Al-Qaeda In The Islamic Maghreb’s Operational Revival In Northern Algeria

By Dario Cristiani

           Algerian armed rebels from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

In the past few months, there has been a rather remarkable operational return of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Algeria. On July 16, a double suicide attack rocked a security compound in the small town of Bordj Menail, 60 km east of Algiers, with two people killed and 14 injured (Algérie Plus, Jul 16). A few days later, Algerian security forces in the area of Thénia intercepted an AQIM team alleged to be on its way to carry out an attack in Algiers (Tout Sur l'Algérie, Jul 26).

The most important attack occurred in late August, when another double suicide attack hit the military academy of Cherchell, about 100 km west of Algiers, killing 18 people and injuring another 20 (Algerian Press Service, August 27; El Watan, August 27). AQIM claimed responsibility for both attacks, blaming also the Algerian government for its support of Muammar Qaddafi (Afrik.com, July 20; AFP, August 20). An AQIM statement described the Cherchell attack as “a small gift to the families of the martyrs, the injured and the weak and subdued prisoners of Algeria, who have been suffering the worst of atrocities at the hands of France, making them subject, with metal and fire, to a criminal gang of Algerian army generals, transgressing across the land spreading much corruption. In fact, their corruption and crime even reached across the borders to neighboring countries, conspiring against the revolutions of our brothers in Tunisia and Libya” (al-Andalus Media/al-Fajr Media Center, August 27).

Following an overall decline in operations since 2008, AQIM’s profile remained low in Algeria until April 2011. The causes for this were several:

·         The “Sahelization” of AQIM as the geographical center of its activity shifted from Algeria to the Sahel.

·         The increasing focus on illegal business activities rather than on terrorist actions.

·         The consistent and effective counter-terrorist efforts of Algeria.

·         The waning appeal of violence in a country that is still recovering from the psychological burden of two decades of violence.

 An internally divided and fragmented leadership, in which power is rather diffused, with its Sahelian factions enjoying a strong autonomy and the formal leadership, based in Kabylia, exercising a rather loose control over the various AQIM units.

However, this situation has been changing since April. As well as the major attacks described above, there have also been strikes on individuals of the military, policemen and gendarmes, killing more than 50 people according to official sources  (Jeune Afrique, August 5). What does this recrudescence mean and what are the reasons behind it?

·         Worsening of the Regional Security Picture: The conflict in Libya has had a negative impact on the security of almost all its neighbors, though it was also overestimated to further national security interests and assist the survival of the political elites. Support for Mua’mmar Qaddafi was equated with preserving regional stability, although this policy proved unsustainable in the long term. Though the regime was wary of the fact that the Algerian protests might indicate the beginning of a spillover effect from the Libyan conflict, it is clear that protests, strikes and mass rallies are constant elements of the Algerian political and social landscape. Nevertheless, the fear of a spillover effect has strongly influenced the Algerian regime’s reaction to the Libyan conflict, and regional security has worsened through the spread of weapons from Libyan arsenals and ineffective control of Algeria’s porous borders. The possibility that weapons and explosives have reached the country is high, and a nexus between the rising number of attacks in Algeria and the conflict in Libya can be identified.

·         The National Political Juncture: Although Algeria’s resilience to the Arab Spring has been greater than that of some other Arab countries, the protests in Algeria were still regarded as presenting a menace to the survival of the regime. Moreover, Algeria will likely experience an increase in political tension and divisions over the next few months. The major political personalities are already eyeing the 2014 presidential elections and many of them have begun creating alliances and strategies for this fundamental date (Algérie 360, May 20). The major party, the Front de Libération Nationale (FNL), is facing increasing internal fragmentation. Most notable of the factions to spin off from the FNL is the Mouvement de Redressement et de l’Authenticité, which is harshly critical of FNL secretary general Abdelaziz Belkhadem, one of the closest politicians to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (Le Journal d’Algérie, August 15). In narrow security terms, the protests mean a greater focus by the government on maintaining domestic political stability, hence a devotion of greater quantities of financial resources and security forces to control these protests. Subsequently, AQIM could have an interest in seizing the political momentum by exploiting this shift of focus in security on increasing its operational profile prior to destabilizing the state should the overall socio-political picture enter a precipitate decline.

·         External and Internal Symbolic Meanings: These latest attacks could also have external and internal symbolic meanings. The external meaning encompasses the international dimension as well as a national one. Internationally, the attacks aim at showing that the group is alive even though its leader, Osama Bin Laden, has been killed. In the national dimension, they show that AQIM still has the capability to attack the most visible elements of state control -- the military installations. The internal meaning of the attacks could be a response to allegations of a decline in influence of the Algerian-based leadership over other factions of the group. Carrying out successful attacks against Algerian military installations could represent a means for AQIM Amir Abdelmalek Droukdel to boost his weakened leadership after the “Sahelization” of the movement entailed a shift in the group’s internal balance of power.

Whether this acceleration in AQIM operations in Algeria will be effective in reviving the fortunes of the Algerian militants is unclear. The worsening regional picture and the increasing domestic troubles facing by the Algerian government could represent a major opportunity for AQIM to further increase its operational profile in Algeria. Internal rivalries could also push some factions to act more vigorously to reaffirm their power and influence within the organization. The ability of AQIM to return to its 2007-2008 levels of violence in Algeria remains weak; however, it is undisputable that the strategic context in Algeria has changed slightly in favor of AQIM in the last few months.

This article was published in the Terrorism Monitor, Volume: 9, Issue: 36, on 22/09/2011

Obama’s Weak Mideast-Peace Hand

The president insisted at the U.N. that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be resolved through direct talks, but he has little leverage with Netanyahu and Abbas.

By Philip J. Crowley

President Barack Obama approaches the podium before addressing the 66th session of the United Nations General Assembly at U.N. headquarters Wednesday, Sept. 21, 2011., Jason DeCrow / AP Photo

President Obama reiterated at the United Nations this week that the solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict rests not through a U.N. resolution (which the U.S. will veto) but through direct negotiation. While he’s right, the reality is, you can’t get there from here, at least not any time soon.

There literally is a roadmap to peace, but the parties are not currently prepared to make the trip. They lack the political will, and the President the leverage, to get a serious negotiation started, much less reaching the ultimate destination, an actual agreement.

The United States, for most of this year, has tried to create the right conditions for negotiations to resume. The fact is, they don’t exist. There is no rapport or trust between Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And President Obama does not have a strong enough relationship with either man, particularly Netanyahu, to bridge that gap.

For more than a decade, politics, not substance, has been the primary obstacle to progress. The so-called final status issues—borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem—are complex and emotional, with competing histories and narratives on all sides, but broad parameters of a peace agreement are known.

Two states would be formed based, as Obama outlined in May, on the 1967 borders—with adjustments. The states would share Jerusalem as a capital, under international oversight. The vast majority of Palestinian refugees would “return” to the new Palestinian state, or stay where they are. Since the abilities of Palestinian security forces would be limited, an international force would provide security assurances to both sides.

In an actual negotiation, all sides would get something meaningful, and give up something meaningful. Therein lies the fundamental problem. The current leaders do not have sufficient political capital to achieve the deal outlined above.

Stung by regional politics surrounding the Goldstone Report in 2009 and a false start to negotiations last year, Abbas has made specific demands for a return to direct talks: terms of reference, which the Obama attempted to satisfy with his speech in May, and a settlement freeze in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Netanyahu granted a partial freeze once, but is unlikely to do so again, certainly not for free.

Abbas lost faith in the Obama administration after it failed to persuade Netanyahu to extend the settlement moratorium. He knows his request for statehood and/or elevated observer status at the U.N. is not a substitute for direct negotiations. But he has already gained some additional leverage over the process, particularly as countries such as France and Russia break with the United States.

Given the evaporation of the peace camp on the Israeli left, the only political pressure on Netanyahu comes from within his coalition—from Avigdor Lieberman on his right. Over time, the prime minister has made a convincing argument that further steps outside direct talks, such as another settlement freeze, risk bringing down the government. Its replacement would be even less willing to negotiate. Thus, absent a meaningful “get” such as acknowledgement of Israel as a Jewish state, which the Palestinians will not give in advance of negotiations, Netanyahu will continue to say the right things but stand pat.

There are valid concerns that, should the Palestinians mount an effective nonviolent campaign based on rights rather than resistance, Israel may be further isolated or delegitimized. However, given everything happening in the region, this appears to be a risk Netanyahu is willing to take. For the moment, he already has what he needs, the public assurance of a U.S. veto.

Obama’s U.N. speech was primarily about domestic and international damage control. What started two years ago as smart policy—Middle East peace is what American presidents do—has lately created political risk. Already criticized across the political spectrum for being too hard on Israel, the president was obviously constrained, not wanting to jeopardize a key constituency, or give prospective opponents a valuable wedge issue as the 2012 election approaches.

The U.N. speech shored up his domestic political base, but at a cost. Whatever happens, the credibility of the United States has been damaged. The extent will depend on whether the U.S. is forced to actually exercise its veto of Palestinian statehood.

Regardless, one fact is clear. Wherever the peace process travels from here, the U.S. no longer is its navigator. Right now, no one is.

-This commentary was published in The Daily Beast on 23/09/2011
-Philip J. (P.J.) Crowley is the 2011-2012 Omar Bradley Chair for Strategic Leadership at Dickinson College, Penn State University Dickinson School of Law and School of International Affairs, and the Army War College. He served as the assistant secretary of state for public affairs and spokesman for the United States Department of State from May 2009 until March 2011

The Ba'ath Party's Grip On Syria May Finally Be Weakening

If Bashar al-Assad's regime does cling to power, it may be forced to amend the constitution to allow for greater political pluralism

By Daniel Pye

                          Syria's president, Bashar al-Assad. Photograph: AP

More than six months of protest in Syria have so far failed to topple the Assad regime and there are no signs that either peaceful protest or armed resistance will do so any time soon.

For years, Syrians opposed to President Bashar al-Assad's Alawite-dominated regime have sought alternatives to his rule. As a result of the uprising the regime has been forced (albeit torturously slowly) to implement a series of modest reforms first pledged when Assad came to power in 2000. It has approved a series of laws on demonstrations, the media, political parties and elections – the latter scheduled to be held in February next year.

Most Syrians taking part in demonstrations that I have spoken to reject all the regime's attempts at reform, seeing them as a disingenuous last-ditch attempt to cling on to power.

There are others, however, who think the regime may have dug in enough to prevent its overthrow. Such people may use whatever means are available to open up society as a result of these reforms, while continuing their activism.

Ask Syrians what needs to change before concrete reforms can be taken seriously and they will say that article 8 of the constitution, guaranteeing Ba'ath party rule, needs to be scrapped.

For the first time since 1973 this may be an option, as pressure from the street has forced the regime to convene a constitutional assembly to draft a new document. The new constitution would end presidential appointment of the prime minister and, in combination with the new political parties law, could pave the way for greater pluralism.

Although the parties law restricts the formation of new parties in a number of ways – they cannot be based on religion, tribe, ethnicity, gender or race – it allows, at least in principle, political parties to organise openly against the Ba'ath for the first time in generations. Kurdish and Islamist parties, however, will not be tolerated.

There could be the beginnings of a freer press as more publications are allowed, though it is not clear whether the suffocating state censorship of the media will be toned down or abolished altogether. Private media opening under the new law will probably be the preserve of the wealthy oligarchy that grew up under Assad's tenure, at least to begin with.

Journalists in Syria are frustrated and angry. In July I had a long conversation about the Syrian media with two editors, one from the 24-hour state news agency, Sana, and another from a prominent daily newspaper.

"I just got back from Daraa, it was horrible. The soldiers are occupying the mosques and writing sectarian slogans on the walls and I can't report it," the Sana editor said. "I lie every day."

"That's not true," the newspaper editor replied. "You lie every minute, I lie every day."

If elections are held in February as planned it seems likely they will enshrine the current ruling powers. The new elections law is based on an archaic law in Egypt. Half of the 250 seats in parliament would be allocated to workers' and peasants' representatives. It is revealing that Syria's richest man, billionaire businessman Mohammed Hamsho (he is Maher al-Assad's brother-in-law), has run for a workers' seat in the past.

But even members of Syria's street opposition are willing to entertain the idea that the regime's "reforms" might be the first sign of rain that heralds an end to the drought of political freedom and social justice. It is unlikely that many of the so-called reforms – introduced years ago in neighbouring countries – will be implemented unless the horrific violence stops. But some Syrians are willing to use whatever peaceful means are at their disposal to effect social change.

A previously heretical reality is beginning to be recognised by the rulers of Damascus: that the Ba'ath party cannot survive with the same methods of control it that got it into this mess. Its antiquated propaganda and Siguranta Statului-style shadow government must be dismantled willingly, or be swept away by the anger of the streets.

-This commentary was published in The Guardian on 23/09/2011
- Daniel Pye worked as a correspondent for the Daily Telegraph in Syria since
February 2011 before taking a post in Jakarta, where he works as an editor at the
English-language Jakarta Globe

Arab Spring, Turkish Harvest

By Richard  Javad  Heydarian


Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in 2009

After consolidating its domestic political position with an impressive third straight victory in the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) is poised to cement Turkey’s status as the prime indigenous power in the Middle East. As mass protests rock most of the region, including Israel, Turkey is increasingly holding itself up as an example of economic dynamism and democratic stability.

The Arab Spring’s greatest beneficiary is neither Iran nor the United States nor Israel. Thanks to its creative foreign policy, burnished international image, and assertive political rhetoric, Turkey is arguably the biggest winner coming out of the Arab uprisings.

Turkey is not only a source of ideational inspiration for Arab revolts, but it is also becoming a concrete source of political support and socio-economic assistance. The United States and its European allies should acknowledge this as an encouraging sign of an emerging post-American order in the Middle East. After all, Turkey is proving to be both a responsible and effective status-quo power.

Foreign Policy Genius

The greatest asset of Turkish foreign policy is its flexibility and consistency of message. Beneath this elaborate policy architecture, Ankara benefits from a very deep and incisive understanding of regional politics.

Turkey is known for its quasi-mercantilist foreign economic policy, using its positive political relations as a springboard for expanding its export-and-investment markets in the region. Turkey is also credited for having the region’s best private sector and most diversified economy. No wonder, then, that Turkish companies – with tacit and pro-active state support – have deepened their market penetration across the Middle East.

Yet, despite growing economic relations with Arab autocrats in the region, Ankara judiciously and meticulously re-calibrated its political approach once mass protests electrified the Arab street from Benghazi to Cairo. Among all major powers, regional and international, Turkey stands out for its ability to develop a coherent and nuanced policy approach in light of rapidly changing facts on the ground.

Starting with the Jasmine Revolution, Turkey began to condemn violent crackdowns and encourage leaders to listen to the voice of the people. When Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for Tunisian and Egyptian autocrats to step down and pave the way for democratic politics, he buttressed Turkey’s moral ascendancy and regional popularity. Ankara explicitly welcomed the strongly secular, populist, and even liberal character of the popular uprisings, setting itself apart from other regional powers. This coupled with favorable domestic conditions, boosted Turkey’s position in the Arab world.

The Crucial Decisions

The true test of Ankara’s resolve came with Libyan and Syrian uprisings. Given Turkey’s significant economic stakes and deep political engagement with those countries, the Arab street carefully watched Ankara’s moves. In Libya, despite huge investments of around $17 billion, mainly in the construction sector, Turkey gradually tilted in the direction of opposition forces. Despite its initial reluctance, Turkey eventually supported NATO-backed intervention in Libya, which sought to uphold the principles of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and Protection of Civilians (PoC) by imposing a no-fly zone as Ghadhafi forces approached the doors of Benghazi. Over succeeding months, Turkey laid the foundation for the recognition of the Transitional National Council (TNC), while providing crucial humanitarian assistance to rebel forces.

When protests hit Syria, Turkey played a crucial role on two levels. It provided much-needed humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees, who flocked to southern Turkish towns. And it vigorously employed all diplomatic channels and political means to encourage a peaceful settlement to the on-going Syrian political crisis. Turkey was arguably the only NATO member with leverage over Syria. Given the intimate and affectionate relationship between Prime Minister Erdogan and President Assad, Ankara sought to utilize its influence to pressure the Syrian regime to move in the direction of genuine reform, reconciliation, and dialogue.

Even while negotiating with the Syrian government, Turkey opened channels of communication with opposition forces,. Turkish cities served as the sites for events that gathered Syrian opposition forces across the ideological spectrum. This two-track approach revealed Turkish attempts to hedge its bets, preparing Ankara for any eventuality.

When Assad refused to de-escalate tensions, institute much-needed reform, and put an end to the crackdown, Turkish leaders began harshly to criticize the Syrian regime and join the international chorus of condemnation. By turning against an erstwhile ally, Turkey was able to project an image that underscored its consistent commitment to political reform in the Arab world. This was in stark contradiction to the inconsistencies that plagued the policy approach of other major powers, both inside and outside the region.

Engaging Regional Powers

Turkey’s momentous resurgence is also a function of how it has managed its relations with other regional powers: Iran, Israel, and the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

With respect to Iran, Turkey has adopted a very sophisticated and multi-layered approach. On the one hand, Ankarahas exponentially increased its commercial and economic interaction with Tehran, serving as a major energy market and source of investments. Turkey has also acted as a mediator in the stand-off with the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. In addition, Ankara has also served as a financial intermediary when sanctions affected Iran’s oil deal with countries such as India. Recently, Turkey and Iran have also coordinated their joint operations against Kurdish separatist groups in Iraq.

On the other hand, Turkey has shown little reticence in pushing its own political agenda, even if it negatively affected bilateral relations with Iran. For instance, Turkey has agreed to the installation of a NATO missile defense shield system on its soil. In response, Tehran has protested this move, arguing that the shield potentially minimizes Iran’s ‘ballistic-missile deterrence capability’ in light of ongoing military threats against the Islamic regime. Moreover, Turkey ‘s much more critical and aggressive stance toward Syria did not sit well with Iranians, who treat the Syrian regime as a vital ally.

Interestingly, Turkey has cautiously approached the on-going popular protests in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. While Tehran further risked its relations with GCC members by its tacit support of democratic protests in Bahrain and Yemen, Ankara has been largely silent on the issue. Given the sensitivity of the situation, for both Saudi Arabia and the United States, Turkey has seemingly accepted the GCC’s jurisdiction and strategic prerogative over protests in the Persian Gulf sub-region. As a result, Turkey has maintained good relations with both the GCC and the United States, avoiding a strategic overstretch that could potentially backfire. This seeming inconsistency has so far escaped the public opinion, given how major media installation – including Al Jazeera – have adopted a very cautious and low-key coverage of protests in countries such as Bahrain.

Turkey’s secular background has also helped it circumvent sectarian issues, which have colored on-going protests.  Since it has strong relations with both Shia and Sunni countries, Turkey can credibly claim that its foreign policy lacks sectarian biases.

Beyond Turkey’s overall political resurgence, what made Erdogan an immensely popular figure in the Arab world is his uncompromising confrontation with Israeli leaders over the Palestinian issue. The murder of nine Turkish citizens during the Mavi Marmara incident set off a chain of reactions that has transformed Turkey into a major critic of Israel. Turkey has not only criticized Israel for its siege of Gaza, but it has also demanded a clear statement of apology for the death of Turkish citizens.

 In response to Israel’s refusal to apologize, Turkey, recently, downgraded its bilateral diplomatic relations and threatened to cancel all military and trade relations. Moreover, Turkey has expressed its support for Palestinian Authority’s bid for statehood at the UN. As a member of the NATO, a candidate for European Union membership, and a long-term strategic partner of Israel, Turkey has executed an about-face that has boosted its reputation in the Arab world.

The Turkish government has instructed its navy to "escort" future humanitarian flotilla to Gaza, setting up the possibility for a small-scale military confrontation with Israel. In an interview with Al Jazeera Television, Prime Minister Erdogan said, “From now on, we will not let these ships be attacked by Israel, as happened with the Freedom Flotilla.” Moreover, Turkey has indicated its plan to take Israel to the International Court of Justice over the Gaza blockade.

All Roads Lead to Ankara

Recent polls conducted among Arab countries have indicated very positive views vis-à-vis Turkey. According to surveys conducted by the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and the Arab American Institute in Washington, Arabs do not only consider Turkey a model nation, both in economic and political terms, but they also see Turkey as a genuine regional power committed to democratic values and political reform across the Arab world. Moreover, Ankara is also deepening its regional influence by establishing strong ties with post-autocratic emergent regimes in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.

Perhaps the greatest indication of Turkey’s rise as the region’s preeminent power is Prime Minister Erdogan’s planned trip to Arab countries, which have experienced democratic upheavals in recent months. The Turkish leader is expected to underscore his country’s support for democratic movements across the Arab world, while encouraging Arab regimes to engage in democratic reform. Accompanied by an army of top businessmen and commercial dealers, Erdogan is also expected to cement Turkey’s economic presence in the post-revolutionary reconstruction and recovery phase. Blessed with ideational charm and a potent commercial muscle, Turkey is in a strong position to carve out a place at the center of Middle Eastern affairs.

Turkey’s renewed resurgence, in light of the Arab spring, should not alarm the United States and other great powers. Although Turkey’s growing independence is beginning to rattle some Western policy-makers, who are critical of AKP’s Islamist credentials and anti-Zionist rhetoric, Washington should recognize that Ankara is indispensable to regional peace and security.

Turkey is already a mediator in the Iran-West nuclear standoff even as it supported the installation of the missile defense shield by its NATO allies. Turkey has played a crucial role in NATO operations in Libya and it provided necessary assistance to the TNC and other post-autocratic regimes. Given Turkey’s growing influence and burgeoning commercial-technological capabilities, the country could play a crucial role in reconstructing post-revolutionary Arab states, while pressuring other Arab countries to institute necessary reforms.

Turkey’s own democratic credentials, despite some serious lingering concerns, makes the country a beacon of inspiration for a more stable and democratic Arab political landscape. The United States has every reason to support Turkey’s rise as the region’s preeminent power. In this way, Washington could inspire other regional powers to follow suit and act responsibly in accordance with international norms and the spirit of the times. 

-This commentary was published in Foreign Policy In Focus on 22/09/2011
- Foreign Policy In Focus contributor Richard Javad Heydarian is a foreign affairs analyst based in Manila

The Ahmadinejad Show

The conspiracy theories and fiery anti-American rhetoric remain, but the the Iranian president is a very diminished figure.

By Barbara Slavin

                        Iranian President Ahmadinejad in the U.N.

Tormenting Western journalists must be among the few pleasures left to Iran's beleaguered president.

On Thursday afternoon in his New York hotel, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad punted questions about human rights, expressed sympathy for the downtrodden masses of Europe and America, and otherwise managed to wear down an august assembly of American media, from New Yorker editor David Remnick to CNN's Wolf Blitzer to your humble correspondent.

Among the platitudes and outright whoppers, a few nuggets stood out:

The political uprisings that have convulsed the Middle East this year "will soon reach Europe and the shores of America." Ahmadinejad cited recent riots in Britain as proof.

There may be homosexuals in Iran -- despite what he said at Columbia University in 2007 about there being none in Iran -- but it would be hard to know. "My position hasn't changed," Ahmadinejad said. "In Iran, homosexuality is looked down upon as an ugly deed... one of the ugliest behaviors in our society that is against the divine teachings of every faith." It is also punishable by death.

Iran would be happy to buy fuel from the United States for a reactor that produces medical isotopes, and in return would stop enriching uranium to 20 percent U-235 -- perilously close to weapons grade. But it will not stop producing low enriched uranium and will not give up its stockpiles, which if further enriched could yield material for several nuclear weapons.

At this session and in earlier interviews this week on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly, Ahmadinejad has said repeatedly that there are no political prisoners in Iran. When I asked him why the two former officials who ran against him in 2009 -- former prime minister Mir Hossein Mousavi and former parliament speaker Mehdi Karroubi -- remain under house arrest after eight months and hundreds of others are in jail for their political activities, Ahmadinejad first said that my information was "incomplete" and then put the blame on Iran's judiciary branch, which is controlled by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

"I cannot move judges, I cannot appoint judges," he said. "I am not in a position to be the spokesman for the judiciary."

The Iranian leader also insisted that the Iranian economy was thriving despite high inflation and unemployment. Although Ahmadinejad was initially applauded earlier this year for phasing out subsidies on gasoline and other staples, Iran's chief auditor charged earlier this month that the reforms -- which involve paying Iranians cash subsidies -- were actually costing Iran more.

Kevan Harris, a sociologist at Johns Hopkins who studies the Iranian economy, quoted the auditor as saying that more than 50 percent of the funds used to pay Iranians $42 a month came from the Central Bank and other "illegal" sources, not from higher state prices for energy and other previously subsidized goods.

Asked about this Thursday, Ahmadinejad noted that the IMF had praised the reforms; the critique of the chief auditor was merely his own "opinion" and not necessarily "correct."

Perhaps channeling his inner Ron Paul, the Iranian president also suggested that the United States would be better off if it brought all its military forces home. Iran, he said, would police the Persian Gulf and ensure the flow of oil.

But despite his confident manner, this is not the Ahmadinejad of yore.

The Iranian president is under a blistering assault at home on matters ranging from insubordination to heresy and corruption. He is so weak that he could not even manage to arrange the release of two jailed Americans before his arrival in New York. A dinner with American Iran experts that was scheduled for Thursday night was abruptly cancelled last week out of apparent concern that the two -- Shane Bauer and Josh Fattal -- would not be out by then. Twisting the knife, the Iranian judiciary -- led by the brother of an Ahmadinejad rival -- let them go hours after the president had landed in the United States.

The release of the two was supposed to be a goodwill gesture, but Ahmadinejad undercut whatever public relations victory he hoped to achieve by delivering a classic anti-American speech at the U.N. on Thursday. Last year, he suggested that the United States was behind the Sept. 11 attacks; this year, he said the U.S. killed Osama bin Laden so the truth would never be known. Most of the diplomats in the hall walked out

One relatively moderate Iranian newspaper, Mardom-Salari, writing on the eve of the Iranian's U.N. address, suggested that Ahmadinejad's seven consecutive trips to New York -- a record for an Iranian president -- were a waste of money and time.

"Visits are not important in themselves; it is more important how we can influence others," the paper wrote, according to Mideast Mirror, a translation service. "We should not sacrifice quality for quantity. What is important and beneficial is planning, which is totally ignored in Iranian foreign diplomacy."

Ahmadinejad's decline began, ironically, with his disputed re-election two years ago. The huge protests and violent government crackdown that followed made it easier for foreign countries, particularly Europeans, to sanction Iran over its nuclear program, citing human rights abuses.

Domestically, the elections severely damaged Ahmadinejad's legitimacy even as they initially forced Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei to clasp the president even closer to his chest.

Ahmadinejad's efforts to take advantage of what he saw as the leader's dependence by firing cabinet ministers such as Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki eventually backfired. Things came to a head in April, when Khamenei blocked Ahmadinejad's efforts to dismiss Intelligence Minister Heydar Moslehi. Ahmadinejad sulked at home for 11 days.

Having vanquished the so-called "seditionists" -- members of Iran's reform movement who supported Mousavi and Karroubi in 2009 -- the Iranian media and authorities have now gone after "deviationists" with equal force and venom. The targets are the supporters of the president and his chief aide and in-law, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.The most serious charges were leveled last week when a businessman close to Mashaei was arrested after allegedly forging letters of credit worth $2.8 billion to buy a controlling interest in a giant steel company undergoing privatization.

The target of the investigation, Amir Mansour Khosravi, has amassed billions of dollars during the Ahmadinejad administration from a modest start as the owner of a mineral water factory, according to the Financial Times.  Iranian media have printed a letter attributed to Mashaei that allegedly urges two government ministers to allow Khosravi to buy half the shares of the steel company with "the agreement of the president."

There have been rumors that Mashaei was detained for a week last month for interrogation. Other unconfirmed stories -- some would say smears -- implausibly link him or relatives to the Mujaheddin-e Khalq, a Marxist-Islamist group that found refuge in Iraq in the 1980s and that is a deadly foe of the Iranian regime. Mashaei accompanied Ahmadinejad to New York this week but has kept an uncharacteristically low profile.

 Ahmadinejad's loss of power in his second term follows a pattern in Iranian politics. What distinguishes him from his predecessors, according to Mehdi Khalaji, an expert on Iranian clerical politics at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is that he tried to invent a "new branch of Islamic radicalism" that rejects clerical dominance. That is a tall order in a system that gives ultimate decision-making to a cleric -- the supreme jurisprudent or velayet-e faqih -- and that allows him to control the state through a series of interlocking councils dominated by clerics he appoints.

Other Iran experts -- and ordinary Iranians -- say the current struggle has little to do with religion or ideology. The competition now is over preventing the president from using his remaining powers of patronage and networks of influence to stack the political deck in favor of his supporters in parliamentary elections next spring and presidential elections in 2013. Among his potential successors is Mohammad-Baqr Qalibaf, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards Air Force and now mayor of Tehran.

"There is no difference between Ahmadi [the president], the leader [Khamenei] and Qalibaf," said an Iranian in Tehran who asked not to be named for reasons of personal safety. "All of them follow power and money."

-This commentary was published in The Foreign Policy on 23/09/2011
-Barbara Slavin is senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, author of four reports for the council on Iran and of a 2007 book, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S. and the Twisted Path to Confrontation

A President Who Is Helpless In The Face Of Middle East Reality

Obama's UN speech insists Israelis and Palestinians are equal parties to conflict

By Robert Fisk

Today should be Mahmoud Abbas's finest hour. Even The New York Times has discovered that "a grey man of grey suits and sensible shoes, may be slowly emerging from his shadow".

But this is nonsense. The colourless leader of the Palestinian Authority, who wrote a 600-page book on his people's conflict with Israel without once mentioning the word "occupation", should have no trouble this evening in besting Barack Hussein Obama's pathetic, humiliating UN speech on Wednesday in which he handed US policy in the Middle East over to Israel's gimmick government.

For the American President who called for an end to the Israeli occupation of Arab lands, an end to the theft of Arab land in the West Bank – Israeli "settlements" is what he used to call it – and a Palestinian state by 2011, Obama's performance was pathetic.

As usual, Hanan Ashrawi, the only eloquent Palestinian voice in New York this week, got it right. "I couldn't believe what I heard," she told Haaretz, that finest of Israeli newspapers. "It sounded as though the Palestinians were the ones occupying Israel. There wasn't one word of empathy for the Palestinians. He spoke only of the Israelis' troubles..." Too true. And as usual, the sanest Israeli journalists, in their outspoken condemnation of Obama, proved that the princes of American journalists were cowards. "The limp, unimaginative speech that US President Barack Obama delivered at the United Nations... reflects how helpless the American President is in the face of Middle East realities," Yael Sternhell wrote.

And as the days go by, and we discover whether the Palestinians respond to Obama's grovelling performance with a third intifada or with a shrug of weary recognition that this is how things always were, the facts will continue to prove that the US administration remains a tool of Israel when it comes to Israel's refusal to give the Palestinians a state.

How come, let's ask, that the US ambassador to Israel, Dan Shapiro, flew from Tel Aviv to New York for the statehood debate on Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's own aircraft? How come Netanyahu was too busy chatting to the Colombian President to listen to Obama's speech? He only glanced through the Palestinian bit of the text when he was live-time, face to face with the American President. This wasn't "chutzpah". This was insult, pure and simple.

And Obama deserved it. After praising the Arab Spring/Summer/ Autumn, whatever – yet again running through the individual acts of courage of Arab Tunisians and Egyptians as if he had been behind the Arab Awakening all along, the man dared to give the Palestinians 10 minutes of his time, slapping them in the face for daring to demand statehood from the UN. Obama even – and this was the funniest part of his preposterous address to the UN – suggested that the Palestinians and Israelis were two equal "parties" to the conflict.

A Martian listening to this speech would think, as Ms Ashrawi suggested, that the Palestinians were occupying Israel rather than the other way round. No mention of Israeli occupation, no mention of refugees, or the right of return or of the theft of Arab Palestinian land by the Israeli government against all international law. But plenty of laments for the besieged people of Israel, rockets fired at their houses, suicide bombs – Palestinian sins, of course, but no reference to the carnage of Gaza, the massive death toll of Palestinians – and even the historical persecution of the Jewish people and the Holocaust.

That persecution is a fact of history. So is the evil of the Holocaust. But THE PALESTINIANS DID NOT COMMIT THESE ACTS. It was the Europeans – whose help in denying Palestinian statehood Obama is now seeking – who committed this crime of crimes. So we were then back to the "equal parties", as if the Israeli occupiers and the occupied Palestinians were on a level playing ground.

Madeleine Albright used to adopt this awful lie. "It's up to the parties themselves," she would say, washing her hands, Pilate-like, of the whole business the moment Israel threatened to call out its supporters in America. Heaven knows if Mahmoud Abbas can produce a 1940 speech at the UN today. But at least we all know who the appeaser is.

This commentary was published in The Independent on 23/09/2011

Lebanon’s Gas Fields, A Gift Or Curse?

By Sami Atallah

The prospect that Lebanon may one day exploit gas reserves off its coast has triggered high hopes for the country’s economic outlook. Some analysts have predicted that gas will reduce the country’s energy bill, pay off the public debt, and will precipitate regional development. But in reality, gas is not a means to any of these ends. On the contrary, it has the potential to greatly undermine Lebanon’s economic and political system should gas revenues be mismanaged.

Beyond addressing maritime disputes with Israel, Lebanon’s primary challenge will be to translate gas revenues into self-sustaining growth, accompanied by improvements in socio-economic welfare. Many countries endowed with oil and gas have failed to do just that. For every Norway that has doubled its per-capita Gross Domestic Product between 1980 and 2008, there is a Nigeria, whose citizens have witnessed no change in their living standards; or a Saudi Arabia, whose per-capita GDP was halved over the same period. The road to effective management is mired with difficulties that could easily overwhelm the Lebanese government.

Five challenges stand in the way. The first is the ability of the government to bargain for a good deal with multinational companies. A majority of profits must be ensured for the state, as must an agreement on future prices, to reap higher returns when prices go up.

This is a daunting task for most governments, as many oil companies have greater resources and expertise in estimating the value of the gas to be extracted, and hence are in favorable bargaining positions. One way to rectify this imbalance is to create a bidding process that increases competition between firms. The stronger the competition, the more the revenue that will be reaped by the state. However, Lebanon’s record of holding a competitive process when it comes to contracting is dismal, with many of the state contracts granted to the private sector marred by cronyism and corruption.

The second challenge is how to manage the boom-bust cycle. A common problem facing gas exporting countries is the volatility in price. Over the last 18 months, natural gas prices have dropped by half. The variation in the revenues earned, not only makes planning more difficult, it also leads to volatility in spending. This provokes boom-bust cycles, where spending is high in good years followed by deep cuts in bad years.

The problem is exacerbated when governments borrow from abroad against the high price of gas, only to face major problems when prices drop and lenders have to be repaid. So instead of reducing its public debt, which is already high, Lebanon could see itself becoming more dependent on loans as a result of mismanagement.

One common way to resolve this issue is to create stabilization funds, which ensure steadier patterns of spending against gas price fluctuation. These must be enshrined with the right incentives for politicians not to abuse them.

The third challenge is managing revenues. A major misconception about gas revenues is that they are regarded as a source of income. In reality, they are not. As a non-renewable asset, the consumption of the gas revenue should be seen as consumption of capital rather than a consumption of income. Hence, the government’s optimal strategy is to invest the gas revenue into financial assets and treat the interest earned as income. This can be done by implementing a national wealth fund where gas revenues are invested globally in stocks, bonds and property.

The fourth challenge is how to manage spending. The gas receipt will tempt politicians to spend more. Those whose tenure in office is uncertain will be tempted to spend the money sooner rather than later, in order to get re-elected or out of self-interest. The population will also be expecting an increase in their own welfare with the new revenues. The nature of Lebanon’s political system makes irresponsible management of resources harder to contain. There is a need to develop binding rules dictating what is spent where.

The fifth challenge is how to deal with the implications of gas revenues on other sectors. Gas revenues will generate higher demand for non-tradable goods and services, such as consumer services and housing, among others. Such services can only be supplied by shifting local resources and factors of production away from the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, rendering those sectors uncompetitive. Since these sectors’ contributions to the economy have dwindled since the end of the civil war, gas will only exacerbate this downward trend. One way to deal with this is to develop a plan that compensates these sectors by improving infrastructure and other types of productivity enhancing investments.

The ability of countries with gas reserves to achieve self-sustained growth remains the exception rather than the rule. A major factor that determines the ability of a government to manage its oil or gas reserves effectively is the political institutions entrusted to ensure transparency and accountability that were in place before the discovery of these reserves. If so, Lebanon’s hopes of transforming itself as a result of its offshore gas will remain illusory.

-This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 23/09/2011
-Sami Atallah is executive director of the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies in Beirut