Palestinians Still In Limbo

By Musa Keilani

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas said in UN that he will reject a peace blueprint if it doesn't demand that Israel stop building settlments.

The Palestinian leadership under President Mahmoud Abbas took a historic step by formally requestingthe UN to recognise Palestinian statehood.

The Palestinians should have done that much earlier since it was clear that Israel had no intention to negotiate a fair and just peace agreement with them based on their legitimate rights upheld by UN resolutions, starting with Resolution 181 of 1947.

The Palestinians were encouraged to start the Oslo process, as political thinker and analyst Adnan Abu Odeh says, by Sadat who regained the occupied Sinai through American sponsorship of direct negotiations with Israel. Certainly one important factor was the fall of the Soviet Union, the real patron, political supporter and military provider of the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

The Palestinians assumed they could follow Egypt’s example and win back their territories without realising the dramatic changes in the power politicsfollowing the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. They should have made Arafat realise that the desert terrain of Sinai is not geopolitically or religiously sacrosanct to the Jews as Jerusalem.

The Palestinian move now, and after 20 years of direct talks, has been prompted by despair and frustration over Israel’s stonewalling and adamant stand that any peace accord should be based on its terms and conditions. Furthermore, the world political powers seemed to go along with the Israeli position.

The Palestinian decision to demand that the UN reaffirm its own decision, taken in 1947, is mainly aimed at breaking the status quo.

According to US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice, the UN Security Council is likely to start debating the Palestinian bid for membership this week. US President Barack Obama already told Abbas that if he insisted on submitting this bid to the UN Security Council, the US would use its veto power to kill it.

The Palestinian problem will continue to remain on the front burner of international conflict demanding a solution as the situation in the occupied territories deteriorates and might presage a third Intifada, which will add more fire and bloodshed to what is witnessed in Damascus, Yemen, Libya and Iraq.

Under a previous proposal, the Palestinians were supposed to simply submit their request to the UN and do nothing towards seeking a vote for one year, during which they would resume negotiations with Israel. Then, French President Nicolas Sarkozy came up with another proposal for the UN to give the Palestinians an observer status position, similar to the Vatican’s.

The French proposal stipulated one condition: that the internationally backed roadmap for peace be implemented within one year. Israel turned down the French proposal, saying it was not viable and not coordinated with the US or the European Union.

The Israeli rejection of the proposal is a reaffirmation of the reality that Israel does not want peace and does not expect any agreement to be reached with the Palestinians in one year, or many years beyond that, during which the demography and geography of the occupied territories will have been transformed so much that there will be little left to negotiate.

Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Jerusalem total now more than the Jewish population in Palestine in 1947, when Israel was founded.

An Israeli offer to resume direct negotiations was yet another ploy to stall the Palestinian move at the UN. Abbas said on Thursday that he had no knowledge of the Israeli proposal.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has accused the Palestinians of“defiant and obstinate behaviour”, whereas he, himself, imposed conditions on the outcome of negotiations: no return of Arab East Jerusalem, no to the rights of the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war to return and no to giving up any Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Furthermore, he wants to impose Israel’s own security arrangements with the Palestinians, including control of the Jordan Valley and of all access to the Palestinian territories. These positions and demands are the main reasons for the deadlock in peace negotiations.

The Palestinians went ahead with their move at the UN in order to force the international community to recognise that they can no longer take the Palestinians for granted and let Israel continue to behave as if they were following a different set of rules.

The expected US veto of the Palestinian bid at the UN will embarrass the United States in front of an overwhelming majority in the international community. Not that Washington would mind it much, but Israel will face further isolation and that is not acceptable to the US.

It is difficult to see how things will get ahead from here, but the Palestinian leadership has added a dramatically new element to the equation.

Israel can be expected to come up with more ideas and proposals, but the Palestinians should not allow themselves to be lured into any of them without ironclad guarantees that fairness and justice will be at the basis of any peace agreement and that they will enjoy their legitimate rights, including the right to set up an independent state with Arab East Jerusalem as its capital.

-This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 25/09/2011

BETWEEN PIRACY AND PERSIA: Mounting Threats To Maritime Chokepoints In The Middle East

By Yoel Guzansky, Jonathan Schachter and Gallia Lindenstrauss

Maritime chokepoints are among the most sensitive locations where geography, trade, and politics meet. The challenges posed by Middle Eastern chokepoints, in particular, were evident even before the massive dependence on oil of the twentieth century. These points have become increasingly volatile in recent years, and especially since the Arab uprisings began. Complications include increased regional instability and aggravation of existing threats, pre-eminently piracy, terrorism, and the challenges posed by Iran.

PIRACY AND TERRORISM AS GROWING CONCERNS

Though states’ interests vary and are sometimes in conflict with one another, all value unfettered shipping. In recent years, the greatest regional threat to this common interest in the Red Sea, has been Somali piracy (although not exclusively). Much has been undertaken to address this ongoing problem. International efforts and resources, including the deployment of European, American, NATO, Chinese, Indian, Iranian, and other naval forces, coordinated commercial shipping movements, dedicated tracking and communications resources, and widespread adoption of anti-piracy practices have driven the attacks away from the Bab el-Mandab Strait further east along the Yemeni coast of the Indian Ocean (towards the Straits of Hormuz) and to the south of the Horn of Africa. [1]

Tactical measures have reduced (that is, displaced) the number of pirate attacks in the Red Sea in recent years. However, the strategic problem of failing states—of which piracy is only a symptom—may be getting worse at the sea’s two ends and in the middle. Somalia’s ongoing problems could prove to be just the tip of the iceberg. Current international anti-piracy efforts mainly target the symptom (i.e. attacks on the seas) and not the fundamental causes of the phenomenon.

Yemen has been racked by sectarian and tribal violence. In the last two years, it has become the adopted home of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). This is similar to how the political and economic conditions in Somalia proved to be a breeding ground for both piracy, and the Islamist terrorist group, al-Shabaab. Recent reports suggest that AQAP has seized control of areas along the Yemeni coast. While Yemen’s instability predates the large-scale demonstrations that swept across the Arab world in early 2011, an increasingly chaotic Yemen could make the country ever more attractive as a base for Somali pirates, expanding their already thriving black market for weapons.

While instability in Yemen, or even its collapse, would not lead inevitably to increased piracy on the Red Sea, it is a distinct possibility. This potential, combined with the global importance of undisturbed shipping through the area, suggest that the stability, security, and prosperity of these states provide a distinct shared interest.

Egypt is also a concern when it comes to maritime chokepoints. While the effective management and smooth operation of the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) pipeline remain a clear Egyptian interest, the country at present is experiencing its greatest political challenge in over half a century. Egypt’s poverty and governance problems pale in comparison to those in Yemen and Somalia, and the country appears an unlikely source of Red Sea piracy. Yet, Egypt is struggling with a restive Bedouin population in the Sinai Peninsula. In May 2011, an Egyptian security official claimed that over 400 Bedouin, Palestinian, and foreign Arab members of al Qaeda were in the peninsula. While Egypt dedicates significant resources to securing the Suez Canal, it is possible that the canal or the SUMED pipeline could become targets for future attacks. An attack on either site could hinder global transportation. This is not just a theoretical concern. In 2009, Egyptian authorities arrested 26 people for planning to attack ships in the Suez Canal and oil pipelines. [2] The Sinai pipeline, which carries natural gas from Egypt to Israel and Jordan, and provides Israel with more than 40 percent of its natural gas supply primarily for electricity generation, has been sabotaged repeatedly in recent months. [3]

THE IRANIAN THREAT

Iran’s threats to close the Straits of Hormuz to international shipping and, thereby, stop the flow of Gulf oil have increased in frequency and intensity recently. Senior Iranian officials have warned explicitly that Iran can—and will—block the Straits in response to any act of aggression. In general, these pronouncements are intended to deter the international community from increasing pressure on Iran and to raise the perceived cost of any military confrontation with it, particularly against its nuclear facilities. Former commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s naval force, Rear Admiral Morteza Saffari, warned in 2010 that U.S. warships are easy prey for the Iranian navy. Iran also threatened to respond if its ships’ cargoes are subjected to inspections (a step included in a 2010 Security Council resolution on Iran). Iran ended the “Great Prophet 6” maneuvers in July 2011 by firing several supersonic coast-to-sea missiles against moving targets near the Hormuz Straits to demonstrate that the country is capable of disrupting, if not blocking, the Straits and will not hesitate to do so. [4]

Because of America’s military superiority in the Gulf, Iran has placed a priority on acquiring and building a large number of small, fast-moving vessels (some of which are for unmanned use). It also has re-outfitted civilian vessels for military missions. As a result, in recent years there have been reports of Revolutionary Guard naval vessels skirmishing with U.S. ships. These incidents were demonstrative, rather than destructive (the U.S. ships were not actually attacked). They were intended to send a message (“naval diplomacy”) to the United States—namely that Iran sees the Straits as its strategic backyard. In recent months, there have been several near misses between Iranian and American ships because of Iran's increased military activity. Both sides appear uncomfortable with the rising tensions in the Straits, as evidenced by occasional talk that a “hot line” should be established between the two rivals.

Recent assessments suggest that the American Fifth Fleet is capable of opening the Straits to naval traffic within a few weeks, even if Iran were willing to sacrifice all of its assets, suffer massive retaliation, and potentially lose many of its own oil facilities and export revenues. [5] Such assessments may be based on the fundamental weakness of the Iranian air force, a belief in the American ability to paralyze Iranian positions near the Straits (where Iran stations its coastal defense cruise missiles), and America’s improved ability to remove naval mines. In addition, unlike other vessels such as cargo ships, tankers are hard to sink due to their size, structure, and the fact that crude oil doesn't burn easily.

Even in the unlikely possibility that Iran could effectively close the Straits for a long period of time, such a move would not be in Iran’s best interests. It would interfere with the import of refined oil to Iran and its export of crude oil (which accounts for some 80 percent of its income). Also, it would undoubtedly lead to a confrontation with the U.S. Navy, which has a clear operational advantage. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the United Arab Emirates, the majority of Iran's oil exports pass though the waterway. [6]

Yet, even a partial blockade of the Straits with rapid, effective international action to open them, would affect the already volatile global energy market. The impact of even a limited campaign on the market would likely last a long time, beyond the event itself, because of the residual concern about supply disruptions. In order to mitigate these negative effects, three options are available:

Tapping into strategic petroleum reserves, half of which are in the United States. In July 2011, because of the impact of the “Arab Spring” on oil prices, there was an international decision to release a limited quantity of oil from American, as well as other reserves. [7]

Taking advantage of excess global oil production capacity, which is primarily concentrated in Saudi Arabia. Saudi senior officials have claimed that the Kingdom can produce an additional four million barrels of oil per day, which approximately equals Iranian production capability.

Using alternate shipping routes, such as the Saudi East-West and the Habshan-Fujairah pipelines, which can carry up to five million and 1.5 million barrels, respectively, per day.

As discussed above, because of its fundamental military weakness, Iran is incapable of blocking the Straits completely for long. Therefore any conflict would focus on disrupting freedom of movement in the Gulf in general, while attempting to avoid a comprehensive campaign that might cost it dearly—militarily, politically, and economically. [8] Within these limits, Iran will continue to take advantage of the Straits’ unique geographical conditions and global sensitivity to tremors in the world’s energy market by threatening to close the Straits. This blustery threat continues to serve the regime well even if it appears contrary to its own basic interests.

That said, any confrontation might develop into a more widespread campaign, where both sides lose the ability to limit its scope in time and space. For example, Iranian harassment actions and U.S.-led counter-actions could precede an attack on the western shore of the Gulf, where there is strategic infrastructure, including ports, refineries, and desalination plants. This possibility undoubtedly would give pause to anyone considering a muscular response to Iran's threats.

The Hormuz Straits are not the only point of maritime friction with Iran. The Red Sea is becoming an increasingly important Iranian-Israeli arena. Iran reportedly transports and even manufactures weapons in the Sudan to supply terrorist groups in Africa and the Middle East. According to U.S. sources, Israel, in turn, has dispatched its air force to attack Iranian weapons convoys headed for Hamas-controlled Gaza. [9] Israel is increasingly concerned that Iran has invested significant efforts in developing its relationships with several East African countries, including Kenya, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti, Tanzania, and the Comoro Islands. For Israel, this is reminiscent of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s initiatives in the 1960s that were intended to provide Egypt with greater ability to block Israeli shipping along the length of the Red Sea. In addition, as part of Iran’s high profile, regional muscle flexing, in 2011, it dispatched ships to the Mediterranean Sea through the Suez Canal, and reportedly for the first time, sent submarines to the Red Sea.

The Iranian threat also has implications for the Black Sea region and the Turkish Straits. Already in 2007, there were reports that the United States might use air force bases in Bulgaria and on Romania's Black Sea coast to launch an attack on Iran. [10] Recently, Russia complained about the presence of a U.S. Aegis cruiser with antimissile technology in the Black Sea as part of a joint U.S.-Ukrainian naval exercise. [11] The perceived need for deploying such technology on the European continent is an indication, in part, of the growing fear in the West of Iranian intentions because of the increased range of Iranian missiles.

CONCLUSION

Piracy, terrorism, and the growing threat from Iran are problems that the international community is trying to tackle collectively. These problems are not necessarily distinct, as Iran is trying to increase its influence in states with weakening governmental control such as Yemen, partly as result of the “Arab Spring.” Iran is also taking advantage of growing piracy to justify its increasing naval presence in the Red Sea vicinity. These Iranian efforts to project power have turned the waters around the Horn of Africa into another area of maritime friction. The result is that other navies operating in the area are now combating both piracy and Iranian weapon smuggling and muscle flexing.

Notes & References

-This essay was published by The Foreign Policy Institute in September 2011
-Yoel Guzansky, Dr. Jonathan Schachter and Dr. Gallia Lindenstrauss are research associates at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tel Aviv University. For a more detailed version of this issue, see “Power, Pirates, and Petroleum: Maritime Choke Points in the Middle East,” published in the July 2011 issue of the INSS Strategic Assessment.

1-[Text] The move eastward also reflects pirates’ ability to adapt and extend the distances at which they can operate. See Lauren Ploch et al, Piracy off the Horn of Africa (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011), p. 1.
2-[Text] Alaa Shahine and Alaric Nightingale, “Suez Canal Ships, Pipelines Were Plotters’ Targets,” Bloomberg, July 9, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aPJCNKXydyAc
3-[Text] Karl Vick, “The Sinai Gas Blast: Another Reason for Israeli Anxiety over Egypt,” Time, February 7, 2011, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2046573,00.html
4-[Text] "Iran to test-fire new Supersonic Missiles," PressTV July 4, 2011, http://www.presstv.ir/detail/187450.html; See also "Iran Tests Hitting Mobile Naval Targets with Hi-Tech Missile," Fars News, July 6, 2011. http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9004151166
5-[Text] Anthony Cordesman, Iran, Oil and the Strait of Hormuz (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., March 2007), p. 6, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/070326_iranoil_hormuz.pdf.
6-[Text] Gawdat Bahgat, "Persian Gulf Security at the Turn of the Century: Opportunities and Challenges," Defense Analysis 15, no. 1 (1999), p. 82.
7-[Text] Dan Strumpf, “Oil Futures: Oil Plunges as IEA Plans to Tap Strategic Reserves,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110623-710876.html.
8-[Text] Yoel Guzansky, "The Straits of Hormuz: Strategic Importance in Volatile Times," INSS Insight No. 204, September 3, 2010, http://www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=4387
9-[Text] Luis Martinez, “Exclusive: Three Israeli Airstrikes against Sudan,” ABC News, March 27, 2009, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2009/03/exclusive-three.html
10-[Text] Rick Rozoff, "Black Sea Crisis Deepens as US-NATO Threat to Iran Grows," Global Research, September 16, 2009, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=15239
11-[Text] "Russia Decries U.S. Antimissile Ship's Presence," Global Security Network, June 13, 2011, http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110613_3406.php

Dynamics Of Arab Spring

A viable Israeli answer to the dramatic changes in the region must take the form of a serious offer of talks with the Palestinian government, with the objective of signing a comprehensive peace treaty

By Joschka Fischer

Regardless of whether democratisation in the ‘new Middle East' succeeds or authoritarian forms of government prevail once again, one fundamental change has already become clear: no one will be able to govern without taking into account domestic public opinion.

This change will shift the foreign policy parameters of the Middle East conflict (understood as both an Israeli-Palestinian conflict and as a conflict between Israelis and Arabs more generally). Despite wars in Lebanon and Gaza, and the intifadas in the West Bank, these parameters have proven surprisingly stable for decades, anchored by the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan and the Oslo accords with the Palestinians.

All this is about to change. And, while the tectonic shift in the region was triggered by the ‘Arab Spring,' its players are not limited to the Arab world or to the confines of the Middle East conflict. The United States, Europe, Turkey, and, in a certain sense, Iran all play a role — some more directly than others.

Let's begin with the US. President Barack Obama's speech in Cairo two years ago created great expectations, but few or none have been fulfilled. Instead, the US allowed a political vacuum to form in the absence of any movement on the part of Israel's government. This vacuum has now been filled by the Arab Spring.

Europe, meanwhile, is preoccupied with its own crisis. But, in the last few years, the Europeans, led by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, have de facto slammed the door to European Union accession in Turkey's face. As a result, Turkey has embraced a ‘neo-Ottoman' foreign policy, in which the Arab world — even more than the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans — plays the central role.

Of course, Turkey, in accordance with its political, security, and economic interests, has no choice but to pay close attention to its southern neighbourhood, and must try to prevent chaotic developments there. Turkey would be facing the same risks even if it were integrated into a European context, but its priorities would then be completely different.

Because of Europe's short-sightedness, Turkey has in effect abandoned its ambitions for EU membership and opted for the neo-Ottoman project of becoming a Middle Eastern power — a policy shift that reflects both interests and ideology. On the one hand, Turkey views regional dominance as a stepping-stone to a greater global role; on the other hand, it views itself as a role model for successful modernisation of the Middle East on an Islamic-democratic basis.

This bid for regional pre-eminence will sooner or later bring Turkey into serious conflict with neighbouring Iran. If Turkey prevails, Iran and the radicals in the region will be caught on the losing side of history — and they know it.

While Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's government is trying to maintain good relations with Iran, its ambition to become the leading Sunni power means that Turkey must sooner or later contest Iran's influence in Iraq, as well as in Syria and Palestine. And that means conflict.

Turkish course

The drastic deterioration in Turkey's relations with Israel is related to this emerging Iranian-Turkish rivalry. To be sure, this rivalry also has a positive side from the Israeli point of view — the weakening of Iran and other regional radicals. But, for Turkey as an aspiring regional leader, the interests of the Palestinians are naturally more important than its relations with Israel. This has become all the more true in light of the revolutionary changes in the Arab world, and is at the root of Erdogan's foreign-policy reorientation.

As a result, Israel is in an increasingly difficult situation. Without a strategic re-orientation of its own — to remain passive is a risky endeavour in a rapidly changing world order — Israel would further delegitimise and isolate itself internationally. A viable Israeli answer to the dramatic changes in the region — and to their already foreseeable consequences — can only take the form of a serious offer of negotiations to Mahmoud Abbas' Palestinian government, with the objective of signing a comprehensive peace treaty.

Security questions must be taken seriously, but they carry less and less weight, because a sufficiently long period can be left between the treaty's conclusion and its full implementation to resolve them by mutual agreement. But Israel's current passivity — with all of its negative long-term consequences for the country — is likely to continue as long as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considers his coalition's survival more important than a decisive peace initiative.

At the same time, the pressure of the Arab revolutions is transforming the Palestinians into a dynamic political factor. For example, in view of the looming fall of Syria's President Bashar Al Assad, the pressure of the Egyptian revolution, and the new role of Islamism in the region, Hamas' alliance with Iran is becoming increasingly problematic. It remains to be seen whether, in the end, the ‘Turkish course' will prevail against the radicals in Gaza or not. In any case, Hamas faces some risky and consequential decisions of its own — all the more so should its main rival, Abbas's Palestinian National Authority, succeed in its current diplomatic campaign at the United Nations. Obama had promised a Palestinian state within one year, and Abbas is now building upon that promise.

But what happens next is crucial. Will Abbas be able to keep the Palestinians on a diplomatic path, or will the situation degenerate again into violence and another disaster? And what will the Palestinian road towards peace look like after the UN decision to recognise some form of statehood for Palestine? Given the current pace of change in the Middle East, we might not have to wait long for answers — or for more questions.

-This commentary was published in The GULF NEWS on 25/09/2011
-Joschka Fischer is former German vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister

GCC Investment Can Lead Post-Revolution States To Stability

One cannot separate political rights from economic rights; there is an urgent need to take real steps to address chronic job shortages and lack of short-term liquidity in post-revolution economies.

By Majid Jafar

                Leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries

As revolutions and unrest sweep the Arab world, commentary centres on a struggle for freedom and political change. These elements do come into play, but what lies at the core of these revolutions is a chronic and widening deficit of economic opportunity, combined with the demographic time-bomb of an exploding youth population. The stark statistic is that 100 million jobs need to be created in the Arab world in the next two decades alone - more than was created in the whole of the last century.

Past attempts at economic reform in many of these countries achieved certain success in terms of headline economic growth, but incomplete reforms and corruption led to only a small minority feeling the benefits. This combined with persistent inflation, especially with food prices rising 30 per cent last year, to create worsening inequality. In addition, education systems have failed to provide the skills needed by the evolving job market. Reform in all these areas is still needed.

The sad reality is that the basic causes that drove the revolutionaries in all these countries - corruption, economic stagnation and lack of job opportunities - are likely to get much worse in the short term. Investment has frozen, economic growth is slowing and unemployment will see a sharp rise.

And people's level of expectation is high, with many hoping that because a regime has toppled, jobs and housing will become available immediately. This was seen in Cairo when the public housing directorate was mobbed by hopeful applicants the day after Hosni Mubarak's fall.

Egypt in particular is an important case as the most Arab populous country. Now that the euphoria of Cairo's Tahrir Square has died down, we face an urgent reality: the critical tourism and construction sectors have ground to a halt causing a liquidity crisis. And 700,000 jobs per year must be created in Egypt, just to keep unemployment from rising. That pace of growth is just unrealistic. If a solution is not found soon, the whole region risks instability or even secondary revolutions.

To take a historical perspective, after the Second World War in Europe, the United States established the European Recovery Plan, known as the Marshall Plan, to rebuild western Europe's battered economies and prevent them falling to communism. The plan was in effect for just four years from the end of 1948, but saved Western Europe with the US investing $13 billion, a full 5 per cent of annual US GDP at the time, equivalent to over $700 billion (Dh2.6 trillion) today. The economies of the Arab world are not as destroyed as Europe's were, but the situation and needs are similar.

Immediate "make work" infrastructure projects are desperately needed to employ large numbers of workers, such as construction of highways and bridges, and large rural or agricultural projects. The private sector could implement them, but the funding needs to be provided.

Yet western governments today are all struggling with their own domestic economic crises, and are unable or unwilling. Instead, the GCC states can act during this time of crisis and unrest. This is not charity, but very much within the GCC's economic and political interests.

The leadership of the Arab world in the 21st century is already shifting from Egypt and Syria towards the GCC. It is Saudi Arabia that represents Arab countries at the G20, and the cities of the GCC are already the most advanced in the Arab world.

The Arab Spring has already resulted in a sustained increase in oil prices of at least $30 per barrel. Over a period of just one year, this will result in an additional income of over $250 billion per year to the GCC states above what had been budgeted. A portion could be set aside in an infrastructure fund designed to inject liquidity into Arab economies that have suffered unrest. International institutions such as the World Bank and IMF could assist in designing the governance and mechanism of the fund, but the leadership and decisions should be kept within the GCC.

The demonstrations and civil conflict attract the attention today, but we must not forget that the chants in Tahrir Square for "bread and dignity". One cannot separate political rights from economic rights; there is an urgent need to take real steps to address chronic job shortages and lack of short-term liquidity in post-revolution economies.

-This commentary was published in The National on 25/09/2011
-Majid Jafar is the chief executive of Crescent Petroleum and a board member of the Sharjah Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Is Netanyahu The New Caligula?

Like his address to Congress in May, Netanyahu gave a bravado speech that was both delusional and detrimental to the wider cause of Israel.    

By Ilana Bet-El

                                          Benjamin Netanyahu

The Roman emperor Caligula was reputed to have waged war on Poseidon, God of the Sea, displaying chests of seashells as “treasure” in a victory march; he was also reputed to have been mad. Benjamin Netanyahu is not mad, but his campaigns definitely bring this anecdote to mind: deploying hundreds of policeman in Ben Gurion Airport to stop “left wing activists” from entering Israel; lecturing the U.S. president on camera on his right to state U.S. policy; and now, fighting the Palestinian attempt to attain U.N. recognition.

All three events carry an identical imprimatur of deploying disproportionate means against much weaker or constrained opponents, then claiming an immense victory– which to many around the world, including much of Israel, appears to be delusional, at best, or downright detrimental, at worst. And there can be no doubt the official Israeli position on the U.N. vote on Palestine belongs firmly in the latter – but not in the Netanyahu bubble, which functions on its own three distinct lines of logic.

First, Netanyahu has no interest in the Palestinian issue in itself: it is a side show to his true ideological bent – which is to prove that Ben Gurion and the left-leaning establishment of the time made a historic mistake in agreeing to the division of Palestine in order to establish a Jewish state in 1948. His fight is to change history: to show the right was right, the Holy Land could be kept whole as the home of the Jewish people, and that to this end all means, including violence in every form, were and remain justified. U.N. recognition of a Palestinian state would void that aim. Worse still, by seeking the vote, the Abbas-led Palestinians are effectively burying their own historic stance, and officially accepting the division of the land into two states. This is a rerun of 1948, but not as Netanyahu envisions.

Second, Netanyahu is a connoisseur of weakness: his true and possibly sole political talent lies in finding the weakness of his opponent and hammering it mercilessly. Faced with strength, he crumbles – especially when dealing with his coalition partners. Indeed, his biggest partner, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, is his biggest problem since he is his diametric opposite: a bruiser and a bully who despises weakness. He is well known to despise Netanyahu, and glories in taking on much bigger opponents such as Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan. In his ex-Soviet fashion, he believes in strength for the sake of strength, no matter the cost – which to Israel, is often great.

Netanyahu occasionally allows his office to brief off-the-record against Lieberman, but on the whole he appears helpless when dealing with him. So he escapes abroad, preferably into the arms of the U.S. neo-cons, to whom he sold his soul many years ago – which is the third point. Netanyahu may be the prime minister of Israel, but his political masters sit in Washington D.C., utilizing him in their own battles with Obama and the Democrats. Whether inviting him to address Congress while Obama was out of the U.S., or driving a U.S. veto on the Palestinian vote, Republicans are happy to use Netanyahu in order to shame the current administration. The immense strategic cost this incurs to the U.S. does not seem to interest them in the least.

Taken together, these points may be bleak, but they also may explain why Netanyahu is willing to drive a position in the U.N. that isolates Israel and weakens the U.S.: he has no choice. He is too weak a politician to do otherwise, and too bound with the historical narrative of the right-wing founding fathers of Israel (including his own father, who is now 101 years old). He is but a vessel of others – who can talk the talk, and leaves others to walk the walk.

So far Netanyahu has gotten away with this, because the Israeli political system is even more broken than that of the U.S., allowing him to use his talent for weakness to the best effect. But things changed this summer, with two months of mass protests focused on social issues. Even now, with the U.N. vote being promoted by the government as an existential threat, the social movement is ploughing ahead, refusing to be budged by the usual scare tactics of “security threats.” Netanyahu does not really understand this shift. He lives in his bubble of advisors, oligarchs and right-wing U.S. backers, Jewish and gentile.

Since he has cynically used the Israeli electoral system to twice get elected, then ride roughshod over the greater national interests in order to service his narrow array of constituencies, he cannot understand that another Israel is out there, not so much disagreeing with him as thoroughly fed up with him, his government and everything he represents. This is not, as Benny Morris suggested, the end of Israel – this is Israel at a turning point.

Rather than pander to Netanyahu, President Obama would do well to appeal to this constituency. So far, the only people he has never directly addressed are the Israelis. Netanyahu went over Obama’s head to address the U.S. Congress; the president should do the same and address the Israeli public. Assured of his friendship and U.S.-backing in the rocky road ahead, the protesting Israelis would have the courage to force Netanyahu to take the necessary steps to secure their future in the region – or else get rid of him. After all, one of the few facts known of Caligula was that despite his early popularity, it was his own guard that ended his reign.

-This commentary was published in The Daily Best on 24/09/2011
-Ilana Bet-El is a Brussels based political analyst and historian, and co-author of The Age of Insecurity (forthcoming)

Yemen At Crossroads With Saleh's Return

By Erika Solomon

                                                    Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh

President Ali Abdullah Saleh returned to Yemen as abruptly as he left, and whether he plans to effect a transfer of power or stamp out protests, his country is a tinderbox edging towards civil war. Protests have simmered for three months as Yemen was mired in political limbo while Saleh recovered in Saudi Arabia from an assassination attempt in June, which burned his hands and arms and drove wooden shards into his torso. But the protesters' attempts to escalate protests last week set off fierce fighting between loyalist troops and former Saleh forces that claim to support the opposition.

The clashes left some 100 protesters dead, and Saleh - sensing an opportunity - slipped back in the middle of the night, unbeknownst to all but a few security guards. "This is an ominous sign, returning at a time like this probably signals he intends to use violence to resolve this. This is dangerous," said Abdulghani Al-Iryani, a political analyst and co-founder of the Democratic Awakening Movement. For five days, bursts of explosions have echoed wildly through this crumbling capital nestled among craggy mountains.

The fear of snipers lurking on rooftops has left protesters, camped out for months on a 4-km stretch they have renamed "Change Square", and terrified residents feeling trapped. The worst-case scenario is that hardliners in Saleh's ruling party, emboldened by his return, will refuse to go back to the negotiating table, allowing the prospect of civil war to remain. "His people will feel that they are in a stronger position and they will refuse to compromise. Basically this means the political process is dead in the water," Iryani said.

A political survivor who has ruled the chaotic Arabian Peninsula country for 33 years, Saleh called for a ceasefire upon his return so that talks can be held, even though he has backed out three times from a power transfer agreement. "It is not a new tactic", said Yemen scholar Gregory Johnsen of Princeton University, who sees Saleh's move as a chance to act as a solidarity figure with the goal of regaining a grip on power. "He saw a deteriorating, bloody situation and saw opportunity to swoop in as a national figure that brings the country together, he did this in 1990s and in 2006 and I think he's trying to do it again.

But with conditions so tense in Sanaa, the technique could backfire: "He comes back at the exact worst moment, this is likely to exacerbate the situation." His unannounced return prompted even his formerly close ally, the United States, to urge him to step down, arrange a full transfer of power and allow Yemen to "move on". "The Yemeni people have suffered enough and deserve a path towards a better future," White House spokesman Jay Carney said in New York.

Another scenario is that Saleh was allowed to return by Saudi leaders, who have long bankrolled Saleh to help stamp out an active wing of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, so that he could eventually transfer power to those who would continue to cooperate with Saudi Arabia. "If there wasn't anything for them (the Saudis) they wouldn't have let him go," said Ghanem Nuseibeh, an analyst and partner at Cornerstone Global consultants in London. Oil giant Saudi Arabia, which shares a porous, 1,460-km border with Yemen, has been a key player in its neighbour's affairs for decades and is keen to ensure stability to keep al Qaeda at bay.

Riyadh spearheaded a regional Gulf initiative for a power transfer in Yemen. Diplomats who have been in Sanaa trying to hammer out a political resolution to stem bloodshed were shocked by Saleh's return but said there could be a silver lining. "If he means to negotiate, the hope is that direct talks allow for less confusion and less gatekeepers getting in the way who block the chance of political progress," one negotiator said. "There could be good news in this." Opposition leader Mohammed Al-Mutawakil seconded that view, saying: "I am optimistic about his return, maybe it will be to bring the situation into check and sign the Gulf initiative. ...I do not think this is an escalation.

What most agree on is that the eight-month long revolt in Yemen has reached a critical juncture. Asked what Saleh's return meant, one Riyadh-based diplomat said simply: "It's really bad." If Saleh clings to power, all-out war could follow and plunge the country into a chaotic battle between tribal factions of rebels in the north, separatists in the south and Al-Qaeda militants moving in to exploit mayhem. In Sanaa alone, a three-way standoff must be resolved. Saleh's son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, who controls the

Revolutionary Guard, is seen as reluctant to allow his family to relinquish power. Sadeq Al-Ahmar, the powerful chief of the Hashed tribal federation, has sided with protesters and his heavily armed tribesmen are clashing with security forces so fiercely that their shelling has sent residents in his neighbourhood underground. Diplomats believe he and his brother, business tycoon Hamid Al-Ahmar, feel sidelined by the political talks and fear losing their share of Yemen's wealth.

Meanwhile, defected general Ali Mohsen, whose swing to the protesters was seen as a heavy blow to Saleh, is suspected of engaging in clashes with state troops last week, perhaps out of frustration that political talks diminished his role as Yemen's kingmaker. Whoever prevails will have to satisfy the demands of tens of thousands of protesters, who have paralysed a central part of Sanaa and vow to remain camped out in Change Square despite the bloodshed until they believe all signs of the regime are gone.

Many are fed up with grinding poverty, where two out of every three live on less than $2 per day and half the population owns guns. Oil wealth is dwindling and water is diminishing so quickly many expect Sanaa to be the world's first dry capital. On Friday, as thousands of pro-government Yemenis set off fireworks and played songs in the streets, the thousands of protesters camped in Change Square expressed a sense of bewilderment at what was to come, and about Saleh's return. "I'm just so surprised," said one of Mohsen's troops, sitting among the protesters, a rifle slung over his shoulder. "But I guess if he fires, we'll have to respond." – Reuters

This commentary was published in The Kuwait Times on 25/09/2011

Will Turkey Succeed Where Iran Failed?

By Huda al Husseini

                          
 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Non-Arab regional leaders are seeking to win over the Arab street, for they can clearly see that Arab public opinion is taken by their stances, and they are therefore playing on their sentiments and frustrations. The Arab street is burnishing the image of these non-Arab regional leaders abroad, and helping them to extend their influence.

Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is following in the footsteps of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The latter attempted to "hijack" the Arab street prior to the "Arab revolutions", and when these revolutions broke out he claimed that they were inspired by the Islamic Revolution in Iran. As for Erdogan, he is trying to seize the opportunity and "harvest" the enthusiasm of the Arab street at the height of the Arab Spring, before the onset of the revolutions’ winter, particularly as nobody knows how long the Arab Spring will bloom.

The Arab street is bestowing power upon these leaders, who are playing on their dreams and speaking about the region’s prosperous future. However the Arab street is like mercury; it is impossible for any leader to grasp it firmly. The Arab street is fickle, and so it turns its back on leaders as quickly as it [previously] rushed to adore them. What happened to the power or influence that Ahmadinejad believed the Arab street had granted him? He used this to quell the demonstrations staged to protest the allegedly rigged presidential elections that brought about his re-election. As a result of this, he lost the Iranian street, whilst the Arab street turned its back on him.

The power that Erdogan obtained from his recent tour [of the Middle East] prompted him to threaten Greek Cyprus, and begin to proceed with exploring oil and natural gas surveys in the waters off northern Cyprus. Erdogan continued issuing threats, but at the same time he told the United Nations [UN] and the [Greek] Cypriot leadership that his country is no longer prepared to accept the concessions previously accepted by Ankara with regards to the reunification of Cyprus, in accordance with the UN’s 2004 plan. Turkey has said that it will not accept anything less than the recognition of two states in Cyprus. Turkey has also warned the European Union that it will not accept any solutions after [Greek] Cyprus takes over the EU presidency early next year.

In mid-March last year, during the Al-Jazeera Forum, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu stressed that we must protect “the territorial integrity” of our countries and region, however he did not once mention Cyprus or the Kurds.

Erdogan is now seeking to place Turkey as a leading supporter of the Palestinian cause, and he wants the “Arab Spring” to view Ankara as a supporter and role model, stressing the need for firm Turkish – Arab unity. He is also planning to establish strategic cooperation between Turkey and Egypt.

The preparation for such cooperation was clear in the size of the delegation that accompanied Erdogan during his tour of the Middle East. The Turkish delegation was made up of 6 ministers, and around 200 Turkish businessmen, which represents a clear signal that Turkey is determined to investing heavily in the region. In 2010, the Turkish trade with the Middle East and North Africa [MENA] amounted to 30 billion dollars, and constituted 27 percent of Turkish exports, whilst more than 250 Turkish companies have invested a figure totalling 1.5 billion dollars in Egypt.

We must acknowledge that despite Ahmadinejad's attempts to win over the Egyptian street by waging a war of words with Mubarak’s regime; he failed to tempt Egyptian public opinion to support Iran. Despite this, Tehran did establish strong relations with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamists, and there is an Iranian street named after Khaled Islambouli [the Islamist Egyptian army officer who assassinated President Anwar Sadat in 1981]. As for Erdogan, the Turkish state model has been extremely popular in Egypt, namely an Islamist party in power (Erdogan’s Justice and Development party), under a secular constitution. Although the army does enjoy a strong presence in Turkey, it has returned to its barracks, and this is not to mention the economic boom being witnessed by the country.

Yet the problem with Erdogan is that he is not pursuing fixed foreign policies, and a quick review of his recent policies casts doubts on his commitment to these.

Erdogan warned of the consequences of invading Libya, insisting that if there was going to be regime change; this must happen from within, not through foreign intervention. Turkey had billions of dollars invested in Libya, whilst more than 20,000 Turkish labourers were evacuated within days [following the outbreak of protests]. Although Turkey is a member of NATO, it strongly condemned UN resolution 1973 [which formed the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan civil war]. However after all of this, when the Gaddafi regime was overthrown, Erdogan welcomed the rebels with open arms.

Turkey, according to the Davutoglu policy, can say that it has "zero problems", because economy and trade take priority. However, this policy collapsed and led to conflict with Israel, whilst the Arab revolutions have caused Ankara to amend this policy. This method (of amending the “zero problems” foreign policy) may be repeated with regards to Turkey’s new “open” policy.

Yet, this amended policy did not succeed with Syria, as relations between the two countries were undermined after Syria neglected Turkey's call for it to cease the military campaign against civil demonstrators, something that stripped Ankara of its position as a “mediator”. Syria is the second country, after Israel, which has stripped Turkey of its mediation position.

In the framework of the "zero problems" policy with its neighbouring countries, Ankara acted to consolidate its political and trade ties with Syria. Erdogan developed friendship with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, and established political and economic ties with once hostile neighbouring states, however these neighbouring countries have returned to a state of hostility with Ankara after Erdogan ran out of patience and despaired of al-Assad taking his advice, ending the brutal campaign against unarmed Syrian protesters, and implementing the required reform. However it may not be Erdogan's fault that Turkey’s "zero problems" policy towards Syria has failed, particularly as keeping promises has never been the Syrian president’s strong-suit. Indeed when Bashar al-Assad approved the political pluralism law requested by the Syrian opposition, he declined to sign this into law until the term “participation in rule and government” was removed.

Last Sunday, in an interview with CNN, Davutoglu stressed that Turkey’s "zero problems" foreign policy had only failed in Syria, meaning that relations with Iran are good.

In his book "Strategic Depth” Davutoglu stressed that Turkey is now a key player in the Middle East, saying that “this is our homeland.” To put this into context, Davutoglu drew up a new equation, namely that neo-Ottomanism plus Turkish nationalism plus Islam equals the New Turkey.

This neo-Ottomanism has brought Turkish influence into the Arab world and the Balkans, whilst Turkish nationalist ties extend to Central Asia. As for Turkey’s Islamic links, this extends from Morocco to Indonesia. Therefore, and this is more significant for Davutoglu, he sees the partnership between Turkey and Iran as something equal to that between France and Germany [in Europe]. In light of Davutoglu's conception of this alliance [with Iran], we can understand the relationship between Turkey and Brazil, and the position that Brazil adopted in the UN Security Council last year against Washington, London and Paris with regards to the Iranian nuclear program.

Syria has close relations with Iran, a situation that placed Ankara in an awkward position, and this may explain the reason why Erdogan ran out of patience with al-Assad. Turkey views Iran as the golden gate to Central Asia, and perhaps to the Gulf region as well, not to mention the implementation of Davutoglu’s equation.

Will Turkey’s long-term ambitions end up meeting the same fate of Iran’s long-term ambitions? Turkey is now exploiting the [Arab] feelings of hostility towards Israel with the aim of gaining credibility (Erdogan may have downgraded diplomatic relations with Israel but he did not sever them entirely). Indeed Turkey wants its crisis with Israel to continue in order to reap even greater political capital in the Middle East. Turkey believes that America will require it to play a greater role in the Middle East, particularly with regards to managing conflicts in the region, from Syria to Egypt to Iran. In addition to this, after the weakening of the Syrian regime in the region, Turkey is seeking to play a role in Iraq, and perhaps take up the mediation role between Washington and Tehran. Turkey took the initiative on 4 September when it officially approved the installation of an early-warning radar on its territory as part of a US-led NATO strategic missile defence system. This may complicate Turkish-Russian relations, yet at the same time, it is a Turkish signal to the US that Washington needs Ankara. This also serves as a signal to Tehran that Ankara is ready to play a mediation role between Tehran and Washington. This may also serve as a signal to Israel, particularly as Iran, saw the approval of this early-warning radar system as a defence of Israel.

Does this Turkish measure hit the mark? So far, Erdogan has lost two battles, the first when Syria declined to listen to his advice, and the second when Israel declined to offer Turkey an apology [for the deaths of Turkish citizens killed by Israeli forces on the Freedom Flotilla].

There are those in Turkey who have begun to warn [against Turkey’s new policies], noting that there are more Azerbaijani expatriates in Turkey than there are Azerbaijani’s at home, as is the case with Turkey’s Armenian Albanian, Bosnian, and Kurdish communities. These all represent potential powder-kegs.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 24/09/2011- Huda al Husseini is a Lebanese journalist and commentator