Palestinian leaders are headed for a dangerous confrontation at
the U.N. that will only leave everyone worse off. Can anyone stop this runaway
train?
By Ziad J. Asali
Late
September is fast approaching, and the stage seems set for yet another crisis
in the Middle East. Palestinian leaders are determined to push for greater
international recognition of their state at the upcoming annual session of the
U.N. General Assembly. A large number of countries are reportedly poised to
vote in Palestine's favor, much to the chagrin of the Israeli government, which
has mounted a vigorous lobbying campaign against recognition.
A
Palestinian state is long overdue. But though the Palestinian people are
perfectly entitled to seek bilateral and multilateral recognition, their action
at the United Nations could lead to a dangerous diplomatic confrontation.
Palestinians might ask the Security Council for full U.N. membership, which
would be vetoed by the United States, or take other actions in the General Assembly
that would place it and its allies at odds with the United States, Israel, and
major Western powers.
I
just returned from the region, where I was struck by the complacent attitude
about September among Palestinians, who, despite heightened public expectations,
believe they are simply pursuing a diplomatic process that will strengthen
their hand at the negotiating table. In contrast, the Israelis seem to regard
it as a major national crisis. Both parties, however, are taking security
measures in anticipation of possible unrest.
Palestinian
President Mahmoud Abbas insists that he prefers negotiations and is not seeking
a confrontation, while Israel continues to mobilize opposition to any U.N.
initiative. Each side is focusing on Europe, which for its own strategic
reasons wants to avoid a split vote but seems so far unable to reach a
consensus. The United States has made clear its intention to veto any
Palestinian application for full U.N. membership in the Security Council, and
it opposes any other U.N. initiative.
A
diplomatic confrontation is not in the interest of any party. For Israel, it
could prompt an outburst of public anger and possible violence in the occupied
territories that would be a security challenge at home and deepen its growing
isolation abroad. For Palestinians, it could mean a return to more restrictive
forms of control by Israeli occupation authorities, more checkpoints and
roadblocks, as well as other forms of retaliation, including punitive economic
measures. For the United States, it risks bringing back traditional
anti-American sentiment front and center to Arab political discourse at a time
when the country has been increasingly perceived as a positive force standing
with the people against dictators.
The
need for a compromise is more urgent than ever. The United States, through the
Middle East Quartet, is engaged in intense efforts to find a formula to resume
negotiations. It is not beyond hope or diplomatic skill to find broadly
acceptable language for a resolution that acknowledges the Palestinian right to
statehood. A diplomatic confrontation with potentially far-reaching
implications on the ground remains a distinct possibility, however. No matter
what happens at the U.N., it is important for all parties to start planning for
the day after.
The
first priority must be to prevent a flare-up of violence, which could extract a
catastrophic human cost and set back the prospects for a two-state solution.
Only extremists would benefit, and the United States will be blamed and inevitably
be drawn into such confrontations.
The
best counterweight to chaos is security cooperation between Palestinian and
Israeli security forces. Over the last two years, this cooperation has reached
unprecedented and by all accounts -- whether Palestinian, Israeli, or American
-- exemplary levels. Security cooperation is as much in the Palestinian
interest as it is in Israel's, because providing law and order is the sine qua
non of governance. This cooperation must be preserved, requiring continued support
for the Palestinian security services and a commitment to its integrity and its
officers' morale. It will also require deploying American diplomatic and
security assets on the ground to ensure that security cooperation is insulated
from the diplomatic and political grandstanding that would inevitably follow a
showdown at the U.N.
Once
the dust from any potential diplomatic crisis settles, achieving a two-state
solution will continue to be an American, Israeli, and Palestinian national
security imperative. A peace agreement will require serious Israeli and
Palestinian partners, which is why the collapse of the Palestinian Authority is
not in American or Israeli interests. Nor will a deterioration of living
conditions among Palestinians serve the cause of peace and moderation. Just
look at Gaza.
Over
the last two years, the Palestinian institution-building program has
contributed to maintaining stability and prosperity. Crucially, it has created
a vehicle through which progress between Palestinians and Israelis can continue
even when diplomacy falters. This avenue should not be closed at this sensitive
time when emotions are high, even if negotiations seem out of reach in the
short term. That requires having the wisdom to see past diplomatic and
political disagreements and instead build on what has been achieved by the
Palestinians with international, and indeed Israeli, cooperation.
Palestinians
have been steadily decreasing the amount they need from donors in recent years
and are set to institute a program of austerity to help protect themselves from
the vicissitudes of foreign-aid delivery and the changing attitudes of donor
countries. The international community should match this responsible policy
with a correspondingly defined and dependable delivery of aid.
The
U.S. Congress can demand, and should secure, continued strict and transparent
accountability for Palestinian finances. But cutting funding to the Palestinian
Authority, or to international and U.N. agencies that operate in Palestinian
areas -- as some in Congress are now threatening to do -- would contribute to
an atmosphere of tension on the ground and play directly into the hands of
extremist groups and their regional sponsors. Continuing support for the
Palestinian institution-building program would maintain a much-needed anchor that
can offset the potential negative impact of events in September, until
meaningful negotiations again become possible.
Any
cut-off of funds that threatens the important gains of the Palestinian
institution-building program, which has done so much to improve the lives of
Palestinians in the occupied territories -- or the security services, whose
cooperation with Israeli forces has ensured law and order and greatly curtailed
terrorism -- would not only punish Palestinians. It would also raise tensions,
play into the hands of extremists, and create a far more serious
"day-after" problem for Israel and the United States as well. Simply
put, it would be a mistake that would make a difficult situation for all
parties not only more difficult, but potentially unmanageable.
-This commentary was published in The Foreign Policy on 08/09/2011- Ziad J. Asali is founder and president of the American Task Force
on Palestine
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