There is more evidence emerging about Iran and North Korea's
cooperation on nuclear technology, but we should be wary about jumping to
conclusions about WMD
By Mark Fitzpatrick
Given
that both Iran and North Korea are pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities in
defiance of UN mandates, it would seem logical for the two outlaw programmes to
share their respective know-how. After all, each is prevented by UN sanctions
from legally acquiring the material and technological wherewithal needed to
develop nuclear weapons that can be reliably delivered.
With
a long history of bilateral cooperation in the development of ballistic
missiles dating back to the late 1980s, it would not be hard for Pyongyang and
Tehran to put those well-practised trade deals and transfer routes to use in
the nuclear-weapons field. It is therefore a mystery why the world has seen few
signs of nuclear cooperation between the two charter members of the rogue
nation club. It is not for lack of looking. Western intelligence agencies are
intensely targeting nuclear acquisition efforts by Iran and North Korea. More
than 90 states have signed the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative that is
designed to interdict nuclear and missile-related trade to and from those two
regimes.
Yet
finding nuclear weapons-related trade is akin to the proverbial needle in a
haystack. In the vastness of ocean and sky routes, most forms of
nuclear-related cargo are so minute as to be almost undetectable. Moreover,
nuclear weapons work in any country is conducted with utmost secrecy. UN expert
panels set up to monitor the implementation of sanctions have explained the
ways in which Tehran and Pyongyang evade sanctions by using intermediaries in
China and long-distance cargo aircraft. The UN panels have documented several
instances of missile-related illicit trafficking between Iran and North Korea
but nothing about nuclear trade.
Comparing
the two nuclear programmes, it is striking how they have developed in different
ways. Both have explored the two pathways to nuclear weapons: highly enriched
uranium, as was used in the bomb dropped on Hiroshima, and plutonium, which
formed the fissile material for the Nagasaki bomb. Yet, whereas Pyongyang went
the plutonium route for the devices it tested in 2006 and 2009, Iran has
emphasised enriched uranium.
More
recently, North Korea also appears to have given priority to the enrichment
route - witness the shiny gas centrifuge facility it proudly displayed last
November. Among the interesting aspects of that facility is that the
centrifuges, of second-generation vintage, were made of maraging steel, a
high-strength material that is difficult to manufacture. By contrast, although
Iran acquired the same second-generation centrifuge designs from Pakistani
black marketeer AQ Khan, it chose to use carbon fibre. Iran cannot manufacture
maraging steel and has already used most of the stock that it acquired before
western countries clamped down on trade in this material. If there were nuclear
cooperation between the two countries, it would be logical for North Korea to
sell Iran maraging steel and for their centrifuges to look more alike.
The
media coverage of Iran-North Korea nuclear cooperation has usually been based
on unidentified intelligence sources. Unsubstantiated claims include the
alleged presence of Iranian scientists at Pyongyang's 2006 nuclear test and a
2005 Reuters report of North Koreans lecturing during a specialist nuclear
training course in Tehran. Last December, Mohammad Reza Heydari, who defected
from his diplomatic post in Oslo earlier in 2010, said that from 2002 to 2007,
when he headed the foreign ministry's office for airports, he saw many North
Korean technicians arriving to collaborate on the Iranian nuclear programme.
In
an April 2008 background briefing, however, US intelligence officials flatly
denied an Iranian-North Korean nuclear connection. There is no doubting the
presence of North Korean technicians in Iran who provide assistance for
ballistic missiles and learn from Iran's own testing and development work.
Given the secrecy of Iran's nuclear weapons-related activities, it is unclear
how Mr Heydari would have been able to conclude that the North Koreans were
involved in nuclear-related work rather than ballistic missiles. Throughout the
past eight years, even senior Iranian negotiators have repeatedly been
surprised by new revelations about Iran's nuclear activities.
Late
last month, two new reports of a North Korea-Iran nuclear connection emerged.
On August 24, the Munich-based Sueddeutsche Zeitung said North Korea had in the
spring delivered dual-use US software that could simulate neutron flows. The
unclassified computer programme has many civilian applications, but its export
is strictly controlled because it can be used to calculate chain reactions for
the development of nuclear explosives. A North Korean delegation reportedly
travelled to Iran in February to train 20 defence ministry employees in the
software. The newspaper vaguely attributed its information to western
intelligence sources. And on August 26, an article published in Israel
collected various strands of information to suggest that Iran may have financed
the North Korea-Syria deal to construct a plutonium-producing reactor near the
town of Deir Al Zour (a site also known as Al Kibar), which Israel bombed in
September 2007.
Like
the previous reports, neither of the latest stories is confirmed. They should
not be dismissed out of hand, however. The well-credentialed Sueddeutsche is no
tabloid and the information it reported is generally consistent, at least in
terms of developmental level, with other reports that the International Atomic
Energy Agency has assembled about what strongly appears to be nuclear
weapons-related work by Iran. The IAEA's extensive reports on Iran's nuclear
programme, however, have never mentioned anything about a North Korea
connection.
In
sum, I am less sceptical about the evidence of an Iran-North Korea nuclear
connection than I was several months ago. But confirmation is needed before
anyone can draw any conclusions.
-This commentary was published in The National
on 06/09/2011- Mark Fitzpatrick is the director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies and the editor of Strategic Dossiers on Iran and North Korea
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