really ready to tear down the 33-year-old Camp David
peace treaty and put at risk the "no war" situation, which diplomats
mistakenly like to call peace? Although the deposed president Hosni Mubarak,
once Israel's best friend in the Arab world, is no longer in the picture the
answer is still no. Even the thousands shouting for change in the street will
not be able to overturn the regional balance.
This
does not mean that things will never change. It is obvious that post-Mubarak
Egypt will simply not accept the same status quo. The complex situation in the
Sinai since the revolution gives some indications of how this change will
affect the Camp David Accords.
The
peninsula has experienced chronic suffering for at least 30 years because of
two related problems. Egyptian governments have repeatedly delayed addressing
serious local challenges, which were a result of the 1978 peace treaty rammed
through by the United States.
In
the past few years, observers have let their imaginations run wild on Al Qaeda
influence in the Sinai especially after the unfortunate Taba Hilton resort
bombings on the Red Sea coast in 2004.
The
real threat comes from the Mubarak regime's history of persecuting, and even
murdering, members of the Bedouin tribes on the peninsula. However,
demonstrations calling for an end to the violence this year followed the
repeated bombings of the gas pipeline to Israel. The pipeline is widely reviled
by Egyptians, but the demonstrations that showed a majority of the people of
Sinai working to erase the stigma of terrorism.
Before
January 25, the start of the revolution, Mr Mubarak tried to hide the Sinai
crisis under the veneer of beautiful sand and beaches marketed as a tourism
heaven to westerners. Meanwhile Cairo was cobbling together ad hoc solutions
that merely delayed the inevitable explosion.
Whatever
the form of the next post-Mubarak government, whether the military appoints its
own leaders or, as many hope, a democratic administration is voted in, it will
face a complex problem in the Sinai that continues to snowball.
The
record of the transitional government, under the unclear supervision of the
military, has been weak at best. But, surprisingly, the government of the
interim prime minister Essam Sharaf seems to have realised these challenges and
taken a stand. The cabinet decided in the last week of August to launch the
so-called Supreme Authority for Sinai Development, and gave it ministerial
powers with an independent budget.
In
parallel, the cabinet strongly condemned the latest Israeli violations of the
border in a language that had never been used in more than 20 similar incidents
since 1978. And the Israeli ambassador in Cairo was summoned and a joint
investigation demanded.
Of
course, loud voices on both sides were not satisfied. But they will never be.
Until recently, Israeli flags had been burnt almost every day in Egyptian
cities since the beginning of the year. And some Israeli writers have advocated
ripping up the peace treaty and cleaning Sinai of "pockets of
terrorism". But on the contrary, both governments and large segments of
both populations understand that neither country can afford a schism.
Israel
is going through one of the most challenging periods in its short history. It
has enough headaches with a nuclear Iran, the unclear future of Syria, an
always renewable confrontation with Hamas in Gaza and an unprecedented internal
social movement against the government's policies. Adding Egypt to the list is
the last thing Israel would want.
On
the other side of the border, the new Egypt with all of its challenges is too
fragile to engage in confrontation with anyone, and definitely not Israel.
There is a government that cannot handle its relations with the army in an
ambiguous transitional period. They cannot even afford a serious diplomatic
confrontation; the Egyptian embassy in Tel Aviv is business as usual.
Instead
of an explosion, the political tides pull both countries towards the
negotiating table to undo the knots tied by three decades of ignoring the
reality on the ground.
Diplomacy
might divert some of the anger in the streets, but more importantly would allow
a renegotiation of some key points without scrapping the Camp David Accords in
their entirety. That might translate into a redistribution of Egyptian forces
along the border that would guard against threats to Israel's security while
granting sovereignty to Egypt on its own soil in real terms - or, at least,
more sovereignty than it now has.
-This commentary was published in The National on 09/09/2011
-Maher Hamoud is a freelance journalist based in Cairo
-Maher Hamoud is a freelance journalist based in Cairo
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