How Syria Works

A senior Sunni army officer explains how Bashar al-Assad uses the Alawite minority in Syria to control his authoritarian regime. He has few hopes that the demonstrations will succeed in bringing change

By Zénobie

The Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. Photograph: Roy Samaha/AFP/Getty

“The Syrian army is the army of the Syrian security services”, said Muhammad (1), a senior Sunni Muslim army officer. To understand how this happened, you have to go back to the 1960s, when the current political structure was created during four coups. The Alawite minority came to political power and the army dominated the Ba’ath Party. When Hafez al-Assad (father of Bashar) seized power in 1970 in the last coup, he finalised this authoritarian system, tightly weaving Syrian society around the army, the security services, the party and the administration. The regime also used family, clan, regional and sectarian loyalties to form a clientele, who were rewarded with civil service jobs. The combination of religious connections and an obsession with security allowed the Alawites to dominate the army and security services.

Fear is the cement of the security edifice, and it is this that the current revolt (2) has swept away. Under Bashar al-Assad, in power since 2000, the party, administration and army have all come under the direct control of the security services, which are in the hands of the Assad family. Syrians consider the Ba’ath Party as the fifth organ of the security services (3).

I asked Muhammad how many men there were in the army and the security services. He told me there were more than 700,000 — 400,000 in the regular army, 100,000 in the police and intelligence, and tens of thousands employed part-time by the security services. These form the battalions of the shabbiha (4) and the irregular forces. The shabbiha are made up of people from the countryside, and probably criminals freed at the start of the revolt. An estimated 100,000 Alawites work in the security services; tens of thousands more serve in the army and the presidential guard, which is completely Alawite. In 2011 Alawites were 10% of the population. About 50% of civil servants work for the security apparatus; the ministry of defence employs more than 60,000 civilians (in particular in the Military Housing Establishment, run by Assad’s cousin). They lose their jobs if they do not assist in state repression. “These are the men you often see standing outside mosques with electric batons or iron bars. They are also called on to take part in pro-government demonstrations.”

Wasn’t it the job of the army to defend the country? Muhammad said: “Of course, but think about it: since the 1990s a large proportion of the national budget has been spent on the army. But most army units have not had any new equipment, so where has all the money gone? They created a brigade for the Israeli border, but it has no military capacity, not even tanks. And the army’s leadership seems preoccupied with other things, for example, stopping Damascus men from doing military service. A young Sunni from Damascus can pay an official every month to validate his service papers while he remains at home, working.”

What about religious affiliations in the army? Muhammad said there was a “symbolic situation, with only two religious denominations, Alawite and Sunni [by Sunni, he meant everyone else — Sunni, Druze, Christian etc, who together make up 90% of the population]. When a commander is Sunni, his second in command is Alawite, and vice versa. The same principle governs the allocation of ministerial posts in the government: every non-Alawite minister is overseen by an Alawite deputy who makes all the political decisions... Decisions in the army and security services are always made by Alawites — Sunnis have no influence. An inexperienced Alawite officer might have a flashy new car, his Sunni superior would drive an old jeep. Crimes by different officers received different punishments. Sunni officers might be watched or investigated to check their loyalty. It is hard for a Sunni to rise to be general,” Muhammad said.

“ Sectarianism is widespread, but unspoken. The Syrian army is made up of seven divisions, each led by a commander. The most important is the fourth division, commanded by Maher al-Assad, Bashar’s brother [who also runs the presidential guard], with 40,000-50,000 men, all Alawite, and the most sophisticated military equipment. It has been involved from the beginning in the repression at Deraa.

“All security service officers come from the army. It is the security services that tell the army chief of staff which officers to appoint and promote. All the decisions made in the repression of the revolt were taken by security service officers, even down to moving a tank. The Syrian army is the executive arm of the security services, and not the chief of staff.”

What about the officers and soldiers killed in the revolt? Muhammad said: “No Syrian soldier would doubt that the security services would eliminate anyone who didn’t carry out an order. Within the logic of the regime, the security services would happily kill several Alawites to provoke a sectarian conflict, or make it look like one. That’s much more productive for the regime than killing a Sunni. But it’s possible that all the soldiers sent out to suppress the revolt were Alawites. It may even be the case that Alawite elements within the 100,000-strong police or security services were dressed as soldiers and sent out to beat Sunnis ... But the deaths of soldiers or members of the security services could also be linked to individual acts of revenge, local initiatives. In Deraa last March people spotted a sniper on the roof of a building, so they burnt down the building. In Jisr al-Choghour, people attacked the police station with a bulldozer.” (There are no pictures of dead soldiers, while there is much swift coverage of the deaths of demonstrators.)

Could the army divide? “What we have here are individual dissidents, and not a split within the entire military. These isolated dissidents cannot deliver a strong message to the regime. The sectarian make-up of each military unit prevents the Sunnis acting together [but not Alawites, as the fourth division demonstrates]. The distribution of headquarters in the army is organised in such a way that even if a Sunni officer gave a dissident order, it would be blocked at various levels by Alawite officers or those loyal to the regime. Don’t expect this army to give the slightest support to the demonstrators.”

What are the prospects for the uprising? “It’s difficult to say they are anything but bleak. The regime has lost its way. The demonstrators are determined not to give in, but the regime is not willing to give ground. Men like Assad can’t imagine a day when they won’t be in power. That’s why the repression keeps getting worse. The army and the regime have declared war on peaceful protestors and civilians, using helicopters, armoured tanks and the navy against them. The only possibility in terms of the military is a split within the leadership of the security services which could spread to sections of the army, but that is unlikely.”

Since our conversation, the regime has announced a telephone number for people to call to denounce government critics.

-This article was published in Le Monde Diplomatique in its Octobre Issue
-Zénobie is a journalist
(1) Not his real name
(2) Thawra in Arabic can be translated as revolt or revolution. If we define revolution as a revolt that has succeeded in changing the political regime, we must use revolt here, bearing in mind it could become a revolution.
(3) There are four organs of the Syrian security service: State Security, Political Security, Military Security, and the feared Air Force Security, which operates throughout Syrian society. All religious denominations are represented in the security services, but there are very few officers from Damascus.
(4) The name given to militias armed by the state; it is equivalent to the baltaguiyya in Egypt during the revolution.