By Rami G. Khouri
I
get the impression after a month in the United States and many public and
private discussions on the Middle East that the issue of Iran – or the Iranian
“threat” as it has long been called in many quarters in the U.S. – is no longer
as pressing or threatening a matter as it has been in recent years. The main
reason perhaps is that when it comes to the Middle East, the United States
generally finds it hard to walk and chew gum at the same time; in other words,
it has trouble dealing with more than one major issue at a time.
The
“threat” of a nuclear-capable Iran with its own enrichment facilities has been
heavily marketed in the U.S. in recent years by a combination of
neoconservatives, pro-Israelis and other groups that find Iran an easy target
and scapegoat, for many reasons having to do with Iranian-American political
tensions, historical anger on both sides, and regional strategic issues.
Today,
though, three other major issues seem to have relegated Iran to the background
of the foreign policy scene in Washington, at least for now. These are the
American withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab citizen revolts and
uprisings across the region, and the renewed focus on the Palestinian quest for
statehood at the U.N. and its diplomatic reverberations.
Iran
itself has not changed very much in the past year or two vis-à-vis relations
with the U.S. However, American perception of Iran and its dangers seems to
have softened a bit, as the U.S. finds itself with its hands full trying to
deal with the three other issues mentioned above. Washington and American
political culture are at their best when they shield themselves from the
frenzied extremes of the ideological lobbies that run amok in the capital, and
instead get on with the task of studying and assessing foreign policy issues on
their own merit, based on facts not imagination.
I
had the pleasure of attending such a gathering a few days ago in Washington,
D.C. at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which examined
the intertwined domestic and regional dimensions of Iranian policy. One of the
issues discussed was how Iran has responded to the upheavals in the Arab world,
and how Arabs across the region view Iran in return.
My
sense of the situation is that Iran and the United States find themselves,
peculiarly, in similar situations: they were both caught off guard by the Arab
citizen revolts; they have both reacted with visible confusion; and they both
stand to lose in the short run by the transformations underway in the Arab world,
in Iran’s case in four ways, at least.
The
first is that quite a few Arab governments or political movements are now
openly criticizing and resisting Iran and its Arab allies or surrogates. Saudi
Arabia is leading an overt anti-Iranian campaign that is focused most directly
these days on Bahrain (supporting the king), Lebanon (opposing Hezbollah), and
Syria (weakening or toppling the Assad regime). This confrontation is sometimes
articulated in the vocabulary of Sunnis versus Shiites (which I personally believe
is highly exaggerated and simplistic). The decisive Saudi-led harnessing of
Gulf Cooperation Council political, military and economic assets to put down
the uprising in Bahrain is the most striking manifestation of this explicit
pushback against Iran.
The
second place where Iran is losing is in Syria, and by extension in Lebanon with
the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah connections. If the Assad regime is weakened or falls,
Iran is likely to lose a strategic partner that represents one of its few
foreign policy gains in the Arab region since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. A
change in Syria will have consequences for Iranian-Hezbollah logistical links,
in a manner that cannot be firmly sketched today but that is certain to be
significant.
Iran’s
third loss is that its attempts to gain Arab favor by rhetorically attacking
Israel are being almost totally marginalized by two concurrent developments:
the center of gravity of Arab-Israeli issues is shifting to the U.N. and other
diplomatic arenas; and Turkey has stepped up and assumed the role of regional
power that is challenging Israel diplomatically in a far more credible manner
than Iran has ever done.
The
fourth reason for Iran’s decline in Arab eyes is that the Arab world is
preoccupied with its own uprisings that seek to establish more accountable and
democratic political systems, making the Iranian model of a centralized,
security-dominated, economically rapacious state less and less appealing.
The
three arenas where many Arabs applauded Iranian policies in recent years –
revolutionary zeal, challenging Israel, and standing up to the U.S. and the
West – are now arenas where Arabs and Turks dominate. Iran is losing its role
as a stand-in that compensates emotionally for Arab political frustrations or
weaknesses.
This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 05/10/2011
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