Syria’s Partition Could Crack Lebanon

By Michael Young

It is difficult to see how President Bashar Assad will prevail over the growing protests demanding an end to his regime. More than two months of carnage by the Syrian army and security forces have failed to shake the demonstrators’ determination, and surely will not.

There are many scenarios for what might happen in Syria. Lebanese should pay attention to one in particular. As it dawns on the Assads that their days in power are numbered, we should consider the option that they and the minority Alawite community will move to an alternate plan. Unable to subdue Syria, the regime may contemplate falling back on an Alawite-dominated statelet in northwest Syria.

There is little certainty surrounding such a scheme. In recent weeks the army and security services have been active in Idlib province along the Turkish border, after their assault near the Lebanese border, particularly in Talkalakh – accompanied by an ongoing campaign to pacify the Homs to Aleppo axis. Even if the Assads’ priority is to reimpose their writ over Syria in its entirety, the actions in these areas may, simultaneously, serve another purpose: to consolidate Alawite control over the margins of a future mini-state.

Alawites are concentrated in the mountain region and cities of Syria’s northwest, even if they have moved elsewhere during the past decades. Notably, they have moved into the plains of Homs and Hama, where they generally live around the main cities. If the community sought to establish a statelet, it would have to implement a three-tiered process. This would involve preparing a forward defense line near areas of Sunni urban concentration, along the Homs-Hama-Aleppo road. It would also entail strengthening Alawite control over the community’s heartland further to the west, particularly over the coastal cities, while arming Alawite villages.

The third stage of the process would necessitate securing a parallel line of defense along the eastern edge of the Alawite mountains, above the plains leading toward Homs, Hama and Aleppo. Not coincidentally, perhaps, the northern hinge of this boundary is at Jisr al-Shughour, while the southernmost hinge is at Talkalakh. These are places allowing the regime to close off access to predominantly Sunni districts across the borders. However, the terror tactics adopted by the Syrian army, security forces and irregular pro-regime militias are disturbingly similar to those of the Serb-dominated army and Serb paramilitaries during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Is the aim to cause permanent population displacement? That’s unclear. However, there is a geographical rationale behind the Assads’ strategy, and its repercussions cannot but affect sectarian relations.

As Lebanese watch developments next door, how might they react? If the Assads manage to retreat to an Alawite fortress, the repercussions in Lebanon (not to say Iraq) could be frightening. Attention would be drawn to Lebanon’s Shiites, but also Christians, to see if they might envisage a similar route toward communal self-preservation.

The Shiites are far less likely to be tempted by the idea of forming a communal statelet than are the Christians, for obvious reasons. The areas of Shiite concentration are not contiguous. Dispersed among the northern Bekaa Valley, the western Bekaa, southern Lebanon and Beirut’s southern suburbs, the Shiite community would be unable to bind these regions together into any sort of cohesive whole.

In reality, the hazards lie elsewhere. If the Assad regime were to collapse, this would represent, potentially, an existential setback, for Hezbollah. The party would strive to defend itself, and its options are limited. Some have speculated that Hezbollah might try to tighten its grip on the state and weaken its adversaries decisively, perhaps through a military strike broader than that of May 2008. However, that would almost certainly fail, instead provoking civil war.

Hezbollah must be aware of this. The party is immensely potent as an armed force, but the only real solution to its dilemma if Assad rule were brought down is a far-reaching domestic political compromise. The party would be reluctant to engage in one, however, at least from a position of weakness. The reason is that any serious internal dialogue would necessarily have to address Hezbollah’s disarmament, which the party’s leadership will not sanction.

The ensuing deadlock could push Hezbollah to do two apparently contradictory things: maintain its presence in state institutions at all costs in order to protect its interests; but also, facing an invigorated Lebanese Sunni community bolstered by an invigorated Syrian Sunni community, further separate territories under its influence from the rest of Lebanon, both physically and psychologically. In other words, even as it rejects a Lebanese sectarian breakup, Hezbollah may be compelled to pursue that very path to survive. And this could be accompanied by an impulse, even a political need, to collaborate with other friendly sectarian entities, an Alawite entity above all.

Which leads us to the Lebanese Christians. There is profound alienation among many Christians from post-Taif Lebanon, and from the idea of coexistence with the country’s Muslim communities in the context of the centralized state that emerged after independence in 1943. This has been debilitating for Christians, accelerating the community’s isolation and sense of decline. Yet virtually all mainstream Christian political groupings deep down aspire to a Lebanese state – federal, confederal or otherwise – that allows a majority of Christians to govern themselves and live among their own.

This mad project is more likely to lead to communal regression and suicide. And yet many Christians will look closely at a Alawite statelet, if one were to take shape, and see how it might serve or buttress their own aspirations. And if this were to come at a moment when the Shiites themselves were experimenting with some de facto scheme of disconnection from Lebanon, it could intensify the centrifugal forces in the country and even eventually prompt a sizable number of Christians and Shiites to join efforts against a perceived Sunni threat.

For now, and hopefully well beyond, this may be political fiction. But ours is not a healthy national mood to defend the Lebanese entity as we know it. Even during the war, Lebanese unity was, paradoxically, more solid than today. The fire lit in Syria could feed Lebanon’s divisions. Unless we’re sensitive to the risks, Lebanon could burn.

-This commentary was published in The Daily Star on 01/07/2011
-Michael Young is opinion editor of THE DAILY STAR and author of “The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle” (Simon & Schuster), listed as one of the 10 notable books of 2010 by The Wall Street Journal

Managing The Arab Situation

By Ahmad Y. Majdoubeh

Is the Arab world, with its so-called Arab Spring and other developments, going through a transition that would lead to something categorically better?

Is it witnessing increasing internal divisions that will maintain and prolong the status quo or divide it and tear it even further apart?

Facts on the ground point in both directions. Time will only tell which way things will ultimately go, and it all depends on how the present situation is managed.

Obviously, one cannot lump all Arab countries together. The situation differs from one Arab country to another, at times quite radically and significantly. Egypt is not Libya, Morocco is not Yemen, Jordan is not Syria, etc. Nevertheless, there are common core issues. Essentially, it is all about democracy, about leaderships having popular legitimacy and about governments “of the people, by the people, for the people”.

In all Arab countries the people call themselves “Arab” - and they are so in their heart of hearts. Their dreams and aspirations are the same, despite their different national situations.

The overall situation in the Arab world will improve only when there is a large degree of harmony, of integration between those governing and the governed. This will happen only when clearcut mechanisms are developed to ensure that those who govern do so with the aim of attempting to fulfil the peoples’ dreams, aspirations and needs - and in accordance with the rule of the law, not the rule of the person or the rule of the regime.

At present, there is neither harmony nor integration. Until now, the situation is built on a dichotomy. Not only do those who govern have the upper hand, but the governed have little or no say in who governs them and for how long. Such unhealthy dichotomy deepens both mistrust and animosity. This is why the relation between the governing and the governed is largely one of tension, friction or direct conflict, depending on where you are in the Arab world.

It is true, of course, that due to the Arab Spring people have become more influential than at any other time before, and that Arab leaders are no longer ruling supreme, as they have done for the most part since independence. Already if not calling the shots entirely, the people are at least influencing events dramatically.

But this is not what one ultimately wants. Continued confrontation between peoples and regimes is not in the interest of the Arab countries. Furthermore, and unlike what it may seem to some, changing Arab leaders will not solve the problem. Nor will the problem be solved by handing the power to the people.

What is required at this point in time is to introduce laws, bylaws, structures and mechanisms that allow people to effectively have a say through able, representatives and viable, sustainable channels and institutions.

Tahrir Square, or any other square or corner in any Arab country, could be an initial necessity, but only an initial one. It is a phase that has to come to an end and the phase of democracy building has to begin.

Democracy is not about people doing what they wish to do. It is about the rule of the majority, through carefully elected representatives and through clearcut institutional and legal channels.

This can only happen through a sincere partnership between the governing and the governed. Those who govern in the Arab world have, at this phase, to make sincere, concrete efforts to meet the people half way, listen to them and then rationally, openly and maturely proceed in the direction of building the required structures and mechanisms.

Some Arab regimes are already doing this. Those who do not will not prevail; in fact, they lose. At the same time, the people have to be patient; not to lessen the pressure, but to exercise the wisdom and patience necessary for something material and constructive to begin to happen.

Change cannot happen overnight and the change that we need is one that comes as a result of a thorough understanding of how the future should be mapped, not a hasty change that either collapses soon or backfires.

There is a golden opportunity now in the Arab world for something positive to unfold. If the situation is managed wisely both by the regimes and the people, it will yield something that will make a real, constructive difference in our lives. If it is mismanaged, by either the regime or the people (or both), what unfolds will, God forbid, be worse than what we have already seen.

And no one, I believe, wants that to happen.

This commentary was published in The Jordan Times on 01/07/2011

Exit Strategy For Afghanistan

A programme aimed at providing jobs for the youth by developing the nation's extensive mineral resources would help

By Patrick Seale

America’s exit from its costly 10-year war in Afghanistan has begun. This is a welcome step. But will it be peace with honour? That is far from certain. Much remains unclear about the longer-term outlook.

Two recent developments have changed the picture for the better, if not yet as radically as some would like. First, it has been announced in both Washington and Kabul that talks with the Taliban leadership, or at least contacts of some sort, are underway. German mediators are thought to be playing a role. Secondly, President Barack Obama has announced a fairly bold timetable for American force withdrawals, defying some of his hard-line military advisers who had argued for a more cautious drawdown.

Of the almost 100,000 American soldiers in Afghanistan today, 10,000 are to return home this summer, another 23,000 by September 2012 (in time to have an impact on November’s presidential election) and many of the remaining 67,000 by the end of 2014, when Afghan forces are due to assume responsibility for their country’s security.

The fly in the ointment is that there is talk of some 20,000 American soldiers remaining in Afghanistan at permanent US bases. No doubt the intention is that they will continue to play a counter-terrorist role in both Afghanistan and neighbouring Pakistan. But this could prove seriously counter-productive, as it will arouse bitter opposition in both Iran and Pakistan, and no doubt in Afghanistan as well.

But that is to look too far ahead. The current message from Washington is that US disengagement from the AfPak theatre of war has begun. Driving the withdrawal is America’s patent war-weariness. American politicians of both parties have grasped that the American public is fed up with what has come to seem an unwinnable conflict and wants out. Deficit-ridden America, wrestling with high unemployment and a crumbling infrastructure, can no longer afford the exorbitant cost of the Afghan war. The bill for the last decade has topped $450billion (Dh1.65 trillion), with $120 billion spent last year alone. Expenditure on the war is currently running at $2billion a week!

Obama is well aware that this must stop. But his policies are still plagued by contradictions and plain muddle. The dominant view in Washington is that the Taliban must first be weakened, if not actually defeated, before serious negotiations can succeed. This was the argument behind the ‘surge’ in US troop numbers which Obama agreed to last year. But the Taliban have proven resilient. They may have fallen back here and there in the face of overwhelming US pressure but their hit-and-run attacks and suicide bombings are more frequent and lethal than ever. They have also pushed their tentacles into northern provinces well beyond their Pashtun heartland. Killing their leaders by missile strikes may raise a cheer but it has resulted in more radical commanders taking over, younger men even less inclined to negotiate than their elders. In a word, the policy of ‘kill them first and negotiate afterwards’ has been a failure.

Should Obama have been bolder? The following are some steps he might have taken — and still could.

* Call for an immediate ceasefire to create the right atmosphere for peace talks. Once the guns fall silent, negotiations could be held in Afghanistan itself, or in Turkey or Qatar, countries with a proven record of mediation.

* Summon all Afghanistan neighbours — whether the US likes them or not — to an international conference at which all aspects of the Afghan problem would be discussed and everyone’s interests in the country addressed, so that the outlines of a deal could emerge. The aim would be to get all Afghanistan’s neighbours, near and far, on board.

* Follow up the international conference with a loya jirga — a major tribal gathering attended by all Afghan factions, at which the details of the internationally-backed peace deal could be thrashed out and finalised.

* Encourage President Hamid Karzai to appoint a commission to draft an urgently-needed new Afghan Constitution. The present highly-centralised presidential system does not suit a country of diverse regions and ethnic communities.

* Pledge that all US and allied forces would be withdrawn once the peace deal was implemented.

* Promise to fund a major 10-year aid package, to be disbursed once peace takes hold.

There are several obstacles to such a peace strategy, most of them the result of America’s mistaken policies.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has a frontier of nearly 1,000 km with Afghanistan, over which it keeps a close eye. It needs to guard against raids by Al Qaida and other extremists, stem the inflow of Afghan drugs, and protect communities in Afghanistan to which it is allied, whether for religious or ethnic reasons. Iran is so deeply involved in Afghan affairs that there can be no satisfactory settlement without its help and approval. Yet, rather than engaging with Iran on Afghanistan and other matters, the United States has followed Israel’s lead in seeking to cripple it with sanctions, subverting it wherever possible, and demonising it as a grave danger to American interests and to mankind at large. Only Iran’s hard-line clerics have benefited from this aggressive policy. In the grip of special interest groups, Washington seems incapable of thinking clearly about Iran. Its hopes for a satisfactory outcome in Afghanistan must suffer accordingly.

The US has treated Pakistan shabbily — violating its sovereignty with clandestine operations (like the killing of Osama Bin Laden) and with its numerous drone attacks against militants which inevitably result in civilian deaths. The result has been to arouse fierce hostility to the United States. The country has been gravely destabilised by America’s ‘war on terror’ and has had to confront a ferocious terrorist assault at home largely because it has seemed to be fighting America’s war against its own people.

The US gives Pakistan billions of dollars a year to fight militants and lectures it for its ambivalent attitude towards such militants, refusing to recognise that Pakistan feels it needs the militants to protect itself against Indian encroachment in Afghanistan once the US withdraws. Like Iran, Pakistan is essential to any Afghan settlement. But it will play its part in reaching one only if its interests are understood and addressed.

President Karzai and his ruling group of warlords and corrupt businessmen have been spoiled rotten by the billions of dollars which the US has poured into Afghanistan. The deluge of funds has become addictive. Much of the money has been wasted or has ended up in private pockets. Karzai’s puzzle is how to survive without this bonanza. He seems to hope that renting military bases to the US in the future will keep the money flowing.

A well-directed aid programme aimed at providing jobs for young Afghans by developing the country’s extensive mineral resources would surely be a better way to spend American tax dollars than waging a destructive and increasingly pointless war.

-This commentary was published in The GULF NEWS on 01/06/2011
-Patrick Seale is a British commentator and author of several books on Middle East affairs

For ‘Truth’ In Bahrain

By Ahmed Al-Jarallah

The King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, drew a road map for anyone seeking a way out of the current impasse when he addressed the Council of Ministers recently. With a genuine desire to find the truth, he asked an independent international investigation committee to probe into everything that happened in February and March.

This gigantic and civilized step is not new to the Bahraini monarch. Prior to the eruption of chaos in the Kingdom, he introduced a series of reforms in an attempt to bring everyone, including those who consider themselves the opposition, on board to build a modern nation. However, the opposition became arrogant and went on a rampage to implement its inordinate agenda, thinking it is possible to overthrow the regime that has been ruling the Kingdom for 300 years simply by liaising with Iran. It was an audacious step against a regime which, for 300 years, has been successful in making this beautiful island a safe haven, while ensuring peaceful co-existence between various sectors in the society, in addition to maintaining the nation’s stability and taking development initiatives.

The opposition even went to the extent of distorting facts to deceive the world and realize their evil objectives. They have been spreading lies through the satellite stations that belong to Iran, Hezbollah and some Iraqi organizations affiliated to the Mullah’s regime. They have committed atrocious crimes against the nation, such as killing the innocent and destroying facilities, yet they had the guts to accuse others of their own misdeeds! They have adopted the famous statement of Nazi Information Minister  Joseph Goebbles: “You say it enough and you repeat the lie, repeat the lie, repeat the lie, until eventually people believe it.” These evil people have lied, lied and lied. Nevertheless, their lies backfired on them when the silent Bahrainis cried for help and asked their King to save their properties, children and the nation itself from the devil’s advocates, who promised heaven yet pushed the people towards hell.

The Bahrainis took to the streets, asking for protection. The King responded by stopping the criminal acts of these villains, who rebelled against him even if he treated them with respect. The GCC fully supported the Kingdom; the outcome of which was brutal for the murderers and destroyers, because the implementation of their wicked agendas has been foiled. Despite this, they did not stop from propagating lies.

King Hamad’s announcement on the formation of an independent fact-finding committee, which comprises the best legal practitioners in the world, is a clear indication that he wants to know the truth. In this way, there will be no falsification or deceit for the evil-doers to realize the troubles they have brought upon themselves. The actions of some nations, which have been making false claims, will be exposed soon. The whole world will know who killed who; who burnt who; who is not loyal to Bahrain; who destroyed which building, invaded hospitals and killed innocent Bahrainis. All the facts that they have been trying to conceal through lies, falsification and deceit will be exposed, including those who brainwashed the children into disobedience, closed Bahraini schools, maimed security officers and terrorized women and children.

Bahrain is wide open and transparent for everyone. Those who helped the Kingdom preserve its security know what really happened. The weak-hearted men thought they could take over Bahrain within two to three weeks. They thought they could turn it into an affiliate of the greatest evil, but this will never happen!

-This commentary was published in The Arab Times on 01/07/2011
-Ahmed Al-Jarallah is the editor-in-chief of The Arab Times and of the Kuwaiti Daily Assyassah

Qatar Bets On Life After World Cup

By Jason Benham and Praveen Menon

As Qatar rushes to prepare for the 2022 World Cup, the tiny Gulf Arab state is spending billions to build stadiums, roads, bridges, apartments and hotels on a patch of desert jutting out into the Gulf's waters. Like cities hosting the Olympic Games, which face the risk of being left with unused venues after the athletes and spectators leave, Qatar is betting that it can accelerate its transformation as a financial and tourism destination to absorb the extra capacity.

It will have to compete with the emirate of Dubai, just up the coast, which also created a glittering seaside desert city on the "build-and-they-will-come" model over the past decade - only to see a property and asset bubble crash in 2008 and 2009, leaving it with hundreds of empty buildings. "They have to plan what to with it after the event," said Ziad Makhzoumi, chief financial officer at Dubai builder Arabtec. "They are trying to design what is practical for later.

On the plus side, Dubai is on the mend, albeit slowly, and both destinations are wealthy enough to invest for the long term. Both are also reachable from nearly every major city on earth via long-haul flights, making them a natural global hub for trade, finance and tourism. Goldman Sachs estimates that Qatar, flush with cash, will spend around $65 billion to prepare for the World Cup, when some 500,000 fans will descend on a country of just 1.7 million people, of whom 80 percent are expatriates.

Dozens of cranes line the dusty expanse stretching across Doha's seaside corniche walkway, far fewer than the hundreds that dotted Dubai's skyline at the peak of its construction boom in 2008. Doha now boasts architectural designs rivalling that of its flamboyant neighbour, such as the Al-Bidda Tower - a 215-m-high twisting commercial building. Like Dubai, it is becoming an architect's playground, thanks to clients with deep pockets and bold ambitions who helped build grand edifices in Dubai such as Burj Khalifa, the world's tallest building.

They (Qatar) have to differentiate between building infrastructure useful for a city and building white elephants, as we saw in Dubai," said Majed Azzam, senior real estate analyst at Dubai-based research firm AlembicHC. "At the end of the day the World Cup and the expansion around it is something Qatar is doing for its pride, to put the country on the map. "Definitely there will be excesses.

Arabtec, one of Burj Khalifa's builders, is also one of several Gulf Arab contractors who are looking to snap up contracts ahead of the competition - more than a decade away - as Qatar builds $36 billion rail network, an $11 billion new airport and a $5.5 billion new deep water seaport over the next five years. Billions more will be spent on 12 air-conditioned football stadiums, boosting the need for additional power capacity in a country where temperatures can soar above 50 degrees Celsius in the summer, when the World Cup is usually held.

Qatar's expenditure on public projects has more than tripled over the last five years to 58 billion riyals ($16 billion) which the OPEC member plans to spend in the current business year from April. Another Dubai-based construction firm, Al Habtoor Leighton, an affiliate of Australia's Leighton Holdings, may pitch for tenders on tunnelling, track work and stations for the $35 billion railway and metro project. The rail network will be one of the first in the region. Hoping to connect their urban centres more efficiently, an ambitious billion-dollar rail system is now being planned to connect the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries - Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Qatar is likely to try to claim a share of the millions of tourists flocking to neighbouring Dubai, which markets itself as a tourist heaven in the region and has attracted over 1.8 million visitors in just the first quarter of this year. Qatar had 9,574 rooms available at the end of 2010 and the number of hotels is expected to increase ten-fold over the next decade, leading to likely hotel oversupply, according to Shakeel Sarwar, head of asset management at Securities & Investment Co in Bahrain. "Based on the discussion we had with some real estate companies, a portion of hotel supply would be designed in such a way that they can be used later as serviced apartments once the event is finished," he said.

The completion of a $3 billion, 40 km causeway linking Qatar to Bahrain ahead of the World Cup would also make it easier to commute between Manama and Doha, enabling tourists to use facilities

in Bahrain, he added. The Gulf state is also planning to use a cruise ship as accommodation for the event. "The government agencies, property developers and the entire business sector is aware that the tournament is an investment," said Ali bin Abdulatif Al-Misnad, treasurer at the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Another potential opportunity is to turn Doha into a meeting and conference hub, an ambition also held by Dubai. Qatar Tourism Authority is focusing on promoting Qatar as a destination for meetings, conventions and exhibitions in the Gulf Arab region and last year launched its "48 Hours in Qatar" campaign to encourage visitors to extend their stays.

Looking to capture the rush of top executives and corporates expected to travel to Doha ahead of the World Cup, St Regis Doha is planning a luxury hotel with 336 rooms that boast a personal butler service for each guest. "We are not just looking at the month of the tournament," said Tareq Derbas, general manager of St Regis Doha. "What is more important is what comes before and after the World Cup. We will definitely be busy before ... hopefully we will be busy after it too." – Reuters

This article was published in The Kuwait Times on 30/06/2011

Egypt: Between Al-Gamal’s Slip Of The Tongue And The Marshal’s Warning

By Zuheir Kseibati

The bloody clashes that took place on Tahrir Square and in Balloon Theater in Cairo and turned the night of the Egyptian capital into a volcano of anger - which caused the wounding of around 600 people within hours - were not a new test for the ability of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to protect the January 25 revolution. Moreover, some in Egypt are not hesitating to recognize that what happened on the square and in the theater was a mere sample of the magma of hatred and spite which exited the crater of oppression and injustice following decades of silence.

During Hosni Mubarak’s days, the opposition was blamed for its decay and weakness. Today, it is blamed as the ally of the victor, for being preoccupied with the settlement of partisan scores without paying any attention to the priority of protecting the revolution. This protection will certainly not be achieved by allowing the remaining “thugs” of the former regime to hide behind the disgruntled over the “slowness” of reform and the reluctance to stage quick trials for the symbols of this regime, but also behind those angry with the police which has started to tremble before them and flee Tahrir Square and Balloon Theater. In the meantime, the scene of the incidents is besieging the army with pressures, at the head of which is Commander of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi.

Yesterday at dawn, the fire of anger was burning the properties of the state and the citizens, at a time when an American citizen donated $100,000 for the protection of “Egyptian cultural heritage.” For its part, the Council responded to the incident witnessed at the theater - which was attacked during a celebration in honor of the families of the martyrs of the revolution - by accusing once again that “organized plan to create division between the revolutionaries and the security establishment.”

It is thus the “conspiracy,” only a few days after what was described as being “Al-Gamal’s slip of the tongue” - when Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Yahya al-Gamal accused Israel and America of weaving the strings of conspiracy to trigger sectarian tensions and clashes between the Muslims and Copts in Egypt. Was it a mere slip of the tongue or an attempt to flee forward to resist the “conspiracy” by seeking those provoking it?

Six hundred people were wounded during the hours of anger! However, this did not prevent the Field Marshal from encouraging the non-postponement of the “summit” match between Al-Zamalek and Al-Ahly, because the people did not wish to see it toppled. As for the Marshal himself, he was not spared from the slogans on the square, following the accusations made to the Military Council of having allied with the Muslim Brotherhood group to pave the way before its victory in the parliamentary elections.

A few days prior to crowded demonstrations – almost including a million people – on July 8 to condemn the delay affecting the trials and the reform, and a few days prior to the commemoration of the July 23 revolution, the police was not the only one besieged by rage. Indeed, this was also the case of the Military Council which is believed to be mixing caution with slow steps to please the street without leading Egypt toward chaos. Some of those who are distant from the mind of “rage” summarize the scene of the revolution based on a three-faceted equation:

 - A government besieged with multiple “blackmail” attempts amid mounting political polarization.

- An inability to answer the question: Who can achieve the security of the state? At a time when the police is terrified of retaliation after it remained – for dozens of years – the primary guarantor for the silence on the street.

- An unrestrained media freedom used to escalate the campaigns against the government of the revolution and “open the retaliatory appetite” of the citizens.

 And in light of the existing poverty - for the handling of which no revolution has a magic wand - retaliation is quickly turning into a collective wish to carry out sabotage and destruction. At the level of the snake of corruption, it has become clear that the severance of its head did not restore the wasted billions to the Egyptian Treasury, and will neither build factories nor provide job opportunities to the millions of poor.

All Egyptians know that those benefitting from corruption are armies that keep changing their flags. However, what is realized by only a few is that the revolution of the poor and the youth cannot survive on the mere production of slogans on the square.

The January 25 revolution is now facing the predicament of cleansing reform from retaliation, whose shapes are varying between “class,” political and sectarian reprisal. If this situation were to escalate, it would lead all the sides toward the “conspiracy” of collective suicide.

This suicide would definitely destroy all that is Egypt with the eradication and elimination of all that existed prior to January 25, 2011.

This is not a call to write off the history of the people’s discounting, but what happened on Tahrir Square in Balloon Theater cannot be explained by the “conspiracy” theory and will not be a convincing pretext for the hastening of the “cleansing” through retaliatory sanctions.

This commentary was published in al-Hayat on 30/06/2011

The Middle East And The Helmut Kohl Formula

By Amir Taheri

"No one saw it coming!" This is the phrase that I heard most often from officials and analysts during a visit to Washington and New York last week.

What we are told "no one saw coming" is, of course, the series revolts that has shaken the "Arab World" for the past six months.

That Western officials and analysts didn't see it coming is no surprise. They also didn't see it coming when the Soviet Empire collapsed like a pack of cards. What is of concern today is that the Western powers plus Japan, that is to say nations that account for some 60 per cent of the global economy, seem to have no idea of how to respond to changes in the Middle East let alone help shape the new geostrategic architecture of the region.

Under President Barack Obama, the United States is applying the reverse gear, a policy encouraged by neo-isolationists in the opposition Republican Party.

"We are going to focus on nation-building at home," Obama says, hoping to use war-weariness as a key theme of his re-election campaign.

The trouble is that the US and Europe cannot remain mere spectators of the sea-change in the Middle East.

True, their dependence on the region's oil is no longer as acute as in the last century. And the end of the Cold War has robbed the Middle East of its geostrategic value. As for fear of "terror-exporting Iran", that bogeyman is not as scary as a decade ago. Isolated and divided, the mullahs are at each other's throats while their nuclear programme, stung by "computer worms", is going nowhere fast. That leaves Al Qaeda, the Arab twin of Khomeinist terror. However, having suffered heavy losses at all levels, and, more importantly, exposed by the Arab revolt as a dangerous irrelevancy, Al Qaeda, too, is no longer capable of keeping Western attention focused on the Middle East.

For six or seven decades, fear of the Soviet Union, the Khomeinist regime and Al Qaeda was one reason for Western attention to the region.

That fear is now either vanished or largely dissipated. The Soviet threat is forgotten while Khomeinism is on a slippery slope that could lead to its ultimate demise. As for Al Qaeda, it is clear that it has no chance of winning power anywhere in the "Arab world".

To be sure, some are trying to find new fears designed to keep Western attention focused on the Middle East. Ultra-right groups foment fear of "mass immigration" and "human trafficking" from North Africa while the ultra-left warns of "endless war" in southern and eastern Mediterranean.

However, it is unlikely that these new fears, based on Schopenhauerian pessimism, would be strong enough to provide the axis for a new strategy.

But what could one suggest as a substitute for fear?

If we follow Tabari the father of Islamic historians, greed could be a good substitute. But if we ask Christian mythology, the best substitute would be hope.

However, neither greed nor hope could do the job.

So, what about "enlightened self-interest"?

I remember the debate over what to do about post-Soviet eastern and central Europe. US President George Bush, the father, and French President Francois Mitterrand saw the newly liberated countries as a potential burden at a time that the US and Europe were experiencing another of their episodic recessions. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, however, saw the whole thing as an opportunity both for German re-unification and for freeing eastern and central Europe from Communism.

Thanks to Kohl's persistence, Europe opened a fast-track to pluralism, the rule of law and economic modernization for the newly-liberated nations. Isn't it remarkable that within a quarter of a century all but four European nations of the former Soviet Empire are members of the European Union? (The four are Belorussia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.)

The European Union adopted a similarly pro-active attitude towards the former Yugoslavia whose breakup came after the bloodiest wars that Europe had seen in 60 years. Two of the six republics of the Yugoslav federation have already been admitted as EU members while another two are in fast-track talks to join.

To be sure we are not suggesting that the EU admit Middle Eastern countries as members. For a set of reasons beyond the scope of this column, that is not in the cards anytime soon, as Turkey's case has shown.

British Foreign Secretary William Hague claims that because none of the Middle Eastern nations has "a collective democratic memory" what happened in central and Eastern Europe cannot happen there.

Hague does not say how one could develop a "memory" of something before experiencing it.

In any case, what does this "collective democratic memory" mean?

When did Hungary or Romania, to cite just two examples, acquire such a memory when, for decades, they were ruled by Fascists then by Communists. Turkey has had a parliamentary system, albeit far from perfect, since the 1920s and Iran had its first parliament in 1906. Before the military seized power in the 1950s, Egypt and Iraq had developed a "collective democratic memory" for three decades.

Translated into plain English, Hague's phrase could mean only one thing: the Arabs are not ready for freedom and prosperity! Translated further, that phrase could mean: the Arabs don't deserve freedom and prosperity!

And that is what every despot has claimed since Hajjaj ibn Yussef.

In 2001, having breakfast with Kohl in Paris, I asked the former Chancellor why he had decided to help fast-track the formerly Communist European countries to partnership with the EU?

"Because I thought they wanted the same things as we do," he said. "They want freedom, security and prosperity, things that all human beings want, things that we could better achieve together."

Kohl made no mention of "collective democratic memory".

Kohl's formula applies to Arabs, as well as Turks and Iranians, as much as it did to eastern and central Europeans. The Western democracies should assume that the peoples of the Middle East want what every human being wants.

-This commentary was published in Asharq al-Awsat on 01/07/2011
-Amir Taheri was born in Ahvaz, southwest Iran, and educated in Tehran, London and Paris. He was Executive Editor-in-Chief of the daily Kayhan in Iran (1972-79). In 1980-84, he was Middle East Editor for the Sunday Times in London. Taheri has published 11 books, some of which have been translated into 20 languages