Israel: If It Smells Like Apartheid…

By Rami G. Khouri

The Israeli parliament’s vote last week making it a prosecutable crime to support any boycott of Israel, including products from Israeli settlements on occupied Arab lands, has rightly generated considerable debate about what this means for Israel, Zionism and Israelis.

The complex and larger-than-life tale of the modern state of Israel has always been seen by its two very different faces around the world. For Jews and many others, Israel has been about a vibrant nationalism, miraculously reborn from the horrors of the European holocaust and centuries of discrimination and subjugation of Jews by white Christian Europeans and Russians. For most Palestinians and Arabs, Israel has been about a predatory and malicious combination of colonialism and racism, the creation of an exclusionary ethnic state on land that was taken from others, with Jews and Israeli citizens having a higher quality and priority of personal and national rights than the indigenous Arabs.

These two competing narratives have played out for the past century. The miracle of vibrant Jewish nationalism and impressive statehood, on the one hand, and the criminality of Zionist colonialism and racism, on the other, are impossible to reconcile. Yet reconcile them we must - or at least Zionists and their supporters must - if we are ever to approach any possibility of a negotiated peace that allows Israelis, Palestinians and other Arabs to live a normal and peaceful life in this region.

The anti-boycott law that has just been approved in Israel will provide new ammunition for those who see Israel and Zionism as intemperate racist, or even, as some Israeli critics have said, fascist.

The basic issue is not whether it is good or bad, right or wrong, to criticise Israeli policies and to support a boycott of Israel. It is not about whether the Arabs should formally recognise Israel as “a Jewish state”, or if Israel is a vibrant democracy that can teach some lessons to the surrounding Arabs. The issue here is simply whether Israel and Zionism are above the law of humankind that attempts to maintain peace and security among peoples by enforcing certain principles of justice and order.

The new Israeli law generates widespread anger and contempt because it essentially says that Israel and Zionism are above the law, and cannot be held accountable, criticised or challenged through boycotts and sanctions in the same manner that the world sanctions other states that engage in immoral or criminal activity. In other words, Israel and Zionism can do anything - including criminal colonialism - without accountability or review, regardless of existing legal or ethical constraints that apply to all other people and states.

The assorted boycotts of Israel have not hurt it very much in material or political terms. They are symbolic acts that Israel seems able to withstand quite easily.

So why do Israelis react so fiercely, and with such official parliamentary zealotry, with this anti-boycott law?

I suspect it is because the sustained boycott effort threatens to place Israel dangerously close to the singularly distasteful place in modern history that was occupied by apartheid-era South Africa.

When American mainline churches, British academics, European labour movements, Norwegian investment funds and assorted other respectable institutions around the world formally boycott Israel because of its apartheid-like policies in the occupied Arab territories, and some Israeli officials think twice about travelling abroad for fear of being slapped with legal indictments, the boycott issue suddenly takes on a much more menacing tone.

Israel is responding with hysterical overkill as it finds itself increasingly assaulted politically by boycott pressures because of the deeper moral challenge that boycotts represent: the delegitimisation of the Israeli state that modern Zionism has created.

The real threat to Israel is not what others are doing to it, but what it is doing to itself - through its criminal policies of territorial colonisation, its persistent assault on Palestinians everywhere, its refusal to negotiate a reasonable peace agreement that acknowledges the Palestinians’ historical rights in the land and, above all, by claiming for itself greater legal, national and moral rights than it is willing to concede to the Palestinians.

So when the supreme Zionist law-making institution representing the Jewish people - in the wake of the divine mandate passed on to humankind via the law-giver Moses - decrees that Israeli actions cannot be challenged on legal, political or ethical grounds, or opposed through boycotts or sanctions, many observers and victims of Zionism naturally react by thinking that this duck sure looks like apartheid, it smells like apartheid, and it feels like apartheid.

If the Israeli parliament takes such actions that rekindle the Zionism-is-racism debate, which is happening, then one has to add sheer stupidity to Israel’s catalogue of shortcomings.

Moses must be uncomfortable in his grave in view of the great divine message he carried to the Jewish people and all humankind to, “pursue justice and only justice”. (Deuteronomy 16:20)

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 22/07/2011

Way Out Of The Syrian Crisis

Some observers believe that a dialogue between the regime and the opposition is the safest way forward

By Patrick Seale

The Syrian protest movement, which started in mid-March, has this week entered its fourth month. Week after week, the Friday demonstrations have grown and their tone has hardened. Increasingly, the strident call is for the fall of the regime. Angry protesters say that more than 1,500 of their number have been shot dead in the streets and well over 10,000 arrested, while the regime retorts that 400 of its soldiers and policemen have been killed by ‘armed gangs’.

As casualties mount on both sides, so the rift widens between the regime and its opponents. Ramadan is fast approaching. When the daytime fast is ended at sunset, the tradition is for the rich to feed the poor, often at trestle tables in the courtyards of mosques — or so it was before mosques became centres of protest. If large crowds gather next month for occasions of this sort, there could be serious trouble.

The opposition faces a stark choice: either to go all out to bring the regime down, or to cooperate with it in building a new and better Syria. The first course is hazardous: if the Baathist state is torn down, what will replace it? The future is uncharted. The second course requires an act of faith: it means accepting that the regime truly wants to implement radical reforms by means of a national dialogue. Its attempt to launch such a dialogue has so far failed to convince.

The regime has mishandled the protest movement. Slow to grasp the nature of the popular challenge, it has been violent and incompetent in confronting it. The security services, like President Bashar Al Assad himself, seem to have been taken by surprise. By resorting to live fire against the protesters, they displayed indiscipline and arrogant contempt for the lives of ordinary citizens. Ordinary people want respect. This has been one of the motors of the Arab Spring.

Al Assad himself has fumbled. Of his three speeches in the past four months, two were public relations disasters and the third far from the rousing, dramatic appeal to the nation that his supporters had expected and the occasion demanded. Above all, he has failed to put an end to the killings, arbitrary arrests, beatings and torture which have sullied his and the country’s reputation.

Meanwhile, the Baath party — ‘leader of state and society’, according to the notorious article 8 of the Constitution — has been virtually silent, confirming the widespread belief that it has become a hollow shell, concerned only to protect its privileges and its corrupt network of patronage.

No forceful leadership

If the regime has shown itself to be weak, the opposition is weaker still. It wants to challenge the system, but it evidently does not know how to proceed. It is split in a dozen ways between secularists, civil rights activists, democrats — and Islamists; between angry unemployed youths in the street and venerable figures of the opposition, hallowed by years in prison; between the opposition in Syria and the exiles abroad; between those who call for western intervention and those who reject any form of foreign interference.

The opposition met at Antalya in Turkey some weeks ago, and then more recently in Istanbul, but no forceful leadership or clear programme has emerged, let alone anything which might look like an alternative government. The opposition movements that have declared themselves — the National Democratic Grouping, the Damascus Declaration signatories, the National Salvation Council formed last week in Istanbul, the local coordination committees in Syria itself — are loose groupings of individuals with little structure or popular base and few clear ideas.

The truth is that, as Tunisia and Egypt have discovered, it is exceedingly difficult to bring about a transition from an autocratic, highly centralised, one-party system to anything resembling democratic pluralism. In Tunisia, no fewer than 90 political parties are planning to contest next October’s elections in conditions of great confusion.

In Syria — and for that matter in most Arab countries — there is no experience of free elections, no real political parties, no free trade unions, no state or civil society institutions, no separation of powers, no independent judiciary, little real political education. The Syrian parliament is a farce. And, as in Egypt and Tunisia, the problem of how to integrate Islamic movements into a democratic political system remains a puzzle.

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood — renamed the Freedom and Justice Party in preparation for the elections — and Tunisia’s Al Nahda tend to frighten the western-educated middle and upper classes. That is why many worried secularists across the region look to Turkey as an inspiring model because Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s AKP has proved that Islam is compatible with democracy.

In Syria, everything will have to be rebuilt from the ground up — including the ideology of the state. The old slogans of anti-colonialism, Arab unity and Arab nationalism, Baathism, radical Islamism, Arabism itself, all will need to be rethought and redefined for the political challenge ahead.

Since the task is so vast, and since any viable transition must inevitably take time, some observers have come to the view that a dialogue between the regime and the opposition is the safest way forward. Creating a new political system is not the only problem. Equally urgent is tackling the huge social and economic problems with which countries like Syria are faced: an exploding population, rampant youth unemployment, an impoverished middle class and a semi-destitute working class, a soaring cost of living, policies of economic liberalisation which have gone wrong and benefited only a tiny and corrupt elite; the neglect of workers’ rights whether on the land or in shops and factories. Syria needs a new social contract.

The rich monarchies of the Gulf can spend their way out of trouble. Saudi Arabia, for example, has announced plans to spend $70billion (Dh257billion) on low-cost housing. Syria, with about the same size of population, can only dream of such figures. If the Syrian economy is not to collapse, it will no doubt need bailing out. Iran may have to come to the rescue.

No one should suppose that the Syrian regime will go down without a fight. Most regimes seek to destroy their enemies. China had its Tiananmen Square massacre and Russia its bitter war in Chechnya. Iran crushed the Green movement. In 1982, Israel killed 17,000 people in Lebanon in an attempt to destroy the PLO and install a pro-Israeli vassal in Beirut. The use of live fire is an Israeli speciality, as Lebanon discovered in 2006 (1,600 dead), Gaza in 2008-9 (another 1,400 dead) and the Palestinians for the past 60 years.

When America was attacked on 9/11, that great bastion of democracy invaded Afghanistan, and then Iraq. Hundreds of thousands died. Millions were displaced or forced to flee abroad. Many were tortured. Was it 160 times or 180 times that Khalid Shaikh Mohammad was water-boarded? Syria still plays host to about a million Iraqis, victims of America’s war.

A sectarian civil war on the Iraqi or Lebanese model is every Syrian’s nightmare. There must surely be another way out of the crisis.

-This commentary was published in THE GULF NEWS on 22/07/2011
-Patrick Seale is a commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs, including Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire

Amid All The Turmoil There Is Still A Land Of Dreams: The United Arab Emirates

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is unlike other Arab countries. Here, the challenge is to tackle our relatively modest problems while telling the world of our successes.

By Dr Shaikha Al Maskari

For the past six months, Emiratis have been shocked spectators of the live coverage of the Arab world's mass protests. I personally have felt a sense of solidarity and empathy with their quest for personal freedoms and better governance.

However, I have also been troubled by how willing the world seems to be to assume that every Arab nation, including mine, has many of the problems associated with those engulfed by the Arab Spring.

Ubiquitous media reports have wrongly implied that all Arab countries are ruled by ruthless regimes, sustained for decades by the duplicity of the West. They further have implied that all citizens of Arab countries, frightened for decades into hibernation, collectively woke up in the spring of 2011, desperately bent on changing their governments at any cost.

Here in the UAE, the reality is much different. The UAE stands out as a haven of stability in a turbulent region. Even in the midst of the global financial crisis the UAE remains a land of dreams for many because of its far-sighted leadership and respect for the law, human rights and liberal policies. The UAE's leaders are on a relentless pursuit to achieve the highest standards for our society.

Admittedly, though, there are still things the Emirates can learn from this season of great change. Through critical thinking and creativity we need to analyse how to learn from the region's mistakes.

In the UAE, as in all countries, there is room for improvement. While the nation is on a relentless pursuit of excellence by seeking expertise, fostering innovation and instituting reforms, there are still measures that can be implemented to create sustainable growth and to achieve the highest standards for society.

For instance, we need to resolve to bring about a change in mind-set when it comes to corruption. Our Government pursues and punishes bribery, but citizens and residents alike must in turn reject all forms of corruption.

Among these, the most pervasive are the "wasta" practice, which is unapologetically embedded in our daily life, and nepotism, which is inherent in the fabric of our tribal past and a generational issue.

It is no coincidence that governments in Egypt and Tunisia - where corruption and connections are ingrained - were unable to provide their citizens with the dividends of good governance.

That said, this is not Egypt or Tunisia; in merely four decades the UAE has charted a dramatically different course for itself.

This country has undergone a transformation from empty desert to ultramodern cities with cosmopolitan communities and lifestyles based on globalised economies. In the process the nation has created a culture of opportunity and progress, while retaining the best of our heritage.

Of course, there is still much work to be done. For the UAE to remain competitive, and for the new generation to achieve its aspirations, fundamental transformation of corporate culture is crucial.

We also need to nurture a culture that encourages shared accountability, shared responsibility, mutual support and camaraderie, especially in the business world.

Yet for the most part the UAE's leaders have much to be proud of. This is why they constantly travel to promote diplomatic and economic cooperation, in neighbouring countries and further afield. Transnational collaboration is important for regional stability and economic growth; the citizens of the UAE should therefore conscientiously and rigorously support the international initiatives of their Government to enable the UAE to pursue sustainable peace and prosperity.

Just as the UAE's leaders tirelessly promote inter-faith and cross-cultural understanding, Emiratis also have a responsibility to reach out to fellow citizens and expatriates in their country and around the world to share their traditional hospitality and sincere compassion.

Here in the UAE, everyone has a responsibility to join forces to optimise shared resources and to come up with proactive, sustainable solutions to environmental and other challenges. All Emiratis and Government officials are partners in progress.

Some 50 years ago, when I was a young girl preparing to go abroad for school, I was at Qasr Al Hosn to bid farewell to His Highness Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, our country's founding father. I remember as he placed his right hand on my head, he said: "Shaikha, everywhere you go, be an ambassador of your country."

But I also remember that when I landed at Charles de Gaulle Airport in Paris days later, officers at the immigration counter had not previously seen a red Abu Dhabi Emirate Trucial States passport nor even heard of my home.

So much has changed in the decades since. Today, when I travel around the world and people ask me where I am from, the mention of the Emirates spontaneously arouses smiles and praise from those who have been here, and expressions of hope from others who would like to come.

At a time when others in the Arab world are engulfed in unspeakable sufferings, we should count its blessings and be thankful for the bounties that we take for granted. I am proud of my country's achievements, and appreciate the efforts of the UAE leadership - which has made our lives safe, secure and prosperous.

In time, one hopes observers of the Arab Spring will learn to feel the same way.

-This commentary was published in The National on 22/07/2011
-Dr Shaikha Al Maskari is an Emirati businesswoman and a philanthropist and chairperson of Al Maskari Holding

Kuwait: Oh Bank Of banks Have Mercy On Us

By Ahmed Al-Jarallah

The Central Bank of Kuwait is considered the financial adviser to the government in accordance with its established laws, but the economic events witnessed in Kuwait over the past six years lead one to conclude that the adviser needs an adviser. We say this because of the series of crises that have occurred mainly due to the decisions taken by the Central Bank.

The crash of the stock market and all the past crises confirm this point. This happened due to confusion and lack of an economic vision, in addition to the series of laws and regulations constraining the banks and the private sector, thus rendering useless — in economic terms — all the comments made by Central Bank Governor Sheikh Salem Abdulaziz Al-Sabah.

These comments are not at all assuring because any investor would rather invest his money abroad or think a thousand times before investing it in Kuwait.

Those who think they are fully aware of all the reasons that led to the stock market collapse and have a lot of options and plans to address the situation will surely find themselves in no-man’s land. This is because it is impossible to think that a healthy and excellent economy is suffering from three structural imbalances at the same time. We must think of a clear cut plan for the future generation.

What some officials do not want to confess is the cause of these crises in the country today is due to the ‘Financial Stability Law’, which is fiercely defended by the Central Bank of Kuwait.

At a time when all sectors of the economy in other countries were striving to overcome the financial crises, Kuwait was busy driving companies to near bankruptcy.

It was a perfect example of bad financial administration, because instead of encouraging banks to open credit lines to the private sector and instead of coming to the rescue of some companies, the Central Bank abandoned them to their fate.

The ‘adviser’ to the government on ‘finance’ started putting restrictions on the banking activities in the country, and the proof is the weakness of bank deposits which totaled KD 32 billion.

Is it reasonable that this meager amount is what we can point to in a country like Kuwait with all development projects and high earning power? This is also very low considering that Lebanon, a country which has a history of economic woes, has the same amount of deposits as in Kuwait.

This is the situation in Kuwait, while our finance officials tell us several stories and talk about theories and slogans to protect banks and improve their competing power.

How can these theories be accepted when banks, which are the spinal cord of investments, are put under severe pressure? The directives issued to banks cripple companies and even lead to bankruptcy due to a lack of credit and the insurmountable requirements placed before them by the Central Bank. When one company falls, it surely affects the others.

No one is arguing the Central Bank has good intentions to improve the financial situation of the country but intentions alone are not enough. It has to correct past mistakes. Everyone is prone to committing mistakes but continuing on the wrong path is suicidal.

If the Central Bank truly wants to put things in the right perspective, it must do away with all the regulations that have led to the collapse of the private sector. There is a need for a stimulation package and credits must be encouraged.

The Governor of the Central Bank must reckon that the stock is the indicator of a healthy financial practice in a country. This is because it represents a third, if not more, of the whole economy. It is also an indicator of how people react to a specific event in a country and around the world.

When the stock market collapses, it means a crisis is imminent and investment is dying a slow death. In Kuwait, the stock market is not only suffering from bad financial practices but from an absence of clear regulations to encourage investment and organize market practices in line with the nation’s economic goals.

This means we are going to continue witnessing bankruptcy in the absence of development-oriented legislation that would prevent collapse.

It is unfortunate some of the required legislation is collecting dust in the National Assembly. These will not see the day of light if people don’t stop politicizing the economy and subjecting the market to daily trials.

Over the past four years, politics has been a hindrance to economic progress. The government has failed to encourage the companies and a perfect example is the withdrawal of the (BOT) build-operate-transfer project under pressure from lawmakers.

It is imperative on the Central Bank to do away with the mentality of being in a war. The government also must be firm and determined. It must not be frightened by comments flying from the mouths of some lawmakers and Diwaniyas.

If we want Kuwait to be a financial hub, we must earn this reputation with hard work not by issuing irrelevant statements and promulgating absurd theories.

The talk of the ‘past’ is enough to make hundreds of countries financial hubs. Kuwait has regressed a lot, now it is time to be brave and act... and act fast.

-This commentary was published in The Arab Times on 22/07/2011
-Ahmed Al-Jarallah is the editor-in-chief of The Arab Times and the Kuwaiti Arab daily Assyassah

Spark Of War Or Turkish “Crescent”?

By Zuheir Kseibati

The facts of the Arab revolutions, the obstinacy of the “arrogant” and the stubborn – from the Colonel in Tripoli to Ali Saleh in Sana’a – and what is being promoted by the Iranian propaganda machine, did not change Tehran’s image and its aspirations to take over the post-Arab dictatorship era, in the hope of planting the seeds of tutelage over the revolution. This would aim at turning what now looks like the defeat of the Iranian project (especially in Syria) into a victory that would force Washington to reconsider its refusal to share the interests with Tehran.

And while Iran addressed more than one message to Ankara to “scold it” for its inclination toward the West in the scenario to blockade the Syrian regime and indirectly “instigate” its oppositionists domestically and abroad, it is also claiming - in this case – that it is not interfering in Syria’s affairs or taking sides with its regime, but rather is seeking the salvation of “rejectionism” from a project which was said to be dubious, but in which Iran is practically nothing but a partner in the interests with the American.

Moreover, Khamenei’s command is claiming it is not interfering in Bahrain’s affairs. However, it is instigating against national dialogue to restore a climate of turmoil in one of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. This instigation was seen after the Council reiterated its condemnation of the Iranian “conspiracy” against its states, as well as the attempts to generate sectarian strife in the Gulf, which not only casts additional shadows over the nature of the next chapter of the political confrontation between the Gulf and Iranian sides, but also calls for caution toward Tehran’s refusal to understand the GCC’s message.

Iran’s defiance wish might translate the state of confusion prevailing over it since it was shocked by the undermining of the Syrian ally and the collapse of its immunity in the face of the uprising, but also since the regional alliance which Tehran used as a tool to expand the border of the Islamic Republic to the Mediterranean Sea was shaken. This confusion might also have been prompted by Turkey’s and Egypt’s success in the post-revolution phase to tempt Hamas with the acquisitions of Palestinian reconciliation, to distance it from the Iranian lap.

Moreover, the increase of the setbacks of the revolutions and the uprisings in the region is increasing Tehran’s confusion, as it is aware that the shift which affected the Turkish position toward NATO’s operation in Libya will not be without a price, especially if Ankara’s interests were to require the establishment of a “crescent” to deter what remains of the “crescent” of the Iranian influence in the Middle East, as well as Erdogan’s embracing of the “moderate” Islamic movements in the countries witnessing uprisings, as a prelude for partnerships with these states. Clearly, the principles of these partnerships in justice, development, stability and regional peace (with Israel) go completely against the principles of “rejectionism,” confrontation with the American and the “wiping of Israel off the map” (even if this is only done through defiance and shouting).

And now that Tehran and Ankara have parted ways in Lebanon (following the formation of “Hezbollah’s government”) and in Palestine (since the reconciliation agreement), what remains is Iraq which is perceived by Iran as being the main winning card and the arena on which its interests intersect with Turkey - especially against any attempt to divide it – considering that this would definitely serve the course of the establishment of a state for the Kurds.

For the time being, the Iranian concerns remain limited to three tracks:

- The wager on the steadfastness of the security solution in Syria until the regime overcomes its most difficult crisis, considering that this regime’s collapse would mean that of the entire strategy of the Iranian axis in light of the popular disgruntlement among the Syrians over the reliance on Tehran and their country’s affiliation with a project that is hijacking its interests and their fates.

- The deterrence of the attack of the Turkish “crescent” project, as Iran is fearful that this attack might earn an American cover and a possible partnership with Egypt (the Islamic movement in particular).

- The dodging of any Israeli trap to spark war with Hezbollah in Lebanon, as Iran is fearful that it might attempt to finish what it started in 2006 (the July war) through the expansion of the confrontation to strike its nuclear facilities and missiles arsenal. It is likely at this level that Israel will get American support, in light of an American mobilization against states classified by President Barack Obama’s administration as being on the top of the list of the “sponsors of terrorism,” including Iran.

Additional puzzlement is prevailing over Khamenei in regard to Obama. Indeed, the guide was accustomed to harshly responding to George Bush’s projects, wars and hostile rhetoric. However, Obama does not favor displays of strength, but when he recently spoke, he only aimed at addressing a warning to Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas.

Which will come first? The attack of the Turkish “project” or the Israeli spark of war, at a time when the Arabs are busy handling the anger of the uprisings and the earthquake of the revolutions?

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 21/07/2011

Egypt: The Promise Of A Revolution

By Amir Taheri

Will Egypt's self-styled democrats help kill that nation's hopes for democracy?

The question is not fanciful. A chorus of individuals, groups and parties describing themselves as liberal, democratic, secular and socialist are calling for the constituent election, scheduled for September, to be postponed. The call is echoed by groups that hope to maintain the regime in a new form.

However, the decision to hold the election in September was taken by the Egyptian people in March when 77 percent voted yes in a referendum.

Those who call for postponement should think carefully about what this means.

First, it means that the will of the people expressed in a free vote, as was the case in the referendum, could be ignored. This would make a mockery of democracy by allowing the whim of a minority to annul the will of a majority.

Secondly, postponing the election would put the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) above the will of the people. What is in effect a classical military junta would be given the moral authority of a constituent assembly. In practical terms that would give SCAF carte blanche in deciding when, and if, to allow transition to democracy or, at least, at what speed transition should take place.

Once the junta can annul an election result, there is no guarantee that it would not do it again. The provisional could become permanent.

Finally, perhaps more importantly, postponing the election would set a dangerous precedent. After that, any minority could claim moral authority to contest the results of any elections.

This is not the first time that Egypt is facing such a dilemma.

In 1953, the Free Officers (Zubat al-Ahrar), who had seized power in a coup, debated whether or not to hold elections.

At that time, Major-General Muhammad Naguib, the nominal head of state, together with democratic parties and groups supported elections.

In contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood allied itself with the militarists led by Colonel Gamal Abdul-Nasser in calling for the postponement of elections "until the right conditions are present."

Needless to say, the "right conditions" never arrived and Egypt fell under a dictatorship that continues to this day.

The Muslim Brotherhood paid a heavy price for its anti-democratic alliance with Nasser while democratic parties were all but wiped out.

Calling for the cancellation of an election result is worse still when those who make it have participated in the exercise.

Taking part in an election, like in any game, implies a moral contract to abide by the results, even if the loser ends up challenging those results in other ways. This was the case in Russia's first free election in 1917, when the Bolsheviks emerged as the biggest losers. They accepted the result but then moved to destroy the newly-elected parliament at gunpoint.

In Chile, democratic parties, including those that had suffered under military rule, did not ask for time to rebuild before contesting elections. They accepted General Pinochet's offer of elections, knowing that the objective was to send the army back into the barracks.

In any case, democracy is a process not a one-shot experiment. Just as one swallow does not a summer make, a single election does not define the democratic process. Egypt's pro-democracy groups might lose the next election but should fight with the determination to win the one after that.

Some speak of "the Egyptian revolution". However, we have not yet had a revolution in Egypt. What we have so far is the promise of a revolution. That promise would be fulfilled when, and if, we have regime change in Egypt. What we have had so far is change within the regime.

Regime change means the return of the armed forces to their job as defenders of the country's territorial integrity against foreign threats. Regime change also means doing away with the culture of Mukhaberati politics in Egypt.

Initially an army-backed concoction, over the past two decades the Egyptian regime was transformed into a façade behind which the intelligence services wielded real power. The evil genius of the regime was not President Hosni Mubarak, a rather bland man, but Omar Suleiman who ran the security service.

None of the above-mentioned objectives could be achieved under the ruling junta, even though the new government formed this week appears to be more responsive to Tahrir Square's demands.

The military-security apparatus may use the pro-democracy parties and groups as a cover for an attempt at remaining in power or at least securing a big chunk of it in any future configuration.

One argument the apparatus is using for prolonging the so-called transition is "the deteriorating security situation" in the country. What is left out of such arguments is the fact that there could be no security without freedom. (Of course, there is also no freedom without security.)

Under the military-security regime, Egyptians did not feel secure. The prolongation of that regime in any form would not enhance anybody's security in Egypt.

The faster Egypt closes the Nasserist chapter and resumes normal life the better for the Egyptians. To close that chapter, Egypt must shorten the transition. And to shorten the transition Egypt must hold elections.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 22/07/2011
-Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday Times. In 1984-92, he served as member of the Executive Board of the International

Why Al-Assad Cannot Reform His Regime

By Gabriel G. Tabarani

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad: What next?

On the 20th of July 2011 Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, under pressure from popular demonstrations and protests issued a decision to form a committee, headed by his Vice-President Farouq Al Sharaa, whose mission is to make proposals to amend the Constitution and to introduce legislative reforms to meet the demands of “the street” - to bring about party pluralism, achieve democracy, engender social justice and separate power from the executive to a more democratic mechanism.

This begs the question: does the Baath regime has the capability to carry out such reforms without committing political suicide? Furthermore, can President Bashar al-Assad implement such reforms given the current balance of power, which controls the foundations and the core of the authority in the country since more than 40 years?

To answer that, it is essential to return to the very beginning.

In 1973 the late President Hafez al-Assad worked on a new constitution which put all authority in his hand after having either excluded or eliminated all his political rivals. Following this he extended his reach to social groups, which, until then, were marginalized from Syrian political life. He also tried at the time to falsify the existence of a multi-party system by creating the imaginary “Front of Progressive Parties” which was formed from left-wing and communist parties that were pro-Baath. He also attempted to placate right-wing parties and mercantilists by coercing them through lax economic regulation. Most importantly he tightened his grip on the military, giving himself full control of the army and the various security agencies.

However, Al-Assad (Senior) faced during his term robust opposition, both by those close to him and by the broader Sunni opposition. He successfully overcame them by paying a bloody price, as evidenced by the suppression of Hama in 1982.

When Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in July 2000 as Syrian President he focused on two things: first; the centralization of the State and the importance of the respect for its institutions, and second; the necessity for economic reform and addressing the problem of incipient corruption. In his early years he was able to carry out some economic reforms, for example the opening of private banks, reviewing currency exchange rules, limited private sector reform, reducing direct state involvement in the economy and opening the way for increased competition in some industrial sectors. Such limited reforms made for only piecemeal changes, and had limited impact on political life.

As for changes introduced by al-Assad (Junior) on political life, in the view of some  scholars and observers, can be monitored through the results of legislative elections held in 2003, which clearly showed full Baath party control over the entire electoral process, , both in terms of laws governing the process of forming candidate lists (in which play a major role the conservatives associated directly with the President and the local leadership of the Baath party) as well as the division of electoral constituencies. Naturally this did not allow the independent candidates to enter the elections if they were not loyal to the regime or linked to the ruling Baath party.

At governmental level, Al-Assad issued in 2003 a decree in which he commissioned the Baath party to run the process for planning, guidance, supervision and political control over the government. Also he altered the distribution of cabinet portfolios in a way that no minister can run more than one ministry. He was keen also to ensure that the Prime Minister at that time Naji Al-Otari maintained close ties to the Baath Party.

The structure of government in Syria makes it impossible for any major governmental decision (such as one affecting vital interests of the regime’s basic pillars: the army, the Baath party and the intelligence services agencies) to be carried out by anyone but the President himself. The centrality of the President position makes him the only source of decision-making, not the government which remains under the will of the President in everything, even in laws and legislation, and under the control of the Baath party through the “Committee on Party Control”. This situation has in fact marginalized the government executive with respect to the civil service and the organs of bureaucracy.

If the Parliament and the Government in Syria are weak, ineffective institutions under the control of the President and the Baath Party, the army and the intelligence agencies constitute the mainstay of the authority of the President and his basic strength, which holds the key to regime’s longevity in Syria.

The army constitutes, as the Baath party, the instrument to frame and educate the people, and according to the Syrian Constitution the task of the army also is to defend the regime. However, there is a close link between the army and the party, about 16 officers in the army high command are also members of the Central Committee of the Baath party. The Minister of Defence is also the President of the Military Committee of the Baath Party.

At the level of the security services, there are four intelligence services agencies all linked directly to the President of the Republic, namely: the Political Security Agency, the General Security Agency, the Military Intelligence Agency, and the Air Force Intelligence Agency. Along with those there is the Republican Guard which is an elite military unit; its task is to maintain the security of the President, its men enjoy special status and privileges. Overall those Syrian so-called security apparatus employs about 200,000 people. The focus of these agencies is away from government organs, as such the breakdown of their missions and roles will always keep the regime a safe distance away and beyond their reach. All appointments within Syria’s security agencies are aimed to keep the balance of power in favour of the President and to defend his interests.

However, defending the regime of Bashar al-Assad constitutes an essential interest for the leadership of the Baath Party, the Syrian army and the intelligence services, because they are in fact in defence of the continuation of their privileges and their own self-interests which are in-turn secured by the regime. So the survival of these security services with the party is subject to the survival of the regime and its fate.

A careful reading into the situation in Syria will show that all of the political reforms which are currently on the table and up for discussion will result in destroying the pillars upon which the regime is built. As such it cannot govern, nor exist, without them.  The President’s monopoly on executive authority along with the Baath party’s monopoly on political action and the political message are in the basis of the 1973 Constitution.

It is the opinion of most observers that Hafez Al-Assad built his regime "to measure" and made sure it focused around him. Recent modifications to the constitution have not been able to break the monopoly of the President nor that of the Baath party in national politics. More importantly they did not lead to genuine political change in the light of complete dominance of the Baath Party, the army and the security services on the State’s capabilities and the continued marginalization of Parliament and the role of the Government. The regime of Bashar al-Assad during his leadership made a "successful adaptation", mimicking the emergent changes in Syrian society if not remaining true to them.

The current balance of political forces in Syrian politics means that the reforms demanded by protesters as well as by western governments appear similar to a request from the regime to commit political suicide via constitutional amendment. To fulfil these demands meaningfully is an impossible request, because doing so will destroy the foundations of the Al-Assad regime. However, the cosmetic amendments which have occurred do not truly affect the powers of the President or those of the party or the military. Nor do they impact the security services and their control over the political life.

The Syrian President knows that the reform required will destroy the basic pillars on which the regime founded. This would kill of the Baath party’s chances of ever again holding power in Syria; and his person and authority would be exposed to the wrath of those currently benefiting from Al-Assad family rule who stand to lose their privileges. Such beneficiary groups continue to hold substantial weight and will play a decisive role in the current conflict between the opposition movement in Syria and the currently entrenched regime.

Is Al-Assad ready, willing and able to think about the future of Syria as he pretends more than the future of his Baath regime and himself? This is the question which is waiting for an answer in the coming weeks.

This commentary was published in the same time on thesop.org in USA and in Arabs Today in UK on 21/07/2011