By Andrew McGregor
Tuareg rebel chief Agali Alambo
At
least 1,500 Tuareg fighters joined Muammar Qaddafi’s loyalist forces (though
some sources cite much larger figures) in the failed defense of his Libyan
regime. Many were ex-rebels residing in Libya, while others were recruited from
across the Sahel with promises of large bonuses and even Libyan citizenship.
Many of the Tuareg fighters are now returning to Mali, Niger and elsewhere in
the Sahel, but for some the war may not yet be over; there are reports of up to
500 Tuareg fighters having joined loyalist forces holding the coastal town of
Sirte, Qaddafi’s birthplace and a loyalist stronghold (AFP, September 3;
September 5).
The Regional Dimension of the Libyan Regime’s Collapse
Media
in the Malian capital have warned that the “defeated mercenaries” are back from
Libya with heavy weapons and lots of money to prepare a new Tuareg rebellion,
labeling themselves “combatants for the liberation of Azawad” (Le Pretoire
[Bamako], May 9). Mali has not yet recognized the Transitional National Council
(TNC) as the new Libyan government; Mali’s reticence in recognizing the rebels
as the new government in Libya may have something to do with the large
investments made in Mali by the Qaddafi regime (L’Independant [Bamako],
September 6). The Libyan leader has significant support in Mali and other parts
of West Africa and a number of pro-Qaddafi demonstrations have been witnessed
in Mali since the revolution began in February.
The
new president of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou, has warned of Libya turning into
another Somalia, spreading instability throughout the region:
The
Libyan crisis amplifies the threats confronting countries in the region. We
were already exposed to the fundamentalist threat, to the menace of criminal
organizations, drug traffickers, arms traffickers... Today, all these problems
have increased. All the more so because weapon depots have been looted in Libya
and such weapons have been disseminated throughout the region. Yes, I am very
worried: we fear that there may be a breakdown of the Libyan state, as was the
case in Somalia, eventually bringing to power religious extremists (Jeune
Afrique, July 30).
Algeria
has its own concerns, fearing that instability in the Sahara/Sahel will provoke
further undesirable French military
deployments or interventions in the region.
Convoys Out of Libya
Tuareg
troops escaping from Libya have been observed using 4X4 vehicles to cross into
Niger (El Khabar [Algiers], August 29). On September 5, it was reported that
“an exceptionally large and rare convoy” of over 200 military vehicles
belonging to the southern garrisons of the Libyan Army entered the city of
Agadez, the capital of the old Tuareg-controlled Agadez sultanate that
controlled trade routes in the region for centuries (Le Monde, September 6;
AFP, September 6). A number of people reported seeing Tuareg rebel Rhissa Ag
Boula in the convoy (Le Monde, September 6). Ag Boula was last reported to have
been under arrest in Niamey after re-entering Niger in April 2010 (see
Terrorism Monitor Brief, April 17, 2010). Ag Boula mistakenly believed he was
covered by a government amnesty against a death sentence passed in absentia for
his alleged role in the assassination of a politician.
According
to NATO spokesman Colonel Roland Lavoie, the convoy was not tracked by the concentrated
array of surveillance assets deployed over Libya: "To be clear, our
mission is to protect the civilian population in Libya, not to track and target
thousands of fleeing former regime leaders, mercenaries, military commanders
and internally displaced people" (AFP, September 6). In a campaign that
has seen NATO target civilian television workers as a “threat to civilian
lives,” it is difficult to believe that a heavily-armed convoy of 200 vehicles
containing Qaddafi loyalists was of no interest to NATO’s operational command.
There has been widespread speculation that the convoy contained some part of
Libya’s gold reserves, which were moved to the southern Sabha Oasis when the
fighting began.
Nigerien
foreign minister Mohamed Bazoum initially denied the arrival of a 200 vehicle
convoy in his country, but admitted that Abdullah Mansur Daw, Libya’s
intelligence chief in charge of Tuareg issues, arrived in Niger on September 4
with nine vehicles (Le Monde [Paris], September 8; AFP, September 5). Daw was accompanied by
Agali Alambo, a Tuareg rebel leader who has lived in Libya since 2009 and was
cited as a major recruiter of hundreds of former Tuareg rebels in Niger. Alambo
later described escaping south through the Murzuq triangle “and then straight down
to Agadez” after his party learned the Algerian border was closed and the route
into Chad was blocked by Tubu fighters who had joined the TNC (Reuters,
September 11). Daw and Alambo reached Niamey on September 5 with an escort of
Nigerien military vehicles. Libya’s TNC has promised it will request the
extradition of leading Qaddafi loyalists from Niger (AFP, September 10).
General
Ali Kana, a Tuareg officer commanding government troops in southern Libya, was
reported to have crossed into Niger on September 9 with a force of heavily
armed troops (Tripoli Post, September 9). A former spokesman for the Tuareg
rebel group Mouvement des nigériens pour la justice (MNJ) said that Kana was
considering defecting after having angered Libyan Tuareg by leading an attack
on a Tuareg town in Libya in which several Tuareg were killed, and by
recruiting Tuareg mercenaries from Mali and Niger but failing to pay them the
huge sums of cash he was given by Qaddafi for the purpose (AP, September 9).
Ali Kana was reported to be with Libyan Air Force chief Al-Rifi Ali al-Sharif
and Mahammed Abidalkarem, military commander in the southern garrison of Murzuq
(AFP, September 10).
Some
Tuareg returning from the Libyan battlefields expressed disenchantment with
their time in Libya, complaining they were not allowed to fight in units
composed solely of Tuareg (AFP, April 21). Others have complained they were
never paid; one fighter said he was part of a group of 229 Tuareg recruited by
Agali Alambo with a promise of a 5,000 Euro advance, but had never seen a penny
(AFP, September 3). Others did receive smaller payments and the offer of Libyan
citizenship. One Tuareg fighter described being assigned to a Tuareg brigade
that was later attached to Khamis al-Qaddafi’s 32nd Mechanized Brigade for
battles in Misrata and elsewhere (The Atlantic, August 31).
Some
Tuareg leaders in Niger and Mali are urging Tuareg regulars of the Libyan Army
to rally to the rebel cause and remain in Libya rather than return to Niger and
Mali with their arms but little chance of employment. The tribal leaders have
set up a contact group with the TNC to allow Tuareg regulars to join the rebels
without threat of reprisal in an attempt to ward off a civil war in Libya
(Reuters, September 4, Radio France Internationale, August 23). “Niger and Mali
are very fragile states -- they could not take such an influx...” said Mohamed
Anacko, the head of the Agadez regional council and a contact group member
(Reuters, September 4). At the moment, however, crossing the lines to a
disparate and undisciplined rebel army remains a dangerous proposition for
Tuareg regulars closely identified with the regime.
The
Tuareg may not be the only insurgents forced out of Libya; there are reports
from Chadian officials that over 100 heavily armed vehicles belonging to Dr.
Khalil Ibrahim’s Darfur-based Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) had crossed
the Libyan border. Ibrahim had taken refuge in Libya after losing his bases in
Chad to a Chadian-Sudanese peace agreement. JEM denied knowledge of the
movement and also denied receiving weapons from Libya (AFP, September 9).
The Libyan Tuareg
Besides
the West African Tuareg who rallied to Qaddafi, Libya is home to a Tuareg
community of roughly 100,000 people, though the regime has never recognized
them as such, claiming they are only an isolated branch of the Arab race.
Though some Libyan Tuareg have opposed Qaddafi, many others have found
employment in the Libyan regular army, together with volunteers from Mali and
Niger. As a result, many Libyans tend to identify all Tuareg as regime
supporters. Near the desert town of Ghadames local Tuareg were threatened by
rebels seeking to expel them from the city before Algeria opened a nearby
border post and began allowing the Tuareg to cross into safety on August 30
(Ennahar [Algiers], September 1; El Khabar [Algiers], September 5). Five
hundred Algerian Tuareg were reported to have crossed into Algeria while the
border remained open (Le Monde, September 8). Some of the refugees promised to
settle their families in Algeria before crossing back into Ghadames with arms
to confront the rebels (The Observer, September 2).
The Death of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga
The
most prominent of the Tuareg rebel leaders, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, was reported to
have died in a vehicle accident in Tin-Essalak on August 26 after having spent
most of the last two years as an exile in Libya (Tout sur l’Algérie [Algiers],
August 29). [1] It was widely believed in Mali that Ag Bahanga was preparing a
new rebellion with weapons obtained from Libyan armories (Nouvelle Liberation
[Bamako], August 17; Ennahar [Algiers] August 27).
He
was reportedly buried within hours, preventing any examination of the cause of
death despite some reports his body showed signs of having been shot
repeatedly. Some claim that Ag Bahanga
was actually killed by other Tuareg in a dispute over weapons, though others in
Mali have suggested the Tuareg rebel leader was killed by a landmine or even a
missile after his Thuraya cell phone was detected by French intelligence
services, though it seems unlikely the veteran rebel would make such a mistake
(L’Indépendant [Bamako], August 30; Le Pretoire [Bamako], September 6; Info
Matin [Bamako], August 29). Despite Ag Bahanga’s resolute opposition to the
Malian regime, President Ahmadou Toumani Touré was reported to have sent a
delegation to Kidal province to offer official condolences on the rebel’s death
(Le Republicain [Bamako], August 29). Ag Bahanga was a noted opponent of the
political and military domination of Mali by the Bambara, one of the largest
Mandé ethnic groups in West Africa (Jeune Afrique, September 8).
The
veteran Tuareg rebel had many enemies, including the Algerians, who were
incensed by his refusal to adhere to the 2006 Malian peace agreement mediated
by Algiers. His rebellion only came to an end when former Tuareg rebels and
Bérabiche Arabs joined a Malian government offensive that swept Ag Bahanga and
many of his followers from northern Mali in 2009 (see Terrorism Focus, February
25, 2009).
Ag
Bahanga returned to Libya, where he became an active recruiter of Tuareg
fighters from across the Sahel when the Libyan revolution broke out in February
(L’Essor [Bamako], August 29). One
returning fighter described seeing Ag Bahanga fighting with loyalist forces at
Misrata: “He was with many former rebels from Mali. They were fighting hard for
Qaddafi” (The Atlantic, August 31).
If
the many reports of Ag Bahanga shipping large quantities of heavy and light
weapons and large numbers of 4X4 trucks back to Mali are true, Ag Bahanga was
about to become an extremely powerful man in the Sahel. His death will satisfy
many, but there are still concerns about the dispersal of his arms, which would
certainly be of interest to buyers from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM),
which has developed contacts with some young Tuareg by employing them as
drivers and guides in unfamiliar territory.
In
an interview conducted only days before his death, Ag Bahanga expressed
discontent with his one-time patron, offering what might be a bit of
revisionist history: “The Tuareg have always wanted Qaddafi to leave Libya,
because he always tried to exploit them without any compensation… The
disappearance of al-Qaddafi is good news for all the Tuareg in the region…We
never had the same goals, but rather the opposite. He has always tried to use
the Tuareg for his own ends and to the detriment of the community. His departure
from Libya opens the way for a better future and helps to advance our political
demands… Al-Qaddafi blocked all
solutions to the Tuareg issue… Now he's gone, we can move forward in our
struggle” (El Watan [Algiers], August 29). Ag Bahanga, who at one point had
unsuccessfully offered to turn his rebel movement into a transnational security
force capable of expelling al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) from the
Sahel/Sahara region, also came out against AQIM’s Salafi-Jihadists: “Our imams
advocate and educate our youth and families against the religion of intolerance
preached by the Salafists, which is in total contradiction with our religious
practice. In fact, on an ideological level, the Salafis have no control over
the Tuareg. We defend ourselves with our meager resources, and we envision a
day soon be able to bring Bamako to account” (El Watan, August 29).
Conclusion
Hundreds
of thousands of workers have returned to Niger and Mali, which are unable to
provide employment to the returnees. There are also 74,000 workers returning to
Chad. Moreover, the loss of remittances from their work in Libya will devastate
many already marginal communities reliant on such transfers. Many of the
returnees suffered rough treatment at the hands of rebels who consider all
black Africans and Tuareg to be mourtazak (mercenaries). Motivation, money,
arms and a lack of viable alternatives form a dangerous recipe for years of
instability in the Sahel/Sahara region, particularly if it is fueled by a
political cause such as the restoration of the Qaddafi regime or the
establishment of an independent Tuareg homeland.
Ana
Ag Ateyoub has been mentioned as the most likely rebel leader to succeed Ag
Bahanga. Ag Ateyoub has a reputation for being a great strategist but is
considered more radical than Ag Bahanga (L’Essor [Bamako], August 29; August
30). Ag Bahanga’s group remains a regional security wild card. If their late
leader was actually intending to launch a new rebellion in Mali with
high-powered arms obtained in Libya, will the group follow through with these
plans?
Former
security officials of the Qaddafi regime recently told a pan-Arab daily that
Libyan intelligence has conducted extensive surveys of the more inaccessible
parts of the country and areas of Niger and Chad while building ties to the
local populations in these places (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 8). According
to a TNC report based on a communication from the former Libyan intelligence
director Musa Kusa, Qaddafi is now moving between al-Jufrah district in the center
of the country, home to a strategically located military base and airstrip at
Hun, and the remote Tagharin oasis near the Algerian border, where he is
guarded by Tuareg tribesmen (al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 5).
Much
of southern Libya and its vital oil and water resources remains outside rebel
hands and might remain that way for some time if the Tuareg oppose the new
rebel regime in Tripoli. It is possible that Qaddafi may threaten the new
government from the vast spaces of southern Libya if he can gain the
cooperation of the Tuareg. Despite signs of disenchantment with Qaddafi among
the Tuareg tribesmen, there is still the lure presented by the vast sums of
cash and gold loyalist forces appear to have moved south on behalf of Qaddafi,
who has always understood the need to keep a few billion in cash under the
mattress, just in case.
Tuareg
rebel leader Agali Alambo believes Qaddafi could lead a prolonged
counter-insurgency from the deserts of southern Libya: “I know the Guide well,
and what people don’t realize is that he could last in the desert for years. He
didn’t need to create a hiding place. He likes the simple life, under a tent,
sitting on the sand, drinking camel’s milk. His advantage is that this was
already his preferred lifestyle… He is guarded by a special mobile unit made up
of members of his family. Those are the only people he trusts” (Fox News,
September 13).
Though
small in numbers, Tuareg mastery of the terrain of the Sahara/Sahel region,
ability to survive in forbidding conditions and skills on the battlefield make
them a formidable part of any security equation in the region. Historically,
the Tuareg have been divided into a number of confederations and have rarely
achieved a consensus on anything, including support for the Libyan regime or
the ambitions of those seeking to establish a Tuareg homeland. However, the collapse
of the Saharan tourist industry due to the depredations of AQIM and a worsening
drought in the Sahel that is threatening the pastoral lifestyle of the Tuareg
will only enhance the appeal of a well-rewarded life under arms. The direction
of Tuareg military commanders and their followers, whether in support of the
Qaddafi regime in Libya or in renewed rebellion in Mali and Niger, will play an
essential role in determining the security future of the region, as well as the
ability of foreign commercial interests to extract the region’s lucrative oil
and uranium resources.
Notes & References
-This report was published in the Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 9,
Issue: 3, on 16/09/2011
-Andrew McGregor is Director of Aberfoyle International Security, a
Toronto-based agency specializing in security issues related to the Islamic
world.
1. For a profile of Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, see Andrew McGregor,
“Ibrahim Ag Bahanga: Tuareg Rebel Turns Counterterrorist?” April 2, 2010. See
also Terrorism Monitor Briefs, November 4, 2010
