America's Misreading Of The Arab Spring Will Backfire

Washington needs to clearly and unambiguously trust forces of change that are reshaping this part of the world

By Abdulkhaleq Abdullah

The pending American veto at the UN Security Council against the Palestinian application for full membership to the UN and the Congressional move to block $200 million (Dh734 million) in financial aid to the Palestinian National Authority shows the extent to which US policy towards the Arab World is helplessly stacked in the pre-Arab Spring era. Washington is tragically misreading the epochal changes of 2011 and its dealings with the 10-month-old Arab Spring have been particularly inconsistent and hypocritical. It has often found itself on the wrong side of history.

Washington was totally taken by surprise by the suddenness, the massiveness and the speed of the Arab Spring. The Obama administration was completely in the dark and was caught off guard. America used to be in the driving seat and on top of events in this supposedly vital region. And for nearly four decades it was the ultimate power that could claim to unilaterally shape regional events to its liking and according to its regional and global agenda. America's dominance was most visible after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and in the aftermath of the tragic invasion of Iraq in 2003. But things have changed over the past decade. This time around the Obama administration did not do its homework and, thank God, the Arab Spring was not made in America.

The Obama administration was not just taken by surprise like everyone else, but Washington did not know what to make of the Arab Spring and at least for a while it was at loss about the proper course of action. The events this year were unfolding too fast and it was a tough call: whether to stand by the 40-year-old status quo or simply risk the leap and embrace the forces of change sweeping the Arab world. There was an apparent debate on the proper policy response to the Arab Spring. On the one hand, there were the usual diehard political realists in Washington who called for a cautious and calculated approach. Luckily, there was also a team of soft-spoken idealists who counselled US President Barack Obama for a more principled policy. At the critical moment, Obama decided it was time to embrace the forces of change which were unleashed in Tunisia and Egypt and throughout the region. Intuitively, Obama realised that something really big and extraordinary was happening in the streets of the Arab world and he decided to be on the right side of history.

Political hypocrisy

However, Washington's overall reaction to the amazing events of 2011 has been typically inconsistent. During the initial stage of the Arab Spring and in cases like Egypt and Tunisia, Obama was certainly forthcoming and supportive of forces of change. But he was reluctant and not as forthcoming in other cases, like Yemen and even Syria. He was sometimes on the right side of history, but often completely on the wrong side of it. While embracing the Egyptian revolution, he held back on endorsing forces of change in Bahrain. He demanded, although belatedly, the departure of President Bashar Al Assad of Syria but was timid to make the call on the departure of President Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. The credibility gap between principles and self-interest of America remains wide and exposes political hypocrisy of the worst kind.

America needs to clearly and unambiguously trust forces of change that are reshaping the Arab world. This includes working with the young people of the Arab world, the various Islamist and the post-Islamist movements of the Arab Spring, the liberal forces who can be easily sidelined and lost in the new political landscape, Al Jazeera and the many souls behind the new social media in the region. On a deeper level America needs to genuinely trust the more plural, possibly the more democratic and indeed the more challenging Arab world.

Washington has supported the political status quo for too long. It stood by despised dictators and corrupt leaders and still does. Clearly, the status quo is no longer sustainable and many of the old, supposedly reliable allies, are on shaky ground. It will be a huge blunder if Washington underestimates the mood for change in the region. Many in the US are still cynical, some are ambivalent and dismissive, and many more are suspicious of the Arab Spring and see nothing but violence and a new era of chaos.

What America needs the most is a new approach towards the region. It needs to think of the Arab Spring as an opportunity and not just as a challenge. Of course, there are tonnes of old and new challenges. But the Arab Spring has provided a new opportunity waiting to be taken. There is a once-in-a-while window of opportunity to build a more moderate, a more plural and a possibly a more prosperous Arab world. This might be way too optimistic but the logic of the moment calls for optimism. The Arab Spring calls for a new start to American policy in the region.

The place to start is the critical Palestinian issue where America needs to be on the side of justice. It is elementary to say that the Palestinians deserve a state of their own. The decision to veto Palestinian membership to the UN only perpetuates injustice and keeps America on the wrong side of history. It proves beyond doubt that Washington is miserably misreading and mishandling the Arab Spring.

-This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 11/10/2011
-Abdulkhaleq Abdullah is Professor of Political Science, Emirates University

Yemenis Ask 'Where's The Catch?'

By Andrew Hammond

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh's declaration in a speech on Saturday that he would leave power "in the coming days" is yet another act of brinkmanship from a leader who has spent much of the "Arab Spring" claiming he is about to step down. Saleh's words were taken almost universally as a ruse by Yemenis who have seen the famed wily operator survive through thick and thin since he took power in 1978. "Where is the catch?" said Gregory Johnsen, a Yemen scholar. "Saleh is dealing with a trust deficit in Yemen, and Yemenis are very wary of promises from this president.

Phrases like "in the coming days" have a highly flexible meaning for Saleh, who returned to Yemen from treatment in Riyadh a month after he said in a speech to supporters that he would be back "soon". His vice president said repeatedly after Saleh was hurt in an assassination attempt in June that he would return from Saudi Arabia "in a few days". Saleh has offered a long list of apparent concessions since youth activists, buoyed by uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, first took to the streets of Sanaa in January to protest for an end to his rule and for democratic reforms.

Ominously, they have often come with a sharp sting. After his ruling party called for dialogue with the opposition in a bid to stem anti-government protests on Jan 29, his supporters attacked Yemenis trying to march to the Egyptian embassy to express solidarity with Egyptians who succeeded two weeks later in bringing down Hosni Mubarak. "He doesn't mean he's leaving in a few days literally," said opposition politician Ali Seif Hassan. "He is trying to threaten the opposition that he can go alone to new elections without an agreement, but he can't now. It's too late.

After government snipers shot dead 52 people one day in March, Saleh shifted ground to talk publicly on numerous occasions of his readiness to step down and distaste in holding onto power for its own sake, but he expressed the desire to make sure of the people he hands the reins on to. "We don't want power but we need to hand power over to safe hands," he told thousands of his own supporters on March 25. Following that, his government engaged openly in talks mediated by Gulf Arab countries, led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States, on a mechanism for a transition to early parliamentary and presidential elections after Saleh formed a new opposition-led cabinet then relinquished the presidency.

That arrangement, which even offered guarantees of no legal action against Saleh and his family, fell through three times as Saleh came up with last minute excuses for not signing. During his stay in Riyadh, he began to push the line more forcefully that the Gulf initiative needed modification to make sure the established opposition did not inherit power. Saturday's apparent countdown to leaving office has a familiar ring to it then. In the same breath Saleh repeated that this long-time opposition party rivals, who he has outfoxed throughout his career, must not be the beneficiaries.

Saleh was merely reiterating these positions, an adviser said. "Saleh has made it clear that he is ready to leave, but this will not happen before Yemen is led to a safe place where power can be transferred peacefully," he said. Saleh may well have had good reason, though, to give the impression of imminent movement, analysts say. On Friday the Nobel Peace prize was awarded to Tawakul Karman, one of the leading activists who has been on the street at 'Change Square' outside Sanaa University since February.

The recognition of a Yemeni democracy activist is set to bring renewed global attention to the struggle in Yemen, an impoverished country of 23 million with problems stretching from declining water resources to Al-Qaeda militants taking advantage of chaos in the capital. Karman used the prize to push home the message that street mobilisation will not stop until the uprisings claim Yemen too. "This is a victory for the Yemeni people, for the Yemeni revolution and all the Arab revolutions," she said in Sanaa. "Our peaceful revolution will continue until we topple Saleh and establish a civilian state.

Saleh will also be mindful of the possibility of action at the United Nations Security Council, where there is talk of a resolution urging the government to implement the Gulf initative, possibly sometime next week. A UN envoy left Sanaa last week to brief the council on what appeared to be a fruitless effort to mediate in a crisis which has brought Yemen to the brink of civil war and its economy to a standstill. "I think the man wants to confuse the UN Security Council before they make a motion to discuss Yemen," said Hamdan Al-Haqab, a youth leader in the protest movement.

One thing Saleh may want to avoid is an ignominious exit under international pressure. He has said himself that if he leaves office it should be "with dignity". "Within days" is a vague enough term in his dictionary to leave the door open to a short- or mid-term exit if the walls finally close in. In an ideal world, Saleh would want to hold on until his term in office ends in Sept 2013. Alongside the deft domestic manoeuvring, Saleh has played to the concerns of his international allies.

Public US pressure has been lacking while he cooperates with Washington in its covert war on militants in Yemen. A CIA drone killed American-Yemeni cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki in Yemen last month in what was seen as a major coup for US President Barack Obama in the battle against Al-Qaeda. Saudi Arabia, a key financial backer of Saleh's government, is as keen to control the succession process as he is. A Saudi government adviser said Saleh was still bound by an agreement with King Abdullah to work to hand over power. "This is part of the understanding Saleh had with the king and now he will have to follow through and implement the Gulf plan," the adviser said. – Reuters

This analysis was published in The Kuwait Times on 10/10/2011

Is Iraq The Model For The Mideast After All?

By Jackson Diehl

In Syria, elite army units are bloodily assaulting a now-armed resistance. Supporters of dictator Bashar al-Assad are being picked off in targeted assassinations while opposition activists are tortured to death. Western countries stand fecklessly by as Russia and China veto action by the U.N. Security Council. At least 2,900 dead have been counted — and the carnage may be just getting started.

I could write a column about all of this. But I’d like to propose, instead, that we think again about the war in Iraq.

With U.S. troops less than three months away from withdrawal, that mission is now generally regarded in Washington as, at best, a waste of American lives and resources, and at worst a monumental folly — and that’s among the Republican presidential candidates. But the misnamed Arab Spring, which has turned from a euphoric winter in Tunisia and Egypt to a savage summer in Libya, Yemen and Syria, casts Iraq in a different light.

It turns out that the end of autocracy in the Arab Middle East, unlike in Central Europe or Asia, will not happen peacefully. People power isn’t working. Dictators such as Assad, Moammar Gaddafi and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, backed by mountains of weapons and armies bound to them by tribe or sect, prefer to fight to the death rather than quietly yield. Despite seeing Hosni Mubarak in his courtroom cage — or maybe because of it — they don’t shrink from crimes against humanity.

The carnage might be seen as regrettable but acceptable if the bad guys were losing. But with the notable exception of Gaddafi, they are not. Assad has been written off by most of the West’s intelligence services, but his tanks and artillery are proving more than a match for the ragtag groups of army defectors in towns such as Homs and Rastan. Saleh was nearly killed by a bomb, but on his return after three months in a Saudi hospital, forces commanded by his son still held the presidential palace in Sanaa.

Gaddafi, of course, is losing, though still at large — thanks to the military intervention by NATO. When the air campaign began last spring, he was on the verge of massacring the opposition in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. Western planes and drones proved just enough to tip the balance against him. But Libya was the limit for the Obama administration, Britain and France: There will be no such operation in Syria or Yemen, goes the constant refrain.

This means that the bloodshed in those countries could drag on indefinitely, and grow steadily worse. Tribal war, and the anarchy of nearby Somalia, beckons for Yemen. In Syria we could see, at worst, a repeat of the history of Lebanon: sectarian war, interspersed with interventions by neighbors and transnational operations by terrorists.

This brings us back to Iraq. As former Bush administration strategist Meghan O’Sullivan recently wrote in The Post, Iraq has fallen well short of both American and Iraqi expectations. The pain and cost of that war are some of the reasons the United States and its allies have sworn off intervention in Syria and why the Obama administration made a half-hearted effort in Libya.

Iraq, however, looks a lot like what Syria, and much of the rest of the Arab Middle East, might hope to be. Its vicious dictator and his family are gone, as is the rule by a sectarian minority that required perpetual repression. The quasi-civil war that raged five years ago is dormant, and Iraq’s multiple sects manage their differences through democratic votes and sometimes excruciating but workable negotiations. Though spectacular attacks still win headlines, fewer people have died violently this year in Iraq than in Mexico — or Syria.

Just as significantly, Iraq remains an ally of the United States, an enemy of al-Qaeda and a force for relative good in the Middle East. It is buying $12 billion in U.S. weapons and has requested that an American training force remain in the country next year. It recently helped get two U.S. citizens out of prison in Iran.

All of this happened because the United States invaded the country. Saddam Hussein demonstrated how he could handle a homegrown, Arab Spring-style rebellion when he used helicopter gunships to slaughter masses of Shiites in 1991. Even had his regime somehow crumbled, without the presence of U.S. troops nothing would have stopped Iraq from spiralling into the bottomless sectarian conflict that now threatens Syria.

The Arab Spring, in short, is making the invasion of Iraq look more worthy — and necessary — than it did a year ago. Before another year has passed, Syrians may well find themselves wishing that it had happened to them.

This commentary was published in The Washington Post on 10/10/2011

The Egyptian Revolution… Between Citizens And The Elite

By Mohammad Salah

Ordinary Egyptian citizens stand perplexed before the post-revolutionary political scene, and ask: when do we begin to reap the benefits of the Revolution? They are surprised, because the parties that have leapt to the forefront of the scene are speaking in their name! If they were to blame those parties, the latter would accuse them of being followers of the former regime, although they are the ones who carried out the Revolution. And if they were to follow behind those parties, they would find the distance between the two of them to be quite great. Certainly the Military Council in Egypt makes mistakes, as it manages the affairs of the transitional period. Indeed, managing the affairs of a country the size of Egypt and laying down the foundations of a modern state, amidst the struggles of the political elites to gain a piece of the cake of the Revolution, in addition to the conspiracies engaged in by the remnants of the former regime, are matters that would baffle any governing body. What to say then when the Council is facing not only such matters, but is also coming under fire from any political faction that does not have its desires met by the military? The Egyptian army came out of its barracks on January 28 in order to bring the situation under control after the collapse of the police, and its leaders did not have in mind that one of their tasks would be to change the regime and topple the President. Indeed, until that day those gathered in Tahrir Square themselves had not realized that the protests, demonstrations and rallies had turned into a “Revolution” that would not rest until the regime was overthrown or changed. And despite the fact that the first military statement contained praise for the Revolution and asserted the legitimacy of the people’s demands, the way things later turned out placed the army in the forefront of the political scene, and in confrontation with all other forces. The army’s task then became not just to topple the regime without division occurring within its ranks, and to compensate for the collapse of other state institutions, but also to deal with the conflicting needs, stances, desires, goals and ideas of various segments of the population and political forces. Such a formula was and remains a difficult one, especially as the length of Mubarak’s rule, inasmuch as it had caused the “cancerous spread” of corruption in government sectors, had also made the majority of state institutions, including the political elite and opposition movements, suffer ills not much different from those of the regime, which considered itself to be “Egypt the state”. The regime fell by the force of those gathered in Tahrir Square, and the army did not defend it, nor was there a reaction from the Republican Guard, the leaders and members of which are supposed to be loyal to the President directly. It appeared afterwards that political forces and the political elites were divided, and that every faction acknowledged no forces other than itself in society with goals, ideas, principles, and perhaps interests that contradict its own goals, ideas, principles or interests. The situation reached such an extent that the Military Council could not make decisions that would satisfy all forces at once, and it became impossible for its policies, decisions and laws to be announced without arousing the anger of other parties, which would consider that a specific party had benefited from them. Thus the Council found itself to have fallen into contradictions it would have avoided had the political elites agreed to keep their disputes under control, and maintained a minimum of consensus over common grounds between their demands. The political elite overlooked an important truth that appeared patently in the “Go Back to Your Barracks” million-man march last Friday, and was reflected in the meager number of participants in Tahrir Square, compared to the real “million-man marches” witnessed from the moment the Revolution erupted up until Mubarak stepped down on February 11 – the truth that a “million-man march” can only be complete by the will of the people, not in order to achieve the narrow interest of this or that faction.

The political elite did not realize that building the state anew would be an object of discord between them, that the views of Islamists would not be accepted by Secularists, that the plans of the Leftists and Nasserists would be sure to clash with the ideas and the principles of Liberals and Rightists, and that the problems faced by the wealthy and the well-off were not the same problems faced by the poor and the destitute. The military has made mistakes, and will throughout the transitional period make others. But what have the Revolution’s symbolic figures done to preserve the Revolution from opportunists and from those who ride the wave, other than talking on satellite television? Between the Yes and No to the referendum on the constitutional announcement, then the elections or the constitution first, then the secular or Islamic nature of the state, then whether the military should stay or leave, then isolating all of the remnants of the National Democratic Party (NDP) or some of them, then the articles governing the constitution or disregarding them, we have reached the phase of Presidential elections or the constitution first! All of them are issues that do not involve multiple options, but only black or white. And with every choice made or decision taken by the military, one party will be satisfied and others will be angered. Thus the Military Council will continue to manage the transitional period in its own way, and the political elites will remain as they are, locked in struggle, while the symbolic figures of the Revolution fade away, those who call for failed million-man marches do not learn, and ordinary citizens feel that they have been let down by all parties, and that they perhaps need to topple all those who have let them down… that they perhaps need another revolution.

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 10/10/2011

Russia Wants A Share In Post-Assad Syria

By Amir Taheri

After months of “intense diplomacy”, the United Nations’ Security Council has failed to develop a position on the crisis in Syria. The failure came when Russia and China vetoed a resolution that urged Syrian despot Bashar al-Assad to end violence against the civilian population or face fresh sanctions.

Paradoxically, the double veto could facilitate stronger action by Western democracies against the Assad regime.

No longer obliged to take into account Russian and Chinese “sensibilities”, the Western powers and their regional allies, notably Turkey, could quickly impose a set of economic and diplomatic sanctions against the Syrian regime. The European Union and Turkey account for more than 80 per cent of Syria’s foreign trade. Turkey is by far the biggest foreign direct investor in Syria. The EU is also the principal importer of Syrian oil, the revenue of which is directly controlled by Assad and his entourage.

At the same time, high level diplomatic contacts with European powers, notably France, helped Assad enhance his prestige at home.

With the Security Council scripting itself out of the Syrian issue, an alliance of Western powers plus Arab allies and Turkey could develop a common strategy to a crisis that is threatening regional peace and security.

Acting outside the Security Council is not without precedents. Western interventions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and, more recently, Cote d’Ivoire, all took place without the council’s involvement. In Kosovo, the prospect of a Russian veto forced the Western democracies to act alone.

What is urgently needed is the creation of a number of safe havens for Syrians fleeing the daily massacres. Turkey is already hosting some 8000 Syrian refugees. In Jordan, the number is put at over 6000 and in Lebanon at around 5000. Jordan has established a camp at Matraq while Turkey is building two close to the Syrian border. Iraq has not yet established any camp although it has received more than 10,000 Syrian refugees.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 10/10/2011
-Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI)

Jerusalem Can Do Strange Things To Your Sanity

By Robert Fisk

The Dome of the Rock mosque: green and gold are the colours of paradise

So there was this chap, a bearded guy, spectacles, a settler, asking for a lift from Hebron to Kiryat Arba.

And Kiryat Arba is quite a settlement, home to Baruch Goldstein who killed about 50 Palestinians before he himself was killed by the survivors, and Don, our man in Jerusalem – who was driving – said "Are you sure?" and my companion and I, anxious to hear "another point of view", said "Why not?" and this chap climbed in to the back seat next to me. And as we left Hebron, he pointed to us and said: "Jew? Jew? Jew?"

And I was a bit taken aback and let Don do the talking, and he said: "No." That kept our mate quiet for a bit. He had a gun in his belt, which I didn't really like. But armed Palestinians had killed Jewish settlers, so I kept my mouth shut. Then we reached Kiryat Arba and an enormous chap – with an even bigger beard – came to the car window with an equally enormous gun and said we could enter. And this settler beside me said: "The Land of Israel – for Israelis. Arabs. In London." Well, I see, we murmured. A bit like the Balfour Declaration in reverse, I suppose. "His Majesty's Government views with favour the establishment in Britain of a national home for the Arab people ..." Well there you have it, I suppose.

So then I called up from the King David Hotel – the best hotel in Jerusalem, I may add, whose Jewish and Arab staff are the best advertisement for a one-state solution, albeit that they may not agree with me! – and asked if the Waqf would permit me and my companion to visit the Haram al-Sharif, the Dome of the Rock, the Esplanade. And they called back and said yes, 9am sharp, Monday morning, and I could touch the footprint of the Prophet. I did – if indeed, it is his footprint, but this I cannot, alas, vouchsafe – and sure enough, I entered the great mosque which looks so like the Omayad mosque in Damascus and wondered at its beauty.

Gold and green are the colours of paradise, so I was told – I can believe it – and then, across the Esplanade, I was shown the Carrara marble aisles which that old trickster, Mussolini, gave to the holiest mosque in Palestine, and I remembered, of course, the Grand Mufti and his trip to Nazi Germany, and his visit to Hitler, and I recalled my student days, researching his speeches and his appeals to send the Jews of Europe to the East... Did he know?

And then I walked across the carpets and there was a plastic casket in which the Palestinians had boxed the cartridge cases of the Israelis who had fired tear gas at them in the 1990 killings here. "Saltsburg, Pennsylvania," it said. "For outdoor use only." Well, I can imagine. Saltsburg? Nice little town?

But then another question. What on earth, in this holy of holies, are these cartridge cases doing? Is this really their place? Should they be here, so close to Mohamed's footprint? Well, yes, I suppose they should, in one way. But I wonder. And then to a brunch at the Hamam el-Ein – the Bathhouse of the Well – which is being carefully restored close to the Esplanade and I talked to a fine Palestinian woman who described Israeli occupation in the language of Conrad. "Israeli occupation," she said to me. "They search everything on you; they go into your soul." That really is an "ouch".

And then we left Israel and the West Bank. "Please don't stamp our passports. Please don't stamp our passports," we pleaded. And the Israelis did not stamp our passports. And then, on the Jordanian side of the river, "Please don't stamp our passports. Please don't stamp our passports," we pleaded, and the Jordanians did not, although the Jordanian emigration officer at Amman airport did stamp our passports, thus allowing the Lebanese to see we had left Jordan but never entered it – but the Lebanese ignored the Jordanian stamp.

All of which makes me think that the Holy Land, Jerusalem, "Al-Quds", "Yerushalayim" – the Israelis print the Hebrew name of the city in Arabic script on Arabic road signs, I notice – is all a bit mad. I don't think I've ever been to a city where people go insane the nearer they get to it.

I once entered the Seven Arches Hotel above the Mount of Olives (and above the grave of one R Maxwell) – and do not ever, ever stay there, O reader – to find a group of Christians linking hands and praying and not prepared to let me through the lobby until they had finished praying. When I told them I was in a hurry one of the Christian men threatened to punch me in the face.

Funny place, Jerusalem. Funny place, Hebron. What on earth did God do to them?

This commentary was published in The Independent on 08/10/2011

Mubarak’s Odious Debts

By Saifedean Ammous

                                 Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak

 A glance at Egypt’s public finances reveals a disturbing fact: The interest that the country pays on its foreign loans is larger than its budget for education, healthcare and housing combined. Indeed, these debt-service costs alone account for 22 per cent of the Egyptian government’s total expenditures.

The impact has become impossible to ignore. With growing political uncertainty and a slowing economy, Egypt is likely to witness decreasing government revenues, increasing demands for urgent spending, and rising interest rates on government borrowing. This could lead to a fiscal catastrophe for the government at the very moment when the country is attempting a complicated political transition. Egypt’s public debt is around 80 per cent of the GDP, very close to the 90 per cent level that economists Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart identify as a harbinger of slower growth and heightened vulnerability to financial and fiscal crises. Egyptians need only glance north, at the European debt crisis, to understand they should sort out their debt problem now, rather than waiting until it reaches Greek proportions.

This debt was incurred during the 30-year reign of the deposed president, Hosni Mubarak. In international law, debt that is incurred without the consent of the people, and that is not used to their benefit, is referred to as “odious”; as such, it is not considered transferable to successor regimes. The reasoning is simple and logical: if someone fraudulently borrows money in my name, I am not expected to pay it back, and neither should a country’s population when an unrepresentative leader borrows in their name and to their detriment.

For three decades, Mubarak’s borrowing only enriched him and his ruling clique while impoverishing and repressing the rest of Egypt. Corruption was rife, but not just the covert type: public money was openly used to support many businesses under flimsy pretexts like “fostering economic growth” and “creating employment”. Along with regulatory capture, this harmed competitiveness, market openness, and Egypt’s small and medium-sized businesses.

The beneficiaries of this largesse are now mostly sitting in prison awaiting trial. The rest of Egypt, however, only felt this money in the form of an ever-expanding state apparatus that solidified Mubarak’s rule, crushed dissent, and repressed millions. When Egyptians rose up against Mubarak in January, they were confronted by weapons paid for with borrowed money.

Is it fair to expect Egyptians to continue paying for their previous repression and impoverishment at the hands of Mubarak and his cronies? Since this money clearly benefited Mubarak but not his people, should it not be Mubarak, rather than his victims, who is held responsible for it?

The type of regime Mubarak was running had been clear for many years, and it was also clear how the money was being used. A prudent lender should have considered these facts before making the loans. So the banks and international institutions that lent money to Mubarak should bear the responsibility of their choice to bankroll his repressive regime.

The new Egypt should make a clean break with Mubarak and his creditors, and let them sort out their business among themselves without involving the Egyptian people. The Egyptian government’s only role should be to help liquidate Mubarak assets for repayment should the need arise.

This would be not only fair, but it also would teach an important lesson to those who bankroll dictators - a lesson that is likely to have an immediate positive impact worldwide. Lenders to a repressive regime will no longer expect these debts to be repaid by its successors, immediately making lenders worldwide careful about lending to them.

An Egyptian precedent would bring awareness and sobriety to an entire generation of lenders that is not accustomed to considering this type of risk, and that may even be unfamiliar with the doctrine of odious debt. Repressive regimes would find it harder to borrow, which would, in turn, make it harder for them to repress their people, and make it easier and cheaper for responsible and legitimate governments to secure important funding when they need it. Transferring liability for foreign debt to Mubarak should not have negative economic consequences for Egypt in the long run. This move should not be understood as a move towards fiscal recklessness, but as a one-time break from it. With a smaller debt burden and interest payments, Egypt’s fiscal position would improve significantly, and threats to economic growth would recede. Foreign lenders’ resulting caution would prevent future Egyptian governments from irresponsibly saddling their populace with debt.

Perhaps most importantly, the days of borrowing to build a large state security apparatus would be gone for good - worldwide. For the sake of Egyptians and people living under tyranny everywhere, Egypt’s government must take a brave stand.

-This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 09/10/2011
-The writer is visiting scholar at the Centre for Capitalism and Society in Columbia University and lecturer in Economics at the Lebanese American University. ©Project Syndicate, 2011. www.project-syndicate.org