Iran Is Losing From The Arab Uprisings

By Rami G. Khouri

I get the impression after a month in the United States and many public and private discussions on the Middle East that the issue of Iran – or the Iranian “threat” as it has long been called in many quarters in the U.S. – is no longer as pressing or threatening a matter as it has been in recent years. The main reason perhaps is that when it comes to the Middle East, the United States generally finds it hard to walk and chew gum at the same time; in other words, it has trouble dealing with more than one major issue at a time.

The “threat” of a nuclear-capable Iran with its own enrichment facilities has been heavily marketed in the U.S. in recent years by a combination of neoconservatives, pro-Israelis and other groups that find Iran an easy target and scapegoat, for many reasons having to do with Iranian-American political tensions, historical anger on both sides, and regional strategic issues.

Today, though, three other major issues seem to have relegated Iran to the background of the foreign policy scene in Washington, at least for now. These are the American withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab citizen revolts and uprisings across the region, and the renewed focus on the Palestinian quest for statehood at the U.N. and its diplomatic reverberations.

Iran itself has not changed very much in the past year or two vis-à-vis relations with the U.S. However, American perception of Iran and its dangers seems to have softened a bit, as the U.S. finds itself with its hands full trying to deal with the three other issues mentioned above. Washington and American political culture are at their best when they shield themselves from the frenzied extremes of the ideological lobbies that run amok in the capital, and instead get on with the task of studying and assessing foreign policy issues on their own merit, based on facts not imagination.

I had the pleasure of attending such a gathering a few days ago in Washington, D.C. at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, which examined the intertwined domestic and regional dimensions of Iranian policy. One of the issues discussed was how Iran has responded to the upheavals in the Arab world, and how Arabs across the region view Iran in return.

My sense of the situation is that Iran and the United States find themselves, peculiarly, in similar situations: they were both caught off guard by the Arab citizen revolts; they have both reacted with visible confusion; and they both stand to lose in the short run by the transformations underway in the Arab world, in Iran’s case in four ways, at least.

The first is that quite a few Arab governments or political movements are now openly criticizing and resisting Iran and its Arab allies or surrogates. Saudi Arabia is leading an overt anti-Iranian campaign that is focused most directly these days on Bahrain (supporting the king), Lebanon (opposing Hezbollah), and Syria (weakening or toppling the Assad regime). This confrontation is sometimes articulated in the vocabulary of Sunnis versus Shiites (which I personally believe is highly exaggerated and simplistic). The decisive Saudi-led harnessing of Gulf Cooperation Council political, military and economic assets to put down the uprising in Bahrain is the most striking manifestation of this explicit pushback against Iran.

The second place where Iran is losing is in Syria, and by extension in Lebanon with the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah connections. If the Assad regime is weakened or falls, Iran is likely to lose a strategic partner that represents one of its few foreign policy gains in the Arab region since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. A change in Syria will have consequences for Iranian-Hezbollah logistical links, in a manner that cannot be firmly sketched today but that is certain to be significant.

Iran’s third loss is that its attempts to gain Arab favor by rhetorically attacking Israel are being almost totally marginalized by two concurrent developments: the center of gravity of Arab-Israeli issues is shifting to the U.N. and other diplomatic arenas; and Turkey has stepped up and assumed the role of regional power that is challenging Israel diplomatically in a far more credible manner than Iran has ever done.

The fourth reason for Iran’s decline in Arab eyes is that the Arab world is preoccupied with its own uprisings that seek to establish more accountable and democratic political systems, making the Iranian model of a centralized, security-dominated, economically rapacious state less and less appealing.

The three arenas where many Arabs applauded Iranian policies in recent years – revolutionary zeal, challenging Israel, and standing up to the U.S. and the West – are now arenas where Arabs and Turks dominate. Iran is losing its role as a stand-in that compensates emotionally for Arab political frustrations or weaknesses.

This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 05/10/2011

Reinventing Arab Nationalism

From the pan-Arabism during the Nasserite regime, the current uprisings indicate a new movement based on democracy and human rights

By Faisal Al Qasim

An Arab-Israeli woman rests during a march for the right of return for refugees who fled their homes during the 1948 war that followed the creation of Israel. Obama's Middle East envoy will arrive in the region this week to try coax Israel and the Palestinians back to negotiations.

When one tries to compare Arab nationalist feelings which were prevalent during the 1960s and even 1970s with Arab feelings now, one would no doubt be extremely shocked. Almost throughout the second part of the 20th century, Arabs felt very nationalistic, especially during the Nasserite era. Nationalist feelings soared, as most Arab countries then were trying to build new states in the wake of independence. Add to that, of course, the fact that the Arab-Israeli conflict was then at its peak.

But no sooner were the Arabs routed by the Israelis in the Six-Day war in 1967, than Arab nationalism began to lose steam ever so swiftly. Most Arabs felt they were cheated by the then nationalistic media, especially the so-called Voice of the Arabs radio, which was run by the Nasserite regime in Cairo. It is no wonder then that political pan-Arabism, in turn, began to fade away.

Hence the emergence of political Islam, which was pushed ahead then by the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini. It seemed at the time that Arabs began to exchange their nationalistic feelings for a new Islamist fervour, which dominated the latter years ever strongly. It is no wonder that Islamic movements such as Hezbollah of Lebanon and some Sunni-Islamist groups enjoyed great popularity towards the end of the 20th century. The Iran-backed Lebanese movement, together with other Islamist movements, made many Arabs regain some of their lost national pride, which was dealt a lethal blow by the US-backed Israelis.

But it seems that Arab political and popular trends are destined to be short-lived. Just as millions of Arabs felt disillusioned with the nationalist movement when it turned out to be no more than empty slogans, they seem now to be almost completely at loggerheads with the hot-headed Islamist movement. It is quite striking that the new Arab revolutions or intifadas for that matter, are neither nationalistically nor Islamically motivated. We haven't seen any ideological slogans raised throughout the Arab uprisings, which signifies that the Arab people are fed up with rotten ideologies such as the nationalistic one.

One can even safely say that the recent revolutions themselves have been staged to revolt against those regimes which utilised and manipulated Arab nationalism for non-nationalist objectives. Most Arabs have come to the conclusion now that patriotism has been used to prop up dictatorships and despotism. It is no wonder that pan-Arabism has now become synonymous with tyranny, one-man and one-party rule.

It is true that the Nasser regime, for instance, played on Arab nationalist feelings, and made millions of Arabs proud of their Arabism at one point. But at the same time, the same regime is reported to be the godfather of the monstrous Mukhabarat (intelligence agency) rule, which handed over the reins of power to the corrupt security apparatus, which almost muzzled everything, and threw thousands of people into prisons for decades just for airing their opinions peacefully.

All Arab regimes that were based on the Nasserite example have treated their people in a way no less worse than how Israel treats Palestinians.

In fact, Israel seems sometimes much more lenient and tolerant than the so-called pan-Arabist regimes. It has been reported during the recent uprisings that the security forces in a certain Arab republic fired on water tanks placed on roofs to empty them so that the people taking part in demonstrations die of thirst. They even prevented cars carrying bread and medicine from entering certain areas as a punishment for those rising against the regime. Some might argue that Israeli aircraft have bombed civilian Palestinian and Lebanese areas, which is true. But Arab fighter planes have also bombarded civilian areas just because people clamoured for their basic rights.

No difference

The ongoing Arab intifadas have shown that there is no difference whatsoever between the so-called Israeli enemy and the allegedly nationalist Arab regimes. The situation has become so bad that many Arab people feel very frustrated to the extent that they can no longer differentiate between the local enemy and the external one, as both have become similar in their savagery. Some Arab regimes even outdo Israel in brutality.

There is no doubt now that Israel feels very happy, as many Arabs no longer regard it as worse than their so-called nationalist tyrants. In other words, the term Arab nationalism itself has become a dirty word for millions of Arabs. It is now sort of another synonym for barbarism, oppression, authoritarianism, and corruption.

Thousands of crimes have been committed against Arab citizens in the name of pan-Arabism and nationalism during the past six decades. But that does, in no way, mean that the Arab people are not patriotic or nationalistic any more. They toil now to build a new and fresh kind of nationalism based mainly on democracy, human rights and real citizenship, not on deception and hollow slogans.

-This commentary was published in The Gulf News on 05/10/2011       
-Dr Faisal Al Qasim is a Syrian journalist based in Doha

New Syrian Order Cannot Be Ignored By Assad Regime

The Syrian opposition has been badly divided, but that is now changing; new forces represent a political reality the Al Assad regime will ignore at its peril.

By Muhammad Ali

                                 Syrian President Bashar al-Assad

Until very recently, the opposition to Syria's ruling regime seemed to be hopelessly divided.

Since the eruption of protests more than six months ago, the expatriate opposition has been fissured, and inside the country those who organise protests are divided among disparate groups.

The divisions seemed to be deepening further after a day of protest last month under the profoundly contentious slogan "international protection".

But then Sunday brought the news that the opposition has been waiting for: the formation of a unified Syrian National Council in Istanbul. It is too early to gauge how much influence this new council will have, but the early signs indicate the majority inside Syria are happy to lend support to it. The council is still a work in progress.

Still, the reasons for the earlier disconnect among protesters should not be ignored: that is, the emergence of powerful opposition forces inside Syria that control the events on the ground and are ideologically different to the traditional forces.

When protesters took to the streets in Deraa in mid-March, they had no leadership. They were not sponsored or led by the opposition. The protests were spontaneous and were driven by anger at the torture and humiliation of 15 school boys in early March.

Slowly, protesters began to organise themselves and formed small organisational committees - initially consisting of as few as two members - to draft slogans and mobilise other Syrians to join the demonstrations. Those small committees are credited for expanding protests town by town and city by city. The committees have performed wide-ranging roles, from intercommunication and logistic support to passing on news materials to Syrian activists outside the country, who turned their rented rooms in Beirut and Istanbul to studios, to send the videos and news on to the international media. They helped keep Syria in the spotlight despite the absence of professional news reports from inside the country.

As the protests grew, the mission of the committees became more complex and required more coordination to provide activists with necessary equipments to cover the events and pass donations to victims and affected areas.

So, more coordination committees were established and as days went by they came under one bloc: the largely secular Local Coordination Committees in Syria (LCCS). Another bloc, the predominantly religious Syrian Revolution Coordinators Union (SRCU) was created later. The establishment of the union was clearly a result of disagreement in viewpoints among the protesters themselves, especially as they both performed similar roles. The union members might have been unhappy with the committees' rejection of any foreign help. Many protests had no qualms in asking for foreign help, although they both reject military intervention.

The two blocs agreed on sensitive matters such as peaceful uprising, civil state, unity of Syrian people and rejection of dialogue with the regime. One could sense, however, an elitist attitude on the part of the local committees - judging by the statements they have issued in relation to political positions and statements. The union's statements lately echoed the protesters' demands to form a national council which the local committees were until recently reluctant about. To make the council a reality, the union formed the Syrian Revolution General Commission which has included activists from inside and outside the country, tasked to set up a national council for the opposition.

Early last month, another bloc was formed: Syrian Revolutionary Council of Coordinating Committees. It is a dubious council that has no apparent new significance, headed by Muhammad Rahhal, who claimed to be the only member who lives outside Syria. Mr Rahhal openly called for arming the protesters.

Another issue worth highlighting is the source of funding. The regime often argued that because protesters would need funding for such facilities, that indicates they receive funds from foreign hands. I have learnt through contacts in Syria that a large number of businessmen have secretly joined the anti-regime protests. Their support has direct effect on the ground, as protests become more organised. Many businesses in the affected areas are closed but the owners are still paying their staff as well as donating to victims and the unemployed.

Protesters also do not need a lot of money to operate, relying on basic communication equipments despite their security risks and the firm restrictions on the internet.

Still, the regime accused them of receiving foreign funds and refused to recognise them as legitimate partners in dialogue. In the "national dialogue conference", held on July 10 and headed by Vice President Farouk Al-Shara, the regime selected opposition figures - some respectable figures - who have no direct contact with the protest movement. The regime realised that recognition of the new blocs would legitimise them For that reason, the security forces chose to hunt them down and arrest them. Now the Assad regime might have no choice but negotiate with the newly-formed Syrian National Council.

The formation of the council was delayed for six weeks largely due to differences over the scale of representation for activists on the ground. Eventually, it was agreed to give them the majority of seats. These emerging forces are the new political reality in Syria and can no longer be ignored. It is they who will eventually help end the rule of the Baath party.

-This commentary was published in The National on 05/10/2011
-Muhammad Ali is a Syrian political analyst and activist based in Istanbul

U.S. 'Paid A Price' On Egypt

The United States’ Gulf Arab allies no longer trust Washington since the White House yanked its support for Hosni Mubarak in February, former Obama adviser James Jones told a private meeting.

By  Eli Lake

                                       
 Anti goverment protest in Cairo

In a blunt assessment, President Obama’s first national security adviser told a private audience this week that there is a “chasm” between the United States and its Gulf Arab allies that has yet to heal since the White House very publicly ushered Egypt’s president out of power in February.

Retired Marine Gen. James Jones, who served as national security adviser in 2009-10, told a private meeting at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce that the United States’ Persian Gulf allies interpret the president’s handling of the Egyptian revolution as a sign that Washington will dump their monarchies or governments if enough demonstrators take to their streets, according to a recording of the speech reviewed by The Daily Beast.

“We have paid a price,” Jones said of the decision to call for Hosni Mubarak’s ouster. “Our policy with regard to Mubarak as interpreted by some of our closest Arab allies in the Gulf has not gone over well.”

“In their interpretation of our dumping President Mubarak very hastily, [it] answered the question of what we would be likely to do if that happened in their countries. So there is a chasm there that somehow has to be bridged,” he added.

Jones did not immediately return a call to his office seeking comment Tuesday.

The remarks from the former national security adviser, who left the White House last year, comprise one of the frankest assessments of the U.S. relationship with its oldest and most important Arab ally, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have been aligned with the United States since the last Roosevelt administration, providing oil to the West in exchange for security guarantees from the U.S. military.

Over the years, the intelligence and security relationship in particular between the United States and Saudi Arabia has grown increasingly interconnected. At the same time, since the 1960s the Saudis also have supported a foreign policy to spread political Islam throughout the Muslim world, exacerbating tensions with Washington since the 9/11 attacks. Many of the al Qaeda attackers were of Saudi descent. Still, the Saudis remain a significant ally in the war on terror.

“In general, yes, there is that concern, certainly among the Gulf countries, that the United States does not stand by its friends in the region,” said Marwan Muasher, a former foreign minister and deputy prime minister of Jordan. “In the case of the Saudis there is an additional point, which is a concern that the United States is not serious about the peace process.”

Since the fall of Mubarak, the Saudis have begun to bolster Arab governments that have not fallen to the Arab spring. In July, Saudi Arabia announced a $1 billion grant for Jordan. Meanwhile, the Saudis have provided logistical and military support to the government of Bahrain, which has sought to suppress popular unrest. The Saudi kingdom, however, has not supported the regimes in Libya or Syria during the Arab Spring.

According to some Egyptian observers, the Saudis also have sought to bolster political parties in Cairo ahead of the upcoming elections in Egypt.

Shadi Taha, deputy to the liberal Egyptian political leader Ayman Nour, said in an interview that since March he has been urging U.S. diplomats in the region to use American influence with Gulf countries to curb unaccountable funding for political groups that are sympathetic to the return of Mubarak.

“The funding is coming from charities,” Taha said. “It’s not the government, it’s from families. But the Saudi government can stop this easily.”

The Saudi ambassador in Cairo has publicly denied any role in funding political parties in Egypt. Along with other Gulf countries, the Saudis have made grants to Egypt for development in the country after the fall of Mubarak.

Taha said he was frustrated that the U.S. has not responded to him about funding from Gulf Arab countries to Egyptian political groups. “I have heard nothing back from the State Department, from the U.S. Embassy, or from the organizations that work closely with Egyptian parties,” he said. “This leads me to think that there is probably a greater power than me on this. I think there is a strong network of lobbying in Washington from Gulf countries that are frankly more important to this administration than Egyptian democrats.”

A senior administration official who spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing diplomatic sensitivities, said, “We share the concern expressed by some Egyptians that not all countries are as transparent and nonpartisan as the U.S. in their support for the election process.”

The official added, “Senior U.S. government officials have raised our concerns with senior Egyptian officials and Egypt’s neighbors, and urged that appropriate measures be taken to ensure the Egyptian election process is protected from outside influence.”

A major concern for the United States has been the influence of Iranian money, according to three U.S. officials.

Taha also said he is urging the U.S. government to publish a list of political organizations that have received support from the U.S. government for democracy assistance in order to prove to the public that his party, al-Ghad, does not receive U.S. funding. For years al-Ghad has been accused in Egypt of being a pawn of the United States.

“We have repeatedly asked to clear our name because we haven’t received foreign funding,” he said. “We are hoping we hear from a U.S. official that the United States did not fund political parties, among them al-Ghad party.”

The United States has provided $60 million for democratic transition in Egypt since Mubarak’s fall from power in February. Some of that money goes toward technical election training like platform writing, election law, and other programs aimed at building a democratic civil society.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has said the United States will be prepared to meet with a number of political parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood. A U.S. official told The Daily Beast on Tuesday that a “handful” of members of the Muslim Brotherhood have “availed themselves of programs” funded by the United States for election training.

Jon Alterman, the director of the Middle East program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the funding for election training executed by groups like the International Republican Institute and the National Democratic Institute are not ways to influence the outcome of foreign elections.

“If the United States were trying to shift the outcome of the Egyptian elections, it would not do it through the democracy assistance money,” Alterman said. “If you want to influence elections, you do it covertly. There is too much transparency in how [the democracy assistance funding] would be used.”

-This commentary was published in The Daily Beast on 04/10/2011- Eli Lake is the senior national security correspondent for Newsweek and the Daily Beast. He previously covered national security and intelligence for the Washington Times

Baghdad Film Fest Aims To Break Cultural Isolation

The Baghdad International Film Festival, which runs all this week, is the latest effort by Iraqis to use an improving but precarious security situation to break their decades-long cultural isolation. The opening ceremony on Monday had all the glitz of a major film premiere. A huge crowd, mostly young, massed along a red carpet as ushers handed out glossy programs at the entrance to the national theatre in the city centre. Inside, television news crews raced between interviews, jostling particularly fiercely to interview Abdelaziz Belrhali, a Moroccan who heads a festival of short films from across the Arab world in his home country and who is the only international member of the film festival's jury.

Culture, in Iraq or elsewhere, is like the sea without a shore-it has no end, no barriers, it cannot be stopped," he said. More than 150 films from 32 countries will be aired at venues across the capital over the course of the eight days of the festival, the third of its kind since the US-led invasion of 2003. The previous edition lasted four days in December 2007, screening 63 films at the Palestine Hotel in central Baghdad. The first film festival was held in September 2005, screening 58 locally-made short films over six days at the Mansour Melia hotel, also in the city centre.

Films this year will be judged for awards in three categories-best drama, best short film and best documentary, with two other prizes reserved for the best young Iraqi director, and the best female Arab filmmaker. Despite Belrhali's optimism, however, the film festival faced difficulties it was hampered by a shortfall in funds and a lack of interest from the authorities, obstacles that go some way towards explaining why the last film festival was held four years ago. Taher Alwan, one of the festival's directors, said that he had worked for months to put the week-long program together.

We contacted all the senior officials in the government and told them about the festival, but the response was very weak because no one believed we would actually organize the festival," he said. Alwan also suggested he had been made to pay to obtain authorization documents to hold the festival at all, a sign of Iraq's pervasive graft.

Transparency International ranks it among the four most corrupt countries in the world. Alwan said that funding problems and question marks over Iraq's security were why no festival had been held since 2007 but voiced hope that it would soon become an annual fixture. Despite a sharp reduction in the number of attacks since unrest peaked in 2006 and 2007, Iraq remains one of the world's most violent countries.

I believe this festival will stimulate cultural life in Iraq, and we will try to restore the culture of cinema in Iraq," Alwan said. "As you know, after 2003, everything was closed-the cinemas were closed, there was no cinema activity, so Iraqis felt isolated from the world." Film-going, like most other leisure pursuits, came to a virtual standstill in Baghdad in the years following the invasion, as families chose to stay at home and many cinemas were burned down during a brutal sectarian war. The Iraqi film industry dates back to the 1940s and was at its most popular in the 1970s and 1980s, when going to the cinema became a weekly family outing.

However the 1991 Gulf war and the economic sanctions that followed saw cinemas go into decline. The turmoil that followed the 2003 invasion saw many cinemas burned down. Alwan added that by showing their work and meeting fellow filmmakers from other countries, the festival would build confidence among young Iraqi professionals and aspiring moviemakers.

Athraa, a film student attending the first day of the festival and a member of the generation Alwan is hoping to inspire, said she had come to "watch and learn, especially regarding their use of sound and special effects.""It is a great help for us," the 20-year-old said. Alwan, who described himself as a screenwriter, documentary filmmaker and movie critic, said he hoped the festival would mark a "turning point" for Iraq's film industry."We have thousands and thousands of stories that are very suitable for cinema, but where is the system of production?" he asked.-AFP

This article was published in The Kuwait Times on 05/10/2011

Yemen’s Problems: The President And Al Qaeda

By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed

                                     Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh

For the Americans, Yemen has become an extremely significant country, not out of love for its people or resources, but rather out of fear of Al Qaeda. Indeed, an Al Qaeda offshoot opted to hide out in Yemen’s mountainside over the past 3 years, fleeing Afghanistan’s mountains and Pakistan’s valleys, feeling the net closing in around them. The group believed that Yemen, thanks to its geographical features, would be a safe haven for them.

Yemen found itself in the international spotlight following two terrifying incidents, which potentially represented the most dangerous terrorist operations since the 9/11 attacks. The first incident was a number of parcels containing explosives being sent from Yemen by plane to Chicago. The second incident is that of a Nigerian youth – trained in Al Qaeda’s camps in Yemen – attempting to blow up a US commercial plane bound for Detroit. Luckily, both terror plots were foiled. Since that time, Yemen has become like Afghanistan; a battlefront in a global war. Earlier this year, US troops trained in counter-terrorism, along with US drones, have hunted down Al Qaeda members and bombed their positions in Yemen. Official reports have claimed that these attacks and operations are being carried out by Yemeni forces, however it has been widely reported that Washington has lost confidence in the Yemeni regime to the extent that they no longer inform the Yemeni authorities of their operations, after a number of such operations failed due to leaks from within the regime.

The reality is that within the past two years, many people have become increasingly concerned about the way that Al Qaeda has been operating in Yemen. As a result of this, a number of stories have been put forward, from Al Qaeda being in possession of secret weaponry, to Yemen secretly collaborating with the terrorist organization, as well as Iranian forces and Somali armed groups being present on and utilizing Yemen’s coasts. Many people believe that one of two things is happening; either the Yemeni government is purposely turning a blind eye to Al Qaeda activities, whilst also supporting the US counter-terrorism efforts, or the Yemeni regime today is too weak, and cannot effectively control the actions of its apparatus and officials.

The regime has found itself in an extremely weak position after the Yemeni people took the street earlier this year, protesting against Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, joining the wave of Arab protests and revolutions. Much of Saleh’s military and tribal support defected from his regime, and the capital Sana’a has been a battlefield between protesters and the government for the past 7 months. We all now know which direction things in Yemen are moving towards.

There can be no doubt that the Yemeni government has not been serious in confronting Al Qaeda over the past few years. However is this out of fear of Al Qaeda, or rather because Sana’a has been using Al Qaeda to serve its own political interests? This is an extremely worrying question that remains without an answer. During the current crisis faced by Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Al Qaeda managed to seize the city of Zinjibar and thus gave rise to fears that Al Qaeda in Yemen could seek to do what Al Qaeda in Iraq had been doing, namely forcibly taking control of cities. It took the Yemeni forces 90 days to expel Al Qaeda from Zinjibar. With the help of the Americans, the Yemenis were able to reinforce two besieged Yemeni military battalions. Two weeks later, one of the most important Al Qaeda leaders in Yemen – US born cleric of Yemeni descent Anwar al-Awlaki – was killed.

Both sides, the government and the opposition, exchange accusations of supporting terrorism. The opposition accuses Saleh of such, and claims that he masterminded the fall of the city of Zinjibar. In the meantime, some government figures claim that Al Qaeda is being sheltered by the opposition. For the Yemeni citizens, the problem lies in President Saleh’s refusal to step down, and his intent to transfer power to his sons and relatives. As for the world powers however, the problem is Al Qaeda.

In my personal opinion both are right; Al Qaeda is a problem and so is Saleh. Saleh has been walking a tight rope and accordingly Yemen remained undeveloped for more than 30 years. He only cared about remaining in power by achieving tribal and regional balances, once with Saddam Hussein, another time with Gaddafi, and now probably with Al Qaeda, when it is time for him to leave. The world will not tolerate a regime that has been rejected both domestically and internationally.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 05/10/2011
-Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed is the general manager of Al -Arabiya television. Mr. Al Rashed is also the former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al- Awsat, and the Pan- Arabic weekly magazine, Al Majalla

Syria: The Opposition Position

The Syrian revolutionary movement now has officially formed a national council. And it's not as fragmented or weak as you think.

By Ausama Monajed

There's no use denying it: From the outside looking in, Syria's revolution sometimes appears to be little more than an unending cycle of violence, with no end in sight. Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad has exploited this perception to apply all possible means to crush the revolt.

The conventional wisdom, however, is wrong. While the world has been preoccupied with crises such as the European financial collapse and the fall of Muammar al-Qaddafi's regime, the Syrian protest movement has grown by leaps and bounds, expanding its base of support and uniting its disparate groups. Much to Assad's chagrin, the more his security forces take action to suppress the opposition, the more the people's resolve to topple the regime increases. Far from the gloomy reports of impending civil war, Syria is heading toward a more peaceful and democratic future.

The evolution of this revolution from its early days has been dramatic. It began last March, with a few young boys scribbling anti-regime graffiti. During its early days, demonstrations were small, spontaneous, short-lived events that occurred in disconnected and confined areas of the country, like the towns and cities of Daraa, Jisr al-Shughour, and Hama. They were limited to Fridays, after prayers. Today, demonstrations are occurring daily and have swelled to include hundreds of communities throughout the country. Last week, for example, hundreds of demonstrations were reported in all regions, including Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Latakia, Banias, Tartus, Sweida, and Hasakah.

Thanks to the young and technologically savvy grassroots movements that have sprouted all across Syria since March, demonstrations have become well-planned, coordinated, and carefully executed events -- including in Damascus and Aleppo, whose residents were first viewed as silent bystanders. While demonstrations were usually confined mostly to young men, today they include Syrians from all walks of life, with women and schoolchildren on the front line.

Demonstrations are lasting longer, and the youth movements have set up protocols to ensure that the injured are treated safely and those wanted by Assad's security services are protected and well hidden. And popular resistance is adopting new, innovative, cross-sectarian tactics to express dissent. On Sept. 24, for example, children in Idlib made a human formation of a cross and a crescent to show a united opposition.

While nobody a few months ago would have expected defections from the Syria army, the number of defected soldiers was recently estimated at 10,000 by a U.S. official, and the Free Syrian Army is swelling to include officers from all ranks. The Free Syrian Army has been providing an alternative to peaceful demonstrations for those living in areas under severe and brutal military campaigns, such as Homs, which has been subjected to horrendous crimes including rape, organ theft, skinning, and kidnapping of children.

Similarly, hundreds of members of the Baath Party, the government, and the unions have resigned in protest throughout Syria. The country has been hard hit by the economic losses caused by the demonstrations and the ensuing crackdown. Inflation has made everyday items some 30 percent more expensive, according to the latest increase in the consumer price index. The regime has reacted by suspending all new car imports to the country and is considering bartering its oil products in a desperate effort to cut costs and preserve Syria's foreign exchange reserves.

 Six months ago, skeptics did not think that the opposition would be able to achieve the organization or common vision necessary to create a united opposition front. Today, the opposition is represented by the Syrian National Council (SNC), which has gained recognition from the demonstrators on the streets, Syrians abroad, and the international community. The formal establishment on Sunday, Oct. 2 of the council -- which seeks to topple the Assad regime and provide a credible, legitimate basis for a post-Assad transitional government that could peacefully usher in democratic change and build a modern civil state -- is a key milestone for the revolution.

We are well aware that a difficult road lies ahead. As the revolution matures, so have the tactics the regime is using to counter it. Security forces are resorting to tanks, bombs, and rockets to quell the demonstrations. They are destroying homes, businesses, livestock, and places of worship in the process. Entire communities are besieged, with cutoffs of their water, electricity, and phone lines. Rape and torture are routine, and there is evidence from credible sources that interrogators are exhausted from the sheer number of detainees.

Security forces are dressing up as civilians to confuse people and are using shrewd tactics to infiltrate the opposition. This month, the Syrian government set up an armed youth intelligence unit in which pro-regime youth volunteers receive training in special-forces camps before being dispatched to infiltrate the opposition and assassinate their leaders. According to U.N. sources, 3,545 people have so far been killed in this crackdown, including 217 children. And at least 20,000 have been detained, including intellectuals, writers, lawyers, and activists, some from Assad's own Alawite community, which is seen as the most supportive of his regime.

There is no doubt that the revolution is making progress toward toppling the regime. One only needs to dig a bit to see how the revolution's social base has widened, how the opposition has grown, and how the country has changed. Today, Syria is not on a road to nowhere. It is moving in the only direction it can go: onward and forward. There is no turning back.

-This commentary was published in The Foreign Policy on 03/2011
- Ausama Monajed is a member of the Syrian National Council and executive director of the London-based Strategic Research and Communication Centre