Stage Is Set For Much Bigger Conflagration In Middle East

Egypt has demanded an apology from Israel over the killing of its officers as Netanyahu blames Hamas for attacks

By Patrick Seale

As if sparked by the intense summer heat, fierce fighting and other acts of extreme violence have broken out across the Middle East. The danger is that one of these nasty local conflicts will escalate into a full-scale war, setting the whole region on fire.

In retaliation for an ambush of a Turkish military convoy on August 17 by guerrillas of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), which killed eight soldiers and wounded another 15, the Turkish Air Force, a couple of days later, struck at 60 suspected PKK hideouts and bases in the mountains of northern Iraq.

Dozens of militants are said to have been killed. The flare-up will put a temporary end to Ankara’s attempts to conciliate the Kurds by granting them more rights — a policy which it had hoped would rob the revolutionaries of popular support.

Iraq, in turn, was swept in mid-August by a devastating wave of attacks in different parts of the country, which left 68 people dead and wounded more than 300. Although no group claimed responsibility, it was a further demonstration of the catastrophic damage to the Iraqi state caused by the US invasion of 2003 and the long occupation that followed.

The government is evidently still not able to provide even minimal security. The attacks are likely to have been triggered by reports that US troops plan to stay on in Iraq beyond the end of the year, the agreed deadline for their final withdrawal.

In Libya, the revolutionaries have at last captured Tripoli. At the time of writing, Muammar Gaddafi’s end seemed very close. However, rebuilding a nation after his eccentric, brutal and highly personal 42-year rule will be no easy task. There are great differences between the east and west of the country, not to mention the Berber tribes in the deserts of the south. At least, Libya will benefit from plenty of oil income with which to reconstruct the country, unlike oil-poor countries like Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and even Egypt itself, all wrestling with grave economic problems.

In Syria, President Bashar Al Assad is fighting for his political life, perhaps for life itself. Outraged by his repression of the protest movement, the United States and several European countries have called on him to step down. Saudi Arabia, the Arab world’s heavyweight, and several Gulf countries have recalled their ambassadors from Damascus.

But Al Assad remains defiant. From his vantage point, the revolt is a ‘conspiracy’ of Islamists and others, backed by the US and European powers and manipulated by Israel, to punish Syria for its defence of Arab nationalist causes, and bring it down. However, recognising the need for political reforms, Al Assad has announced the holding of legislative elections next February. Will he be heard? Meanwhile, the killing continues, drowning out hopes of a political settlement.

Further afield, Pakistan and Afghanistan are both suffering from conflicts of growing intensity. Pakistan seems in imminent danger of imploding, so great are its internal tensions, while in Afghanistan, nowhere is safe from Taliban assaults, not even Kabul, the heavily defended capital. In Europe and the United States, opinion is more than ever sceptical of the wisdom of continued Western implication in the war.

As usual, the most explosive conflict zone is that between Israel and its neighbours. On August 18, seven Israelis were killed and dozens injured in a series of roadside attacks on buses and cars travelling down to Eilat, through the Negev, along a road close to the Egyptian border. Israel and Egypt share a 240 km border through the desert to the Red Sea at Eilat and Taba. It was the deadliest assault on Israel in at least four years.

In hot pursuit of the attackers, Israeli troops and aircraft entered Egyptian territory and killed five Egyptian policemen, an incident which has caused outrage in Cairo. It brought to the surface latent anger and detestation of Israel. Israeli flags were set on fire and crowds demanded the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador. Egyptian opinion feels nothing but shame for the way Hosni Mubarak, the former dictator, colluded with Israel, notably in the siege of the 1.5m Palestinians of Gaza. The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which removed Egypt from the Arab line-up, thus giving Israel great licence to hit its other neighbours at will, is slowly being emptied of its substance.

Egypt is demanding an apology from Israel and compensation for the killing of the five policemen, in much the same way as Turkey is demanding an apology and compensation from Israel for the nine Turks killed by Israeli commandos on the Mavi Marmara, when the Turkish ship tried to break the Gaza blockade.

The attacks on Israeli vehicles across the Sinai-Negev border may well have been the work of a Palestinian Islamist group or of angry Bedouin, the semi-nomadic inhabitants of Sinai who have suffered from heavy-handed treatment by both Israel and Egypt. The Bedouin long for greater autonomy. Some factions among them have almost certainly been responsible for the repeated attacks on the pipeline which carries Egyptian natural gas to Israel.

Although Hamas strenuously denied having anything to do with the attacks on the Eilat road, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu immediately blamed them. In time-honoured fashion, Israeli planes bombed the defenceless Gaza Strip, killing at least 20 civilians, wounding twice that number and causing much material damage. Determined to maintain some element of deterrence, Hamas and other Palestinian factions then fired volleys of rockets into Israeli territory. The stage is thus set for a wider conflagration.

In his usual belligerent form, Israel’s Defence Minister Ehud Barak declared: “Those who operate against us will be decapitated.” Like other members of Netanyahu’s far-right government, he seems unaware that Israel’s aggressive and expansionist behaviour is piling up hate against it, undermining its future security. In mid-August, Barak himself approved the building of 277 apartments in the illegal Jewish colony of Ariel, built deep inside the occupied West Bank. In any reasonable resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ariel would have to be evacuated. Yet Israel has recently moved ahead with plans to build more than 2,500 apartments in Occupied Arab East Jerusalem, which the Palestinians claim as their future capital. Israeli officials say 2,700 more apartments will be approved soon.

In an eloquent column in the International Herald Tribune on August 20-21, Roger Cohen wrote: ‘... Jews cannot with their history become the systematic oppressors of another people. They must be loud and clear in their insistence that continued colonisation of Palestinians in the West Bank will only increase Israel’s isolation and ultimately its vulnerability.’ A generation ago, James Baker, a former US secretary of state, urged Israel to give up ‘the unrealisable dream of a Greater Israel.’

There is no sign that these wise counsels have yet been heard. More violence can safely be predicted.

-This commentary was published in The NEWS GULF on 26/08/2011
-Patrick Seale is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs

Power Grabs And Politics Are Stalling Progress In Iraq

Iraq's endless cabinet crisis is a symptom of a paralysed political system. Unfortunately, there's no reason to think new elections would help very much.

By Reidar Visser

Observers of Iraqi politics are increasingly realising that the formation of the second Maliki government - hailed by many commentators when it made news in December 2010 - is still very much a work in progress. Indeed, during the course of Ramadan it has become clear that we are very near a crisis point in Iraqi politics. With no more meetings of parliament scheduled before September 6, the chances of any immediate resolution are looking remote.

The key elements of the current crisis are as follows:

First, two important security ministries - defence and interior - remain in the hands of acting ministers who have not received parliamentary approval.

Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki recently appointed Sadun Al Dulaymi, a Sunni ally of his with no significant independent party base, as acting minister of defence. And Mr Maliki continues to act as minister of interior himself.

The failure to fill these two ministries with candidates who enjoy parliamentary approval may be the single most important problem with the current government.

The secular Iraqiyya government keeps focusing on a second aspect of the political crisis, namely, the failure to create the so-called National Council for High Policies that was part of the original agreement behind the formation of the government in 2010. The council is not in the constitution and has only vaguely defined powers in the current draft bill that pertains to it.

Members of Mr Maliki's bloc have made it clear that they will fight the bill until the bitter end, meaning that the fate of the council is likely to disappoint Iraqiyya almost regardless of outcome. Legislation to give it real power is likely to be defeated in parliament; conversely, if the legislation passes in parliament it will almost certainly define a "consultative" council that enjoys little influence.

In an interesting move, Sadrists as well as former premier Ibrahim Al Jaafari, both considered close to Iran, have supported the council lately, meaning it is conceivable Iran could be backing it in a move to further disperse power in Iraq.

Iraqiyya is openly discussing a call for new elections as a way out of the crisis. But is this realistic?

It may be instructive to compare the situation today with one year ago, when the second Iraqi government had yet to be formed and the various players were exploring different alliance options. The parliamentary arithmetic is quite similar.

The all-Shiite National Alliance that eventually clinched the second premiership for Mr Maliki is today mostly fictional.

Instead, the secular Iraqiyya headed by Ayad Allawi remains the biggest identifiable bloc in parliament with around 90 members. Prime Minister Maliki and his bloc State of Law have lost one deputy, bringing them down to around 88. The rest of the Shiite Islamists make up around 69 deputies, and the two biggest Kurdish parties (43 seats) are thought to control altogether somewhere between 50 and 55 deputies including smaller Kurdish parties (except Gorran) and some minority representatives.

The main difference from 2010 concerns the political dynamic, where a slight change can now be detected. Back in the autumn of 2010, the Kurds formed the swing vote that clinched Mr Maliki's premiership.

However, lately there have been an increasing number of instances in which the Kurds and the secular Iraqiyya have made common cause in parliament. This included a symbolic fight to avoid a reference to Islamic jurisprudence in a law on state pensions, joint criticism of Iranian military incursions into Iraq's Kurdistan region, a drive to adopt the national council for high policies, and most recently a joint bid to challenge the oil and gas legislation that emanates from the oil ministry, and the prime ministerial dominance it envisages in the federal gas and oil council.

The question is whether this is sufficient to prompt a vote of no confidence in Mr Maliki's government as a whole. Iraqiyya are making threats in this direction but will need the active support of all the Kurds plus at least some 10 to 20 Shiite Islamists to reach the critical threshold of 163 votes. As long as the Kurds are not interested, chances are that the current government will continue to sputter along.

The second question is of course whether new elections at this point would do any good anyway.

Iraqiyya elites remain locked in personal alliances with leaders of parties with whom they have little in common ideologically, like the Kurds and the Shiite Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. For his part, Mr Maliki keeps showing a complete lack of realism in his coalition-building ventures.

At times, Mr Maliki is clearly trying to come across as an Iraqi nationalist with cross-sectarian appeal, but the hard facts show that he remains spectacularly unsuccessful in terms of co-opting Sunnis with a popular following into his coalition. In sum, there is depressingly little movement in directions that could realistically break the stalemate that resulted from the 2010 elections.

What is the best remaining option? The attempt to legislate the National Council for High Policies is likely to end with frustration for Iraqiyya, and new elections in many ways appear as unrealistic and possibly counterproductive.

The issue of keeping a contingent of US instructors beyond 2011 is one on which Mr Maliki is actually closer to the Kurds and Iraqiyya than to his assumed coalition partners in the highly theoretical Shiite "National Alliance", and it is a potential trust-building issue that might encourage Mr Maliki to ditch some of the smaller Shiite Islamist faction from his coalition and form a more consolidated cabinet with Iraqiyya and the Kurds.

-This commentary was published in The National on 26/08/2011
-Reidar Visser is an historian of Iraq who blogs at gulfanalysis.wordpress.com

The Kingdom Of Magical Thinking

Widely assumed to be a fabulously wealthy welfare state, Saudi Arabia is in fact an economic basket case waiting to happen. 

By Robin M. Mills


Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi

In 1935, an oilman visiting the Middle East reported back to his headquarters, "The future leaves them cold. They want money now." Although the temptation of overspending has repeatedly undermined oil-rich governments from Caracas to Tehran, Saudi Arabia avoided this trap over the last decade through fiscal discipline that has kept its expenditures below its swelling oil receipts.

But in a recent report striking for the candor of its unpalatable conclusions, Saudi investment bank Jadwa laid out the kingdom's inexorable fiscal challenge: how to balance soaring government spending, rapidly rising domestic oil demand, and a world oil market that gives little room for further revenue increases. And that was before the recent economic turmoil knocked $20 per barrel off oil prices.

Saudi Arabia's government spending, flat since the last oil boom in the 1970s, is now rising at 10 percent or more annually. And it will rise faster still: The House of Saud's survival instinct in the wake of the initial Arab revolutions led King Abdullah to announce $130 billion of largesse in February and March. The resulting increases in government employment and salaries can be cut only at the cost of more discontent.

And that's only what the kingdom is spending on its "counterrevolution" at home. Saudi Arabia will pay the lion's share of the pledged $25 billion of Gulf Cooperation Council aid to Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and Oman. With Iraq, Syria, and Yemen likely flashpoints yet to come, the bill will only increase. Already, nearly a third of the Saudi budget goes toward defense, a proportion that could rise in the face of a perceived Iranian threat.

Meanwhile, fast-growing domestic demand poses a serious threat to oil-export revenues. The kingdom is one of the world's least energy-efficient economies: With prices fixed at $3 per barrel for power generation and $0.60 per gallon of gasoline, Saudi Arabia needs 10 times more energy than the global average to generate a dollar of output. Subsidized natural gas, too, is in short supply, undermining an economic diversification drive focused on petrochemicals. As much as 1.2 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil are burned for electricity to meet summer air-conditioning demand, yet Jeddah, Saudi Arabia's second-largest city, still suffers frequent power cuts. By around 2026, Jadwa projects that domestic consumption will be over 5 million bpd, exceeding exports, which will never again reach their 2005 peak.

This combination of higher spending and lower exports shortens Saudi Arabia's time horizon. Usually considered, on shaky evidence, to be a "price moderate" within OPEC, the kingdom now requires $85 per barrel to balance its budget. That figure will rise to $320 by 2030, according to Jadwa. (Of course, just because the Saudis need a certain oil price to balance the budget does not mean they can get it. Higher prices today come at the inevitable cost of future revenues, as economic growth is reduced and consumers choose more efficient vehicles.)

Savings cushion the budget for now. But the experience of the last oil price cycle is likely to recur: $180 billion of assets in 1980 had become $176 billion of debt by the end of 2002, and despite the oil-price crash, Riyadh was able neither to cut spending nor to grow a viable non-petroleum economy. This time, Jadwa foresees that the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency will be forced to draw down its $500 billion of foreign assets to the point where, by 2030, the country's fiscal position will be under severe strain.

So far, the kingdom has been fortunate. This decade's rapidly rising spending was enabled when Saudi Arabia's main OPEC rivals, Venezuela, and Iran, left the field clear due to underinvestment in and mismanagement of their oil industries. Along with the war in Libya, this has allowed Saudi production to increase to its highest level in 30 years while prices have remained strong. But the good times will soon come to an end.

Oil prices have again, as in 2008, been allowed to get too high, too fast. The renewed economic downturn, combined with fears of overheating in China and other emerging markets, has only sharpened this challenge. Growing efficiency, demographics, and alternatives mean that OECD oil demand is probably in a slow, long-term decline, while non-OPEC supply is proving more robust than expected, with strong growth in Brazilian pre-salt oil and North American unconventional shale oil and oil sands.

And, for the first time since Oil Minister Ahmed Zaki Yamani did battle with the Iranians in the 1970s, Saudi Arabia faces a real challenger within OPEC. Even if Iraq's ambitious plans are only half-realized, it will soak up more than half of global demand growth. Its vast, low-cost reserves make major production increases attractive even if they reduce prices. For its own reasons, Iran seeks to undermine Iraqi stability, but that would hardly be a palatable outcome for the Saudis either.

And that's not all: Angola also has room for further growth; Muammar al-Qaddafi's impending defeat may restore some of Libya's production; and, with Hugo Chávez suffering from cancer, Venezuela's oil policy may change after the 2012 election.

The Saudis' dilemma is this: They hold nearly all OPEC's spare capacity, their essential weapon for keeping the cartel in line. June's "worst meeting ever" was actually a victory for Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi. Opposition by Iran, Venezuela, Libya, and others to a production hike left him free to increase output as far as he chose. Yet Saudi Aramco, the country's monopoly state oil company, has few drill-ready development projects. Plans announced in 2008 to take Aramco's capacity to 15 million bpd have not been implemented, and the only big project under way, the giant Manifa heavy oil field, with about 900,000 bpd, will mostly serve domestic needs.

So what should the Saudis do? Setting a credible target, say $70 per barrel, and defending it by creating new spare capacity would reduce long-term prices. By enduring some pain themselves and drawing down their vast savings, they would burn off high-cost competition, punish OPEC rivals that are ignoring quotas, and damage archenemy Iran. Yet they are understandably reluctant to spend billions of dollars on new fields at a time of wavering demand.

Ambitious plans for nuclear and solar power are no panacea. Saudi Arabia has no competitive advantage over other countries in alternative energy. If it succeeds in reducing oil use in transportation, other countries can too -- so who will be buying Saudi oil?

The black hole in current policy discussions is improved energy efficiency. Raising domestic fuel prices would cut demand, allow development of higher-cost gas resources, and free up more oil for export. "Smart" subsidies or cash transfers could offset the price hikes for vulnerable groups.

A lower oil-price target would have to be combined with domestic spending restraint. The Saudi government cannot forever be the employer of last resort; reshaping education and labor policy to bring more Saudi citizens into the private sector would ease some social pressures. Between 2005 and 2009, 2.2 million private-sector jobs were created, but only 9 percent went to Saudi citizens.

Tinkering is not enough. Without radical reforms, Saudi leverage within OPEC will be increasingly constrained. The kingdom's regional power will weaken, precisely at the time when it is attempting to step up its role. And in the long term, its economic and social model will come under intolerable strain.

Yet the crisis is still too far away, the lure of easy oil money too strong -- and the policy changes required demand deft execution untypical of Saudi bureaucracy. As Machiavelli cautioned, "There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things."

-This commentary was published in The Foreign Policy on 25/08/2011
-Robin M. Mills is a Dubai-based energy economist and consultant, columnist for the National, and author of The Myth of the Oil Crisis and Capturing Carbon

Between Beirut And Moscow

By Hassan Haidar

Lebanon and Russia, despite the differences between them in terms of geography, size and interests, seem as if existing outside of time in the way they have been dealing with developments in the region. Indeed, they deliberately ignore what is happening and overlook facts that can no longer be denied, their consequences taken lightly and their strikingly rapid developments neglected. In spite of this, they refuse to admit that they must deal with the results, adapt to new factors and accept what is being defined by the wills of the peoples.

Thus Russian President Medvedev departs from all logic and realism, declaring, after Tripoli has fallen and Gaddafi has fled, that “there are two powers in the country” that should “sit down at the negotiating table and reach agreements on future peace” (!), as if he does not know what is happening, or as if reports are reaching him late. At the same time, his country opposes imposing sanctions on Syria at the Security Council, without a care for what is happening on the ground in Syria in terms of killing, arrests and torture.

And if Moscow, in the way it has been dealing with events in the Middle East, is acting in accordance with its immediate interests, with blatant short-sightedness that puts it in the position of being nearly the only international defender of dictatorships, and with domestic considerations interweaved in its stances that are imposed by the approaching presidential elections and the potential competition they entail, Beirut, on the other hand, is applying the principle of burying one’s head in the sand, believing that this will spare it of the responsibility to think and prepare in advance for how the situation will develop, especially in Syria where the regime is steadily headed towards isolation and fragmentation.

But Russia is a major power with a vast network of relations and interests, and at the end of the day, it will not jeopardize its long-term interests for the sake of weapons deals with Damascus worth a few billion dollars it might never collect anyway, or for the sake of a military base here or there it might later not find anyone to defend. Moreover, its leaders are not forgetting that it will later have to “acknowledge” reality after having obtained a “price” in other issues, or ensured for itself some share in exchanges with the new regimes. Indeed, the age of ideologies has passed, and there is no longer in Russian politics anything called “solidarity among nations”, but rather merely markets and resources. Thus wagering on the stability of Russia’s current stance on the crises of the region will bring disappointment to those who make such a wager, as has happened several times in the past with Iran, for example.

In Lebanon, on the other hand, where there are neither resources nor elements of strength – unless one considers, making light of the most basic military and political notions, that Hezbollah’s weapons, which it threatens with and waves around in every direction, can guarantee it permanent immunity and provide it with one “victory” after another – the government cabinet formed by the new majority is itself engulfed in bygone stances, and distracted by slogans and plans that are as if time had stopped at the Syrian clock after it returned to work according to its own outdated timing, outside of any context. Its leaders are pouncing on the different parts of the “cake” and fighting over petty electoral considerations, after some of them have grown fond of the idea of bribing voters with “light bulbs” and faucets, believing that their rule will last “forever”, and ignoring the reality that the change taking place with their “big brother” next door will after a while drag away with it all illusory lamp posts, fabricated engines and artificial alliances, especially when international justice soon moves into a new phase and reveals the lie from the truth.

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 25/08/2011

Libya: Pandora's Box Or Coffer Of Jewels?

By Amir Taheri

By the time this column appears, Libyan despot Muammar Gaddafi could be anywhere.

He could be in Mauritania where he is reported to have extensive investments, or in South Africa where President Jacob Zuma has benefited from his largesse. And, what about Venezuela where his “brother-friend” Hugo Chavez is in power? Also, he may be in the hands of the rebels who have entered his capital.

However, the truth is that, politically, wherever he is, Gaddafi is nowhere. The mischief he has made in the past six months was the final bouquet in the fiendish fireworks he triggered 42 years ago.

What is important now is to make sure that Libya does not end up with another Gaddafi or a “lite” version of the colonel-clown.

However, it would be naive to think that post-Gaddafi Libya would simply reverse gears and take the road to democracy. There is little in the Libyan society as it emerges from Gaddafism to support that vision.

Comparisons with Egypt and Tunisia would be misleading.

Egypt had a taste of proto-democracy before Abdul-Nasser seized power. Partly thanks to contact with Western Europe, Egyptian elites had at least flirted with democratic ideas for 150 years. Before General Ben Ali imposed his police state, Tunisia had lived under Habib Bourguiba’s autocracy that, though far from democratic, was not despotic either. More importantly, perhaps, the presence of a million Tunisian immigrants in Western Europe and North America, many of whom visit the country every year, provided a human link to a different world.

In Libya, the situation is different. Most Libyans have known nothing but despotism. Almost two-thirds were not even born when Gaddafi seized power. Apart from Sufi fraternities, the country had few civic institutions. It never had political parties of an appreciable size. Nor did it enjoy the experience of free and robust media, even for a short while.

Thus, the current tendency of the Libyan society is towards dictatorship, not democracy. It is no accident that a majority of the members of the National Transition Council, now the interim government, consists of defectors from Gaddafi's regime.

This does not mean that the individuals in question are necessarily bad men. What it means is that Libya needs a system of government in which even bad men are denied the chance to do mischief. A bad system run by the best of men seldom does any good while the worst of men could do little harm in a good system.

As far as Libya is concerned the first rule must be: do no harm. One must not assume that Libya is a blank page on which to draw the image of an ideal society. Over the past weeks, we have seen dozens of “drafts” for a future ideal Libya. Some of us have even been invited by the French government to help produce “a project for society” in post-Gaddafi Libya. (Needless to say, we refused.)

The only problem with Gaddafi's system was not that it was not democratic. After all, democracy is a relatively recent method of government. Human history is full of fairly successful, and relatively humane, societies that were not democratic.

The fundamental problem with Gaddafi's system was that it was not Libyan in the sense that it had nothing to do with Libyan history, culture and sensibilities. It was a fabrication, a lie, imposed on the Libyan people. Beginning with its very name, everything about this Jamahiryah was a lie. The “Supreme Guide” lied to the people, and the people lied back to him. What Gaddafi achieved over 42 years was the destruction of the Libyan government, in fact of the very sense of government in Libya.

Any system of government should reflect the history, aspirations, and realities of the society it pretends to administer. The Gaddafist system did nothing of the sort.

To be credible a system must have an inner logic and respect its own rules and laws. The Gaddafist system failed on both scores. Over four decades, several senior Libyan personalities, including Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam, have admitted to this writer that they were unable to define the inner logic of their system. They were also obliged to admit that rules that one thought were in place could change even while one talked about them.

In comparison, the defunct Soviet Union had an inner logic and respected the rules it set for itself. Even under Stalin a senior official could not suddenly ”disappear” without discussions in the Politburo and, in most cases, at least a show trial. Nor could the “Man of Steel” change a major policy on a personal whim.

The present Communist system in China is another example. It is certainly not democratic and, in my opinion, a bad bargain for the Chinese people. Nevertheless, it has its inner logic and is respectful of most of the rules it sets.

With Gaddafi hopefully gone, the lid has been knocked off the Libyan box of mysteries. No one knows whether we have opened Pandora’s Box or a coffer of jewels long hidden by an evil warlock.

The best thing to do is to let Libyans talk, and listen, to each other and the rest of the world, and be heard. For four decades, only one voice was allowed in Libya: that of the colonel. Let us see, and hear, if there are other voices and, if yes, whether they are worth listening to. Before aspiring to follow a democratic course, Libya must correct its freedom deficit.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 26/08/2011
-Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the Executive Board of the International Press Institute (IPI)

Libya: What About The South?

The situation on the ground in southern Libya is largely unknown but any new government will have to tame this wild expanse

By Alex Warren

A Libyan boy with a herd of goats near Ghadames, which has reportedly been under siege since the conflict began. Photograph: John Moore/AP

Some 400 miles south of Tripoli, the city of Sebha is a sprawling mess of low-lying houses, dusty roads and half-finished construction projects in the heart of Libya's Fezzan region. In the middle of a small roundabout, framed by a low green fence, is a one-room cabin called Dar Muammar that was briefly home to the future leader of Libya before he was expelled from the local school.

Faded billboards recreate scenes of Gaddafi in a desert tent, planning the restructuring of Libya into a jamahiriya and "the era of the masses" that he announced from Sebha in 1977. Looming menacingly above the city, whose population has soared in the past few years to more than 250,000, is an Italian-built fort that became a symbol of power in one of the regime's most important strongholds, and one which appears to remain in the control of Gaddafi loyalists.

Throughout this Libya conflict, attention has understandably been focused on populous coastal cities such as Tripoli, Misurata and Benghazi. The south, in contrast, has been a virtual black hole of information, with few verifiable reports about the situation on the ground. But taming this wild expanse of desert and rocky plains – which covers an area larger than France and Spain combined – will be increasingly vital for any new government claiming to control Libya.

This is not least because of the region's natural resources. Lying west of Sebha is a fertile zone called the Wadi al Hayat – the Valley of Life – which contains some of Libya's most important oil and water reserves. An oilfield operated here by Spain's Repsol accounted alone for more than 15% of Libya's pre-conflict crude production, while other energy firms are also active in the area. Deep underground aquifers in southern Libya supply water to the Great Man-Made River – perhaps one of the few achievements of the Gaddafi regime that will outlive it – that in turn provides about two-thirds of the country's water supply.

Security is also a crucial consideration. Even before the uprising, parts of the south were close to being lawless. Huge swathes of uninhabited desert between the towns of Ghadames and Ghat were frequently off-limits to travellers because of clashes with militants or bandits infiltrating across the Algerian border. Ghat itself, a garrison town close to the border with Chad and Niger and a world away from Tripoli, has in recent years seen shootouts between al-Qaida-linked fighters and Libyan security forces.

In the extreme central-south, which has no paved roads or mobile phone network, are remnants of Libya's border war with Chad in the 1970s and 1980s which has left many areas heavily landmined. In the deep south-east, the town of Al Kufra has a history of rejecting centralised control from Tripoli. A rebellion by the local Tubu tribe in 2009 was only quelled after the security forces sent in helicopter gunships. Around the town are the skeletal remains of second world war tanks and aircraft, a reminder of previous battles waged over this patch of north African desert.

Ghadames, home to a Unesco world heritage site and one side of a three-way border with Algeria and Tunisia, has reportedly been under siege since the conflict began, with pro-Gaddafi soldiers joining forces with Tuareg tribesmen and fighters from nearby towns that have historically been antagonistic towards Ghadames.

Illegal immigration is an even bigger issue. Sometimes aided and abetted by corrupt police or human traffickers, thousands of sub-Saharan African nationals filter every year across Libya's porous borders with Sudan, Niger or Chad and make their way northwards to the Mediterranean.

Six months of fighting might have discouraged all but the most motivated of these migrants, but peace will bring renewed immigration problems not just for the new transitional authorities but also for the EU, which had managed to reduce the number of immigrants reaching Italy from Libya from 32,500 in 2008 to 7,300 in 2009 after closer co-operation with the Libyan authorities.

It is almost impossible to ascertain the real situation in the south, and recent events in Tripoli have shown the danger of jumping to conclusions about who controls what in Libya. On Monday, the transitional council's chairman, Mustafa Abdel-Jalil, admitted in a press conference that Sebha was still not under its control, while there are even rumours that Gaddafi has moved the Central Bank's gold reserves to the desert city. Other reports suggest there are serious food shortages and large numbers of stranded migrants across the region.

It is equally difficult to predict how pro-Gaddafi elements in the south might react when, or if, their leader and his sons are captured or killed. They could melt away and quickly switch allegiance to the transitional council, but they might also be inclined to fight for their turf.

Opinions vary about the actual importance of Libya's tribal and regional affiliations, but they will almost certainly be stronger in the south than in other parts of the country, especially as it contains a more diverse mix of ethnic groups and nationalities which includes the Amazigh, Tubu and Tuareg, as well as large numbers of nationals from Chad, Niger and Sudan.

Deep-seated distrust and old feuds may well violently rear their heads in the collapse of any remaining law and order in the coming weeks, while the abundance of weapons now circulating throughout the country also bodes ill. Whoever wins the battle for Tripoli has not necessarily won the war for Libya.

-This commentary was published in The Guardian on 24/08/2011
- Alex Warren is a director of a Middle East research and advisory firm, Frontier and has worked extensively throughout Libya since 2008. He has written and presented widely on the country

In Libya, Culture May Be The Enduring Adversary Of Change

By Christopher R. Hill

While NATO probably will not want to replicate its Libya intervention elsewhere anytime soon, it seems that the alliance, with a little help from its friends, has prevailed in toppling Colonel Moammar Gadhafi. This is a good moment for NATO, but one that evokes a sense of relief rather than celebration.

Given the mismatch of member states’ policy (topple Gadhafi) and a strategy to “protect civilians” based on a contested United Nations Security Council resolution, NATO can certainly take pride in managing a great challenge and strengthening its role as the preeminent Euro-Atlantic institution.

Now, however, comes the real hard part. Libya was not a smoothly operating country before the civil war started six months ago; today, it is thoroughly broken and will require an enormous amount of rebuilding – post-conflict operations, or “stability ops,” to use the current jargon. Libya’s needs run the gamut: governance, institutional capacity building, economic reform, and security.

As in most post-conflict countries, effective and legitimate leadership will prove hard to come by. The National Transitional Council, the governing body established in February by the various rebel groups, has functioned fairly well, given the mammoth centrifugal forces and other pressures at work. But the skills needed for leadership of a wartime governing council are very different from those needed to run a sovereign state.

Given the variety of the figures on the council, there will be natural pressure from within Libya and beyond for a quick move to elections of some sort. The various political groupings need to discuss a timeframe for a popular vote, brief the restive international community, and finally set (and keep!) the date. But that date should be set sufficiently in the future to allow an adequate start on rebuilding political institutions and the economy.

The security and judicial system, a wasteland under Gadhafi, should be the first priority, though it is the area probably most in need of deeper, longer-term reform. One can only imagine the endemic nepotism and corruption that have traditionally characterized Libya’s police forces, but they will need to be made adequately operational quickly, probably via a new loyalty oath and some crash training. It is not ideal by any means, but allowing the streets to be policed by militias and various tribal-based groups would be far more dangerous.

What to do with the various rebel groups that “liberated” the country will probably be one of the main challenges facing any new provisional government. One can expect that NATO’s devastating airstrikes on Gadhafi’s forces will soon be forgotten in the heroic retelling of the intrepid rebel troops’ advance to Tripoli.

The sooner these forces can be decommissioned, the better. Many will probably be absorbed into Libya’s security service, but many others, one hopes, can go back to their place of origin. The sheer amount of weaponry strewn around the country will probably pose the greatest challenge to its prospects as a successful state with an effective government.

Gadhafi’s armed forces were carefully chosen on the basis of loyalty and ethnic affiliation, rather than any concept of merit, so the temptation to strip everyone to their underwear and send them home (to describe what may be the most humane of outcomes) might be great. But arguably the most important lesson learned in Iraq resulted from the almost catastrophic decision to decommission Saddam Hussein’s army without pay or pension. That move lay at the very root of many of Iraq’s subsequent security problems.

Libya is fortunate is some ways. The oil sector appears to be relatively intact, and thus should contribute to government revenues relatively soon. By contrast, other countries undergoing radical change, including Egypt and Tunisia, are more dependent on the service sector, including the always-finicky tourism industry.

The international community must stand ready to assist Libya. Key decisions need to be made in close consultation with the country’s emerging leadership about which international institutions, civilian and military, should be present on the ground. Again, NATO might be popular now, but that could change quickly. Libyans, like other Arabs, may turn out to hold the conflicting views that have so confused the West in Iraq: they want us there, but they also want us gone.

Governance, institution building, security, and agreeing on an international presence are daunting challenges, but probably the most worrisome aspect of post-Gadhafi Libya will be the view among Western experts that experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has given them the knowledge and the skill sets to manage all these operations. One recalls Talleyrand’s famous aphorism on the restitution of the Bourbons – that they learned nothing and forgot nothing.

The Western countries’ collective knowledge is no substitute for a collective wisdom about Libya’s distinct history and rhythms. Gadhafi was a brutal dictator, but he gained power – and maintained his grip on it for 42 years – for a reason. If we learned anything from Iraq and Afghanistan, it is that a few years of politics, or institutional rebuilding, does not trump centuries of culture. Those centuries, not the remnants of the Gadhafi regime, are likely to be the real enemy of change in Libya.

-This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 25/08/2011
-Christopher R. Hill, a former U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asia, was U.S. ambassador to Iraq, South Korea, Macedonia, and Poland, U.S. special envoy for Kosovo, a negotiator of the Dayton Peace Accords, and chief U.S. negotiator with North Korea from 2005-2009. He is now dean of the Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver. THE DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with Project Syndicate © (www.project-syndicate.org)